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OTAN

Allied Command
Transformation



Norfolk, Virginia | USA

ALLIANCE WARFARE DEVELOPMENT

CONFERENCE
2023



REPORT





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INTRODUCTION



2023's Alliance Warfare Development Conference (AWDC) was held in Norfolk, Virginia, 5-7 December 2023. The theme was "Shaping Today to Succeed Tomorrow".

Over 139 attendees participated in the event held at HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, from 52 Allied and 11 Partner nations, including 44 Flag Officers/General Officers and their civilian counterparts. The diverse agenda, structured around the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC) Lines of Delivery, included a number of plenary and syndicate sessions, intended to exploit the wealth of knowledge and experience of the delegates, all of whom were responsible for warfare development activities nationally, within Centers of Excellence or the NATO Command Structure. Partner Nations followed their own separate single day program with some topics integrated with the Allied Nations.

The event commenced with an opening address from Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, General Philippe Lavigne.

He was followed by Director General International Military Staff (DGIMS) Lieutenant General Janusz Adamchak.

The opening plenary was concluded by Chief of Staff Allied Command Transformation, Vice Admiral Guy Robinson, who provided a summary of ACT activity from 2023, drawing together the breadth and scale of what had been achieved. He offered an insight into the ambitions for 2024.

Vice Admiral Robinson also presented the Warfare Development Plan to the Allied nations; the culmination of months of work.

Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, General Chris Badia provided an overview of the linkages and prioritization of key deliverables.



The first morning culminated in a panel comprising SACT, DSACT, DGIMS and COS, providing an opportunity for the gathered audience to pose questions to some of NATO's most senior leaders. The rest of the day was dominated by syndicate sessions, considering four key areas; the future operating environment, cross-domain command, NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) changes and challenges and shared approaches to persistent experimentation.

Day 2, the gathered audience was honored to receive a keynote speech from Sweden's Minister of Defence, Dr Pål Jonson.

The conference closed with closing remarks by SACT.

READ AHEAD

FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT



The aim of the Future Operating Environment Study 2024 (FOE24) is to anticipate the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. FOE24 provides an assessment of the evolving characteristics of the battlespace, actors, and warfare in the next 20 years.

FOE24, based on the strategic foresight work at HQ SACT and collaborative research with Allies and Partners, will enable SACT to develop, enhance, and promote long-term understanding and awareness of the military implications of the future security environment to anticipate and adapt to emerging threats and optimize resource allocation.

FOE24 serves as a framework for forward-looking capability development to ensure Allied forces remain adaptive, resilient, and effective in the face of future challenges.

SCOPE

FOE24 will provide information for ongoing future-oriented strategic considerations (futures thinking) at NATO Allied Command Transformation. It will expand its research into the military aspects considered in the Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA23) in supporting classified analyses.

FOE24 will also enable the futures thinking of a wide range of customers and partners in the Allied futures' community with up-to-date and robust baseline foresight research. It will support many users, including the warfighting development and concept development community, defence planners and wargamers, to augment and revise existing assumptions and develop new scenarios.

FOE24 development will utilize existing strategic foresight methodology, including horizon scanning, horizontal surveys, trends assessment, scenario development as well as modelling and simulation.

BACKGROUND

In 2022, the Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation (SACT) revived the 2018 Strategic Foresight process, with three objectives:

1. Create a new, biennial foresight cycle, after a six-year hiatus, with a general trends assessment document as a baseline for futures thinking (SFA23).
2. Create a subsequent analysis of the Future Operating Environment of the Alliance (FOE24) to expand and update existing assumptions on the FFAO18 and as set

out in the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC).

3. Enable the transformation of the Alliance's Military Instrument of Power (MIoP) and Warfighting Development efforts by providing a shared futures baseline and initial implications. Establish a foresight community and modernize foresight practices within the Alliance to enhance collaborative foresight research, as well as provide support to Allied and Partner foresight efforts, upon request.

THE FOE24 RESEARCH IS DESIGNED IN LINE WITH SACT TASKING TO PROVIDE:

- An assessment of the evolving characteristics of the Future Operating Environment, in terms of battlespace, actors and warfare, identifying which are enduring and which are emerging.
- An analysis of the trends that will shape the evolving operating environment in the next 20 years.
- A set of plausible scenarios with a more robust assessment of their potential military implications.

This syndicate session provided an opportunity for stakeholders in the Allied warfare development and defence planning community to provide inputs to the key tenets of the evolving operating environment (battlespace, actors and warfare). Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Policy, MGEN Joseph D'costa will lead a discussion to identify your national and organizational views on:

BATTLESPACE:

How will the relevant drivers affect the physical, cognitive and virtual dimension of the Battlespace?

What are the emerging and enduring characteristics of the Battlespace?

ACTORS:

Who will be the decisive actors in the FOE in 2043?

How will the drivers of change affect dominant actors' intent and objectives?

How will the international order in transition shape the future of military alliances?

WARFARE:

What will constitute major shifts in the future character of warfare?

How will adversaries exploit changes and shape, contest and fight?

How should NATO adapt?

How will technology shape the evolution of warfighting?

What are the most likely enduring and emerging characteristics of warfare?

What actions are needed to ensure the capacity and perseverance to fight?



Branch Head Strategic Foresight Gergely Nemeth opened the interactive discussion with the audience asking them some provoking questions on the future battlespace, actors and warfare. The syndicates were eager to respond to these and share some insights. Central themes that were discussed:

COMMERCIALIZATION, MDO AND COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS (C3)

Commercial actors with monetary assets and capabilities are on the rise. Commercial actors will have more info on battlespace, and better, as seen already in the Ukraine. NATO needs to address this. Action from National level is not enough for Alliances' MDO. One nation can orchestrate effects, but interoperability in multinational context is crucial to outpace opponents like China, that control all IoPs. Opponents incorporate commercial actors as well. NATO should work more with partners with a different global perspective like partners in the Indo-pacific.

Can we still fight without commercial actors? There will be moral collisions. Commercial actors serve their own interest. Closer cooperation with especially the

IT industry is necessary to synchronize effects (shared interests) in the cyber domain and kinetic deterrence through C3. For instance, the big tech companies (from US and China) will play a significant role in the Battlespace with dual civil-military assets in the future.

The competition for resources will be a problem set for NATO-nations; control of SLOC's, seabed infrastructure and space is key. The western world is very dependent on seabed cables.

We need to share info between civilian, commercial and military sides as a first step while integrating the domains. Functional needs from industry need to be addressed at Summits and used to establish minimum Long-term acquisition requirements.

In addition, alignment on National government level is needed to create converging effects (MDO). The alignment of the Command and Control of the Military Instrument of Power (MIoP) with others IOPs is essential. All domain capability Development is needed. We have to be clear on how we use "shared space", manoeuvre, control and how we incorporate this in command and control and data interoperability. An effect based approach, embracing technological



opportunities, could be the solution. Nations should be asked to deliver an effect, “rewrite” cap codes in effects, including cyber and space effects.

We need C3 interoperability with nations and partners and for MDO Federated Mission Networking (FMN) is the way ahead, but the speed of implementation today is too slow! Information management is another critical condition for future C3. C2 interoperability is key to guarantee conditions for future MDO, but National decision-making and force organization varies from Nation to Nation.

Relationships need to be built and in place through governments to discuss how to move all capabilities and prepare/defend societies against opponents. The political level needs to think about changes in the Rules Based International Order and use of military power. What if opponents use other IoPs, as they are doing right now? What is the effect of the other IoPs on the generation, mobilization and pivot of fighting power? This topic should be discussed between political and military level.

CYBER SPACE AND COGNITIVE WARFARE

In order to anticipate future wars, we have to identify the threats, especially in the cognitive dimension. The activities in the cyberspace that are affecting the virtual and cognitive dimension are a problem set that we need to incorporate. How to counter hackers, hacking, cyber targeting, vulnerability of targets etc. Detection, attribution and response is becoming more difficult. Warfare will be targeted on the human brain, on social engineering and decision-making. There will be a rally to the flag in cognitive manoeuvre and in the virtual domain, through hard and soft targeting (narratives).

For instance a narrative can be impacting risk taking culture; like preserving own troops and personnel from violence and using expendable (machine) systems to increase lethality on opponents. Perseverance and the will to fight is a political and societal issue but military resilience (recruitment, retainment, Armed Forces support) will be targeted by opponents. We need to be proactive, create narratives and be the first. Speed in narrative important!



The challenge is how to fight in a Whole of Society war, reaching the cognitive dimension (minds) being in charge of the MIOp only. There is no hard boundary between war-peace in the continuum of conflict. Effects need to be created in the shaping phase, as well as in large-scale combat campaigns. The ability to apply violence and maintain readiness is a major deterrent. Global demographic shifts will challenge the ability to generate fighting power and mass.

TECHNOLOGICAL IMPACTS IN WARFIGHTING

Future battlespace will be shaped by trends in Emerging Disruptive Technology (AI, quantum computing, autonomous sensor/shooters etc) increasing the speed of (military) operations. Cycles of speed and decisions between autonomous systems and manned systems will vary and strategic compression will put more pressure on this.

There will be an increasing dependence on technology with the rise of data-driven operations. Quantum technology will have impact on computing, communications, navigation, crypto, sensing, seeing through walls and structures, but it will be contested, and create new competition. In terms of EDT's we should bear in mind the impact of biotechnology.

Personal, medical data has been shaped (use tailored viruses could be weapon) to military targets (commanders, pilots etc).

We should focus on troops rather than hardware, we have to rely on soldiers' training combat skills and share information at all levels. Moreover, we will fight battles on Alliance soil. We need to be interoperable with civilian side, in infrastructure, processes and structure.

How will technology change warfighting? We today still see large formations (Ukraine looks like Verdun in some ways), so speed of change varies. We need to increase speed with technology, train soldiers how to use it, integrate it, but be robust as well without technology, when the environment is interdicted. Technology will not enable us to reach our objectives unless we take charge of it. All activities in the battlespace can potentially become visible, so we need find ways to operate more effectively with technology. Ethical, legal and moral regulations of AI in the West can constrain use of new technological capabilities in warfare and "peacetime".



FUTURE WARFARE

We need to share data and clarity on what has to be done in near peer combat. There are two extremes; there is a dynamic battlespace with only effectors, where you act on the move. Or we / they control critical elements and focus on extreme planning constraints. We will be tied and constraint, we will want to predefine this warfare and shape conditions as much as possible. In order to be swift and agile we need to make sure conditions for warfare have been shaped timely and constraints and restraints are as limited as possible, allowing for freedom of activity and movement. We need to think about how is technology is shaping competition in relation to NATO's core tasks.

A focus on targeting the network of the adversary, using technology to deny the opponent the use of his capabilities is the way ahead. We also need to discuss and re-establish our Level of Ambition in the PG27 and stand united.

READ AHEAD

CROSS-DOMAIN COMMAND



“ SINCE ANY TECHNOLOGY IS BY DEFINITION SUBJECT TO LIMITATIONS, HISTORICAL ADVANCES IN COMMAND HAVE OFTEN RESULTED LESS FROM ANY TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY THAT ONE SIDE HAD OVER THE OTHER THAN FROM THE ABILITY TO RECOGNIZE THOSE LIMITATIONS AND TO DISCOVER WAYS – IMPROVEMENTS IN TRAINING, DOCTRINE, AND ORGANIZATION – OF GOING AROUND THEM.

-MARTIN VAN CREVALD

THE WHY

Future military commanders will operate in a complex and contested environment. Rapidly responding to changing conditions and the ability to command across the five operational domains, in all operating environments and dimensions, will be critical in order to outperform future adversaries. Against this backdrop, traditional methods of command will no longer be sufficient to win future multi-domain conflicts.

DRAFT CROSS-DOMAIN COMMAND CONCEPT PROBLEM STATEMENT

Current methods of command and control do not fully support efforts to become a Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) enabled Alliance, including the ability to plan, execute, and assess

activities across all operational domains. There is a lack of cross-domain integration, survivability, and agility to operate in complex, dynamic, and contested environments, at scale and speed, and in collaboration with other instruments of power, partners and stakeholders.

THE WHAT

To support the transition to a MDO-enabled Alliance with capabilities to deter and defeat adversaries across all five operational domains, in an orchestrated and synchronized manner, the Military Instrument of Power must evolve beyond the current commander-centric Joint Operations approach. NATO must review, re-think and, as necessary, adapt and advance current approaches to Command and Control in order to execute Multi-Domain Operations in the future. We must innovate concepts

and doctrine, and consider advancements in technology, training, and leader development. We require extended use of mission command and new approaches, such as empowered cross-domain and multi-functional teams operating and collaborating based on a shared understanding of commander's intent.

NATO VISION FOR CROSS-DOMAIN COMMAND (WORKING DRAFT)

The Alliance's approach to Cross-Domain Command will provide an agile framework of command principles, command culture (elements), and command functions to address complex, dynamic, and contested conditions better and faster than that of our adversaries. This will allow for a shift from a traditional way of command and control to an approach that emphasizes extended use of mission command and orchestration of activities across domains and at all levels to achieve converging effects.

Moving towards a Cross-Domain Command approach will require a fundamental change of mindset and organizational culture.

Referencing the Alliance Concept for MDO, a future MDO commander would need to master the art of orchestrating and synchronizing effects, thus broadening the scope of the traditional "art of command".

However, what is orchestration? What does it mean? What is its scope? How do we do it? This is an area of MDO that the Cross-Domain Command Concept (CDCC) must dive deeper into to ensure commanders have the tools and knowledge available to lead in increasingly complex environments.

NATO DEFINITION OF "ORCHESTRATION" (WORKING DRAFT)

Orchestration is the arrangement and coordination of military activities across domains (and affecting all levels) that align with the commanders' intent to achieve converging effects in support of military objectives. Orchestration requires creativity and agility in planning and coordination, continuous development of shared understanding, and the

ability to adapt to changing circumstances.

Technology is rapidly improving Alliance capabilities. By 2040, strategic, operational, and tactical levels of command will be connected via a common mission network. Tactical units will be connected via a "5G-like" command network. Artificial intelligence, assisted decision-making tools, advanced data analytics, and autonomous capabilities will be integrated into command networks and structures. These new technological capabilities will provide new opportunities and challenges. The CDCC explores how we can best take advantage of these technologies to improve the way we command and thereby give warfighters the greatest advantage.

THE HOW: EXPLORATION QUESTIONS

Extensive research and analysis has been conducted, resulting in a distillation into a set of high-level considerations as a basis for further development of the CDCC – some of which could potentially be considered principles or elements of future command.

During the syndicate, Deputy Chief of Staff for Capability Development, LGEN David Julazadeh led the discussion on these three key areas:

- CDCC Problem Statement, CDCC Vision, and the definition of Orchestration
- Key elements of CDCC (candidate principles): Share, Empower, Collaborate
- High-level considerations: Command Approach, Organizational Structures, Survivability



Cross-Domain Command Concept (CDCC) is intended to establish the basis for strengthening the Military Instrument of Power (MIOp) through revising and as necessary advancing current conceptual approaches to Command and Control in a multi-domain perspective.


Lt Gen Julazadeh provided the introductory remarks and set the stage for discussion through strategic context and the purpose of the CDCC. LTC Larsen then provided an overview of the CDCC, and the major elements of the CDCC, which is comprised of a draft problem statement, a vision, CDCC principles, a definition of orchestration, and 12 high-level considerations for Cross-Domain Command in the 2040 timeframe. The AWDC participants then had an opportunity to discuss and provide feedback and ask challenging questions to the CDCC team. After feedback and questions, Lt Gen Julazadeh concluded each session with an open invite to continue collaboration and participation in the CDCC.

KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM SYNDICATE:

- » ACT work on the CDCC appears to be on the right track and capture relevant ideas.
- » The CDCC is on an appropriate timeline for the nations.
- » DCOS CD observed that the CDCC should be continuously revised (perhaps every 5 to 7 years), due to the imperfect view of the future at any given time.
- » The CDCC team received specific and actionable feedback on all of the major elements of the CDCC. Specifically, the problem statement was updated to reflect the uniqueness of “constant technological change.”
- » According to feedback, command should be adaptive, survivable, resilient, all-domain, agile, and fast.

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READ AHEAD

NATO DEFENCE PLANNING PROCESS - CHANGES AND CHALLENGES

The NDPP as a five step, four year process identifies and apportion the pool of forces and capabilities that our Alliance needs to succeed. It is NATO's primary tool to influence Allies to develop and deliver forces with the required capabilities and readiness to ensure that the Alliance successfully achieves its Level of Ambition (LoA). The NDPP is expected to facilitate the harmonization of national defence planning from the short term, through the medium term, and out to the long term. While it must continue to assist and inform force generation in the short term, it should be focused primarily on harmonizing the development of the capabilities necessary to safeguard the freedom and security of all of NATO's members in the medium and long term.

The process provides the framework within which 31 national defence plans and the Alliance defence planning activities may be harmonized to meet agreed targets and enable Allies to provide NATO-required forces and capabilities in the most effective way. The process is underpinned by the political principles of fair burden-sharing and reasonable challenge.

The NDPP is a threat/risk informed, capability-based approach that is in constant motion. The current (4th) cycle of the process is well underway. Allies agreed on the Political Guidance for Defence Planning (PG23) in February 2023 as part of Step 1. Subsequently, the determination of the requirements (Step 2) started and is currently in its final stages resulting in NATO's Minimum Capability Requirements (MCR) delivery in early 2024. This will be followed by NDPP Step 3 – apportionment of the requirements and the setting of targets to Allies. Simultaneously, ACT is supporting IS DPP in the conduct of the Step 5 assessment. This biannual effort gives an update on where the Alliance stands in terms of defence planning and informs the next Step 3.

The success of the Alliance depends not only on our ability to transform and modernize capabilities to deter, defend and, if necessary, defeat future threats,

but also on a strategic understanding of the global security environment. The NDPP exists to support that as a tested, trusted and inherently collaborative process to focus Alliance Capability Development and to address future threats, in order to deliver the requisite capabilities to enable the Alliance's three core tasks: deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.

CHANGES

Russia's war of aggression on Ukraine prompted decisions by Defence Ministers that bring significant change to this cycle of the NDPP. The Nations changed the level of ambition and directed military authorities to better incorporate new operation plans into defence planning to prepare for a new era of collective defence.

Level of Ambition: The LoA provides the parameters for the development of forces for each NDPP cycle. Key changes in 2023 are an increased focus on collective defence, more demanding levels of readiness, responsiveness and interoperability. Of rising importance are in-place forces and regional forces. These substantial changes reflect the development of the current security environment, but also represent an important and necessary driver for transformation.

New Operational Plans: The MCR in Step 2 of the NDPP identifies the complete set of requirements for capabilities considered necessary to meet the ambitions set out in the PG. In this cycle, the scaling of the MCR is driven by and expected to meet the requirements of forces and capabilities detailed in the operational plans.

Step 2 of the NDPP: SACT is responsible for delivering an ambitious, yet realistic, sustainable and credible MCR during Step 2 of the NDPP. In this cycle, it is clear that the combination of a demanding LoA, a wide range of developing concepts and the requirement to align Operational and Defence Planning have added a high level of complexity to this NDPP cycle.

CHALLENGES

Balance: Refocusing on Collective Defence by incorporating the operational plans into NDPP strives to make the forces and capabilities available to the Alliance to meet its objectives in the short term with improvements in readiness, responsiveness, adaptation, mobility and interoperability. This needs to be balanced against the systematic approach to the development of capabilities needed to meet the strategic objectives of the Alliance in an uncertain future security environment, the medium term (7-19 years), maintaining sufficient sustainability and flexibility for the challenges of the future. This also includes the analysis of rapid technological change and transformation. The Alliance must meet the dual challenge of preparing for the fight of today and the fight of tomorrow.

Customer orientated: Acknowledging the Nations as the “customers”, ACT aims for a balanced approach to ensure that each Ally’s capacity to evolve rapidly and fully is taken into account, by respecting the contingencies of individual current planning commitments and preserving the coherence of national capability development.

Military Workforce: Capability development is important, but those capabilities need to be manned. The trend of declining recruitment in many NATO Nations will foreseeably make it even more difficult to maintain manned formations and capabilities with high quality personnel. Some of the many reasons are an increasingly competitive job market, slow military recruitment procedures or challenging self-imposed requirements and standards. In addition, based on the technological advancements, the skillset needed to operate today’s military systems demands an increasing level of knowledge, proficiency and education. These demands very often are not appealing or cannot be met by young adults, based on a lack of information, personal qualification, current deployment rates and salary (especially for highly qualified personnel in the cyber and space domains). Comprehensive plans within Nations are needed to solve personnel shortfalls.

Transformation: The NDPP supports the NATO agreed approach to a continuous process of modernization and continuous transformation through successive cycles, providing a context for future capability development in support of the continued transformation of the Alliance. Against the necessities to provide capabilities for current operational requirements, we need to ensure that new, future orientated capabilities in the context of Multi-Domain Operations, Cyber, Space and Digital Transformation are reflected and incorporated within the NDPP.

This Syndicate will aim to stimulate the conversation and exchange of opinions, perspectives and views.

- How do you balance operational needs of today against preparations for the future fight?
- Is the NDPP flexible enough?
- How much is NDPP a driver for transformation from your perspective?
- What challenges are you facing in transformation?
- Contextualized by SC2022, what is shaping your thoughts on the drivers for force development?
- How do Nations intend to secure their workforce of today and tomorrow?
- Is the increasing demand signal from NDPP improving your engagements with the Defence industry?



The read-ahead and introductory brief for this syndicate session (re)familiarized the audience with the NATO defence Planning Process and introduced the specific changes and challenges for the current cycle, which is branded a ‘transitional’ cycle for its major shift in Political Guidance’s Level of Ambition and the incorporation of operational plans within Defence Planning. After this introduction, each of the four syndicates had a discussion with the panel on the changes and challenges that come with this transitional NDPP cycle.

Familiarization:

The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) is a four-year, five-step cycle owned by the Allies and supported by the military authorities to develop the required military capabilities in a 7 to 19 years’ timeframe.

- » Step 1: Establish Political Guidance
- » Step 2: Determine requirements
- » Step 3: Apportion requirements and Set Targets
- » Step 4: Facilitate implementation
- » Step 5: Review results

CHANGES:

- a. Revised Level of Ambition with a focus on Article 5 operations, while non Article 5 operations, NATO permanent tasks and Transformation remains.
- b. Operational plans are now part of the Minimum Capability Requirement 2024 (MCR24).
- c. Methodology for Step 2 changed to accommodate these changes.



CHALLENGES:

- a. Balancing today's and tomorrow's requirements
 - » Operations Planning is short term based on current threat, taking into account current available forces, and their readiness and interoperability.
 - » Defence Planning is mid to long term tailored to future security challenges, taking into account the state of technology and transformation of the Military Instrument of Power.
- b. Provision of required Military Workforce
- c. Transformation remains customer oriented
 - » The Defence Planning approach is to be ambitious, realistic, reasonable, sustainable and sequenced.
 - » NATO Nations are considered for their capacities, existing Plans, contingency, coherence and existing commitments.

THE KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM THE FOUR PANEL DISCUSSIONS WERE:

NDPP is fit for purpose:

- » The process offers a certain degree of flexibility to the Nations which are able to provide D&G through the Political Guidance every 4 years and to retain political control throughout the cycle;
- » From the Nations' perspective, there is a requirement for continuity between the Defence Planning cycles;
- » Operations Planning and Defence Planning are complementary in nature and have to inform each other reciprocally (not a one-way approach).

Multi Domain Operations concept and Future Force study will boost transformation in Defence Planning:

- » These studies will set up a long term direction of travel;
- » NATO Concepts and doctrines have to be adjusted/developed at a faster pace to support this effort.

READ AHEAD

SHARED APPROACHES TO PERSISTENT EXPERIMENTATION (TALOS)



Wargaming has proven to be a useful experimentation tool, more suited to conceptual experimentation but there is a need to expand the experimentation programme to a horizon of at least 5 years, thus allowing more efficient planning and coordination activity within the Alliance.

NATO exercises are mainly computer-assisted evaluation events that are not optimized for industry involvement. There are financial and legal impediments in linking industry to warfighters in a non-procurement experimentation environment, thus there is an increasing number of tests and experiments going on in Allied Nations despite the fact that there is no common sharing point/platform for programming, coordinating, and prioritizing experimentations in NATO / National venues.

HQ SACT is leading the development of TALOS - project name for SACT's priority to ensure enduring and persistent experimentation and wargaming in NATO.

Key elements of TALOS are:

- It is intended to support a revised legal framework for private sector and industry involvement in NATO experimentation and wargaming.
- It is intended to adopt an improved funding model for private sector and industry involvement in NATO experimentation and wargaming.
- It will develop / adjust Bi-SC procedures / directives and a Battle Rhythm for coordination of NATO experimentation and wargaming.

- It will provide a data-sharing platform for:
 - » The Planning, Scheduling and Synchronization / Prioritization of all Wargame and Experimentation activities across the Alliance on a long term rolling 5-year plan, providing long term visibility, coherence and de-confliction;
 - » Experimentation Activity Management: facilitating experimentation and evaluation design and management;
 - » Experimentation Analysis & Reporting: facilitating evaluation and data collection at Point of Need (mobile) and exploitation across strategic, operational, and tactical experiments.

In this syndicate session, Deputy Chief of Staff for Joint Force Development, RADM Placido Torressi will lead discussion with attendees to identify:

- Does your nation support this initiative?
- How much experimentation and wargaming does your nation / organization does?
- Would your nation / organization be willing to share your data from your experimentations and wargame?
- How can we best ensure a common picture and standards, as well as active participation of relevant stakeholders?
- How can we fruitfully engage the private sector?
- What can ACT do better to help/support Nations with their experimentation and wargaming activities?

READ AHEAD

PARTNER NATIONS: THE OUT-PARTNERING
FUNCTION

“ OUR SHARED PURPOSE AFTER THE MADRID SUMMIT IS TO ENHANCE OUR PARTNERSHIPS SO THAT THEY CONTINUE TO MEET THE INTERESTS OF BOTH ALLIES AND PARTNERS. OUR AMBITION IS TO CONTINUE TO MAKE NATO PARTNERSHIPS AN EVER MORE INTERESTING AND ATTRACTIVE PREPOSITION.

-AMBASSADOR MIRCEA GEONA, NATO DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL
GENEVA 12 JULY 2022

The NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept (NWCC) offers a vision in support of maintaining and further developing NATO's decisive military advantage, and continuously adapting the Military Instrument of Power (MIoP) through to 2040. In the future, the military instrument of power should aspire to out-think, out-excel, out-fight, out-pace, out-partner, and out-last any potential adversary.

Recognizing the importance of partnerships at the military level, the out-partnering function underlines their potential future role in the Alliance's MIoP adaptation. It envisions making full use of partnerships to stay ahead of potential adversaries. The out-partnering function seeks to outline the characteristics needed for NATO to remain the partner of choice in the future.

NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept reaffirmed the importance of partnerships, noting that working together with partners is essential and contributes to NATO's three core tasks. However, current approaches to partnerships remains largely reactive. This means that NATO and partners react to geopolitical developments and events, rather than aiming to proactively shape that environment.

Therefore, guided by the partnership framework set out in the 2022 Strategic Concept, Allied Command Transformation is currently exploring what an out-partnering function would look like in the future and how to translate its findings into concrete recommendations. This function is intended to inform the future development of NATO's partnerships at the military level and not be a new stand-alone policy. As a first step, the out-partnering function seeks to understand better in order to identify the common strategic objectives, risks and opportunities for NATO and partners in the long term. Additionally, the out-partnering function aims for a more active approach to partnerships, by considering NATO's and partners' motivations and interests and tries to assess how NATO and partners can work together in the future to proactively shape, contest and, if necessary, fight.

This session will aim to inform and exchange ideas regarding the out-partnering function. This discussions will be guided by the following questions:

- How do you interpret the principle of “mutually beneficial partnerships”?
- What do you believe is the biggest challenge when partnering with NATO?
- What role do you see for the partnership with NATO in the long-term?
- Which mutual strategic objectives will remain? Which will change in the future?
- What are the biggest future risks and threats impacting our partnerships?
- How do we need to adapt our partnerships today to be able to counter these trends tomorrow?
- What should be the role of partners in shaping, contesting and fighting environments?

After the Opening Plenary the Partner nations conducted a deep-dive into the Out-Partnering concept with Deputy Chief of Staff Strategic Plans and Policy, Major General Joseph D’costa and Dr. Vlasta Zekulic, Branch head Strategic Issues and Engagements. They considered the importance of partnerships at the military level, and its role in the Alliance’s MIOp adaptation. It envisions making full use of partnerships to stay ahead of potential adversaries. The out-partnering function seeks to outline the characteristics needed for NATO to remain the partner of choice in the future. Partners from Austria, Ireland, Switzerland and Georgia all provided deep and insightful views on how NATO can improve its out-partnering function. They reflect on importance of interoperability, quality vs. quantity of partnership activities, divergence and importance of recognizing both the mutual values and interests.

In the afternoon Partners attended the Inform: Future Operating Environment (FOE) syndicate and the Explore: Cross-Domain Command syndicate sessions together with Allied Nations.

To close the day Partners attended a round table discussion with GEN Chris Badia, Deputy SACT.



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