



PARTNERSHIPS 360 SYMPOSIUM

2022 REPORT







INTRODUCTION



Following a two-year pause forced by the COVID-19 pandemic, on 11-13 July 2022 NATO finally held in Geneva (Switzerland) its Partnerships 360 Symposium co-chaired by the Political Affairs and Security Policy Division of the International Staff (PASP) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT). The 2022 edition of the Partnerships 360 Symposium took place a little more than a week after the successful NATO Madrid Summit and the launch of a new Strategic Concept. This third in-person edition of the Partnerships 360 Symposium followed the virtual Partnerships 360 Symposium held on 6-7 July 2021.

This new edition of the Symposium brought together 251 participants from 54 Allied and partner nations, as well as the United Nations, the European Union, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), the Geneva Centre for

Security Sector Governance (DCAF), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), NATO military Commands and NATO Centres of Excellence among others.

The social programme of the Symposium started on the evening of 11 July with an icebreaker session hosted by Ambassador Jürg Lauber, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations in Geneva. On the morning of 12 July, the working session of the Symposium was inaugurated jointly by Deputy Secretary General of NATO Ambassador Mircea Geoană, State Secretary of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland Ms Livia Leu, and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation General Christian Badia.



OPENING OF THE SYMPOSIUM



In his pre-recorded intervention, Deputy Secretary General Geoană thanked Switzerland as the first partner country ever to host the Symposium, and described the main highlights of the Madrid Summit and the new Strategic Concept with a particular emphasis on all those aspects directly related to the core task of cooperative security and NATO partnerships. Speaking about the Russian aggression against Ukraine, the Deputy Secretary General spoke about the importance of upholding international humanitarian law, as well as the interconnection between Euro-Atlantic security and the security of countries in other continents - as shown by the current energy and food security crises. He also described the key decisions at the Madrid Summit concerning resilience, innovation, and technology.

Deputy Secretary General Geoană said that Allied Heads of State and Government in Madrid had stressed the importance of human security, the security implications of climate change, and NATO's commitment to advance its

Women, Peace and Security agenda. Finally, he invited participants in the Symposium to reflect on how to make NATO's partnerships network closer, stronger, and more dynamic in an increasingly uncertain and dangerous world.

State Secretary Leu condemned Russia's actions and called for a halt of its military operations in Ukraine and a withdrawal of its troops. She demanded a full investigation of all human rights violations and war crimes reportedly committed in Ukraine and that those responsible be brought to justice, while expressing her hope that a way out of the current crisis be found together with Russia. The State Secretary also mentioned that the concept of security through cooperation, which was prevalent when Switzerland joined Partnership for Peace in 1996 is currently being challenged and agreed that the rules-based international order is under pressure. She invited the NATO partnerships community to lead by example and invest in the international institutions that protect our values.

State Secretary Leu mentioned that "international Geneva" is in itself an important contribution to international peace as the largest United Nations Hub in the world and the host of numerous international organizations. This results in a unique environment conducive to finding solutions for emerging challenges, and she expressed the hope that the Symposium would help deepen and expand the ties between Geneva and NATO. She closed her intervention by calling for increased political dialogue and cooperation between NATO and its partners to increase stability as well as enhance our common security.

In his opening remarks, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation General Chris Badia stressed the strategic contribution that partnerships play for NATO and international security, as emphasised during the Madrid Summit. General Badia mentioned that NATO and its partners are facing distinct challenges and threats from a variety of strategic directions, and that just as NATO has

to adapt to uncertainty and complexity of those challenges and threats, so do NATO's partnerships. For the General, stronger partners also means a stronger Alliance, for partners are essential in supporting NATO's 360-degree approach to security.

General Badia continued by explaining that ACT, as the Alliance Warfare Development Command, is keen to develop close practical relationships across the NATO partnerships Community of Interest. This commitment is enshrined in the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept requirement to "Out-partner". This concept, according to General Badia will be essential if NATO and its partners are to get ahead of the competition and challenges that we face now and the challenges that are yet to come. In addition, General Badia stressed the importance of cyber and space for the Alliance as newly recognised operational domains, and also emphasised NATO-led efforts on innovation and interoperability.







HIGH-LEVEL PANEL ON THE NATO MADRID SUMMIT



Assistant Secretary General Political Affairs and Security Policy Ambassador Bettina Cadenbach chaired a high-level panel on the "NATO Madrid Summit: The new Strategic Concept and other implications for partnerships." Speakers in the panel included Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation General Chris Badia, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Operations Mr Thomas Goffus, former Permanent Representative of Montenegro to NATO Ambassador Dragana Radulovic, and the Director of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and former Secretary General of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Ambassador Thomas Greminger. The discussion that followed the intervention of the speakers in the panel took place under Chatham House Rules.

During his intervention in the panel, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander

Transformation General Chris Badia welcomed the clarity with which the new Strategic Concept and the Madrid Summit had mapped out the way forward for NATO's Supreme Commands. This clarity also applied to the threats that NATO faces, the steps necessary to prepare and successfully meet those threats, as well as the three core tasks. When it came to partnerships, General Badia stressed the importance of harmonisation, standardisation, and interoperability. He also referred to ongoing work on digitalisation and disruptive technologies as key areas to be further developed and which are of interest to partners.

Assistant Secretary General for Operations Goffus said that the new Strategic Concept has acknowledged the reality that Partnerships are critical to all three NATO core tasks. He highlighted the positive record of NATO Capacity

Building activities – as shown in the case of Ukraine – but recognised that the lack of ability to predict the level of resourcing undermines the ability to plan for the longer-term. The use of common funding for Capacity Building should ensure a baseline of consistency and predictability that will help NATO deliver. ASG OPS stressed that the focus will be finding, and then targeting the intersection of partner interests, NATO strategic objectives, and NATO delivery capabilities. This will move NATO from a program-focused approach, to a more geographically- and capability-focused approach that takes into account NATO objectives. This is in essence the Individually Tailored Partnership Program (ITPP) approach.

Ambassador Dragana Radulovic reviewed the main aspects of the new Strategic Concept. She commented that the strong Allied solidarity and cohesion displayed at the Madrid Summit had been key in sending a message of “credible reassurance” to NATO populations. Voices questioning the purpose and value of NATO are getting fewer and weaker by the day, and public opinion has finally accepted the need to invest more and better in Defence. The crisis in Ukraine clearly shows that no crisis is just “conventional”, and that there are always other elements involved such as cyber and hybrid. Importantly, the new Strategic Concept recognises that those elements could actually accumulate into an Article 5 situation. She also welcomed the prominent role of resilience in the new Strategic Concept. Ambassador Radulovic called for the streamlining of NATO's efforts towards each partner and for the development of a tailor-made approach to partnerships which is not just geographical but also topical.

Ambassador Thomas Greminger reminded participants that the GCSP is a Swiss contribution to PfP since 1996 and a NATO Partnership Training and Educational Centre. While NATO's current focus is naturally on deterrence and collective defence, the Alliance's collective defence is even stronger if its partners are both strong and resilient. Ambassador Greminger invited participants to enlarge the understanding of state partnerships to include a whole of society approach. He also called for systematically valuing and using partners working on human security, arms control, and normative initiatives. The Ambassador asked for a reinvigoration of existing platforms or the creation of new ones for managing partnerships. Finally, he praised NATO's adoption of new principles on the responsible use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and explained that the GCSP has recently launched the so-called “Geneva Process on AI Principles”, and is eager to continue working with the Alliance and its partners on this.





NATO 2022 **STRATEGIC CONCEPT**

Adopted by Heads of State and Government
at the NATO Summit in Madrid
29 June 2022



RESILIENCE & PARTNERSHIPS

Through the Strengthened Resilience Commitment agreed at the 2021 Brussels' Summit, Allied Heads of State and Government called for more engagement with our societies and populations, the private and non-governmental sectors, as well as for closer cooperation with our partners and international organisations engaged in resilience and civil preparedness efforts, especially with the EU. Partnerships are essential to the Alliance's efforts to fulfil this commitment. This already complex, fast changing, less stable, less linear and less predictable strategic environment requires a more resilient Alliance, and strong and resilient partners. Both are vital to enhance the security within the Euro Atlantic area and beyond to withstand, absorb and recover from disruption, shock and surprise.

Russia's war against Ukraine and its impact on international security underlines how important strong partnerships, resilient societies and a robust and capable Military Instrument of Power (MIoP) are to deliver deterrence and defence. The ability to "Out-Partner" potential adversaries is one of the cornerstones of NATO's approach to warfare development and is therefore a significant driver of the future operating environment. Resilience is about investment, making choices, trust that goes into lasting and effective partnerships. Resilient partners build regional security, and partners can become resilience providers for the Alliance and help to fulfil and support crisis management, cooperative security and collective defence.

This panel will address how NATO can take forward its ambition for a more strategic, integrated and coordinated approach to strengthening national and collective resilience. It will include how to project forward resilience, the key requirements to have resilient military forces, the impact of climate and energy security on our resilience, and the role of societies and citizens in building national resilience.

- *In what ways should NATO enhance its cooperation with, and support to, its partners to strengthen their resilience?*
- *How does NATO's approach to partnerships affect the overall collective resilience of the Alliance?*
- *What concepts and best practices from partners could NATO draw upon to further advance resilience of Allies and Alliance in general?*
- *Climate change and risks to security of supply (i.e., energy, food) will affect NATO, including through geostrategic shifts that are taking place outside the Euro-Atlantic Area. What are the main strategic shifts we should anticipate? How can NATO and partners cooperate to mitigate them?*
- *Maintaining effective industrial supply chains is critical to ensuring defence production meets the needs of our armed forces. If we are moving from a "just in time" to a "just in case" approach to supply chains and logistics, can NATO influence the process to ensure robust supply of critical equipment? How can partner support and shape efforts of the Alliance? How can we work with the private sector to be a key stakeholder in this effort?*
- *Building societal resilience is paramount in addressing hybrid threats. What are some concrete ways to empower and engage societal stakeholders in strengthening national resilience against such threats?*



Canadian Ambassador to Switzerland Patrick Wittmann chaired an expert panel on Resilience. Ambassador Wittmann kicked off the discussion by highlighting resilience is about civil preparedness and the resistance of our societies to external and internal shocks, our survivability, as well as the health and robustness of our internal structures, institutions and societies. Challenges like climate change, COVID-19, and the Russian war in Ukraine test our resilience, which is why he called for a strategic approach for national and collective resilience.

Dr Valbona Zeneli from the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies emphasized NATO's responsibility in shaping the international security context and creating a comprehensive approach to resilience. Dr Zeneli advocated a "culture of resilience" to achieve effective deterrence and defence. According to her, we need to defend our prosperity, democracy and way of life, both with a national and a collective approach. Therefore, Dr Zeneli focused

on three kinds of resilience: democratic resilience, shared resilience and forward resilience. Additionally, she underscored the importance of the NATO-EU partnership in strengthening resilience.

Dr Elizabeth Chalecki from the University of Nebraska focused on NATO's three core tasks and claimed climate change sits at the foundation of the Alliance's ability to address them effectively. She described the potential dangers for our future if we do not tackle climate change and its security implications like disrupted energy flows, supply chains or a decline of fresh water resources and food production immediately. Solutions include renewable energies, an increase of stability operations as well as climate and energy innovation from Allies, partners and other players. For her, climate change is at the heart of collective security.

Major General Tony Wright, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Plans and Policy at Allied Command



Transformation, explained the military aspects of resilience and laid out that the role of the staff for Strategic Plans and Policy at ACT is to look into the future, execute threat analysis and do forecasts. He recognized that the NATO International Staff has been working on Civilian Resilience for years, but until now, almost no work has been done on the Military Resilience and the critical interconnectedness between these two layers. Through this NATO Defence Planning Process, capabilities are generated to tackle the challenges ahead. He stated resilience touches upon everything he and his team does and that escalation management is central to their work.

Finally, Ms Gergana Vaklinova, Head of Concept Development and Experimentation at the Crisis Management and Disaster Response Centre of Excellence, emphasized three aspects

of resilience. Namely, that resilience is multidisciplinary in substance, collaborative in form and transformative in the outcomes we should be seeking to achieve. Ms Vaklinova highlighted the importance of defending our interconnectedness within the process of resilience. She reiterated the centrality of various forms of resilience, mainly of democratic, societal and collective resilience. According to her, there is no "one size fits all approach" to go about resilience but rather that it is a concept which leaves room for discussion and critical analysis.



BREAKOUT GROUP DISCUSSIONS



Following the opening plenary session, participants broke out into five smaller groups, each led by a Moderator supported by a Rapporteur and Speakers to quick-start the discussion. Each breakout group discussion was informed by the respective "Breakout Session Read Ahead", as well as the respective Tiger team paper. Participants were able to join three different breakout group discussions during the afternoon session. In these groups, participants addressed – again under Chatham House Rules – five different themes:

- i) The Rules Based International Order
- ii) Human Security – Leading by Example
- iii) Capacity Building
- iv) Innovation
- v) Interoperability

The key findings and recommendations from the breakout group discussions were presented to the plenary on the second day of the Symposium during a panel chaired by Assistant Secretary General Ambassador Bettina Cadenbach.





RULES-BASED INTERNATIONAL ORDER

The 2022 Russian aggression against Ukraine exemplifies the negative impact that the resurgence of geopolitical competition has on the rules-based international order. In the new Strategic Concept, NATO Allies have stated their commitment to uphold and shape this order, including by working closely with other countries and organizations. As authoritarian powers become more assertive and try to shift the global balance of power in their favour and undermine our values and interests, the rules-based international order is only likely to come under growing strain in the coming years. A test for which NATO and its partners must be ready.

The current challenge to the rules-based international order has already affected the functioning of key institutions of the international system as we had known them since the end of the Cold War. It has questioned the central principles that regulate the international society, and shocked the fundamental areas of the rules-based international order of great importance to the Alliance and its partners, such as international humanitarian law or the maritime domain. Furthermore, not only are current rules undermined but the risk also extends to the new ones, given systematic attempts to influence the development of new rules and standards inside key international fora. This is particularly clear when it comes to space and cyber.

These challenges will have a direct and increasing impact on our freedom and our shared security. At the same time, they also provide an opportunity for NATO and its partners to work together for their mutual benefit, and in pursuit of a common strategy based on both interests and values. Dialogue, partnerships and cooperation, all support the rules-based international order. In turn, they all benefit from it. Global challenges like maintaining peace in a period of increasing great power rivalry or tackling the security implications of climate change require more cooperation (not less) and a functioning rules-based international order that provides a level of certainty and predictability to all actors.

Our discussion in the Symposium should try to generate new and concrete ideas – as well as refine some already existing ones – and help us articulate an efficient way forward for NATO and its partners to shield the rules-based international order from conscious efforts to destabilise it.

The following framing questions are intended to guide the breakout group discussion:

- *What should be the top priority areas of the NATO partnership community when it comes to the rules-based international order? In which concrete areas can NATO and its partners possibly add the greatest value, and achieve the greatest impact?*
- *How can we best support the implementation of existing rules, including international humanitarian law?*
- *How should NATO and its partners work to influence the development of new rules, norms and standards, particularly in the field of technology and in areas like Artificial Intelligence?*
- *Does the NATO partnerships toolbox have the appropriate instruments to both play a role in upholding the rules-based international order and assisting the development of new rules? What new tools or formats for cooperation can be developed?*
- *How, and with whom, should NATO and its partners work to protect the rules-based international order? What new partners and actors can make a positive difference in this regard?*
- *Can NATO and its partners possibly engage with actors challenging the rules-based international order in a meaningful dialogue given the present context? How could this be done and in which areas?*

Moderator: Ms Nina Soljan, Head of the NATO Affairs and Security Policy Section, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division of NATO

Speakers:

- 1. Ambassador Amanda Gorely, Australian Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Conference on Disarmament in Geneva*
- 2. Mr. Laurent Gisel, Head of the Arms and Conduct of Hostilities Unit at the ICRC*

Rapporteur: Dr iur Philipp Häsler, Deputy Head of the Swiss Mission to NATO

KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The NATO Summit in Madrid and the new Strategic Concept have stressed the importance that the Alliance gives to upholding the Rules Based International Order, which is a key theme also for all international organisations and institutions based in Geneva. As the new Strategic Concept mentions, partnerships are crucial to protect the global commons, enhance our resilience and uphold rules based international order. NATO will continue to strengthen its ties with partners that share the Alliance's values and interest in upholding the rules based international order. The Alliance will also enhance dialogue and cooperation to defend that order, uphold its values and protect the systems, standards and technologies on which they depend. In order to support this approach towards the rules based international order, NATO and its partners should consider:

- a) Continue to work with organisations that shape important elements of the rules based international order such as the UN, the EU, the OSCE, and the ICRC. This could include leveraging through other international organisations such as the Organisation of American States and the African Union.
- b) Consider NATO's role in setting standards, leading by example in the implementation of existing norms, and being a pioneer in the application of norms in new areas, such as Cyber and AI.
- c) Including partners early on in the process of defining standards and shaping norms, which would broaden the legitimacy and reach of NATO policies and standards. This could possibly include the areas of Cyber, Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDTs), and Human Security.
- d) Consider the establishment of thematic groups, inter alia, to channel the work of NATO and its partners in upholding the rules based international order.
- e) Reaching out to partners which are not always like-minded to broaden support for the rules based international order.



HUMAN SECURITY - LEADING BY EXAMPLE

In a changing and volatile security environment, significant threats to security remain, challenging the values that underpins Human Security (HS) such as democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. HS represents a vision of security that “recognizes the inter-linkages between peace, development, and human rights” and that therefore calls for “people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses”.¹ For NATO, the term HS relates to risks and threats to populations where NATO has operations, missions or activities, and how to mitigate and respond to them. NATO’s concept of HS brings together five areas: protection of civilians; children and armed conflict; countering trafficking in human beings; preventing and responding to conflict-related sexual violence; and cultural property protection. Although NATO maintains Women, Peace and Security (WPS) as a separate policy pillar to HS, WPS and HS are seen as intertwined.

HS is identified within NATO as an important sphere for partnership work. It is recognised as an area in which NATO and partners should share standards, best practices, and regional perspectives, and where the Alliance has the potential to ‘Lead-by-Example’. The 2019 Partnerships Symposium in Chania highlighted that the HS agenda needs to be further mainstreamed and operationalized across all NATO’s policies, including partnerships. The 2021 Brussels Summit Communiqué affirms NATO’s intention to continue to work with partners, international organizations, and civil society to further its HS agenda.

Work is actively underway within NATO to set out what HS means to NATO. NATO has also taken some steps to recognise the linkages between WPS and HS, and the intersections between gender, WPS, HS and climate change². NATO’s Action Plan on Climate Change and Security recognizes that the impacts of climate change (famine, floods, loss of land and livelihood) can have a disproportionate impact upon women and girls. It commits NATO to leverage its science and technology programmes and communities to support research on the impact of climate change on security, including gender perspectives in the context of NATO’s WPS policy. In such references, along with those related to impacts upon displacement, migration and human mobility, the Action Plan implicitly links climate change and HS. The report³ of the 2021 Partnerships Symposium suggested that NATO should “fully incorporate climate change in WPS work given its impact on HS”.

Our discussion in the Symposium should try to identify the nexus and synergies between NATO’s policies on HS, WPS and climate change and security. It could as well generate new and concrete ideas on how NATO approaches, actions and partnership cooperation could be more strongly manifested in these areas. The following framing questions intend to guide the breakout group discussion:

- *What should be the top priority areas of the NATO partnership community when it comes to the rules-based international order? In which concrete areas can NATO and its*

partners possibly add the greatest value, and achieve the greatest impact?

- *How can we best support the implementation of existing rules, including international humanitarian law?*
- *How should NATO and its partners work to influence the development of new rules, norms and standards, particularly in the field of technology and in areas like Artificial Intelligence?*
- *Does the NATO partnerships toolbox have the appropriate instruments to both play a role in upholding the rules-based international order and assisting the development of new rules? What new tools or formats for cooperation can be developed?*
- *How, and with whom, should NATO and its partners work to protect the rules-based international order? What new partners and actors can make a positive difference in this regard?*
- *Can NATO and its partners possibly engage with actors challenging the rules-based international order in a meaningful dialogue given the present context? How could this be done and in which areas?*

¹ Common understanding on human security, adopted at UN General Assembly resolution 66/290, 10 Sep. 2012

² For example, conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) and sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), first identified as NATO priorities through work on WPS, are recognized as critical HS issues.

³ AC/340-N(2021)0133 (R)

HUMAN SECURITY - LEADING BY EXAMPLE

*Moderator: Mr Peter Hauge Berg,
Head Human Security Unit, Office
of the NATO Secretary General's
Special Representative for Women,
Peace and Security*

Speakers:

*1. Dr Martin Frick, Director of the
World Food Programme Office in
Germany*

*2. Ms Christine Low, Deputy Head
of the Peace and Human Rights
Division at the Federal Department
of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland*

*Rapporteur: Ambassador Kevin
Conmy, Ireland's Ambassador to
Belgium and to the Liaison Office of
Ireland to the Partnership for Peace*

KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

NATO's new Strategic Concept commits to integrating human security, the Women, Peace and Security agenda and climate change across all NATO core tasks. The breakout session identified these issues as key areas for enhanced cooperation between NATO and partners. NATO and partners recognise the interconnections between climate change, food security, and instability and armed conflict, and between Women, Peace and Security and each of these issues. For example, food insecurity, gender inequality and climate change are risk multipliers for violent conflict; while women's empowerment can catalyse progress toward food security and build stability. NATO and its partners should now:

a) Move forward in implementing the human security, Women, Peace and Security and climate change aspects of the new Strategic Concept, including in NATO missions and operations;

b) Continue to reflect upon how core elements of the concept of human security related to conflict prevention, peaceful resolution of disputes, arms control, disarmament and good security sector governance can be addressed in NATO's approach to human security;

c) Engage in further dialogue and mapping to enhance shared understandings of NATO's roles in relation to human security, women peace and security and climate change as fruitful arenas for NATO engagement on these issues, including with partner countries and as well as international and regional organizations including the EU, the UN, and others;

d) Conduct further analysis with a view to developing guidelines and identifying capacity building needs, so to understand, implement and "lead by example" in the military contribution to climate change, human security and the Women, Peace and Security agenda in missions and operations;

e) Continue to, in cooperation, play a progressive role in implementing norms and setting and promulgating standards in relation to Women, Peace and Security, climate change and human security.





CAPACITY BUILDING

For three decades, NATO has used its Defence Institution and Capacity Building (DICB) infrastructure to foster peace and security by making partners more capable, more secure and better prepared to respond to crisis at home and abroad. By focusing NATO's DICB efforts with partners on defence reform, defence capabilities development, strengthening resilience, and promoting integrity and good governance in the defence and security sector, DICB has made a concrete contribution to enhancing international and Allied security and to sustain conflict prevention and management. However, as global security and technological environment, and NATO's own strategies, continue to evolve addressing the role and the future of NATO's DICB is a clear necessity.

In our discussion at the Symposium, we will seek to examine the possible adaptation of DICB in the context of the transformed strategic environment and seek to address the impact of the NATO Madrid Summit decisions on NATO's DICB. Taking into account the specific challenges to, and opportunities for, NATO's DICB in the transformed strategic context, the breakout group discussion will furthermore try to propose recommendations for policy, strategy, and management changes to NATO's DICB.

The following framing questions intend to guide the breakout group discussion:

- *Given the strategic change, what functional areas should DICB efforts focus on?*
- *What are the areas in which partners need more intensive DICB support? At the same time, what are the functional areas Allies are interested in providing support for?*
- *Do we need to propose specific DICB "specialisations/expertise areas" for interested nations, be it Allies or partners? What could the practical implementation of the concept look like?*
- *What are the impediments for Allies and partners to contribute to DICB efforts? How can potential roadblocks be addressed?*
- *How to ensure continued political buy-in from partners? Which aspects of NATO's DICB provide the most added value for partners?*

*Moderator: Bora Onen, Cell Leader
for Defence Capacity Building,
Operations Division of NATO*

Speakers:

- 1. Ms Victoria Walker, Assistant
Director of DCAF and Head of
the International Security Sector
Advisory Team, DCAF*
- 2. Capt(N) Nicolas Leclerc,
Cooperative Security Division,
International Military Staff, NATO HQ*

*Rapporteur: Ms. Ava Leone, Political
Attaché at the US Delegation to
NATO*

KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Capacity Building remains a key pillar for two of NATO's core tasks in the new Strategic Concept. It also has direct implications for a third. NATO's Capacity Building efforts need to be delivered within a framework of good governance to ensure the best possible results, as well as ensure sustainability and long-term impact. The Alliance, together with interested partners should consider the following:

- a) Further increase the engagement between NATO and partners in the field of Capacity Building.
- b) Consider ways in which NATO can retain the ability to adapt programming and interventions through an iterative, responsive relationship with each interested partner.
- c) Study possible ways to sustain an on the ground presence and mentoring to help Capacity Building efforts to security actors while they

carry out their roles.

- d) Bear in mind that managing expectations is always a key aspect of any Capacity Building exercise.
- e) Evaluate the different factors that will challenge NATO's Capacity Building goals, resources, decision-making processes, and coordination.
- f) Introduce further clarification in NATO's Capacity Building doctrine, which categorises certain types of interventions for specific goals.





INNOVATION

In an environment characterized by complexity, instability and unpredictability, innovation is crucial to ensure that we adequately adapt our Military Instrument of Power, to keep both a competitive advantage and the operational relevance for the final benefits of NATO warfighters and Nations.

The Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), will leverage existing innovation structures, assets and capabilities within NATO and Allies, in order to accelerate interoperable, dual-use emerging and disruptive technological solutions to answer critical Alliance defence and security challenges.

Within Allied Command Transformation, Innovation is the implementation of new and/or different ideas, methods or solutions that achieves value for the Alliance. Innovation permeates all military adaptation, and is about generating, collecting and testing ideas that we can turn into capabilities as quick as possible through Warfare Development. Since 2012, ACT has been using open and directed innovation, with an intent to think big, start small and steadily scale up, with a view to spending a little upstream and early in order to save a lot later through better informing the warfare development.

This session aims to inform attendees on NATO's current innovation activities and explore how to develop them in the coming years. Questions and answers will be an opportunity to clarify the role of NATO in the field of innovation, and the way partners are and can be associated with this journey.

The following framing questions intend to guide the breakout session discussion:

- *How does NATO innovate on the strategic, operational and tactical levels?*
- *What value can DIANA bring to partner nations?*
- *How can we best accelerate procurement of innovation solutions to provide timely support to the warfighters?*

An important scientific innovation rarely makes its way by gradually winning over and converting its opponents; it rarely happens the Saul becomes Paul. What does happen is that its opponents gradually die out and that the growing generation is familiarized with the idea from the beginning.

- Max Planck in *The Philosophy of Physics*(1936)

Moderator: Mr Fabio Rugge, Italian Deputy Permanent Representative to NATO

Speakers:

1. Ms Zoe Stanley-Lockman, Acting Deputy Head of Innovation, Innovation Unit, Emerging Security Challenges Division of NATO

2. Colonel Laurent Jannin, Innovation Branch, Capability Development Directorate, Supreme Allied Command Transformation

Rapporteur: Col Laurent Jannin

KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Concerning Innovation, NATO and its partners generally share a common understanding of the relevance of EDTs in our defence and security environment. They also largely recognise a series of roadblocks to collaborating on innovation in defence and security. From trust to resourcing, and resistance to change. In the aftermath of the Madrid Summit, there is a significant appetite and interest from partner nations to know how to participate in the NATO Innovation Fund and in DIANA. There is also an increased interest in incorporating a "green angle" into NATO's approach to Digital Transformation. In view of these factors, NATO and its partners should think about:

on innovation and EDTs to explore Allies' and partners' interest, enhance dialogue and practical cooperation, exchange best practices, and share information about Allies and partner efforts.

b) Encouraging cooperation with partners on innovation through the ITPP process.

c) Explore formal opportunities for partners and DIANA, the NATO Industry Forum (NIF), and the ACT Innovation Agenda as a matter of priority.

d) Finding ways to leverage the partners' existing activities – such as Science for Peace and Security (SPS) and Science and Technology Organization (STO) panels – to further cooperation with partners in this area.

e) Exchanging best practices on Innovation with technology-oriented partners, the ACT Innovation Hub and Diana.

f) Sharing information about DIANA Challenge Calls with partner nations who have similar Challenges.

g) Exploring the possibility of joint challenges between NATO and partner countries.

h) Including partners in considerations about interoperability of EDTs.

a) Developing a thematic group





INTEROPERABILITY

Interoperability in NATO is described as “the ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve Allied objectives.” It is essential to NATO’s effectiveness in peace, crisis and in conflict. Military cooperation with partners in NATO-led operations benefits both the Alliance in terms of increased military resources, and the partners in terms of enhancing interoperability with NATO. Interoperability among nations enables forces, units and/or systems to operate together, communicate with each other, utilize common procedures, infrastructure and bases, all based on shared common doctrine. Interoperability also reduces duplication of effort, enables pooling of resources and produces synergies among Allies and partners.

With the end of the missions in Afghanistan, the opportunity for NATO and partner nations to work together at the HQ level and in the operational theaters has shrunk. In addition, the Russian aggression against Ukraine has fundamentally changed the Euro-Atlantic security landscape. Even in this complex and continually changing environment NATO needs to develop modern, efficient and interoperable capabilities, but on a much shorter timeline than before. The time to think about interoperability is at the very beginning of the capability development process and capacity building of our partners, so that the solutions are effective, robust, resilient and interoperable from the start.

Interoperability breakout session aims to debate on the following questions:

- *How do we preserve the acquis gained through operational involvement in NATO-led Operations?*
- *How do we implement the Political-Military Framework’s post-crisis exchange of information to assess where and when crises might occur and how they can best be prevented?*
- *How do you assess interoperability shortfalls and deal with them across your military services and partner nations?*
- *How does your nation identify and manage interoperability challenges? How does it assess the impact of these challenges?*
- *Is your nation making best use of existing NATO mechanisms that address interoperability in the capability development process (e.g. CNAD, C3 Board, AVC...)?*

Interoperability of our armed forces is fundamental to our success and an important added value of our Alliance.

- Warsaw Summit Communiqué, 8-9 July 2016

*Moderator: Mr Terry McCoy,
Federated Interoperability Branch,
Supreme Allied Command
Transformation*

Speakers:

*1. Ms Beatrice Lurquin, Plans, Policy
and Partners Branch, NATO HQ*

*2. Lt Commander John Stephenson
(GBR NA). Interoperability Unit
Capability Development Directorate,
Supreme Allied Command
Transformation*

*Rapporteur: Lt. Commander John
Stephenson GBR(NA)*

KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The session leads established that interoperability is central to achieving military objectives, a fact underlined by the strategic direction provided by the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw.

All of the participants in the three interoperability breakout sessions were in agreement on this matter which, when contrasted with the NATO definition of interoperability (the ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve Allied objectives) are synchronous.

Wide ranging Tactical, Operational and Strategic interoperability considerations (concerning people, process and technology) were discussed and these were applicable to Maritime, Land, Air or Joint domains.

The following findings and conclusions were specifically agreed upon by the participants:

a) Encourage interoperability by design from the very beginning of the capability development process as well as procedurally within all aspects of national and NATO training.

b) Ensure that implementation of the latest Alliance agreed technical standards, NATO doctrine and processes is considered as mandatory by Allies and Partners alike.

c) Improve political and cultural behaviour between both Allies and Partners so these two areas are not blockers to interoperability.

d) Improve the releasability processes of NATO documentation relevant to interoperability (technical standards, tactical publications etc).

e) Encourage Partner affiliation and contributions to the Federated Mission Networking (FMN) initiative, which acts as the forcing function to all aspects of interoperability, whether that be people, process or technology.

CLOSING REMARKS



The official programme of the 2022 Geneva Partnerships 360 Symposium concluded with the final remarks by Assistant Secretary General Ambassador Bettina Cadenbach, Ambassador Philippe Brandt, Ambassador to the Kingdom of Belgium and Head of the Mission of Switzerland to NATO, and General Chris Badia, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation.


The speakers underlined the necessary increased focus on innovation and interoperability when it comes to NATO's partnerships, as well as the greater level of ambition in light of the Madrid Agenda. Not only in terms of having more interlocutors around the globe, but also in terms of covering more topics with our partners – including climate change and human security. The overall aspiration for NATO must

remain to further increase practical cooperation and hold an ever more productive and frank political dialogue through more political engagements.

Last, but not least, Ambassador Cadenbach made the formal announcement that Spain will host the 2023 edition of the Partnerships 360 Symposium, at a location still to be determined.



TIGER TEAMS FOOD FOR THOUGHT PAPERS



PARTNERSHIPS, DIALOGUE, AND RULES-BASED INTERNATIONAL ORDER

THE TIGER TEAM PROCESS

In view of the NATO 360 partnerships Symposium 2022 in Geneva, a number of Allies and partners with support of NATO IS and ACT formed five so called Tiger Teams to conduct informal reflections on topics relevant to the evolution of NATO's partnerships.

The Tiger Team on Political Dialogue was led by Germany and Spain, as well as Australia and Switzerland. Greece, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia as well as Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Finland, Mauretania, Serbia, and Ukraine participated. The Tiger Team met six times from November 2021 to May 2022 and exchanged views on partners' role in supporting the Rules Based International Order (RBIO) and on political dialogue.

The Following Food for Thought Paper reflects the discussions in the Tiger Team. It respects the different views of different Allies and partners. It remains an informal document.

PARTNERSHIPS AS A VECTOR FOR THE RBIO

The notion of the RBIO is evolving as there is no established definition. However, it was highlighted that the RBIO is based on key documents such as the Charter of the United Nations and the Helsinki Final Act. In the Tiger Team, it was highlighted that NATO's partnerships themselves contribute to the RBIO, providing platforms for cooperative security as foreseen by said order. In particular, it was highlighted that this includes working with organizations who shape important elements of the

RBIO, such as the UN, the OSCE, the EU, and the ICRC.

The discussion showed that for some partners, joining forces with NATO in coordinating positions in international fora and pointing out potential violations of the RBIO may be an opportunity to implement their own political goals. For others, however, this avenue proves more difficult.

It was stated that for some partners, the founding documents such as the PfP Framework Document and the commitments to key components of RBIO reaffirmed therein can serve as a basis to promote values of the partnership essential to the RBIO, and thus, NATO's. It was also suggested by some Allies that the document could be potentially revised to reflect the nature of the RBIO in the 21st century and, therefore, better serve as a bridge. Through partnerships, NATO and partners can exchange views on topics relevant to the RBIO. In working with partners, NATO can "lead by example," both in cooperation and in specific work areas such as international humanitarian law or human security. In its capacity building with partners, NATO can include the promotion of the RBIO. NATO 2030 provides further guidance. Work on RBIO is relevant for the entire spectrum of partnerships.

WORKING WITH PARTNERS ON UPHOLDING THE RBIO AND ON SETTING NEW LEGAL AND ETHICAL NORMS

Through addressing the challenges to the RBIO, as well as by contributing to the shaping of new standards

and norms, NATO can contribute to upholding and the evolution of the RBIO. In working with partners, NATO can aspire to establish a broader foundation to preserving the RBIO and to shaping new standards and norms in areas that are important to the security of Allies and Partners. Including partners early on in the shaping of new norms is seen as a way to broaden the legitimacy of new norms, and to facilitate partners' willingness to subscribe to such norms.

It was evoked that NATO's policy on WPS was a good example of including a broad group of interested partners in norm setting. In more sensitive topics, such as new technologies (such as artificial intelligence), it was noted that NATO may at the same time include a smaller group of close partners early on, and reach out to a broader group of interested partners at a later stage. It was also highlighted that sometimes, informal processes such as the one leading to the Tallinn Manual on applicable norms in the cyber space are fruitful options to meaningfully cooperate with partners to strengthen the RBIO.

DIALOGUE AS A MEANS TO PROMOTE THE RBIO - AND BEYOND

The Tiger Team has highlighted that dialogue is an important instrument for NATO to promote the RBIO. Beyond that, dialogue is seen an essential aspect of the partnerships in a broader sense. On that basis, the Tiger Team has focused on political dialogue in a wider sense.

As the 2019 Chania Symposium co-chair report (AC/340-N(2019)0162-MULTIREF) reads, political dialogue

and information sharing are indispensable for understanding each other's perspectives, and, therefore, constitute the essential foundations for any practical cooperation. It states that NATO must continue to leverage existing opportunities and seek innovative ways to consult with partners, in particular in the early stages of a decision shaping process, on matters of common interest and/or concern, thereby clarifying its vision, building mutual trust and ensuring joint ownership of any possible future action.



STRATEGIC MENTALITY, EFFICIENCY, AND FLEXIBILITY

From NATO and partners' perspective, the aim of sustained political dialogue is a long-term, stable relation, focused on topics of mutual interest. Strengthening political dialogue demands maximizing all available fora to exchange views. A more strategic vision of political dialogue may be translated into realistic agendas,

results-oriented fields of cooperation, the improvement of mutual situational awareness and strategic anticipation regarding shared threats and challenges. If it is in NATO's interest, a strategic approach to dialogue should also include reaching out to partners/interlocutors with whom it does not share all values.

Efficiency may require to accurately identify the strategic interests of NATO and priorities and expectations from partners in order to achieve that mutual interests between NATO and its partners intersect. It was



noted that dialogue is most efficient when leading towards a common outcome/product. In view of avoiding duplication, dialogue with partners was seen as a possibility to gather views of partners and thus informing discussions among Allies.

The discussion showed that political dialogue needs a flexible approach and the right balance between regional and bilateral approaches, and between thematic and

geographical groupings, between formats limited to close partners in a specific thematic area and open to all interested partners. Inclusion of international Organizations and civil society was encouraged. Maximizing the available tools for exchanges of assessments and information (e.g. regarding emerging security challenges) is seen as a great opportunity to increase mutual awareness and to build support for increased engagement with NATO.

As a general rule, early inclusion (i.e. before decisions are made) and early access to documents and information, based on existing policies and procedures, was highlighted as key to informed and productive dialogue. NATO's policy to find consensus within Allies before reaching out to partners and structuring dialogue with partners as a mere information to Allies was considered by some as an obstacle to fruitful exchanges, leading to decreased interest by both Allies and partners.

Participants emphasized the added value of an exchange in particular in view of specific link to a topic or occasion. From a military perspective, political dialogue feeds into the cooperation on the military level. A stronger focus on objectives and outcomes would therefore be desirable. With a focus on deliverables, smaller formats are oftentimes preferable, whereas more inclusive formats contribute to greater legitimacy.

STRUCTURING DIALOGUE

The discussion showed a desire to better structure dialogue and setting targets for dialogue. Setting common realistic goals is key to



political dialogue and based on these goals a feasible can be elaborated. Furthermore, appropriate means of evaluation allow feedback for increased political dialogue and enhanced practical cooperation, as well as setting up a concrete list of priorities. Using all layers of political and technical interactions is key to strengthening practical cooperation.

It was highlighted that the ITPP may play a central role in defining common interests and dialogue goals between NATO and a specific partner, e.g. with the goal of conducting annual staff talks and/or exchanges on working level on specific topics. Other models include specific memoranda of understanding and a structuring in working groups as seen in other bilateral relations.

In terms of formats, the implementation of thematic platforms beyond established geographical formats on matters such as Cyber, Innovation, or Capacity Building was recommended, with a narrower focus

of partners contributing to NATO's efforts or specifically benefitting from NATO. At the same time, a regular use of the Big Tent format for general outreach on relevant topics was recommended by some.

The outreach workshop on the next Strategic Concept was mentioned as a good example. The case was also made for a more regular use of informal groups such as Tiger Teams, with Allies leading and Partners contributing to planning and supporting dialogue on a working level, e.g. to inform discussions among Allies.

Dialogue with international organizations is seen as key for NATO and partners, and partners may have a perspective on cooperation between NATO and a specific IO. An increased use of liaison offices was encouraged. On a bilateral level, Contact Point Embassies may take a more prominent role in facilitating dialogue with partners. Informal dialogue, including in Track 1.5 or

Track 2 modes, may be supported through NATO Entities (e.g. NATO education and training facilities) or partner institutions (e.g. Partnership Training and Education Centers).

Dialogue on NAC level is seen as an important tool of stock taking and giving impetus to further consultations. Early preparation and follow-up dialogue on working level may increase sustainability and effectiveness of dialogue.

To have a more structured exchange among partners, and a forum to address common issues, a dean model was suggested.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON PARTNERS ROLE IN SUPPORTING THE RULES BASED INTERNATIONAL ORDER

It is recommended that

- NATO increases cooperation with international organizations that represent the RBIO, in particular the EU;
- Cooperation between NATO and partners is guided by values of the RBIO;
- NATO and partners, including international organizations and civil society organizations, engage in dialogue on supporting the RBIO in areas relevant to Allies' and partners' security;
- NATO and partners lead by example by supporting the RBIO;
- Allies and partners promote the RBIO in jointly shaping standards and norms in line with international law;
- NATO, when possible and according to existing policies and

procedures, includes close partners early on in discussing new norms;

- Allies reach out to partners to work together on promoting legal and ethical norms;
- NATO mainstreams RBIO in all partnership activities.

ON POLITICAL DIALOGUE

It is recommended that

- NATO increases dialogue with partners in a strategic, efficient and flexible manner;
- NATO strives to include partners in dialogue early on and shares information with partners as early as possible, based on existing policies and procedures;
- NATO includes both high level and follow-up meetings on working level with specific outcomes to increase impact;
- NATO continues to hold regular dialogue with Partners in Big Tent Format;
- NATO considers the creation of thematic formats/platforms with close partners on given areas for regular exchange on topics of interest, including RBIO;
- NATO and partners make more regular use of informal dialogue fora such as Tiger Teams or Track 1.5 or Track 2 events hosted by NATO or partner entities;
- NATO and partners define goals and structure of bilateral dialogue, including in the ITTP;
- NATO increases use of liaison offices and Contact Point Embassies for Dialogue.

ALLIES AND PARTNERS, LEADING BY EXAMPLE-HUMAN SECURITY, WOMEN PEACE AND SECURITY, CLIMATE CHANGE AND SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

NATO's Partnerships Symposia foster the exchange of ideas between NATO Allies and Partner nations, as well as International Organisations in Europe. The 2022 Partnerships Symposium is an opportunity to explore understandings of the changing security environment, exchange good practices, and deepen and extend NATO's dialogue and political-military cooperation with partners.

The Tiger Team "Leading by Example" worked three topics upon which NATO, Allies and Partners might deepen their partnerships to advance a common agenda: a) Human Security; b) Women, Peace and Security (WPS); and c) climate change and security. The Tiger Team discussed challenges and opportunities for enhanced partnership cooperation, enriched through presentations by Allies and Partners on their experiences, briefings from NATO personnel, and independent expert analysis. The following Food for Thought Paper reflects the discussion in the Tiger Team "Leading by Example". It respects the different views of different Allies and Partners. It remains an informal document.

Human Security, Women Peace and Security - WPS, and Climate Change and Security within the context of NATO and its Partnerships

Human security is the

interconnection between security, development and human rights, with the focus being on how the individual can feel secure and protected by institutions responsible for ensuring their security and protection. Human security is important to NATO and Partners across at least three dimensions: in how NATO develops responses to the human security challenges it faces in operations; in how NATO can build capacity in Partner nations; and in terms of NATO's role in contributing to the development of security norms and principles at the global level. Work is actively underway within NATO to further articulate a common vision for NATO's Human Security agenda and its operationalisation.

Like WPS, Human Security is identified within NATO as an important sphere for partnership work. The 2019 Chania Symposium determined that Human Security is "an area in which NATO and partners have a lot to share and discuss (standards, best practices, regional perspectives) and where the Alliance has the potential to "lead-by-example." It highlighted that the Human Security agenda "needs to be further mainstreamed and operationalized across all NATO's policies, including partnerships."ⁱ The 2021 Brussels Summit Communiqué affirms NATO's intention to continue to work with partners, international organizations, and civil society to further its Human Security agenda.ⁱⁱ Yet, until now there has been limited exchange between NATO

and Partners on the political level concerning Human Security.

Women Peace and Security WPS has been a fruitful area for partnership cooperation and capacity building since the adoption of the first NATO/EAPC policy on WPS in 2007.ⁱⁱⁱ Still, measuring progress on WPS continues to be challenging for Allies and Partners alike, who identify the potential to be more goal-orientated and transparent. NATO's October 2021 Action Plan for the Implementation of the NATO/EAPC Policy on Women, Peace and Security 2021-2025^{iv} defined several actions to enhance cooperation among NATO and Partners on WPS including:

- a. integrate WPS into partnership mechanisms, tools and instruments;
- b. mainstream gender in NATO defence capacity building, education and training, including WPS projects as appropriate; and
- c. cooperate on exchanges of lessons learned, briefings and joint initiatives, including on gender and SALW, mine action and counter-terrorism, and implementation of NATO policy on Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and trafficking in human beings.

NATO's engagement with **Climate Change and Security** builds upon its longstanding work on environmental security, which stretches back to 1969.^v NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept identified climate change as a security matter of concern, and climate issues have since been highlighted in NATO Summit Statements.^{vi} Reflecting Allies' commitment to the Paris Agreement to reduce global warming, NATO adopted a Green Defence Framework in 2014.^{vii} In substantive

terms, NATO is deeply concerned with three areas of security implications of climate change: (a) the pressures upon the stability and resilience of regions highly vulnerable to climate warming, (b) the geopolitical and strategic impacts of climate change in the High North, and (c) the practical consequences on carrying out military operations in areas highly affected by global warming.^{viii} Responding to such challenges, NATO agreed at the 2021 Brussels Summit to launch NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan to guide the alliance in becoming a world leader in terms of expertise on climate security and adaptation measures, aiming at reaching net zero emissions by 2050.^{ix} The Action Plan lays down four broad priority areas for work: (a) impact assessment and awareness-raising,

(b) adaptation and (c) mitigation strategies, and (c) global outreach.^x

Through the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme and dedicated Trust Funds, NATO has supported cooperation between Allies and Partners on environmental security and, progressively, security threats related to climate change. It has created and shared knowledge to help Partners better prepare for extreme weather conditions and deal with climate-related risks and vulnerabilities. As a norm-setter in military environmental standards, guidelines and best practices, NATO has also supported Partners to clean up ageing and dangerous stockpiles of weapons, ammunition and unexploded remnants of war. NATO and Partners have worked together to develop policy and technical solutions to improve energy supply

and reduce the environmental and energy footprint of military activities.

Allies and Partners identify challenges to collaborative work on climate security: lack of awareness of the climate-security nexus in defence; lack of commonly defined goals, interoperability and targeted resources; as well as, in some states, weak political will. Still, they see strong potential to deepen collaboration in the field of climate security. Many NATO Allies and Partners share policy priorities, such as enhancing energy efficiency and decarbonization within armed forces, to meet international commitments on climate action.

NATO has taken some initial steps to recognise the linkages between WPS and Human Security, and the intersections between gender, WPS, Human Security and climate change. For example, conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) and sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), first identified as NATO priorities through

work on WPS, are recognized as critical Human Security issues. NATO's Action Plan on Climate Change and Security recognizes that the impacts of climate change (famine, floods, loss of land and livelihood) can have a disproportionate impact upon women and girls. It commits NATO to leverage its science and technology programmes and communities to support research on the impact of climate change on security, including gender perspectives in the context of NATO's WPS policy.^{xi} In such references, along with those related to impacts upon displacement, migration, and human mobility, the Action Plan implicitly links climate change and human security.^{xii} The report of the 2021 Partnerships 360 Symposium suggested NATO "fully incorporating climate change in Women, Peace and Security issues given its impact on human security".^{xiii} The synergies between these three policy agendas could be more strongly manifest in NATO approaches, action and



partnership cooperation.

For Partners, cooperation with NATO on WPS, Human Security and climate security offers a range of potential advantages. NATO has diverse modalities for flexible cooperation with partners, including through Tiger Teams, Trust Funds and SPS projects. NATO plays a credible “example-setting” role as a leading alliance of militarily advanced nations and military centres of excellence. NATO’s integrated politico-military structure sets doctrine and standards that matter for Allies and partners alike and provides mechanisms to assess the implementation of joint standards. NATO offers access to a wide and diverse network of military and defence expertise, such as through Nations, Centres of Excellence (CoE) and Partnership Training and Education Centres (PTECs).

Strengthening NATO’s work on Human Security, WPS and Climate Change and Security, in particular, Partnership Cooperation:

Opportunities exist to develop and strengthen the implementation of NATO’s approach to WPS, Human Security and climate change and security in all areas of NATO’s activities, including partnerships. The following priorities and actions are recommended for the consideration of the Partnerships Symposium.

Better integrate human security, gender- and climate-sensitive analysis and approaches across armed forces’ defence, disaster response and peacebuilding-related activities:

- Incorporate a conceptual understanding of the “gender, climate and security nexus”^{xiv} into NATO

policy and action related to Human Security and climate security.

- Develop a common NATO methodology for identifying climate security risks and designing adaptation and mitigation measures that integrate WPS, gender, climate security and Human Security into impact assessment and planning.

More direct, sustained and deeper political dialogue on WPS, Human Security and climate change:

- Enhance joint briefings and training with political level engagement and practical cooperation projects.

- Engage in dialogue to promote peace and civil and military resilience to the climate crisis.

- On WPS, dedicated mechanisms (such as Trust Funds, DCB packages, ITTPs) for Allies and Partner cooperation on specific goals and outcomes could strengthen implementation of the existing policy framework.

- At NATO Headquarters, the “WPS Group of Friends” could be “reactivated” to include Partners and to be more concretely involved in Action Plan implementation.

- NATO Groups of Friends - Allies and Partners - could also be convened regarding Human Security and climate security. These, along with Tiger Teams and other modalities, could serve as fora to consult with Partners on policy and action plans, share experiences, and deepen collaboration on concrete projects.

- NATO’s network of Contact Point Embassies could channel political engagement with Partners

and support for WPS, Human Security and climate security action.

Enhance sharing of experience in implementing WPS and addressing Human Security and climate change:

- Increase in-depth thematic exchanges between NATO and Partners, sharing tangible examples of successes and problems, and identifying lessons.
- The NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives facilitates exchange amongst Allies and Partners on WPS. It could be a model for mechanisms for military-to-military experience sharing on Human Security and climate change and security.
- Share key scientific evidence on climate impacts and technological know-how to jointly build up expertise on climate-sensitive conflict analysis, early detection and strategic foresight.

Enhance Partner capacity building:

- Ensure the availability of expertise on gender, human security and climate for all NATO Partnership programmes.
- Enable more projects fully dedicated to enhancing partnership cooperation on WPS, human security and climate action.
- Enable training and capacity building of military personnel and institutional leadership on these specific issues (through, for example, mixed political / military mentoring teams, exercises and wargaming, and training through NATO Centres of Excellence), ensuring gender perspectives are incorporated into all training courses.^{xv}

- Dedicate Trust Funds (as per the Trust Fund Jordan III, which developed a training centre for women) or NATO SPS projects specifically to WPS, Human Security and Climate Security.

- Engage in capacity building to achieve military self-sufficiency and energy efficiency to better adapt military operations to extreme weather conditions and to reduce militaries' ecological footprint

Further joint Allied/Partner research at the nexus of Human Security, WPS and Climate Change and Security:

- Establish new research collaborations to examine the impacts of climate change on international, regional and human security, with an emphasis on the differentiated impacts on women and gender roles. Support the gathering of sex-disaggregated data on the gender-climate security nexus.^{xvi}

- Deepen the understanding of the consequences of climate change on security and the impacts of military action on climate and environment, specifically on the capacity and effectiveness of military forces in defence and peacebuilding contexts; reducing militaries' ecological footprint; and the broader role of military actors in addressing climate-related security risks.

Strengthen regional and international norms integrating human security, WPS and climate security:

- Ensure NATO's strategic guidance documents comprehensively reference core principles concerning WPS and human security and commitments to climate action.

- Lead by example in creating codes of conduct, guidelines and procedures guiding armed forces and defence institutions, and share experience and best practices internationally.

- On climate change adaption and mitigation within the defence and security sphere, Allies and Partners might seek to define and work toward common goals, with interim targets and mechanisms for mutual assistance, ensuring their Partnership plays its full potential role in responding to the climate crisis.

General," 27 September 2021, UN doc., S/2021/827.

xv According to the Progress Report on the Implementation of the NATO/EAPC Policy and Action Plan on WPS (December 2020-June 2021), only 3.3% of the 710 courses listed in the Education and Training Opportunities Catalogue (ETOC) have integrated gender perspectives into the course content.

xvi In line with commitment 9.1 of the NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan: "... NATO will leverage its science and technology programmes and communities to support research on the impact of climate change on security, including of NATO's Women, Peace and Security policy".

i AC/340-N(2019)0162-MULTIREF, Paragraph 8.

ii Brussels Summit Communiqué (14 June 2021/086), Paragraph 60.

iii Implementing UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (10 December 2007)

iv AC/340-N(2021)0147-REV1.

v Environment, Climate Change and Security (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91048.htm, accessed on 13.04.2022).

vi NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan (14 June 2021), Paragraph 5, (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_185174.htm, accessed on 13.04.2022).

vii Idem.

viii Environment, Climate Change and Security (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91048.htm, accessed on 13.04.2022).

ix Brussels Summit Communiqué (14 June 2021/086), Paragraph 6.g (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91048.htm, accessed on 13.04.2022).

x NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan (14 June 2021), Paragraph 9, (https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_185174.htm, accessed on 13.04.2022).

xi (PO(2021)0204 para. 4 and 9.1.

xii (PO(2021)0204 para. 4.

xiii AC/340-N(2021)0133 (R).

xiv A concept growing used in UN and other multilateral fora; for example: "Women, Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary

INTRODUCTION

NATO's partnerships are one of the key advancements of NATO's post-Cold War evolution. Over a period of 30 years, the number of partners has grown steadily, as has the geographical scope of partnerships, extending NATO's strategic awareness, promoting interoperability, and enhancing support to the rules-based international order. The menu of partnership activities has expanded commensurately, ranging from political dialogue and scientific cooperation all the way to military exercises and even military operations. This collaboration plays a key role to implement NATO's strategic tasks and positively impacts the evolving security environment. In the 21st century, a NATO without Partners has simply become impractical, even unthinkable.

The overall success of NATO's approach to partnership is due in part to its flexibility, which allowed it to accommodate an array of topics and objectives, as well as geographical, cultural, and political differences among Partner nations. Partners can choose the issues on which they wish to cooperate with NATO, and they can determine the depth of this cooperation, while at the same time, the Alliance aligns these wishes with its interests which are equally important for the cooperation. The new NATO Partnership document – the Individually Tailored Partnership Plan (ITPP) – facilitates this process. As a result, while geographic formats still play a role, each Partner has the space to cultivate an individual relationship with NATO, based on

agreed strategic objectives at the intersection of partners' and NATO's interests.

The diversity of NATO's partnerships and Partners' individual capacities will remain. NATO's menu of capacity building offerings reflects this reality and provides opportunities to both contributing and beneficiary nations. It includes, but is not limited to, the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative (DCB), the Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP), the Professional Development Programme, the Partnership and Training Education Centres, and the Building Integrity Initiative.

NATO's capacity building efforts carry significant institutional credibility and a wealth of expertise, including in Special Operations Forces (SOF); Small Arms Light Weapons (SALW) and Mine Action (MA); Building Integrity; Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) defense; and counterterrorism. NATO also provides a platform to coordinate and synchronize bilateral and multinational capacity building programs to maximize their effectiveness and efficiency.

ONGOING CHALLENGES

While there are many examples of NATO's partnerships directly strengthening Alliance and Partner security, Allies and Partners agree there is room for improvement. Since the first partnership symposium in 2018, Partners have made concrete suggestions to help realize their partnerships' full potential. Some of

these recommendations are already bearing fruit: the ITPP process, which grew out of the 2019 symposium, is better aligning NATO Partner objectives. Reforms undertaken in 2021 to consolidate and better manage NATO Trust Funds are an important step toward ensuring more reliable, consistent sources of funding

for some capacity building activities. However, further adjustment is needed as the NATO 2030 process has shown that overreliance on Trust Funds and Voluntary National Contributions (VNC) are a non-sustainable solution. Now, Allies are discussing additional improvements to the Alliance's capacity building work and how to contextualize the role of partnerships in the updated Strategic Concept, which offers an opportunity for the development of more focused, long-term oriented and value based partnerships.

During the tiger team discussions, Partners mentioned difficulties in accessing NATO's capacity building activities. Many of these challenges can be linked to a lack of resources, the limited availability of appropriate opportunities, and administrative hurdles. There were also calls for better prioritization and improved coordination of capacity building efforts.

APPROACH OF THE TIGER TEAMS

The tiger team focused on recommendations from previous symposia, many of which remain unaddressed, and internal review processes. The team paid particular attention to challenges and opportunities to ensure NATO's capacity building efforts are meeting

their targets.

Discussions were further enriched with presentations by Partners on their experiences, exchanges on best practices, and external research.

Presentations on the ITPP process and the partnership toolkit contributed to a better understanding of the interrelationships between the various tools.

This Food for Thought Paper reflects the discussion in the Tiger Team "Capacity Building". It respects the different views of different Allies and Partners. It remains an informal document.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Develop a new NATO-wide Defence Institution and Capacity Building (DICB) policy to define NATO's own role in DICB and provide a set of principles and rules which guides design and delivery of DICB by NATO, including in the context of the new Strategic Concept and other related work strands leading to the Madrid Summit 2022.

- Define ways in which DICB should contribute to the successful achievement of 2022 NATO updated Strategic Concept.
- Highlight the strategic importance of DICB as part of NATO's Partnership's policy.
- Look for ways to better tailor DICB to individual partners' needs in order to help partners develop more coherent national programs for capacity building.

Help Partners better navigate partnership tools, increase information

flow by NATO and Allies with Partners, and reduce bureaucratic hurdles.

- Undertake a review of the Partnership Cooperation Menu (PCM) to ensure the courses offer fully reflect the mutual interests of both partners and NATO Allies, and weed out any items no longer relevant and/or in demand, and replace them with courses better suited to NATO and partners' interests.
- Implement a mechanism to help Partners understand the opportunities available through NATO's Centres of Excellence (CoEs), Partner Training and Education Centres (PTECs), and regional centres.
- Increase the flexibility and agility of NATO's capability building offer to Partners, including through increasing the availability of mobile training teams (MTTs).

Analyze the resources required to fully meet NATO's agreed capacity building commitments for Partners.

Make better use of thematic formats (Chania, 2019).

Focus on areas where NATO possesses unique expertise and experience in DICB and increase complementarity in this regard with other actors (EU, UN, OSCE and bilateral), including through more fine-grained and analytical security assistance mapping.

As modern defense institutions are key to increasing Allies' and partners' abilities to manage today's security environment, help Partners develop long-term institutional capacities to turn national security policy

into effective implementation and successful management of change.

- Deepen cooperation with Partners on Defense Institution Building (DIB) issues (Warsaw, 2018).
- Implement feedback mechanisms through which Allies and partners can discuss and share best practices and lessons learned from exercises and operations (Chania, 2019).

Make use of existing review clauses (or alternatively develop new ones) within DICB, in order to constantly define and assess progress made and identify lessons learned.

QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION

Building on the Strategic Concept adopted at the Madrid Summit in June 2022, how can capacity building facilitate the successful achievement of NATO's three essential core security tasks: deterrence and defense, crisis management and prevention, and cooperative security?

How can the ITPP increase the effectiveness of capacity building? How to design and deliver capacity building-related elements of ITPPs? What are the initial effects on capacity building (both on NATO and Partner sides) that can be derived from the ITPP?

As Partners reflect on their experiences with NATO capacity building - including through the pandemic - what single change would make the biggest difference to the efficacy of capacity building efforts?



INNOVATION

The Tiger Team on Innovation was led by the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Switzerland. Austria, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Ukraine participated, as well as staff from NATO IS, Ops, ESC and ACT. The team met five times from November 2021 to May 2022 and exchanged views on current and future opportunities for Partners in NATO's Innovation and Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDT) agendas.

Presentations of national views and efforts in the field of EDT from the UK, Israel, Sweden, Switzerland and Ukraine enriched the sessions. This Food for Thought Paper reflects these discussions. It respects the different views of different Allies and Partners. It remains an informal document.

INNOVATING NATO TODAY, TOMORROW AND BEYOND: THE ROLE OF PARTNERS

Maintaining NATO's technological edge was identified as a key pillar of the NATO 2030 agenda, and NATO's thinking on innovation and EDTs has rapidly evolved in recent years, including through the development of a number of new policies and initiatives.

Increasingly, Partners have requested more opportunities for dialogue and cooperation on this agenda. They are keen to share their substantial expertise with Allies where collaboration is mutually beneficial. However, new opportunities for Partners in this agenda have not yet been identified or developed.

The group identified three key questions it wanted to explore:

1. What opportunities currently exist for Partners to engage on innovation and EDTs, and what challenges do Partners experience in accessing these opportunities?
2. How could NATO cooperate with Partners on the new EDT/innovation projects and work strands (e.g., DIANA and the Innovation Fund)?
3. Are there new or different ways NATO could cooperate with partners on EDT/innovation issues that are not currently being considered?

OPPORTUNITIES FOR PARTNER ENGAGEMENT AND CHALLENGES IN ACCESSING THEM

The group heard from relevant programme leads on the following established instruments of innovation open for Partner involvement. These inputs helped to better understand existing opportunities for cooperation on innovation.

Table 1: Innovation opportunities currently open to Partner involvement

Organisation	Context	Opportunities for Partners
Science and Technology Organisation (STO)	The STO is responsible for NATO scientific research and development of EDTs in early stages of technological maturity.	Partners can request to join the STO and contribute to activities, including on innovation. The STO view cooperation with Partners as essential, and praise Partners' excellent science and technology facilities. STO involvement is flexible so Partners can participate where activities are open to the partnership formats Partners are part of.
Science Peace and Security Programme (SPS)	SPS promotes dialogue and practical cooperation between NATO and Partners based on scientific research, technological innovation and knowledge exchange projects. EDT and Innovation are priorities of the SPS program, which covers all stages of technological maturity.	Activities are open to all Partners and are all unclassified apart from one, making it highly accessible for Partners. Opportunities are advertised in the annual report, online, and through public diplomacy carried out by the SPS team in Partner countries.
Conference of National Armament Directors	CNAD and its substructure work with technologies in later stages of development and during their use phase.	The Capability Development Groups are broadly open to Partners alongside the CNAD PS Partner sessions, with certain topics being discussed in more selective formats.
ACT Innovation Hub	The Hub's mission is to make NATO more adaptable and implement innovative solutions.	ACT run a number of activities that are open to entrants from Partner countries. They are promoted on social media and through direct engagement.

During group discussions, a number of challenges in working with these organisations were raised:

- Partners mentioned difficulties in identifying available opportunities in this area, and in understanding the different processes for inclusion.

- Some Partners also felt that NATO has been slow to involve Partners, and does not do enough to update them on its agenda or involve them in relevant discussions in ways that would facilitate substantial and/or constructive partner contribution. Often most, Partners express the need to be involved at an earlier stage of the process in order to be able to produce constructive inputs to discussions.

- Until recently, the direction of each Partner's engagement with NATO was often determined through different processes and documents, which could be confusing. However, Partners are now transitioning to NATO's new comprehensive partnership document—the Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPPs)—which will help to alleviate this issue. Innovation and EDTs can be included as a specific area of cooperation within the ITPP wherever NATO and a Partner have a mutual interest in increasing their engagement on these issues.

POTENTIAL PARTNER OPPORTUNITIES WITHIN NEW PROJECTS AND WORKSTRANDS

Recent decisions by Allies on the innovation and EDT agendas provide opportunities for enhanced cooperation with Partners. Some of the most important are highlighted in the following table.

Table 2: Potential opportunities within new projects and work strand

Effort	Context	Opportunities for Partners
EDT Implementation Strategy 2021	This strategy agreed a clear approach for identifying, developing, and adopting EDTs at the speed of relevance, guided by principles of responsible use, in accordance with international law, and taking into account discussions in relevant international fora.	<p>This strategy agreed NATO should collaborate with 'private sector, academia, and relevant Partners' and suggested the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme as a suitable vehicle for engagement.</p> <p>It also recognised the need to collaborate with other international organisations, specifically the EU and UN, in this area.</p>
NATO Artificial Intelligence Strategy 2021	This strategy agreed a set of NATO Principles of Responsible Use for Allies.	<p>It recognises the need for cooperation with the private sector, international organisations, (including the UN, Council of Europe and the EU) and possible ways of cooperating with Partners.</p> <p>There is no mechanism for Partners to formally adopt the Principles of Responsible Use, but Partners could choose to adopt them.</p>
Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) 2021 and NATO Innovation Fund 2021 and DIANA Charter Madrid Summit 2022	At the NATO Brussels Summit in 2021, NATO leaders agreed to create DIANA to boost transatlantic cooperation on critical technologies and establish a NATO Innovation Fund to invest in start-ups working on emerging and disruptive technologies.	<p>Allies have recognised that both initiatives could create new opportunities for cooperation with Partners, but those opportunities have not been finalised.</p> <p>The DIANA Charter at the Madrid Summit in 2022, foresees possibilities for Partner involvement through mechanisms that would still need to be established.</p>

POTENTIAL NEW WAYS FOR NATO TO COOPERATE AND COLLABORATE WITH PARTNERS

The group discussed a number of potential ideas that go beyond efforts currently being developed, and **our recommendations** are as follows:

NATO should establish a **thematic group** with partners for dialogue and cooperation on EDT and innovation. Partners within this group should have the opportunity to discuss and shape policy, as appropriate, to learn from Allied expertise, and to share their own.

NATO should improve **information sharing** in this area. Ways of doing this could be:

- The release of related papers and policies to Partners (appropriate to the classification);
- More regular updates from the Emerging Security Challenges division (ESC) on progress around EDTs and innovation;
- The organisation of an 'Innovation Awareness Day' by ESC to highlight available opportunities. Alternatively, PASP could organise a 'Partnership Opportunities event';
- The development by the Defence Investments division (DI) of an event similar to the NATO Industry Forum, which could be attended by technology companies in Allied and Partner countries;
- Increased dialogue and information sharing by NATO organisations like STO, the

Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and Allied Command Transformation, where possible, to identify practical opportunities for cooperation.

NATO should **establish formal opportunities for Partner participation** in the Innovation and EDT agendas, including in DIANA, the Innovation Fund, and the Principles of Responsible Use.

NATO should **make better use of Partner expertise** through more regular dialogue and consultation. One key opportunity could be in the development of the new policies on priority technology areas.

Partners should include the partnership goal on EDT in their **ITPP** if they wish to further their cooperation with NATO in this area.



INTEROPERABILITY

INTRODUCTION

Interoperability is the ability to operate together using harmonized standards, doctrines, procedures and equipment to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives.¹ Various NATO initiatives strive towards achieving interoperability through four dimensions: technical, procedural, human and information. The goal of achieving interoperability is not limited to Allies but has been extended to NATO's network of Partners in the broadest sense of the word. In enhancing coherence in all capability areas, interoperability of Partner with Allied armed forces is fundamental in harmonising planning and execution efforts and the development of redundancy for force capabilities. Hence, interoperability is an important added value for NATO in underpinning its core tasks. In particular, interoperability allows the Alliance to strengthen its cooperative security task through increased cooperation in flexible and tailored formats while fostering common understandings with Partner Nations.

Thus, interoperability not only is fundamental for the effective conduct of missions, operations and activities, but it is also a vital driver of NATO's partnerships.

geographical spread of the challenges it is facing, the Alliance, now more than ever, needs to work with Partners in order to successfully cope with further common challenges as they emerge. Contributing to stability and security for NATO, in particular beyond its territory but within its area of interest, would prove difficult without the specific expertise, niche and force enhancing capabilities of its Partners.

Extended military cooperation is an effective way to deal with the impact of potential security risks to NATO Allies and Partner Nations. Over the years NATO has created ample partnership programmes, tools, and procedures in order to pursue interoperability with Partners. With the reorganisation and restructuring of partnership tools and mechanisms, through the creation of the Individually Tailored Partnership Programme (ITPP), NATO and its Allies have invested intellectual and operational resources to make cooperation with Partner Nations fit for purpose aiming for a more appropriate use of its potential.

While interoperability extends to other dimensions of dialogue and practical cooperation this Food-For-Thought paper zooms in on strengthening NATO's partnerships through military interoperability.

BACKGROUND

Since 2014 and the launch of the Partnership Interoperability Initiative (PII), the environment in which NATO and Partners operate has rapidly changed, with new security challenges coming from a 360° perspective. Given the complexity and

AIM

The aim of this paper is to identify areas for improvement regarding the interaction between NATO and its Partners, focusing on military-related mechanisms and processes of partnerships. The paper attempts to group several recommendations

for enhancing future cooperation between NATO and Partners in terms of military interoperability, providing food for thought for the 2022 Partnerships 360° Symposium in Geneva.

CONSIDERATIONS

NATO's broad network of Partners is diverse. Some Partner Nations fully adopt and implement NATO standards and have capacities and capabilities similar to Allies. There are Partners who are among the first to take up active responsibilities to contribute to defend shared security interests. Some Partners aim for full membership. Other Partners may be more focused on building their own security capacity in line with commonly understood NATO standards and require assistance, including capacity building, to deal with security threats on their territory.

NATO currently has an extensive toolbox aiming to enhance interoperability with Partners across the full spectrum of bilateral and collective cooperation. PARP² remains the essential process for many Partners to plan, organize and structure their cooperative efforts with NATO, for some even up to the level of NDPP³ for Allies. OCC⁴ & FMN⁵, tools to which many Partners actively contribute, enable a rapid integration of NATO mission networks, thereby enhancing interoperability and information sharing from the very first moment of its mission-wide operationalisation.

The Partner Interoperability Initiative (PII) of 2014 launched the two most recent initiatives, Interoperability Platform (IP) Format and Enhanced

Opportunities Partners (EOP), to offer additional formats for increased and strengthened cooperative and individual partnerships. The IP-format was created to offer a platform for exchanges and discussions on thematic issues relevant for the strengthening of interoperability efforts by Allies as well as Partner Nations. Many other programmes and initiatives are aimed at improving interoperability of Partner Nations with NATO by providing training and support in standardisation processes, such as DEEP⁶, SPS⁷, PTECs⁸, BI⁹, DCB¹⁰ or WPS¹¹.

NATO approvals of partnership tools such as PARP or OCC provides Partners with relevant support doctrines to develop capabilities and deliver on interoperability. However, access limitations to relevant supporting documentation restricts the ongoing interoperability of some capabilities.

Once bilateral partnership programs are transitioned to ITPP, it will form the basis of the cooperation between NATO and the respective Partner Nation. The 4-year cycle is intended to guarantee maximum alignment between Partners' capacity planning and where agreed the NDPP, as well as continuity in the further development of the individual partnership, which aims to strengthen efforts towards interoperability. In comparison with IPCP¹² 2-year cycle, and while covering two 2-year PARP cycles, ITTP is expected to offer a more strategic approach and a higher level of detail in each Partner Nation's cooperation program.

Because NATO currently has less

Crisis Management Operations and participation in NATO article 5 Exercises is restricted, Partners have less opportunities to enhance and maintain interoperability in all domains of warfare.

RECOMMENDATIONS

This paper presents recommendations for current and future discussions:

Individualisation:

We welcome the introduction of ITPP, which allows NATO and the respective Partner Nation to further strengthen their cooperation efforts in areas of common strategic interests in a flexible and tailored manner.

To make full use of this individualization, NATO may consider defining tailored levels of interoperability with each Partner by following the One Partner One Plan philosophy to enhance common efforts in cooperative security and foster Partner's own security and defence reforms.

Strategy:

The new NATO Strategic Concept will emphasize the importance Partners play in the overall architecture of the Alliance. Early and broad involvement of Partner Nations in the Alliance's adaptation emanating from the Strategic Concept enables them to align strategic planning when considering participation in exercises, information exchange, missions and operations.

Given the purpose of NATO partnerships mutual benefit, NATO should make full use of Partner

Nations' expertise when addressing security challenges.

NATO may consider enriching the IP-format through thematic agendas to enable Partners to engage and contribute appropriately, e.g., regarding EDT¹³, Cyber, WPS, Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation or Climate Change. The approach should be to make the IP-format suitable for exchanging views, experience, and expertise to the benefit of both - NATO and Partners - stakeholders in a more sustainable manner.

Information sharing:

NATO may consider enhanced interaction and to continue to facilitate cooperation with Partner Nations through organising high-level meetings as well as by providing tailored briefings. Routine back briefs from IMS on key policy and military meetings would enable Partner Nations to clearly understand political - strategic considerations and anticipate their possible role or participation in NATO's activities and operations.

Following the approval of partnership instruments, Partner Nations should have enhanced access to relevant doctrine and documents that will assist them in developing the capability and establishing interoperability. Tailored EDT roadmap and NWCC¹⁴ briefings are welcomed, however CAPDEV¹⁵ planning is difficult to follow through for Partners without access to the relevant documents.

To increase the level of information sharing between NATO and Partners, thematic approaches within

established programs, a more frequent use of the IP-format and closer interaction with each Partner Country Team could serve as solutions.

Exercises, Training and Operations/
Missions:

NATO may consider conducting additional non-Article 5 Exercises, to include Partners, e.g., the extended use of existing initiatives such as CWIX¹⁶ is recommended in order to increase interoperability with Partners taking into account both sides' needs, limitations and requirements in an operational or training environment.

1 www.nato.int: Interoperability: connecting forces. 22 Feb. 2022

2 Partnership for Peace and Review Process

3 NATO Defence Planning Process

4 Operations Capabilities Concept

5 Federated Mission Network

6 Defence Education Enhancement Program

7 Science for Peace and Security

8 Partners Training and Education Center's

9 Building Integrity

10 Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Program

11 Women, Peace and Security

12 Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program


13 Emerging and Disruptive Technologies

14 NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept

15 Capability Development

16 Coalition Warrior Interoperability Exploration Experimentation Examination Exercise

KEY NOTE ADDRESSES





AMBASSADOR MIRCEA GEOANĂ NATO DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL

OPENING REMARKS (Virtual)

Good morning and thank you for inviting me to inaugurate the 2022 NATO Partnerships 360 Symposium. I would have liked nothing more than to see you all in Geneva this year, as originally planned. Unfortunately, it was not possible for me to travel and join you in person.

Yet, after having waited for so long to meet in Geneva, I am sure that the coming two days will fully meet the intended goal of the Symposium as NATO's annual partnerships flagship event. Namely, to serve as a unique forum for exchanging concrete ideas about the future and value of NATO partnerships in an increasingly uncertain and dangerous world. To use the brainpower and experience gathered in Geneva to move forward and make our partnerships network closer, stronger, and more dynamic.

I would like to thank the Swiss authorities for hosting the Alliance's partnerships community for this important event. I also thank them and the other Allied and partner nations directly involved, for their hard work on the "Road to Geneva", including on the Tiger teams process.

The Madrid Summit that took place just a week and a half ago was a truly transformative and historic Summit for the Alliance.

Against the backdrop of the most serious security crisis in Europe since 1945, Allies have sent to the entire world a strong and unequivocal message of transatlantic unity and solidarity.

Among other key decisions, Allied Heads of State and Government invited two trusted partners to join NATO. Finland and Sweden have already signed their Accession Protocols. Allied leaders endorsed a new Strategic Concept to guide NATO's future work.

They set a new baseline for our deterrence and defence posture with our 360-degree approach across land, air, maritime, cyber, and space domains. NATO leaders also decided to continue, and further step up, our support to Ukraine. As well agreed tailored support measures for NATO's partners Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Moldova.

Let me stress that Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine not only undermines international security and stability. It has also inflicted immense damage on the civilian



population and material infrastructure of the country, provoking the biggest refugee crisis in Europe since the nineteen forties. This aggression is a blatant violation of international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter, which NATO so strongly stands for as part of the rules-based international order. You will be reflecting on it during the Symposium.

The images from the war in Ukraine have brought us back to the darkest periods of European history, which we all thought we had left behind. It has become a sad and dramatic reminder of the importance of upholding international humanitarian law. This is an important reflection to make. Particularly in a city that gives its name to some of the most important body of international humanitarian law in history, the Geneva Conventions, and which hosts the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.

Our security is interconnected. NATO is becoming more attentive to various global security developments which have an impact on the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO is also reaching out to new partners around the globe.

As we do this, the war in Ukraine has also reminded countries outside our continent that European security also matters to them. The current energy and food crises are clear examples of this. They will have long-term implications for their own security, far from Europe as they might be.

At the Madrid Summit, our Heads of State and Government have agreed to enhance our resilience. They have also established a Defence Innovation Accelerator and launched a multinational Innovation Fund.

This Innovation Fund will bring together governments, private sector and academia to bolster our technological edge.

These are key decisions, for they will help us move our innovation and technology agenda forward at a critical moment in global affairs.

A moment in which technology, more than ever before, has a strategic impact on our security, our economies, and our freedom.

Allied Heads of State and Government have also stressed the centrality of human security. Again, a message that will strongly resonate in Geneva, the world's diplomatic capital of human security.

Importantly, the Alliance has again committed to advance our Women, Peace and Security agenda.

NATO Leaders have also declared climate change as a defining challenge of our time and recognised its profound impact on Allied security.

At the Madrid Summit, Allied leaders also reiterated the importance of NATO's partnerships in an increasingly competitive and challenging security environment.

Their meetings in Madrid with many of NATO's partners confirms our robust commitment to cooperative security as one of the core tasks of our Alliance, as also stated in our new Strategic Concept. Allies and partners alike face a critical time for our security and

international peace and stability. They will continue to be impacted by global issues, such as the rise of China, hybrid and asymmetric threats, terrorism, irregular migration and human trafficking, and climate change.

NATO partnerships are beneficial for both Allies and the countries and organisations with which we work together. They generate value for our governments and serve our citizens.

They make us all safer, and help us better deal with uncertainty and international security challenges. Our shared purpose after the Madrid Summit is to enhance our partnerships. So that they continue to meet the interests of both Allies and partners. Our ambition is to continue to make NATO partnerships an ever more interesting and attractive proposition. And we have a lot to offer in that regard. From a political as well as an operational perspective, from a civilian angle and a military angle, we have a lot to share with you.

And we also have a lot to learn from our partners. Thank you for sharing your knowledge and experience with us. After Madrid, we intend to use partnerships as vehicles to increase our mutual situational awareness. To discuss common approaches to global security challenges where our interests are affected.

To share perspectives through deeper political engagement, and always seek new concrete areas for increased cooperation.

We will also move ahead with strengthening our engagement with existing and potential new interlocutors, beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, that share the Alliance's values and interests in upholding the rules-based international order.

Moreover, NATO will continue to work closely with the European Union.

We want to increase cooperation on issues of common interest.

Of which there are many -- from the war in Ukraine to military mobility, resilience, the impact of climate change on security, emerging and disruptive technologies, human security, and the Women, Peace and Security agenda.


I am honoured to address this diverse and vibrant NATO partnerships community today.

I thank you for all your work and efforts in bringing our partnerships agenda forward.

During your upcoming discussions, I invite you to think outside the box. To reflect on what works and what could be improved. To think about how the new Strategic Concept and the outcomes of the Madrid Summit can make a difference to our partnerships and to our shared security.

So that we can ensure that our partnerships continue to blossom and grow as we continue to move forward with the implementation of NATO 2030 and the decisions taken at Madrid.

I can't wait to learn about the results of the Symposium.



MS LIVIA LEU STATE SECRETARY OF FEDERAL DEPARTEMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF SWITZERLAND

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, dear colleagues

*We decided in December 2018 to host this symposium. I believe that you will all share my sentiment that this feels like a decade ago. First we were confronted by a global pandemic. Then **Russia decided to start an unprovoked war against Ukraine**, in complete defiance of international law and the cooperative European security architecture.*

*We strongly condemn Russia's actions. We continue to call on it to halt its military operations in Ukraine and to withdraw its troops immediately. Such heinous acts demand a **strong and steadfast response from all States**. That is why we have adopted the sanctions of the European Union. We also demand a full investigation of all human rights violations and war crimes reportedly committed in Ukraine. Those responsible must be held accountable and brought to justice.*



*Indeed, the future of European Security looks bleak and the road ahead of us is not an easy one. But the world is luckily never static; change is always around the corner. When we decided to join the PfP in 1996, times also seemed to be changing. Optimism about a unified, cooperative and prosperous Europe was soaring. Then Swiss President Jean-Pascal Delamuraz started his New Year address by stating: "In Europa schweigen endlich die Waffen." – **Finally, the guns are silent in Europe.***

*This was just a few weeks after the end of the war in Bosnia. His opening thoughts well reflected the political deliberations about international security at the time. The Soviet Union had collapsed, and diplomats from formerly opposed sides worked hard to create perspectives for a **new partnership between East and West**.*

In Europe, conflicts between States were seen as a thing of the past. Switzerland was also searching for new approaches to adapt its long tradition of neutrality to new global realities. One important aspect was how we would develop our relationship with multilateral

organizations.

The Partnership for Peace was an attractive option. It allowed Switzerland to decide independently how it could best cooperate with NATO.

As times change, so has our partnership. In 1999, Switzerland decided to deploy a military contingent to KFOR, the so-called SWISSCOY. This was a milestone in Switzerland's foreign policy. Before that, we had never sent armed soldiers abroad. This deployment remains to this day Switzerland's largest commitment in the framework of its partnership with NATO. It is a symbol of our trust and close cooperation.

*Another important **cornerstone in our relation is our regular diplomatic dialogue.** Your presence in Geneva and the agenda we have put together reflect these exchanges. We believe that Switzerland brings a lot to the table. The venue, which has graciously agreed to host us, is home to the three **Geneva Centers** that Switzerland founded as contributions to the PfP. They bring together respected expertise on security sector governance and reform, security policy, and humanitarian demining. Each of them enjoys a longstanding partnership with NATO, and its partner states.*

*In a larger sense, Switzerland can also contribute with "**international Geneva**". Being the largest UN Hub in the world and hosting numerous international organizations, **Geneva offers a unique environment conducive to finding solutions for new and emerging challenges.** We hope that this symposium will help us to deepen and expand the ties between Geneva and Brussels.*

Dear colleagues,

*Change is upon us. Just like in 1996, I am sure that **we all long for the day on which the guns have once more fallen silent in Europe.** Although we would wish that this day be tomorrow, we know that there is a long and difficult path ahead of us. Even though Russia's illegal war is still ongoing, we can already see how it is reshaping Europe. It will take time until we are again able to consider Russia as a trustful partner in the European security landscape. As a direct consequence of the aggression of Ukraine, all the other European countries are more united than it has been in a long time, and the transatlantic ties are even stronger. For Switzerland, the past months have further confirmed the importance of close and strong cooperation with NATO and other partners. However, let us face it: Russia is not going to disappear, or to be removed outside the map of Europe. One day or the other, we will have to find the way out of the current crisis, together with her.*

*In its **conclusions in Madrid**, NATO has made it clear that political dialogue and cooperation with partners contribute to stability and enhance our shared security. This is a strong commitment to NATO's partnerships, and provides us with a solid ground to strengthen our existing cooperation.*

This Symposium offers us an excellent platform for discussions between allies and partners on how to transform these strategic ideas into practical cooperation. It seeks to contribute

to the realization of the partnerships of the future. The combination of civilian and military discussions seems particularly promising. We are best prepared to meet security challenges when both dimensions work closely together. I am thus delighted that the Chief of the Swiss Armed Forces is present today with us.

I would also like to share a few thoughts on the importance of political dialogue between NATO and its partners. First, our rules-based international order is under pressure. Certain states systematically violate international law, human rights and international humanitarian law. They seek to undermine the institutions that have been put in place to ensure accountability and transparency. If we want to present a united front, we must champion our values. We must invest in the international institutions that protect them. Above all, we must lead by example. Through NATO's partnership approach, we can share experiences and good practices; we can pool resources and join forces to develop common positions; we can foster a better mutual understanding; and we can create trust and confidence between partners.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I believe we are off to a good start when it comes to expanding our cooperation: the preparation of this symposium with our NATO partners was simply excellent. I would like to thank the teams of the NATO Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, the NATO Allied Command Transformation, and GCSP for their excellent work. We are also extremely grateful for the lead and contributing nations of the different groups of discussions convened in Brussels, the "Tiger Teams", that prepared a lot of the substance for the discussions ahead. No matter what change confronts us, it is always easier if you can rely on strong partnerships. We are certainly willing to invest even more in those.

Thank you for joining us today and for your attention. I wish you a successful, memorable and thought-provoking symposium.

BIOGRAPHIES OF PRINCIPALS IN
SURNAME
ALPHABETICAL ORDER



GENERAL CHRIS BADIA

DEPUTY SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION

General Chris Badia was born in Bavaria on September 28th 1963. After finishing school, he joined the German Air Force as a cadet in 1984 to become a jet-pilot and officer. Trained in the US between 1986 and 1987 his first assignment led him to Fighter Wing 71 "Richthofen". General Badia gained experience for 8 years as a fighter pilot before taking his first command as Squadron Commander of the 1st Sqd. of that Wing between 1996 and 1998. He then was nominated to attend the 43rd Command and General Staff Officers Course at the Federal Armed Forces Command and General Staff College in Hamburg. His first assignment after the academy was with NATO as Personal Assistant to COM/DCOM HQ Allied Air Forces Northern Europe in Ramstein. After his follow-on assignment as Director Ops of the 4th Air Force Division in Aurich, General Badia was posted as Assistant Branch Chief for Military Policy Concepts for Operations and Exercises to the German Ministry of Defence in Berlin.



Following a tour in the Office and as the Head of Office to the Parliamentary State Secretaries Kolbow and Dr. Pflueger, General Badia assumed responsibility on his second commanding position, as Commander Fighter Wing 71 "Richthofen".

After three years of Command, he was posted for three consecutive assignments to the Ministry of Defence, as Branch Chief Concepts and Doctrine in the Air Staff, following his promotion to Brigadier General as Assistant Chief of Staff Air Force Future Development/Plans and Policy and as Division Chief for Strategic Defence Planning and Concepts in the MoD.

Following two commanding assignments, first as Commander, European Air Transport Command, in Eindhoven and thereafter as Director General of the German Military Authority in Cologne, General Badia 2018 took over responsibility as Director General for Planning in the Ministry of Defence before he was appointed on July 7th, 2022, as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia.

AMBASSADOR PHILIPPE BRANDT

AMBASSADOR TO THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM AND HEAD OF THE MISSION OF SWITZERLAND TO NATO

Born in La Chaux-de-Fonds (Canton of Neuchâtel) in 1963, Mr. Philippe Brandt holds a Law Degree from the University of Neuchâtel. From 1990 to 1994 he was working for the Federal Department of Economic Affairs and mainly dealt with questions relating to employment and labor market. In 1994, he joined the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and started his internship in Berne, London and New-York (UN). He was then appointed as diplomatic adviser to the United Nations Section in Bern in 1996. From 2000 to 2003.

Mr. Brandt was posted to the Permanent Delegation of Switzerland to the OECD in Paris as counsellor and then as Deputy Head of Mission in Athens from 2003 to 2007.

Back in Berne in 2007, he was assigned to the Political Division I (Europe and Central Asia/ Council of Europe and OSCE) as Regional Coordinator for Western and Central Europe; he became Deputy Head of Division in 2010. From 2011 to 2015, Mr. Brandt held the position of Deputy Head of Mission in The Hague, in charge of multilateral affairs (mainly ICC and OPCW).

From 2015 to 2019, he has served as Ambassador to the Republic of Madagascar, the Union of Comoros and the Republic of Seychelles with residence in Antananarivo. He took up his new position as Ambassador to the Kingdom of Belgium and Head of the Mission of Switzerland to NATO in early May 2019.



AMBASSADOR BETTINA CADENBACH ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY

Professional Experience

Since Sept. 2019 NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy

2018-2019 Director for Security Policy / Deputy Political Director Federal Foreign Office

2016 - 2018 Director for Security Policy, Federal Foreign Office

2015 - 2016 Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany to Georgia

2012 - 2015 Head of Common Security and Defence Policy Division Federal Foreign Office

2009 - 2012 Deputy Head of Mission, German Embassy in Tehran, Iran

2006 - 2009 Head of Office, Minister of State for Europe, Federal Foreign Office

2004 - 2006 Deputy Head of Mission, German Embassy in Tallinn, Estonia

2000 - 2004 Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations, New York

1997 - 2000 Desk Officer "European Security and Defence Policy", Federal Foreign Office

1994 - 1997 First Secretary, German Embassy in Ankara, Turkey

1992 - 1994 Attachée, Foreign Service Academy

1988 - 1992 Cultural Affairs, Administrative District of Osnabrück

1986 - 1988 Freelance Journalist, Daily Paper "Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung"

Education: MA Humanities (Literature, Political Science) at Hannover University

Languages: German, English, French



MIRCEA GEOANĂ

NATO DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL

Mircea Geoană became NATO Deputy Secretary General in October 2019, after a distinguished domestic and international career. Mr Geoană is the first Deputy Secretary General from Romania, and the first from any of the countries that joined the Alliance after the end of the Cold War.

Mr Geoană was born in Romania on 14 July 1958. He studied at the Polytechnic University in Bucharest, the Faculty of Law of the University of Bucharest, the Ecole Nationale d'Administration in Paris, and he holds a PhD from the Economic Studies Academy of Bucharest. Mr Geoana has served as a diplomat and a politician, and in 2009 was his party's candidate to be President of Romania.

- 1991-1995: Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romania • 1993-1995: Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- 1996-2000: Romanian Ambassador to the United States.
- 2000-2004: Minister of Foreign Affairs
- 2001: President in Office of OSCE
- 2004-2016: Senator
- 2004-2008: Chair of the Senate Foreign Policy Committee
- 2005-2010: President of the Social Democratic Party
- 2008-2011: President of the Romanian Senate
- 2012-14: High Representative of the Romanian Government for Strategic Economic Projects and Public Diplomacy
- 2012-2014: Chair of the Parliamentary Committee for Romania's accession to the Schengen Area

Mr Geoană is a strong advocate of transatlantic integration and has held a number of international positions, including OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in 2001 and personal representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for Georgia in 2005. He is President and founder of the Aspen Institute Romania and has published extensively on domestic and international affairs.

In 2000, he was made a Commander of the National Order, The Star of Romania. He has also been awarded the French Legion d'Honneur and the Italian Stella della Solidarieta.

Mr Geoană is married to Mihaela, an architect by training and former President of the Romanian Red Cross. They have two children, Ana Maria and Alexandru. He is fluent in English, French, Spanish and Italian. You can follow Mr Geoană on Twitter (@Mircea_Geoana)



STATE SECRETARY LIVIA LEU

FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CHIEF NEGOTIATOR WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION

Livia Leu was born in Zurich and her place of origin is Truns in the canton of Graubünden. She studied at the University of Zurich and the University of Lausanne. She holds a degree in law and was admitted to the bar in the canton of Zurich.

After joining the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) in 1989, she completed her diplomatic service training in Bern, Paris and Geneva. She subsequently held various positions, including in the International Organisations Division, the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations in New York, the Swiss embassy in Cairo and the Americas Division and the Africa/Middle East Division, which she headed as ambassador.

From 2009 to 2013, she headed the Swiss embassy in Tehran, which also represents US interests. In August 2013, she took up her post as the Federal Council's delegate for trade agreements and head of Bilateral Economic Relations at the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) in Bern. From 2018 to October 2020, Livia Leu served as Swiss ambassador to France and Monaco. In October 2020, the Federal Council appointed her as FDFA state secretary and chief negotiator with the European Union.

Livia Leu is married and has two sons.



AMBASSADOR PATRICK WITTMANN

AMBASSADOR OF CANADA TO SWITZERLAND AND LIECHTENSTEIN

Patrick Wittmann studied at the University of Toronto and graduated with a BA Hons in History and Political Science in 1989. He continued his education at Oxford University, obtaining an MPhil in International Relations in 1991.

He worked as a special assistant to the head of the UN peacekeeping operation in Mozambique before joining Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 1995.

During his time in Canada, he was the director of the UN and Commonwealth Affairs Division and of the International Defence Relations Division. He also served as the first Canadian political adviser at the North American Aerospace Defence Command in Colorado.

Most recently, he was assistant secretary to the Cabinet, foreign and defence policy, at the Privy Council Office.

In January 2022, he was appointed ambassador of Canada to Switzerland and Liechtenstein, with a 4-year mandate.

He is fluent in English, French and German. He is married to Catherine Stewart; they have 3 sons.









Strategic Issues and Engagements Team Contact Details:

Strategic Issues and Engagements Branch

HQ SACT Strategic Plans and Policy

7857 Blandy Road, Suite 100

Norfolk, Virginia, USA 23551-2490

<http://www.act.nato.int>

SACTStrategicIssuesEngagements@act.nato.int