

SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION

# SACT's remarks to

# NATO Defence College visit

# Norfolk (ACT), 08 May 2017


# Général d'armée aérienne Denis MERCIER



- Welcome to Norfolk! I'm very happy to share some thoughts with you on NATO, and the role of my Command – before we start the day with the three syndicates, and we will discuss your findings this afternoon in a plenary session.
- You are THE college for NATO, you prepared for this visit and the syndicates, and your aim is to do a reality check of what you've discussed in an academic environment through readings, lectures and discussions with the work "in the field" – and my aim is for you to gain deeper knowledge and understanding of the main challenges for NATO, and in particular the role of ACT in all the work strands that deal with them, and how we do this.
- As you know, NATO is the only organization of its kind that has a permanent command structure.
- It is formed by our 2 strategic commands, ACO in Mons (Belgium) and ACT, here in Norfolk – and a number of subordinate commands and centers.

A COMMAND TRANSPORT





 As you can see ACT is the only NATO HQ on this side of the Atlantic (important because it materializes the Transatlantic link, presenting challenges but also opportunities) → your visit will hopefully also help you better understand why this linkage across the Atlantic is so important.


<u>A direct example</u>: protection of our SLOCs and the recent deployment of US and Canadian troops in Europe (1<sup>st</sup> time since end of Cold War).

• Since ACT is one of the two strategic commands of the Alliance, it is important to understand its role.

But first, this slide gives you a more detailed overview on how ACT is organized



#### SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION



# ACT Command

- CG (SACT, DSACT, COS, POLAD)
- 4 directorates : SPP, RM, CD and JFT
- 1 Bi-SC directorate : MPD
- 4 divisions : DP, CEI, C2DS (CD); JETE (JFT)
- JALLC, JWC and JFTC
- STRE (NATO HQ) and SEE (SHAPE)
- = Max 1050 people in 33 Branches

We prepare for the delivery of capabilities and training (exercises) based on the requirements from ACO, and we evaluate (based on Lessons Learned) the execution, to adapt and improve = in a national environment we would



be called "a joint warfare command", we are the "Strategic Warfare Command of the Alliance"

# Second, what is our role?

- ACT does not provide transformation. Transformation is not an end in itself. The real question is: **what do we transform?** 
  - We seek to transform NATO's military capacity. This requires the right posture for the Alliance to face challenges today and in the foreseeable future.
  - To adapt the Alliance's posture (and this is not new) we must understand our strategic environment – and more importantly "what has changed?".
  - I want to insist on ACT + ACO both being operational headquarters in an alternated supporting/supported role.
     ACT is not a think tank – while ACO "operates", we ACT prepare the "adaptation"

# **STRATEGIC CONTEXT**

- The security environment is complex, ambiguous and everchanging at a high pace (from complicated to complex)
- Complicated meant interacting with many factors, but that we could analyze and draw reasonable conclusions to drive our decisions.
- **Complex** means that there are so many factors interacting with each other that it is impossible to comprehend all the outcomes,



## SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION

thereby <u>making surprise more possible</u>, and decision-making based on imperfect information more commonplace.

- In this complex environment where surprise will be a factor to take into account, the threats and challenges are thus more diverse, and why do we call it "complex ?
  - The same state and non-state actors follow separate agendas but interact differently according to situations which makes understanding more complicated.
  - Not only in the North-Atlantic region, but 360 degrees, in the South, in the East, but also in the (high) North.
  - Not only geographical but also demographic and coupled with transnational risks (climate change, economic instability,...).
  - New forms of threats (Hybrid including Cyber and in fact more broader in the domain of Information Operations, terrorism, energy security,...)
  - The easy access to new technologies makes any form of threat more dangerous.
  - The threshold between peace crisis and conflict (peace and conflict is clear) – but crisis lays in a grey zone and is much more difficult to define.



• 4 phases in NATO history:

o 1949-1991: collective defence (post WWII and Cold War period) – I invite you to re-read the Atlantic treaty (should we have to re-write it today, we would see that it is still very valid).

o 1991-2001: cooperative security with the eastern enlargement but also the development of partnership (PfP, including with Russia) – and then we had 9/11...

o 2001-2014: focus on expeditionary operations and crisis management, with a strong emphasis on Afghanistan (nonarticle 5 operations)

o Since 2014: Ukraine crisis - the current phase (4th phase) with the returning emphasis on collective defence and at the same time projection of stability (360 degrees, and the interrelation of crises) –Warsaw Summit decisions (2016).  $\rightarrow$  **Russia is not an adversary, but a threat** – for the <u>unity</u> of our Alliance, that we need to keep at all price (it's one of our main challenges – stay united!).

# → Introduction of 2nd syndicate "Security Environment"

• The security environment in Europe, timeframe 2035, will be the theme for the second Syndicate.



- It will cover the future trends and the military implications (and I will come back to this) that will shape the foreseeable future in which we will evolve.
- The threats for NATO as an Alliance are transregional + multidomain + multifunctional, and you will discuss in particular the role of Russia.
- NATO is the collective defence of 1 billion people, and 50% of the world's GDP. To shape the future, the role of ACT is instrumental, but we're not alone you must see our work connected to the work in ACO and with that in the Nations (we work for the same Alliance).
- Our role is to deliver the best possible military advice for the political decision-makers. We must do this straightforward, and across all work strands that are all linked to each other.
- I'm looking forward to hear how you see ACT's role in this fast changing environment (Hybrid Warfare, including Cyber, Info Ops, Technological evolution), to prepare for the Alliance's adaptation (across all domains) while we operate – and the impact on the development of future capabilities.
- In this complex context, even if the assumptions have changed, the Strategic Concept of 2010 has not changed
   – as well as the 3 core tasks, but they are more and more overlapping:
  - We have to be able to carry out these tasks in a more integrated way than before.
  - Because the crises we face are interrelated.
  - <u>This is a huge task!</u> A combination of "Collective Defence –
    Cooperative Security Crisis Management" missions requires



### SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION

Forces with an appropriate combination of capabilities with new levels of readiness, and a Command Structure capable to perform simultaneously all the required functions.

 This is why both SCs are currently contributing to a Functional Adaptation report of the NCS.

(I will come back to that later)

- We cannot "regionalize" conflicts: addressing them requires the combination of a wide range of actors – this is why <u>partnerships</u> are so important (we cannot imagine NATO operations without partners - no one nation/organization has all the capabilities on its own to manage a crisis, it was maybe the case before, but it is no longer a reality).
- ACT has to focus on the adaptation of our posture supporting today's missions with a view on the foreseeable future (<u>operate and adapt</u>).
- It is the combination of the new strategic context with the ongoing adaptation efforts that could lead to review the Strategic Concept.
- In this context: what is the right posture for NATO?
  - Posture = the right mix of forces (conventional nuclear missile defence) at the right levels of readiness.
  - Readiness and responsiveness are key for the credibility of the Alliance (credibility = capabilities, resolve and messaging).
  - The complexity of the new security environment called for a new posture whose foundation was laid at the 2014 Wales Summit with the adaptation measures (RAP) but it was only the 1<sup>st</sup> step.



# **ADAPTATION MEASURES IN THE PRESENT**

- The 2016 Warsaw Summit expanded on this adaptation and went further:
  - The main theme of the Warsaw Summit was building a renewed and robust defence and deterrence posture and projecting stability across NATO's borders.
  - The adaptation of NATO's posture will be conducted in both :
    - Defence and Deterrence
    - Projecting Stability
  - 2017 is a crucial year for the implementation of the post-Summit tasks.
- Defence and Deterrence :
  - The deployment of the Enhanced Forward Presence in Poland and the Baltic States, and the Tailored Forward Presence in the Black Sea region constitute what we can call a "first wave or line of forces" contributing to deter a potential aggression :
    - eFP: to enhance NATO's military presence in the eastern part of the Alliance, with four battalions in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, on a rotational basis, robust (combat ready) and multinational, to be fully operational by June 2017 – and in this context, the renewed commitment of CAN and US troops in Europe is a very strong sign (ERI – European Reassurance Initiative, US Heavy Bde on 6 months rotation) and it is the first time since the end of the Cold War!



- tFP: to enhance NATO's military presence for our south-eastern flank and built around a Romanian framework brigade, under Multinational Division Southeast, and supplemented by improving the readiness and interoperability of air and maritime forces in the Black Sea region.
- ✓ Cyber defence pledge: cyber = 5<sup>th</sup> domain, in the Hybrid environment we cannot imagine anything without Cyber – it is now recognized as an operational domain (joining land, air, sea and space) and must be integrated from the onset in our capabilities and networks – in operations, missions and training and exercises.
- Missile Defence: the NATO ballistic missile defence system has now been declared Initially Operationally Capable - this means that the sea-based US Aegis BMD vessels (based in Spain), the landbased early warning radar in Turkey and the land-based interceptor missile site in Romania are now able to work together under NATO command and control.
- The focus on Collective Defence (Art 5) and MJO+ is THE driver for our capabilities (higher end/higher readiness) – and the NDPP (a complete process – not a catalogue) has targeted 100% of the MCR (Minimum Capabilities Requirements) to the nations, with 100% acceptance – to be approved by the Defence Ministers end of June.
  - This is a very good start, but now these targets (capabilities) must be delivered – so we must link to the national defence plans.



 The delivery of some targets will take more time, so we must include long term aspects – and take into account the game changers in the 15-20y ahead – this will be a topic of the COTC this year (maybe some of you will participate for your nation?).

# → Introduction of 1<sup>st</sup> syndicate "Resilience"

- In the execution of these adaptation measures and combined the complex security environment, we cannot foresee everything, we will be surprised so it will be important that we prepare for quick recovery from initial shocks
   so we need to build resilience for the protection of our populations (ultimate goal). This will be the theme for the first syndicate.
- Building resilience, we cannot do this alone, we must work together with the public – a whole of government approach - and with the private sector (industry, academia, etc.).
- Last week we held, here in Norfolk, the first international Resilience Conference (34 nations) – co-organized with the city of Norfolk (world leading city for resilience) and the Old Dominium University. Key word = interdependencies.
- I'm looking forward to hear from <u>you</u> how we can best prepare for this, and how can ACT work on resilience across all work strands – it will be interesting to compare your findings or thoughts with those of last week's conference, more specifically on :



# SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION

- How to set the conditions for an increased cooperation (eco-system, share vulnerabilities, role of the nations and organizations vs their reluctance to exchange sensitive information);
- Component of the credibility of our posture (not just a military problem, full-spectrum resilience, e.g. reliance on contracting in Logistics and Sustainability);

Training and Education: we must also exercise failure of support in infrastructure, transport, medical, etc. and train together.

- Projecting Stability :
  - The adaptation of the way we do Partnerships is an important effort to improve the support to the projection of stability.
  - NATO has 41 partners (and 5 enhanced partners Finland, Sweden, Jordan, Georgia and Australia)
  - ✓ When it comes to countering the terror threat, a persistent, flexible and resilient network with partners will be vital to both receive and provide early warning and anticipate security demands.
  - ✓ As part of NATO's Framework for the South, a Hub for the South at our Joint Force Command in Naples, will as a focal point increase understanding of the challenges in that region improve the relationship with Partners, both nations and IOs. It is important to be <u>in the region</u> to do that. My recent visit to <u>Jordan</u> has clearly demonstrated this.



- ✓ In particular also a strong focus on NATO-EU: a Joint Declaration identified key areas for expanding our cooperation, in seven areas: countering hybrid threats, operations, cyber defence, defence capabilities, exercises, increasing maritime security and training and capacity building for our partners.
- There are many partnership initiatives with NATO There is a lot of overlapping in these many initiatives, so duplication of effort and resources could be avoided if we identify the same functions and try to streamline them – that is why we are conducting a Functional Analysis of our Partnerships. It is a first step to identify where we can simplify, optimize and synchronize; and also improve the coordination with organizations and nations.
- The ITRs(Individually Tailored Roadmaps) are not just a list of activities, but shared objectives with a 3-5 year roadmap (to build stability takes time and we must offer a longer term perspective with a plan to make this happen, Ref. to Afghanistan and Iraq).
- → Introduction of 3rd syndicate "Projecting Stability"
- Projecting Stability will be the theme for the third syndicate, including its role in the fight against terrorism.
- Let me repeat what I said at the SMPC in October last year: "Despite the complexity of the strategic environment, the remaining uncertainties and the high pace of technological innovation both present challenges as well as new opportunities.
- So we can use these new opportunities offered by <u>Partnership activities</u> to build on common grounds, and <u>to enhance connectivity</u> and <u>improve</u>



#### SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION

<u>continuous awareness</u>. This is an era when no single nation or actor dominates the sphere of international security.

- In response, nations and international organizations, or NATO must foster partnerships that both reflect the scope of emerging security challenges and are capable of sustaining political and operational advantages amidst change and uncertainty.
- Our peace and security increasingly depend on NATO's success <u>in</u> <u>maintaining, expanding and being receptive for a responsive and</u> <u>adaptable network of most divergent partners</u>."
  - The risk, however, is to implement these decisions while focusing too much on the present (what we improve in the short/medium term must remain relevant for the longer term).

Quote of Peter Drucker : "it is not about taking future decisions, but about the future of current decisions"

- While we are operating (deployment of the eFP, tFP, supporting combat ready troops in the first line), we must also adapt (to make sure that these current measures remain relevant in the foreseeable future).
- One SC cannot go without the other: ACO leads the operating effort, but supported by ACT, while ACT leads the adaptation effort, supported by ACO. It is a combined and permanent effort.



# ADAPTATION FOR THE FUTURE – "OPERATE and ADAPT"

- NATO must be ready to face today's challenges but must also keep the edge in a rapidly changing environment.
  - This is the main idea that we focus on at ACT: improve today, shape tomorrow and bridge the two.
  - How do we achieve this?
- We produce analyses on the trends of future operations, challenges and potential technologies. These trends are described by the SFA and the FFAO, documents that look out to the 30-year horizon (I highly recommend you to read these documents – and we are updating them, SFA this year, and FFAO next year).

By the way – you can participate – by connecting to our Innovation Hub

- We have identified the need for a transition between short-term and longer-term adaptation:
  - We must try to identify the potential game-changers and technological breakthroughs at the 15-year mark.
  - The purpose is to put our actions in a broader perspective and assess how our actions today will shape our future capacity.
- We strive to put the implementation of the outcomes of Warsaw in a larger perspective and bring coherence.



- But we do not only focus on capabilities. Responsiveness does not solely rely on the responsiveness of our forces (even forces with the highest levels of readiness is not enough), but must include other areas to englobe the total spectrum of our missions.
- We identified 6 areas: C2, logistics and sustainability, exercises and training, partnerships, capabilities and human capital – as pillars of a <u>robust military posture</u> through an incremental approach.
- Why these 6: because we believe they are the foundation of our posture, necessary to ensure the appropriate levels of readiness and responsiveness.
  - C2 (I mean C4ISTAR): robust, permanent Command and Control (Ref. FA NCS) – NATO is the only organization of its kind that has this.
  - Logistics & Sustainability: we need to be able to deploy and sustain our forces – L&S are national responsibilities, but how do we organize it.
  - E&T: refocus on MJO+ and we must train together before we can operate together (incl. interoperability, but also STRATCOM).
  - Capabilities: Ref. to our NDPP, incl. long term aspects and mitigation of prioritized shortfalls not just a catalogue.
  - Partnerships: NATO will no longer operate without Partners.
  - Human Capital: train our future leaders for this complex environment, new technologies, common standards (I think



## SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION

our human capital is even more important than it was before)

- These 6 areas constitute the back-bone of our work, with the following principles:
  - o Identify game-changers and potential breakthroughs
  - Define an integrating vision consistently with the long-term adaptation (15 years ahead)
  - Bridge the short-term and long-term objectives: our short-term
    Programme of Work (the implementation of Warsaw outcomes)
    needs to be consistent with the building of this vision.
  - All these focus areas also require cooperation with other actors to fuel our reflection (think tanks, academia) and to monitor the potential outcomes (technology, industry).
- Regarding C2, both SCs have been tasked to conduct a Functional Assessment – and we identified limits when dealing with the maximum level of ambition, being a MJO+. To mitigate the identified shortfalls, there are different options.
- Our most demanding objective is to be able to execute an MJO+ (CADO) – and the question is, what is the C2 structure we need for this mission? We must use a C2 structure based on the NCS, parts of the NFS, national and other structures.
- To do so, we consider a new approach, and we promote the idea of a persistent federated approach. It is a different approach from what we do today, based on the following principles: agile, networked,



# SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION

and based on the full Alliance's capacity, resilient and avoiding duplication.

- It is about better use of what already exists, leveraging it through existing structures, using it on a day-to-day basis (making it persistent), but without taking ownership nor duplicating the effort.
- It is important to make it persistent because otherwise we will not really know if it works, is everything interoperable and is everything fit for purpose?
- It could apply to everything we do: C2, Capabilities, Training and Exercises, Logistics and Partnerships and Human Capital.
  - It is already applied, or partially applied, across several other work strands line AirC2, Cyber, Strategic Awareness, Sea Lines of Communication,... so it is not entirely new or a radical change.
- A similar approach is used in the civilian world. Although the objectives from civilian companies are different, they too have to deal with the same complex environment. And some of the most innovative companies have managed to adapt faster to the 21st century than the Defence sector. They have in fact been very successful in maintaining their daily businesses while constantly adapting to a fast moving environment that is constantly challenging them.
- I have visited some of them last month in the Silicon Valley, and I drew some of the principles they have adopted for this adaptation:
  - No organization can solve all problems alone;
  - Strategic awareness and understanding the evolution of the environment are essential, and most information is available in open sources;



### SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION

- Development of a wider network of partners is key but must rely on the dynamism of eco-systems rather than a logic of contract;
- A main strategic resource is data, and the ways to collect, concentrate, exploit and distribute them leads the transformation of organizations;
- In a technology-centric environment, human capital is essential, even more than it was before;
- And finally, emerging disruptive technologies will continue to impact our lifestyles, businesses and numerous sectors of the economy.
   Big data, cloud computing, artificial intelligence, advanced analytics and cognitive computing will challenge current business models and create new ones.
- We could apply these same principles, but adapted to our own requirements.
- This would mean that :
  - We develop interoperability standards (FMN);
  - We exercise this approach;
  - We change Policies to make this federation a daily practice;
  - And we define clear transitions between peacetime and crisis, and make clear C2 arrangements to support this.

# The PFA is not an objective on itself, but a tool to meet NATO's LoA.

 Finally, it will reinforce cohesion and unity within the Alliance (= main underlining theme of the Warsaw Summit!), and with all nations and partners that share the same common values.



- These are a few examples of the concrete areas we work on at ACT.
  - We are the "strategic warfare command" of the Alliance
  - ACT and ACO are both operational commands we work together for NATO.
- As we look at this foreseeable future, we can clearly see it will require a common and global effort.
- I thank you for your attention and I'm looking forward to the discussions across the outcomes of your syndicates later today.