

# SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION

# SACT's proposed outline for ACT-EDA Joint Intervention at EUMC/CS

Brussels, 07 Nov 16, 1600-1700

As delivered

**SACT** 

Général d'armée aérienne Denis MERCIER

# SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION

#### → Gen Mercier

General KOSTARAKOS, Chairman of the European Union Military Committee,

Admirals, Generals,

#### Ladies and Gentlemen,

I'm very pleased to be here today and to address the Military Committee of the EU in CHODs session.

My aim is to demonstrate the development of a practical informal relationship between Allied Command Transformation and the European Defence Agency, and to share with you my views on the way forward.

The changed and evolving security environment demands the ability to meet challenges and threats of any kind and from any direction (360 degree dimension, not only geographically speaking but also in terms of the wide range of actors and threats involved in potential crises)

Since nations in the Euro-Atlantic area will face common threats and challenges, the response to future crises will necessitate a better coordination with a wider span of actors. The interconnection of our security calls for a new level of ambition in a context of mutual reinforcement.

At the Warsaw Summit, the NATO-EU Joint Declaration clearly recognized this new reality and underscored the necessity to give new

# SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION

impetus and new substance to the strategic partnership between both organizations.

Within this scope, our objective is to develop concrete solutions to enhance this partnership, within the framework of the Joint Declaration.

Alongside its engagement with all the relevant actors, ACT has developed a practical relationship with the European Defence Agency, based on the following guiding principles:

- Avoid the unnecessary duplication of effort between our organizations,
- Operate without prejudice to the specific character of the defence policy of any ally or member state,
- Mutually benefit from the respective strengths of each organization.

Within these principles, we have identified five initial areas on which our respective staffs are working together:

- Capability development with a focus on foresight analysis and future perspectives;
- 2. Impact of hybrid threats on capability development, which leads to cooperation on technological solutions and aspects of resilience;
- Exploitation of lessons learned from operations and exercises to ensure we are able to integrate relevant findings into our respective capability development processes;
- 4. Military Aviation, specifically Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems.

# SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION

5. Chemical, Biological Radiological and Nuclear defence (CBRN), which would encompass both civilian and military aspects of protection.

These five areas present a wide range of possibilities for enhanced cooperation.

Let me develop some of these identified areas of cooperation.

=== 1. Prospective and futures work ===

At last month's NATO Defence Ministers meetings, the ministers highlighted the need to bring more coherence in the Defence Planning processes.

First, both NATO, with our Strategic Foresight Analysis, and the EU, with Strand B, produce analyses on the future trends of conflicts. These trends are obviously similar, even though they may have different military implications for each organization. The Strategic Foresight Analysis is one of the baseline inputs on which Strand B is built, so this is a great example of complementarity to be taken forward and to develop better ways to share the same prospective view of the future.

The objective would be to develop a shared analysis, from which we could derive our respective military implications. This analysis should also include the potential technological breakthroughs for the medium to long-term outlook.

=== 2. Capability Development ===

Regarding capability development, we already exchange some information about our respective defence planning processes. But, we still

# SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION

face a number of issues: for example, we still have our own capability databases. Even though the databases serve different purposes, there is a need for coherence of output between both defence planning processes.

As far as capability development is concerned, let me offer you a few other ideas:

- First, we could share our analysis of the required capabilities to mitigate the identified shortfalls in our respective planning processes.
   A lot of progress is already ongoing since EDA has been attending the NDPP meetings, but this could go further and offer an opportunity to harmonise the solutions to mitigate the identified shortfalls.
- In a common effort to mitigate these shortfalls, we could be able to develop innovative solutions.
- We could then identify the best option to implement these innovative solutions, including multinational initiatives such as NATO Smart Defence, Framework Nation Concept or EU Pooling and Sharing, and how these might best be taken forward.

#### === 3. CBRN ===

Without being directly related to the Joint Declaration, CBRN is inherently related to building capability resilience.

 CBRN defence capabilities are a promising opportunity as they are also dual-purpose in nature. The objective would be to seek how we



### SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION

could develop a coordinated approach for protection standards and doctrine.

 Building resilience against CBRN threats and a joint mapping effort on capability-related projects (such as Biological Detection Equipment) could offer quick solutions.

These are but a few examples. All these strands of work are achievable, and will help build momentum towards real practical outcomes.

In all the above mentioned work strands experts from ACT and EDA have started to work on, with the aim of delivering tangible output.

As far as Military Aviation and Remotely-Piloted Air Systems is concerned, ACT is developing a Joint Air Power Strategy for NATO, which would offer another area for complementarity.

Finally, whilst the Cyber domain has not been part of our initial work, it does form part of the NATO-EU Joint Declaration, and it is intrinsically connected to all efforts to boost our ability to counter hybrid threats.

Before leaving the floor to the EDA, I would like to thank you General Kostarakos, Admirals, Generals, Chiefs of Defence of the EU and members of the EU Military Committee to have this opportunity to address these few points with you.

This work we have started with EDA will continue to be transparent to all interested parties in both organisations. With your support, and the resolute commitment from all relevant actors through the appropriate

# SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER TRANSFORMATION

staff coordination mechanisms, we will aim to provide tangible results while avoiding unnecessary duplication.

But I would insist that these results will really depend upon a strong political support to our initiatives!

Thank you for your attention