Netherlands Defence Doctrine
Netherlands
Defence Doctrine
In these times of financial crisis, the Defence organisation has to work hard to remain affordable and relevant for the long term. Furthermore, we are going all out to make sure our armed forces can make a difference and stand out for their quality, versatility and power of renewal. My philosophy is that whatever we do, we must do it well. That cannot happen without simplifying structures and processes, without joint planning, preparation and execution of operations, or without having units and materiel that can be deployed interoperably.

Yet it is not these developments that necessitate new doctrine. That has been prompted above all by the rapidly growing complexity of the environment in which operations are conducted and the developments in the ideas behind the deployment of instruments of power. It has also become clear that certain topics at joint level require specific doctrine and no longer need to be discussed in detail in the Netherlands Defence Doctrine (NDD). This specific doctrine can be found in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 5, Command and control, and JDP 2, Intelligence. This generates a more straightforward structure of joint doctrine publications, in line with those of NATO.

In this revised NDD, greater emphasis is placed on the use of the comprehensive approach as a common denominator for certain operational concepts. The context of the environment and the situation in which military personnel have to operate is given more attention. An understanding of ‘factors and actors’ in an increasingly complex environment is crucial for the commander, the planner, the military adviser or the diplomat. The context may be so important in some situations that it could or should prevail over adherence to military principles. Understanding of the context ensures a more precise and more widely considered decision. More than ever before, context has become an inherent part of doctrine.

This NDD centres on joint, multinational and interagency operations and describes the Services as part of the bigger picture and along the lines of the particular domain in which they operate.

Tom Middendorp
General
Chief of Defence of the Netherlands
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Introduction

Background
The Netherlands Defence Doctrine (NDD) was first published in 2005 as a result of the growing cooperation between the individual Services, developments in respect of doctrine within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and changes in the Defence organisation. The former Advisory Commission on the Future Role of the Chief of the Defence Staff underlined the fact that doctrine, particularly joint doctrine, was one of the tools available to the Chief of Defence to substantiate his role as corporate operator.

After more than seven years, the nature of military operations has evolved further. Military deployment, particularly in Afghanistan and around Somalia, and the experiences gained from it have shown that operations are more joint in nature than ever before. Ideas about the essence of the military contribution in upholding the international legal order, understanding of contributions to conflict management and collaboration in the development of permanent solutions have all progressed further, and it is these developments that have led to this revision of the Netherlands Defence Doctrine (NDD).

Doctrine in a historical context
Ever since the Age of Enlightenment, there has been a growing belief in Europe that the nature and manner of warfighting could be fathomed by study and analysis. The end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century saw the start of a wave of military publications. It was during this period that many (military) authors took the first step towards describing ‘laws of war’ and lessons learned from military operations. The most famous of these were Switzerland’s Jomini and Prussia’s Von Clausewitz. At the same time, professionalisation and the trend towards mass warfare since the time of the French Revolution meant that armed forces now needed to set out their future actions in doctrine. Here, they defined the functions of the Services during a conflict and the way in which (large) formations could achieve their objectives. These descriptions created unity of opinion and channelled military thinking at the different organisational levels. Military history was regarded as the primary source of this doctrine writing.

The first doctrines provided unambiguous guidelines for the planning, execution and completion of military tasks. Even then there was a certain stratification. There were

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1 The definition of ‘joint’ will be discussed in paragraph 4.6.1.
publications which described operations by ‘large units’ at strategic level, as well as publications which dealt with the tactical actions of arms and branches, and manuals for operating at technical level, the modern ‘Tactics, Techniques and Procedures’. The correlation between the various publications and the level of detail was still limited.

The Netherlands armed forces issued various doctrine publications over the course of the 20th century, relating mainly to land and air operations. In 1925, the Air Arm of the army issued the ‘Directive for use of Air Forces’, with the emphasis on operations by the air arm in larger army units, such as what was then the field army or a division. In 1926, the army introduced the ‘Manual for combat by large units’ (the Combat manual). The army doctrine dealt exclusively with the large-scale conflict, in which the operations, in all forms of combat, were on the whole fairly methodical.

Responsibility for the execution of the internal and external security task in the Dutch East Indies lay with the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) and the Royal Netherlands Navy (RNLN). The KNIL developed its own doctrine, which focused on counter-guerrilla warfare in order to fight anti-colonial resistance. The core of the colonial approach consisted of small groups of indigenous troops who were under the command of a Dutch lieutenant and who, armed with carabines and klewang, hunted insurgents in the jungle. The method of using these mobile units proved successful and served as a model for operations by all KNIL infantry. It was laid down in the ‘Regulations for the execution of the army’s political police task’ (VPTL in Dutch), but after the departure of the Dutch from the East Indies, any knowledge of this faded away.

In the 1950s, the Dutch armed forces were reinforced to be able to perform a defensive task under NATO. For the army, this primarily meant the co-defence of the IJssel-Rhine line, but the allocated defence sector later shifted to German territory. The Dutch Services also had a NATO-based task in the air and at sea. The navy concentrated on the protection of convoys (sea lines of communication, SLOC), and the air force focused on the fight for air superiority and ground-based air defence. It was in this period that the army developed its own, national (land) doctrine. Because of the way air and naval operations were embedded internationally, the RNLN and the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF) based their operations mainly on NATO doctrine, supplemented with national tasks and those in Dutch overseas territories.

The 1960s saw the implementation of a number of amendments, partly because of the advent of tactical nuclear weapons. During this period, NATO doctrine was based on the
principle of forward defence, whereby NATO troops would first have to delay and halt the attacker, after which the original situation would be restored by a large-scale counterattack, with or without the support of tactical nuclear weapons. The planning and direction of operations was centralised.

At the end of the 1960s, NATO introduced the flexible response. In theory, this defence concept was to be non-nuclear. In principle, NATO operations remained defensive in nature, focusing mainly on the wholesale attrition of the enemy and the execution of a decisive counterattack. A hallmark of the situation in the 1950s and 1960s was that the individual Services were largely involved in waging their own war. The concept of joint operations was still in its infancy, and multinational operations were mainly the domain of the navy and the air force.

In the 1980s, the conventional ascendancy of the Warsaw Pact had increased significantly, and to be able to deal with this successfully, the Americans developed the AirLand Battle doctrine, which was partially adopted by NATO in its follow-on forces attack (FOFA) concept. With this, the Alliance was counting on its technological superiority, which would also make it possible to attack the enemy in the depth. This method of warfighting required a great deal of planning and coordination between the various command levels and units.

In 1989, the armed forces were still adapting their doctrines to this new concept when the Iron Curtain was suddenly swept away. In the years that followed, the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union came to an end, and suddenly the NATO allies no longer had an enemy that could be identified in advance. The fixation on a major conflict disappeared and attention turned once again to other forms of military operation.

In the mid-1990s, the Services produced revised doctrines which were more in keeping with the new situation. In 1996, the air force’s Airpower Doctrine and the general Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) ‘Military Doctrine’ were issued; these were the umbrella documents containing, respectively, the general principles of air and land operations. Because the spectrum of deployment options had increased significantly, the army doctrine was issued in several parts; subsequent volumes dealt with ‘Combat operations’, ‘Peace operations’ and ‘National operations’. This new doctrine was based on the guiding principles of the manoeuvrist approach and mission command. In 2005, following on from the publication of the first Netherlands Defence Doctrine, an operational guidance document on the maritime component of military operations was issued, namely the Navy Field Manual for Maritime Operations.
Purpose and importance of the Netherlands Defence Doctrine (NDD)

Unity of opinion. Like other large organisations with a great diversity of work spheres and disciplines, armed forces must have the ability to manage complex activities and ensure that organisational objectives are realised. Armed forces must also be able to adapt rapidly to changing circumstances and to continue to function effectively in chaotic and life-threatening situations. Military personnel must be able to cope with complex situations and to act responsibly in extreme conditions. They have to be able to operate independently, possibly in isolation from each other and in accordance with the ethical and moral principles to which the Defence organisation adheres, as well as the set operational and logistic guidelines. For this, unity of opinion within the organisation is essential. This unity of opinion is also relevant in situations in which the connection between the Dutch military contribution and the national interest is not self-evident, particularly in operations designed to uphold and promote the international rule of law. The professionalism and resolve of individual military personnel and units are supported by placing the Dutch military contribution in the right context. At the tactical level, this unity of opinion means that actions are performed in the spirit of the military organisation in general and of the individual commanders in particular.

Means of control for the Chief of Defence. Doctrine also paves the way for the planning, preparation and execution of military operations, making the operations more efficient and more effective than they would be without unity of opinion. Joint doctrine provides the Chief of Defence (CHOD) with a means of control, also for the activities of his own staff directorates. Since 2005, the CHOD has played a key role in managing the Services (operational commands) and the deployments of the Netherlands armed forces. The NDD supports the CHOD in guiding the way in which the armed forces are deployed in the context of Dutch security policy.

National policy context. The NDD places doctrine in a Dutch context. Although NATO doctrine forms the basis for Dutch thinking with regard to the use of the military instrument, this doctrine is ultimately the product of a consensus. This means that national emphasis may differ from what is expressed in NATO doctrine. The NDD is the document in which these Dutch accents are highlighted. It provides the common framework that enables joint deployment of the armed forces. The growing interlacing of operations by units from different Services and the ever-increasing collaboration with other departments and (government) organisations mean that unity of opinion about the conduct of military operations is essential. The NDD substantiates this and provides guidance for the thinking on the conduct of operations by the armed forces in general and by the individual Services
in collaboration with each other. This not only makes collaboration more straightforward, but also ensures better mutual understanding.

**Transparency.** The NDD also serves as a reference work for other actors who are in any way involved in military missions. To enable collaboration, a clear definition needs to be given of the principles that form the basis for the deployment of the armed forces and of the way in which operations are to be conducted. This will ensure that transparency is achieved for other actors, and this transparency will benefit anyone who, for whatever reason, wishes to familiarise himself with Dutch military doctrine.

**New in this doctrine** is a strong emphasis on the use of the comprehensive approach as a common denominator for certain operational concepts. The NDD issued in 2005 spoke only about ‘integrated operations’. Conflicts are characterised to an ever-increasing extent by the actions of irregular groups or elements that are not bound by government or any state authority. Today’s commander needs to be increasingly mindful of a growing and diverse assortment of ‘actors and factors’ and thus of a considerably more complex operational environment. Parallel to the introduction of the comprehensive approach, joint, multinational and interagency operations dominate the foreground more than ever before. Lastly, specific doctrine has been developed for certain aspects at joint level, such as command and control and intelligence; consequently, these subjects will no longer be discussed in detail in this NDD.

**Target groups**
The NDD is primarily intended for commanders and staffs at the military-strategic, operational and higher tactical level. It also forms the basis for military education, the military training environment and for the further study of doctrine-related subjects. Another target group is thus the military student or trainee. The NDD also forms the starting point for the Dutch contribution to allied doctrine development and for the further development of derived doctrine publications. This target group comprises researchers and doctrine developers. Finally, in the context of mutual understanding, the NDD is also designed for non-military personnel in the Ministry of Defence and for personnel in other ministries and non-military organisations.

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2 The comprehensive approach and the instruments or means of power at the government’s disposal are discussed in Chapter 1.

3 For example, information operations, effects-based approach and network-enabled capabilities.

4 Collaboration and coordination with international and non-governmental organisations are elaborated further in paragraph 2.6.2.
Definition of military doctrine

Military doctrine is the formal expression of military thinking, valid for a particular period of time. Doctrine is general, descriptive, and not prescriptive in nature. It describes fundamentals, principles and preconditions for military operations at the various levels of military action, and is thus the unifying element that guarantees unambiguous definitions and ensures that the same approach is used by all commanders in the planning and execution of military operations. This precludes the need for extensive explanations and discussions at critical moments. Doctrine provides a common frame of reference for actions and ensures unity of opinion. Yet doctrine is certainly neither dogma nor a set of rules; it must always be applied with common sense.

The term ‘doctrine’ does not have the same meaning as the term ‘concept’. Concepts are ideas, developed in response to changes in the security environment or with a focus on new technologies. Before concepts can be incorporated into doctrine, they must be studied, tested, analysed and validated, and ultimately finalised. Only then can they be referred to as doctrine.

Doctrine is based largely on past experience, but it also contains forward-looking elements. Doctrine reveals implicitly where shortcomings lie. It can also influence requirements in terms of the organisation, personnel and equipment of a military force. Its function is not to set out a series of specific rules, but to provide guidance for decision making, for the actions of service personnel and for the thinking about the most effective use of military power.

Unité de doctrine ensures unity of opinion in a broader sense in joint and multinational operations in larger groups. This helps to achieve interoperability5 and thus an anchor point for seamless collaboration

Position of the NDD

The Netherlands Defence Doctrine cannot exist in isolation. From the point of view of interoperability, it is closely related to the doctrine of multinational organisations, particularly to that of NATO. Apart from that, doctrine also stems from policy documents and from lessons learned in practice. The NDD is the national umbrella doctrine document6, which means that it forms the basis for all other Dutch doctrine publications.

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5 Interoperability refers to the capacity for procedures and systems from different organisations to be coordinated with each other and to work together (see paragraph 4.4.3).
6 The term capstone document is used internationally.
this reason, a national doctrinal structure has been developed, similar to that of NATO, and this structure ensures a vertical separation in levels and a horizontal separation according to subject.

Derived directly from the NDD are the domain-specific doctrines: Grondslagen Maritieme Optreden (“Fundamentals of Maritime Operations”) (GMO), Doctrinepublicatie Landoptreden (“Doctrine Publication for Land Operations”) (DPLO) and Airpower & Space Doctrine (APSD). These domain-specific doctrines (for the maritime, land and air domains) in turn form the basis for derivative publications within those domains. Even more detail can be found in manuals and regulations; these publications are often mainly prescriptive in nature which means that, strictly speaking, they do not fall into the category of doctrine.

As well as domain-specific doctrine, there are also doctrines for specific subjects that transcend a particular Service or domain. These are issued in the form of Joint Doctrine Publications (JDP), examples of which are JDP-2 ‘Intelligence’ and JDP-5 ‘Command and Control’. These are subjects which require defence-wide unity of opinion.

Sources of doctrine

One important source of doctrine is practical experience. The lessons that stem from the practical application of doctrine, or, as the case arises, from operations for which no doctrine (yet) exists, may prompt the revision of existing doctrine or the development of a new one. The armed forces usually operate in a multinational context and in collaboration with other government and non-governmental organisations. To ensure the required interoperability, the different doctrines must be closely in line with each other. The main fora in this respect are NATO, the EU and the UN, of which NATO’s doctrine development is the most advanced. It is for this reason that the NDD is based mainly on NATO joint doctrine, as expressed in the Allied Joint Publications (AJP). The EU has a framework for EU military conceptual documents. This framework contains a structure of conceptual and doctrinal documents for the deployment of military means in an EU context; this structure is based on NATO doctrine at all levels.

Doctrine is also based on policy documents, as doctrine follows policy. Just as NATO’s AJP series is based on NATO policy, the NDD too is based on national policy, on ministerial policy documents and the CHOD’s Military Strategic Vision. In the development of joint

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7 At the time of issue of this NDD, the GMO, DPLO and APSD were still being developed.
8 The most recent policy document is the memorandum entitled ‘Defence after the credit crunch: a smaller force in a troubled world’, Parliamentary Document 32 733 no.1, 8 April 2011.
and domain-specific doctrine, NATO doctrine is followed as closely as possible (ideally on a one-for-one basis), given that this doctrine will normally have been ratified by the Netherlands. Another source of doctrine is scientific research, when fundamental and structural studies are conducted on the deployment of military power. In the accompanying scientific debate, theory and practice are brought together, which can impact on principles of doctrine. Lastly, collaboration with non-military actors (such as international and non-governmental organisations) might require that military doctrine be more in keeping with the principles and work methods of those non-military organisations. Efforts will need to focus increasingly on the exchange of knowledge and on coordination to gain a better insight into and understanding of the principles upon which the actions of both types of organisation are based.

Validity of doctrine for the Netherlands armed forces

The way in which the Netherlands armed forces operate is in principle based on national doctrine. From the point of view of interoperability, national doctrine is primarily based upon – or brought into line with – ratified NATO doctrine. National doctrine is, therefore, no longer developed or published if it can be taken one-for-one from NATO doctrine, as the Netherlands armed forces were involved in its development and have approved it. After this publication, Dutch joint doctrine will only be written and issued for subjects not covered by NATO doctrine or in which specific Dutch aspects need to be emphasised, in cases where the Dutch vision differs from that accepted within NATO or if clarification is needed for the tactical level. NATO doctrine which is adopted one-for-one as national doctrine (possibly with a number of specified exceptions or additions) will be given a title and place within the Netherlands doctrine structure and finalised accordingly by the CHOD.

Structure of the NDD

The way in which the Netherlands armed forces are deployed cannot be regarded without the context in which that deployment occurs. The first consideration is the national and international environment in which the armed forces operate. Next is the armed forces’ product, namely military power. The NDD closes with the principles that guide the deployment of that military power. The chapter structure of the NDD is, therefore, as follows:

- Chapter 1 – The (inter)national environment describes the national and international actors and factors that exert influence, the means of power at the state’s disposal, the mechanisms that play a role in dealing with opposing interests and the conflict cycle.

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9 Doctrine is seldom a direct result of scientific studies, but it is often the result of an iterative process between applied science and practice; examples are the effects-based approach, the manoeuvrlist approach and the comprehensive approach.
- Chapter 2 – *Dutch security policy* describes Dutch security policy in general terms in the context of international security policy.
- Chapter 3 – *The armed forces as a government instrument* looks at the role of the military in government policy and the anchoring in state structures.
- Chapter 4 – *Military power* describes the contribution made by the armed forces in realising government policy in the form of military power.
- Chapter 5 - *Military doctrine* introduces the principles that underlie the deployment of military power.

Each chapter contains a military historical context. They also contain text boxes, in which important principles are highlighted.
1. The national and international environment

1.1. Introduction

The Netherlands does not stand alone in the world, but exerts influence on other states, international organisations and various actors. In reverse, these states, organisations and actors also affect the Netherlands, its citizens and its interests. The armed forces play an important role in this interaction. To be able to understand military doctrine, it is vital to first describe the environment in which the Dutch state and its means of power operate. This chapter describes that environment from the point of view of the armed forces.

The historical perspective focuses mainly on states and the relations between them. Nowadays, however, various non-state actors, such as international organisations, non-governmental organisations, and terrorist and insurgent groups, play an ever greater role in conflicts and crises. This chapter will therefore look at these actors. It will also discuss Dutch interests and the means of power the Netherlands government has at its disposal to secure those interests. Because the use of means of power can escalate, the concepts of confrontation, conflict, crisis and disaster will be described in theory; the possible causes, manifestations and phases will be discussed in the process. And finally, given that military doctrine is an expression of military thinking over a specific time period, this chapter will discuss the trends that could affect military operations over the next five to ten years. Trends with a longer-term effect will be looked at in other, scientific publications.

The national and international environment in a historical perspective

The period from the 17th century is regarded as the era of the modern, sovereign (nation) state, characterised by the constantly changing coalitions of states which kept each other in a balance of power and corrected any imbalance by waging war. International relations revolved around diplomacy, mercantilism and the threat of or actual use of force. The first political entity on Dutch territory, the Republic of the Seven United Provinces, was a global superpower in the 17th and 18th centuries. It was constantly embroiled in an armed battle of competition with major rivals, the most important of which were Spain, Portugal, France and England, both on the continent of Europe and on the world’s oceans. In the battle between the major powers, the Republic, after a ‘golden age’ of being a world power, gradually conceded defeat.

The phenomenon of the state had grown since the Middle Ages to become the main instrument of war and peace. The authorities promised law and order, and peace and security, in exchange for the monopoly of power, money (taxes) and loyalty. The latter had been ‘levied’ in the form of conscription since the Napoleonic era, and the state
established a bureaucracy for the collection of taxes and the mobilisation of its subjects. While states were to their citizens the protectors of peace and law and order, they were, with their armies (hired or otherwise), the main threat to other states. The state was thus its own raison d’être.

After the secession of Belgium (1830), the Netherlands – a unified state and kingdom since 1815 – withdrew into the isolation of armed neutrality. The former superpower plied inconspicuously between the major European powers, most literally between Great Britain and what was to become Germany. The latter’s vast territorial and economic expansion from the mid-19th century was perceived in the Netherlands as posing the greatest threat to the Kingdom’s integrity and its existence as an independent nation. Our country had by then been reduced to a small, rich trading nation, still holding considerable economic sway. The Netherlands was exploiting profitable colonies in the East Indies and in the Caribbean, and it was one of the countries in Europe to see, in the mid-19th century, the first contours of a democratic, constitutional state (a liberal, parliamentary democracy).

After the First World War and the Russian revolution – in effect the beginning of a period of conflict between major world ideologies which was to last until the end of the Cold War - the state gradually began to lose the role of protector. Threats and security issues were seen less and less as a matter for a few states to deal with, or as matters of war and peace alone. The idealistic concept of a universal, supranational law that eroded the sovereignty of individual states was also gaining ground. The same was true of the idea of a supranational structure, first in the form of the League of Nations, later to become the United Nations, for the peaceful resolution of confrontations and armed conflicts.

Furthermore, the industrial revolution and European imperialism had created a global economy that was transcending national borders to an ever-increasing extent. Important social, financial and economic processes were slipping out of state control, while at the same time having a significant impact on global security issues of the time and on international stability. This became evident in the 19th century, for example in the global depression of 1847 that became the catalyst for the revolutions of 1848, and in the 20th century after the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression in the years that followed. Technological advances ultimately resulted in the development of weapons of mass destruction, first chemical and biological and then nuclear, the destructive power of the latter being such that states were no longer able to protect their people against them.
At the same time, non-state actors had been getting involved in the game of international relations since as early as the 19th century. Some of these actors placed threats and security issues, such as human rights violations or manmade damage to the environment, on the agenda of what was to become known as the ‘international community’. Other actors were a threat in themselves, acting in the name of a particular ideology or a (perceived) injustice, such as terrorist organisations. In the course of the 20th century, there was a growing global awareness of shared security problems that were more than simply matters of war and peace or colonial politics.

In the meantime, however, states continued to be the key players on the world stage and to be each others’ greatest threats. The Netherlands experienced this from 1940 to 1945, when it groaned under the occupation by Nazi Germany until it was liberated by a coalition of democratic countries led by the United States and Great Britain. After the Second World War, the threat came from further to the east, from the Soviet Union. The danger posed by this communist dictatorship was deemed so great that the Netherlands gave up its old position of armed neutrality. It joined the Western coalition, which was made permanent in 1949 as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). En passant, the Netherlands lost its colonies during the course of these post-war years, as did most other European nations.

Acting in the name of peace and with the aim of eradicating for ever the prospect of disastrous, all-out warfare in continental Europe, the states of Western Europe entered into far-reaching – in some respects even supranational - alliances. This occurred in respect of vital industrial raw materials (the European Coal and Steel Community), of nuclear energy (European Atomic Energy Community), of important economic functions such as trade and agriculture (the European Economic Community), and of human rights and the safeguarding of the democratic rule of law (the Council of Europe). In respect of defence, there was the alliance of the Western European Union (WEU), NATO’s cousin, as it were. After the collapse of the Wall in 1989, these institutions expanded to include many of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and effectively became pan-European organisations.

A sign of those times was the warning in 1972 by a group of scientists (the Club of Rome) of an impending catastrophe on a planetary scale caused by unchecked population growth and migration, food shortages, environmental pollution, exhaustion of raw materials and famine. Such topics, along with human rights and (humanitarian) intervention issues, were becoming an increasing part of the security problem. People were feeling more and more like world citizens in a global village. This development,
1.2. Actors and factors
The international environment is determined by players (actors) and environmental features (factors). Actors act consciously and after due consideration, or subconsciously and more impulsively. Examples of actors are states, (international) organisations, interest groups, religious institutions, multinationals, influential individuals (warlords, heads of state and government leaders), leaders of criminal and terrorist organisations, and local administrators and businessmen. Actors always have specific interests and are led in thought and deed by how they think their interests will best be served. Not all actors will explicitly formulate their strategic aims or the way in which their interests are served.

Factors are environmental features. These could be the availability of energy sources and raw materials, (changes in) climate and environment, cultural and historical aspects, religion, ethnicity and politically driven events, demographic developments, the presence of international media and access to the Internet, and many other factors; coincidence or pure bad luck might also play a role.

1.3. Interests
A state’s interests usually consist of preserving national independence and integrity and improving the well-being of its population. A state may also have higher ideological goals and these will give rise to decisions and activities which, also fed by ideological aims, serve this national interest. The promotion of the international rule of law and the prevention of human rights violations are examples of such strategic aims. International organisations such as the UN, the EU and NATO support the common interests of member states and promote the international rule of law. Membership of these organisations and the provision of an active contribution are thus in the national interest. Ideological and humanitarian organisations, interest groups (mainly non-governmental organisations), private businesses, companies, organisations and individuals with ideological foundations (private volunteer organisations) have their own interests. These organisations therefore have their own objectives and they too use means (of power) to exert influence and realise their objectives.
Actors such as states and organisations often express their national and international interests and objectives in a grand strategy. A state’s grand strategy significantly overlaps its foreign policy, in which political leaders focus on the implications of national security policy, in particular how and by what means and methods the policy will be implemented. The Netherlands does not have a specific grand strategy, but the Constitution contains a number of grand strategic elements. This will be discussed further in Chapter 2.

1.4. Means of power

Actors can use a range of instruments (or means of power) to realise their objectives and safeguard their interests. These means of power are designed to influence another party and induce that party to take a course of action that is favoured by the actor. By doing so, the actor (for example, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, or an international organisation such as the UN, NATO or the EU) can put its security policy into practice. By employing political, diplomatic, economic, socio-cultural, humanitarian and military activities, influence will be exerted or power exercised for the purpose of realising these objectives.

Means of power are divided into the following categories:
- the diplomatic instrument
- the economic instrument
- the military instrument
- information as an instrument

1.4.1. The diplomatic instrument is the means most commonly used by a state or an international organisation to establish and maintain relations with foreign powers and other actors on the international stage and to protect its interests and realise its objectives. Diplomacy is used to try to influence other actors. Diplomatic pressure can also be applied, with or without the overt threat of the use of other means of power. International fora are an important stage upon which actors use their diplomatic might. A state or international actor wields its diplomatic power through political leaders and ambassadors. Other means of diplomatic power include the use of special envoys, negotiations, participation in or boycott of alliances or coalitions or the signing of treaties.

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10 Grand strategy – the general and internationally accepted definition is ‘a comprehensive vision for the longer-term with a description of essential actions and activities by which a state or organisation plans to achieve its major objectives. Key factors of this strategy may include the areas in which to specialise or to diversify, in which to join strategic alliances or not, and in which to prioritize activities.

In this NDD, grand strategy is defined as the coordinated, systematic development and use of all means of power to serve national (or allied) interests (see paragraph 5.2.1).

11 There are several classifications in categories of a state’s means of power, such as PMEC (political, military, economic, civil) and DIME (diplomatic, information, military and economic).
1.4.2. The economic instrument provides a range of options to improve a state’s wellbeing and to support or combat other actors. This means of power includes economic aid on the one hand, and measures such as embargoes or boycotts on the other. In a general sense, the economic instrument is used by adopting a particular trade policy and implementing fiscal and monetary policy. Where economic instruments are used against an international actor, the effect will usually only be felt in the long term. It is even the case in practice that the desired effects are not always achieved because the economic instrument is not used consistently, for example in the event of a change of government, or if there are parties who do not consent to the imposed measures. Secondly, governments of Western democracies do not have absolute control over the economic instrument, particularly in respect of multinational corporations, which can easily circumvent local legislation.

1.4.3. The military instrument can be used by a government or a coalition of governments as a means to persuade other actors to take a particular course of action or to refrain from one. The use of credible force is key here, the aim being to show all parties that the government or coalition is willing and able to use force to achieve the desired end state. The military instrument thus distinguishes itself sharply from the other instruments with the threat or actual use of force. The idea that the use of the military instrument is particularly effective in combination with the other instruments is an important principle in the comprehensive approach. Not only because no crisis or conflict can be resolved by military means alone, but also because other instruments are less effective in the resolution of armed conflicts.

The use of military power alone cannot bring about a lasting solution to a conflict. Such a solution always lies in the domain of other means of power. It is important, therefore, that military planners and commanders consider a security issue in its entirety, making it possible to estimate the effect of any integrated use of the military instrument. This does not detract from the fact that the threat or use of force can be a deciding factor in the creation of conditions, such as a safe environment, for a lasting solution. By contributing to the successful use of other means of power, the military instrument provides support and creates the required conditions.

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12 Statement from the NATO Bucharest Summit Declaration of 2008, in which all member states expressed their willingness to contribute to a comprehensive approach by the international community.
1.4.4. **Information as an instrument.** As well as the means of power defined above, states can also use information as an instrument. For reasons of national security and privacy, a state’s information needs to be protected, and access to important information about a proposed strategy must be denied. The controlled release of information is an important instrument for influencing public opinion and perceptions held by other actors. Apart from the release of information, the information instrument is also designed to influence an opponent’s information and target his information systems, while at the same time protecting the state’s own information and information systems.

1.4.5. **Civil capacities.** Other civil capacities exist alongside the diplomatic and economic instruments, but these are not referred to as means of power in this context, as they are either outside government control or unable to make a direct impact outside national territory. A state might use the civil capacities at its disposal, such as the judicial system and the civil police, to realise its strategic objectives. Civil capacities encompass a wide diversity of means, such as the use of legal powers, police force, administrative organisations, education, health care, media and utility companies. But there are also other organisations with a religious, political, cultural or scientific background, international organisations and NGOs that can contribute to the realisation of strategic objectives. These civil organisations are not government-controlled, yet they can exert influence. The control and coordinated deployment of civil capacities is complex, if only because many organisations, particularly NGOs, occupy an independent position in respect of the government. Despite the often specific and divergent interests and objectives of these civil organisations, all efforts need to be synchronised as much as possible to achieve an effective resolution of a conflict. The government will at the very least play a stimulating and coordinating role in this process.

1.4.6. **Other groups or entities with means of power.**

This summary of means of power and their various categories is not complete. As previously indicated, other groups or entities may also possess such instruments. Examples are:
- international organisations, such as the UN, the EU and NATO
- NGOs, such as humanitarian relief organisations (Red Cross)
- large international companies (multinationals)
- terrorist groups and criminal organisations
- influential or powerful individuals or groups.

Generally speaking, smaller organisations or groups have a more limited choice of instruments, or lack the capabilities to use them successfully. This does not, however, mean that these organisations or groups are powerless. The ability to use means of power is in any event not confined exclusively to states.
1.5. Use of means of power

As described above, actors use their means of power to safeguard their interests and achieve their strategic objectives. Means of power are always used in combination. It is not always necessary to deploy all instruments at the same time; depending on the interests to be protected or the objective to be realised, and on the prevailing situation (peace, confrontation or conflict), one instrument will be more suitable than another. The use of the military instrument is not, however, limited to conflict situations and crises; it can also be used preventively in the event of conflicts of interests, confrontations or disasters. There is a shift from ‘military deployment that does not per definition occur independently’ to ‘military deployment that per definition does not occur independently’. The general tendency is also that any action is always taken within a coalition of countries or organisations.

1.5.1. Conflicts of interest, confrontations, crises and conflicts. On the international playing field, all actors have their own interests and objectives. A conflict of interests arises if a party’s interests and objectives are at odds with those of other actors. If that is the case, and actors persist in these differences, the situation becomes one of confrontation. Confrontations can harden and result in a crisis or a conflict. To ensure an accurate definition, these terms are explained below.

In conflicts of interests and confrontations, there is an escalating difference of opinion about objectives that is so crucial that neither party will concede. The root of the difference of opinion normally lies in conflicting economic or political interests, and it is in that sphere that the solution must initially be sought. Nevertheless, the threat or actual use of military might is sometimes made, and this would normally serve to protect, prevent or deter.

- Protection of national interests. This includes, for example, airspace and border security, the military contribution to the coastguard and law enforcement on the high seas, as well as operations to counter smuggling and piracy. The permanent presence of military units at strategically important locations (e.g., the Caribbean islands of the Kingdom) also falls into this category.

- Prevention of escalation. In this case, military deployment supports the use of other instruments. Examples are military diplomacy, such as showing the flag and military visits, and the provision of military advice, assistance and training to friendly nations.

- Deterrence. Here, military deployment is intended to convince other actors of the willingness to use the military instrument and to apply coercion. Examples are the forward deployment of offensive military capabilities and the execution of joint exercises in or near the area in question.
The emphasis lies on the presence of military might; the actual use of force is not usually relevant here. Confrontations may last extremely long, such as the Cold War, for example, which was not actually a war but a confrontation. In conflicts of interest and confrontations, it is crucial that the situation does not escalate and develop into a crisis or conflict. This applies particularly in the case of vital interests, where the level of damage caused by an escalation may be disproportionately high or even irreversible. In the case of vital interests, therefore, much emphasis will be placed on prevention and protection. By taking preventive action, in which there is usually no question of the use of force or intervention in an impending conflict, a state’s political leaders preserve the greatest freedom of choice for the deployment of its means of power.

A crisis is deemed to have arisen when a state or population group loses control of the situation because of a conflict of interest, a confrontation or an impending or worsening disaster. Crises have no set pattern; each crisis has its own dynamic and characteristics. Generally speaking, a crisis does not arise because of a single specific event, but because of a series of events spread over time. Several conflicts of interest are usually to blame for a crisis.

A disaster often leads to a crisis and can also be classed under the phenomenon of a crisis,
as the characteristics of each bear close resemblance to each other. It involves the severe
disruption of public safety, usually caused by a single, brief and catastrophic event at a
single location. When a disaster occurs, a great number of people are put in grave danger,
and there is extensive material damage or significant damage to the environment, all within
a short space of time. Disasters can be caused by human actions (major accidents) or by
natural events (earthquakes, hurricanes, flooding, pandemics). The socio-economic
consequences of a disaster are often more catastrophic than the physical disaster itself.

In an armed conflict, the conflict of interests has escalated to such an extent that parties
resort to the use of weapons to secure their interests. A conflict may be small scale and
local, but it can also lead to large-scale violence.

1.5.2. The conceptual conflict cycle. If a conflict of interests or confrontation between
actors or states escalates, it becomes a conflict. Each conflict is unique; no two conflicts
arise or progress in an identical fashion. The conceptual conflict cycle model\textsuperscript{13} has four
phases. It should be pointed out here that the word ‘phase’ wrongly suggests that the
phases must occur sequentially. Activities with features from two or even three different
phases may also take place alongside each other in time and space. For example, activities
that bear the characteristics of intervention might be conducted in one region, while
activities bearing the hallmarks of the stabilisation phase take place in another. Or both
types of activity might even take place in the same region at the same time. The phases
often overlap, which means that the transition periods are often not clearly identifiable.

The conceptual conflict cycle has the following phases:
- \textit{The prevention phase}. There is not yet any question of a conflict in this phase, just a
  conflict of interests or a confrontation. The use of means of power occurs as described
  above.
- \textit{The intervention phase}. In the intervention phase, the emphasis is on military action. If
  preventive activities are not successful, a conflict could escalate in a short space of time.
  Intervention means interceding in the conflict with capabilities that can operate in a
  high-intensity environment. It has a coercive character and the use of military force will
  almost always be unavoidable. Intervention ideally takes place before any escalation, but
  experience has shown that this is seldom the case. The aim of intervention is to resolve
  the conflict, ultimately reducing the level of force and thus creating the conditions for
  the subsequent stabilisation phase. An escalating conflict is accompanied by violence, of
  which the local population are often the victims, intentionally or unintentionally, which

\textsuperscript{13} Source: Military Strategic Vision 2010, Chief of Defence, March 2010
results in a humanitarian emergency. During this phase, the environment is usually so
dangerous that civil aid organisations can only have a limited presence, if any at all.
This may mean that military capacity will be required to provide emergency relief. The
boundary between the intervention phase and the stabilisation phase is difficult to
define; it is usually a case of a gradual transition. It is, therefore, vital that the planning of
an intervention takes account of the conditions required for the stabilisation phase.

- **The stabilisation phase.** In the stabilisation phase, the accent shifts increasingly from
  predominantly military action to the deployment of other means to achieve the mission
  objectives. 14 Operations in the stabilisation phase are geared towards the normalisation
  of the security situation and thus create conditions for lasting development and peace.
  Operations in the stabilisation phase of conflicts are complicated by the diversity of tasks,
  changing levels of force and the large number of actors with different interests. Although
  it is mainly rebuilding capacity that is needed in this phase, there may be various reasons
  to use force or to demonstrate the willingness to use it. The circumstances are often such
  that the peace is fragile and the level of force can suddenly increase dramatically. If the
  military force is unable to contain this escalating violence, stabilisation is doomed to fail.
  The possession of means and capabilities to enable escalation dominance is, therefore,
  vital in this phase.

- **The normalisation phase.** In the normalisation phase, the emphasis is on sustainable
  development and reinforcement of the local administration and the security sector,
  taking account of local culture and tradition. Military input is reduced further in this
  phase and will eventually focus on activities related to security sector reform (SSR) 15,
  which will have been started in the stabilisation phase. The principle underlying the
  support of rebuilding activities in this phase is ‘as civil as possible, as military as
  necessary’.

The phases often overlap, which means that the transition periods are not clearly identifi-
able, and which is why these periods often carry the highest risk during an operation.
Diplomatic, military, economic and civil capacities are required in all phases, and the accent
differs according to the phase. The activities of all capacities need to be embedded in a
comprehensive strategy designed to realise strategic objectives.

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14 See also ‘Crisis management operations in fragile states’, Advisory Council on International Affairs, March 2009.
15 Security sector reform entails activities designed to assist the rebuilding or restoration of organisations in a country’s
security sector so that the country can ultimately provide independent, legitimate and effective security for itself and
its citizens. That security sector must enhance the country’s stability and also be accountable for it; the population
must have equal rights and equal access to the judiciary.
1.6. The comprehensive approach

Confrontations and conflicts in the international arena are complex. The causes vary widely, but they almost always have economic, ideological and cultural dimensions. Such complex problems require a comprehensive solution and a comprehensive approach. The integrated coordination of all means of power at the disposal of one or more international organisations or a coalition of nations is thus the foremost approach for the resolution of confrontations and conflicts.

In a comprehensive approach, the means of power available to a state are deployed in a coordinated and cohesive manner, ideally in a coalition with other countries and in conjunction with international and non-governmental organisations. The armed forces must be deployed in such a way as to reinforce the deployment and efforts of other means and parties and to keep any adverse effects to a minimum.

At the time of the Dutch participation in ISAF from 2006, the term 3D (defence, diplomacy and development) was introduced. Although the term is convenient and has proved its worth, it does not convey the full meaning. The term refers to the three key players (the government departments officially responsible for those areas) and thus ignores the role of the other departments involved.
In a comprehensive approach, those who are directly involved develop, on the basis of a common analysis, a joint approach to a specific crisis, in which mutual coordination, tasks, roles and responsibilities are established and for which, ideally, joint planning will also take place. A comprehensive approach ensures optimum synchronisation of the various means of power with the aim of achieving the best possible lasting solution to a confrontation or conflict.

However, not all actors that are directly involved, including IOs and NGOs, have the same strategy or the same views in respect of the desired end state. This is the reason for the fact that, although the actors concerned generally acknowledge the sense of a joint approach, a joint strategy and end state do not form part of the concept of the comprehensive approach.

1.7. Trends
The concept of security continued to develop after the Cold War. In the traditional sense, security related mainly to the state: the extent to which national sovereignty and the integrity of national territory were protected. In recent years, the concept of security has also developed in other areas, such as food, energy and society. As a result of the heightened threat of terrorist attacks and the necessary countermeasures, many individual freedoms have come under pressure, such as freedom of movement and freedom of expression. The financial crisis, climate change and the stricter rules in the public and social domain place even more restrictions on the individual freedoms that have been won over the years.

Environmental developments are propelled by four main strategic drivers: demographic change, globalisation, composition of the political arena and technological advances. There is a general consensus about these trends, but less agreement in respect of three others that are developing rapidly: media, the cyber dimension and outer space. The question of how, when and how quickly these trends will actually manifest themselves and shape the security concept remains the subject of discussion.

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17 These could be ministries or large and influential international organisations, or states that form part of an international organisation or a coalition of nations.

18 This is examined in more detail in section 2.5 when the National Security Strategy is discussed.
1.7.1. Demographic changes

Developments of a natural, political or economic nature and population growth give rise to increasing migration and urbanisation. This often leads to ethnic tensions or increasing pressure on employment opportunities and social security systems, and could result in security risks. The following factors intensify the effects of these demographic developments.

- Food and water shortages are a major problem for parts of the developing world.
- Impoverishment and unequal distribution of resources can lead to resentment. They provide extremism and organised crime with a breeding ground. Poverty, starvation and disease in the third world put increasing pressure on security.
- The unequal distribution of raw materials and resources and poor governance intensify the problems in areas hit by demographic and climate change, whereby people are no longer able to support themselves. This further increases the pressure on migration, increases internal instability and may give rise to a need for humanitarian interventions.
- The growth in population and the inability of people to support themselves in rural areas have led to a growing economic migration to urban areas. As a result, more and more of the world’s population will be concentrated in cities. One effect of this is that the number of megacities numbering more than 10 million inhabitants will increase significantly. This will be accompanied by the inevitable challenges in terms of infrastructure, public services, the environment and criminality, and it will place enormous pressure on the quality of local government.

1.7.2. Globalisation

It seems that the world is becoming ever more integrated in a global village. Conventional borders and geographical distances are becoming blurred, both in reality (Schengen Agreement) and in a virtual sense, through information and communication technology. Worldwide economic activity and the global exchange of knowledge and information are inextricably linked to globalisation. Globalisation stimulates international cooperation, thus reducing the national influence of individual states. It also ensures that not only states but increasingly individuals, groups and multinationals play an important role in international relations and the mutual balance of power. As well as the many positive effects of globalisation, it is also accompanied by security risks. The repercussions of the financial crises since 2008 have shown how interconnected states and businesses have become, particularly in the financial sector. As a counter-response to globalisation, many countries have experienced the alienation of part of the population from its own government, as a result of which an upsurge of nationalistic feeling and polarised views is leading to unrest. The differences between the wealthy countries, which derive greater benefit from the effects of globalisation, and the poorer nations are becoming more obvious. In countries which
are finding it difficult or impossible to cope with the repercussions of poverty, tensions are rising between population groups, or between sections of the population and the government, if it is seen as the cause of the worsening situation. If governments fail to function properly if at all, it is often impossible to offer any resistance to forms of organised crime, rising nationalism, radicalism or even terrorism. Poverty, food shortages and a lack of security can cause migration flows. Another effect of globalisation is that infectious diseases are able to spread more rapidly because of the virtually unlimited travel opportunities, allowing them to develop into pandemics. Although continuing advances in medical science and technological applications enable better prevention and control, it is still difficult to predict whether they will always be able to ensure an appropriate response.

1.7.3. Composition of the political arena
Despite the effects of globalisation, individual nations still remain the main geopolitical players. Nonetheless, the way in which state sovereignty is exercised is changing as a result of the following factors.
- Greater, mutual dependence is being created between states; power is shifting from states to transnational organisations and networks of multinationals. The growing mutual dependence does, however, have the advantage that increased interaction leads to better mutual understanding, thus reducing the risk of interstate conflicts.
- States are becoming more open societies. They are also becoming increasingly dependent on global stability, particularly with their main trading partners in Europe, North America and, to a growing extent, Asia.
- Failing states can pose a threat to global security. Non-state actors can exploit the vacuum created by the malfunctioning state authority. Furthermore, the strategic interest of a failing state could shift from the availability of raw materials or the geographical location to the possibility for non-state actors to form a base. It may, therefore, be necessary in many cases to intervene to stabilise a dangerous situation in a poorly or non-governed area.
- A country’s technological and economic superiority will force an opponent to look for new ways to achieve his political objectives, including alternative ways of using force. A state’s counter-response to such threats must come in the form of a joint approach using all its means of power. This requires close contact between multilateral networks and organisations.

1.7.4. Technological developments
Technology remains a major driver for change and brings with it both opportunities and risks. Technology is developing at an ever-increasing pace and advanced technology is very quickly available to the general public. New developments in fields such as robotics,
nanotechnology, miniaturisation, biotechnology, space travel and information technology present new opportunities. Technological development has up to now been the basis of the military superiority of Western powers. At the same time, this superiority also represents a weakness: opponents can concentrate on achieving their objectives by attacking this dependence on technology. This is further reinforced by the fact that opponents in our open and internet-based society have easier access to certain knowledge and technology than ever before. It appears to be relatively easy to get detailed instructions (and raw materials) from the internet for making weapons of mass destruction or dirty bombs. It is also becoming more and more difficult to protect vital information and operating systems against the growing and increasingly significant cyber threat.

1.7.5. Media
The computerisation of society has brought with it an upsurge in the role and speed of reporting by the media. The media play an important role in reflecting and potentially bolstering public opinion on issues affecting the armed forces and their deployment. In the decision making about a large number of military missions conducted by the armed forces since the Cold War, there has been intensive interaction between media attention, public opinion and political decision making. Reporting about abuses in the world or within the armed forces never fails to affect public perceptions, and these perceptions help to define the image of the armed forces and the level of public support for a military mission.

1.7.6. Cyber dimension
Something that is becoming increasingly important is the digital information dimension. With some expertise and resources that are relatively easy to obtain, the ICT infrastructure can be targeted by cyber attacks. In the recent past, conventional attacks have been preceded by cyber attacks designed to degrade and manipulate the opponent’s command and control systems, or even render them entirely ineffective. Both civil and military networks are now being attacked on a daily basis, and this trend is expected to grow.

1.7.7. Outer space
Dependence on both civil and military use of outer space will increase further over the coming decades. Many information systems belonging to governments, banks, stock markets and air traffic controllers, etc, rely on the performance of satellite systems. Society

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19 A dirty bomb consists of conventional explosives (with relatively limited destructive power) and radioactive material (with associated risk of contagion, hence the word ‘dirty’), the threat or use of which could lead to mass panic and terror, ultimately resulting in extensive psychological and economic damage. Because of the use of a conventional explosive charge, however, it is unlikely to cause large numbers of fatalities, which is why it is not regarded as a weapon of mass destruction.
and economic activity can suffer severe disruption if these satellite communications fail. The significantly heightened situational awareness on the part of commanders in current operations also relies on satellite systems at all levels. Many 3C systems, ISR assets, precision-guided weapons and logistic tracking systems can no longer function without using outer space.

At the same time, a growing number of commercial providers are supplying satellite products and services (such as satellite phones, GPS receivers, imaging equipment) not just for friendly or collective allied use, but also to opponents. The safeguarding of knowledge about dependence, vulnerability and potential risks and threats, as well as possible ways to secure the required capacity, forms the starting point for further policy development within the defence organisation in respect of the military use of outer space.

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ISR: Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (see also paragraph 4.9.3.).
2. Dutch security policy

2.1. Introduction

Dutch military doctrine defines military thinking as it is applied in the Netherlands armed forces. Because the use of the military instrument is derived from Dutch security policy, it is first necessary to define that security policy, thus providing an insight into the higher framework in which the armed forces apply their doctrine.

This chapter looks first at security policy, both from an international and Dutch perspective. This will be followed by a description of Dutch interests, and the way in which the Netherlands government serves these interests which results in a grand strategy and a national position based on the Constitution. Lastly, the chapter will set out what this means for national security organisations and for the armed forces in particular.

Dutch security policy in a historical context

From 1815, when the Kingdom of the Netherlands was established, the armed forces had two tasks: 1) defending the Kingdom in Europe and 2) upholding law and order in the colonies. The first task was the responsibility of the army and navy; the second was performed in the Dutch East Indies by the KNIL, the Royal Netherlands Indies Army. In the Caribbean, the Netherlands Forces in Curaçao and the Netherlands Forces in Surinam were tasked with the defence of the colonies. These armies concentrated on land defence, on assisting with internal law enforcement and on ‘pacification’. Expeditionary actions were mainly the province of the navy and the marine corps, who at that time were engaged all over the world in the protection of trade and in showing the flag.

In politico-strategic terms, the Netherlands maintained a policy of armed neutrality until the Second World War and the force in Europe concentrated mainly on the ability to engage in a major conflict in the event of any violation of that neutrality. The assumption was that the opponent, an army of another European power, was likely to conduct ‘regular’ operations. After the conquests of the 19th century, the colonial troops focused mainly on restoring and maintaining internal law and order. The operations by the KNIL were primarily directed at combating indigenous opponents who were conducting guerrilla warfare.

In 1913–1914, the very first deployment of Dutch military personnel with a peacebuilding task took place as part of a multinational operation in Albania. It happened again more than twenty years later, in 1935, when marines were deployed in Germany’s Saarland in an operation by the League of Nations (the forerunner to the United Nations). Generally
speaking, Dutch defence and security policy, like that of other Western countries, had virtually no ambitions with regard to international crisis management and conflict resolution until long after the Second World War.

After the end of the German occupation and the restoration of Dutch independence in 1945, Dutch defence and security policy focused on land defence with its allies against the communist threat from the East. To protect vital interests, the Netherlands opted – initially hesitantly, but gradually with more conviction – for international collaboration and incorporation into multinational (security) structures, such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Community, now the European Union (EU).

During the Cold War, the Netherlands’ immediate security concern was the territorial defence of Western Europe as part of NATO against a military attack by the Warsaw Pact, led by the Soviet Union. The rebuilt Dutch military consisted of armed forces who were geared towards and equipped for regular combat. The Netherlands also agreed to contribute on a small scale to peace-enforcement and peace support operations by the new UN which, within certain limitations, was proving to be more capable of taking action than the League of Nations, and to humanitarian aid operations, providing that such a contribution would not interfere too much with the NATO defence task.

The end of the Cold War heralded yet another new era. The revolutionary geostrategic upheaval of the period from 1989 to 1991 caused a huge shift in Dutch security policy. The Netherlands transformed its defensive army into a smaller, more flexible instrument for crisis management. Deployment under the UN increased because the Security Council was able to claim a greater role in the resolution of conflicts. NATO changed from a regional defence collective to a globally operating security organisation. Participation in international NATO operations, in ad-hoc coalitions or in EU military structures became the norm. Dutch policy makers were more concerned about the aim of participating and gaining diplomatic prestige than they were about the actual effectiveness of the missions. After the Srebrenica fiasco in 1995, the Netherlands became increasingly reluctant to participate in UN operations and developed a preference for NATO and EU missions and for coalition-based operations.

NATO remained the Netherlands’ cornerstone in terms of security. After the security situation changed in 1991, the alliance developed a new strategic concept. This provided a wider, less territory-based, flexible security strategy, the essence of which was reduced dependence on nuclear weapons and greater emphasis on the use of multinational formations (combined joint task forces) for a broad set of crisis
management and peace-keeping tasks (also outside the treaty area).

NATO also opted to enter into partnerships with non-member states and to extend the hand of friendship to the old enemies on the other side of the former Iron Curtain. In the years that followed, the alliance expanded greatly with the accession of many Central and Eastern European countries and even a number of former constituent republics of what used to be the Soviet Union. On its 50th anniversary in 1999, and again in 2010, NATO revised the strategic concept, the member states being aware of the increasing complexity of the global security climate and of the challenges that this presented.

In line with this, the Dutch defence organisation also shifted its focus at the turn of the century to the task of helping to resolve security problems which did not traditionally make up the hard core of the military domain. The armed forces thus found themselves dealing with overseas drug-smuggling and piracy, they reinforced specialist units’ counterterrorism capabilities, the navy and the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee joined other EU countries for border control tasks on land and at sea on the external borders of the continent of Europe and provided military support in civil disaster relief, both at home and abroad.

2.2. International security policy

Our country has a vested interest in a stable and peaceful international environment; it relies on good international relations and on well-functioning international organisations. It is for this reason that the Netherlands makes an active contribution to the main institutions that look after our security: the United Nations (UN), NATO, the European Union (EU) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This membership carries certain obligations, and the Netherlands undertakes to meet those obligations as well as making a financial contribution. NATO remains the cornerstone of Dutch security policy. Membership of NATO requires unconditional involvement and commitment under Article 5 of the NATO treaty.21 The Netherlands’ wellbeing relies on free trade, the unrestricted movement of goods and free access to raw materials. Despite the fact that, by virtue of European and trans-Atlantic cooperation, the Netherlands is located in one of the most stable regions in the world, it is still vulnerable to disruption, and it is in this context that

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21 Art. 5 of the NATO treaty (Washington, 1949) regards an attack on one member state as an attack on all member states.
NATO’s Strategic Concept and the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy are particularly important. Dutch foreign and security policy is in line with that of the organisations referred to above.

2.3. Dutch foreign and security policy
Dutch society is vulnerable to security risks that originate elsewhere in the world. This is a consequence of the open nature of Dutch society, the country’s external orientation and worldwide interdependence. Both internal and external security policy, therefore, require an integrated approach, at a conceptual and a practical level. The inseparable nature of internal and external security does not only apply to the Netherlands or to the global role the country plays in peace and security matters, but is the same all over the world. Most countries have internal security problems that are affected by factors outside their national borders.

The main objective of Dutch foreign and security policy is based on the Constitution and is to ensure the country’s independence, integrity, stability and wellbeing. The Netherlands’ open economy benefits from the free movement of goods, information, services and people and free access to markets and raw materials. The Netherlands also wishes to promote the international legal order and is committed to the alleviation of human suffering and the prevention of human rights violations.

Global trade, worldwide socio-cultural communication via the internet and the media, cross-border organised crime and international terrorism can all affect a state’s vital national interests, which means that foreign and security policy cannot be seen in isolation from each other.

2.3.1. Strategic functions
Looking after security is one of the Netherlands government’s core tasks. This provision of security supports Dutch foreign and security policy and the development of the required capacity. The ‘strategic functions of government’ model is a tool for bringing these functions together and finding a clear and logical line of reasoning in the event of a crisis or conflict requiring quick and accurate decisions.

Good preparation and the capacity for rapid and effective decision making strengthens the government’s role in establishing security. The following model divides the government’s security role into seven strategic functions.

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22 This section is a summary of the Future Policy Survey final report, Ministry of Defence, 2010, Chapter 20.
The seven strategic functions are:

- **Anticipation**: To be prepared for foreseen and unforeseen developments and events which could affect the interests of the Kingdom and the international rule of law.

- **Prevention**: To operate within and outside the national borders to prevent threats to the interests of the Kingdom and to the international rule of law.

- **Deterrence**: To discourage activities that are at odds with the interests of the Kingdom and the international legal order by presenting the prospect of credible retaliatory measures.

- **Protection**: To protect and if necessary defend national and allied territory and guarantee the safety of Dutch citizens at home and abroad and of Kingdom-registered properties.

- **Intervention**: To enforce a change of behaviour in actors deemed to pose a threat to the security interests of the Kingdom or the international rule of law.

- **Stabilisation**: To assist in the termination of a conflict and to support stable political, economic and social development in a (former) conflict area to serve the interests of the Kingdom and the international legal order.

- **Normalisation**: To restore acceptable living conditions after a conflict or a manmade or natural disaster.
As part of the government, the Defence organisation helps to fulfil each of these strategic functions, and the role played by the Defence organisation focuses on the deployment of the armed forces’ military assets. This is not confined to the Services (operational commands); other Defence elements, such as the Central Staff, the Military Intelligence and Security Service, the Defence Materiel Organisation and Support Command (CDC) also make a contribution.

The Defence organisation contributes to the strategic function of **anticipation** by keeping a sufficiently capable and flexible force on stand-by. The defence organisation also needs to set itself up in the best possible way for this strategic function. This is done by:

- gaining and maintaining a strategic intelligence position and constantly monitoring the risks to Dutch security interests;
- maintaining military doctrine and a sufficiently broad and relevant knowledge base;
- conducting scenario analyses and prognoses;
- ensuring sufficient flexibility, adaptability and resilience in the Defence organisation;
- engaging in military cooperation with countries that could be important in the support of operations in which Dutch troops are or will be taking part;
- managing a network of flexible facilities and capabilities on a call-up basis.

The Defence organisation contributes to the function of **prevention** by joining multinational, military partnerships, thereby helping to achieve good international relations and effective security institutions. Examples are security sector development\(^{23}\), ensuring a military presence in support of diplomacy, and joint exercises with regional partners. Furthermore, the armed forces can, in conjunction with the use of other means of power, contribute to - and where necessary lead - the deployment of military forces to prevent damage to Dutch interests or an impending conflict. The armed forces can assist the national civil authorities in maintaining public order and thus in preventing social disruption in the Kingdom.

The military contribution to the function of **deterrence** is designed to prevent a country or an organisation from conducting hostile activities, or to persuade that country or organisation that such activities will not have the desired effect and the cost will be unacceptably high. The credibility of military deterrence depends on the military capabilities for and the political will to actually take any action, such as setting up a blockade or retaliating after an attack. Credibility also depends on the military capability to stop an aggressor carrying out his attack successfully.

\(^{23}\) The term security sector development (SSD) is used as well as the term security sector reform (SSR). This refers to situations in which there are virtually no official institutions in the security sector and so they have to be set up from scratch.
For the strategic function of **protection**, the Defence organisation performs the following activities:

- the protection – and where necessary the defence – of national territory as well as NATO and EU territory;
- assisting in the control of the EU’s external borders;
- providing permanent and incidental support within the Kingdom’s borders on the basis of legal and administrative agreements;
- conducting evacuation operations for the protection of Dutch citizens outside national borders, as well as protecting Dutch embassies abroad and merchant shipping registered to the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

The Defence organisation’s contribution to the strategic function of **intervention** consists of using military means to enforce a change of behaviour in actors deemed to pose a threat to the security interests of the Kingdom or the international rule of law. The accent rests on maintaining – and if necessary enforcing – the international legal order and on defending the interests of the Kingdom outside national borders. Military action might also be required to prevent wholesale violation of human rights.

The Defence organisation contributes to the function of **stabilisation** by assisting in the termination of a conflict and supporting stable political, economic and social development in a former conflict area to serve the interests of the Kingdom and the international rule of law. For this function, the armed forces focus on participation in multinational stabilisation operations, examples of which are:

- stabilisation operations in fragile states;\(^{24}\)
- stabilisation operations designed to keep apart states or other actors as part of a peace settlement or ceasefire;
- observer and police missions and small-scale missions of a civil-military nature.

For the strategic function of **normalisation**, the Defence organisation can supply military assets for the following activities:

- humanitarian relief operations;
- reconstruction in a former conflict area;
- advice, training and education of security officials and organisations in post-conflict countries after the stabilisation phase (security sector reform, SSR).

\(^{24}\) States are referred to as fragile when state structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations. This is also the definition of the OECD (Parliamentary Document 31 787 n°2, 2008-2009).
2.4. Dutch security policy

National interests are increasingly dependent on developments in the rest of the world, so Dutch foreign policy focuses on fostering good international relations. This translates into efforts to achieve a well-structured, international society, in which human rights are respected and the international rule of law is upheld and supported. The Netherlands’ national interests and objectives are set out in the Constitution, which includes the cross-border, strategic objective: “The Government shall promote the development of the international rule of law” (Article 90 of the Constitution).

Vital Dutch interests. In 2007, five vital Dutch interests were identified in the National Security Strategy.

- **Territorial security**: the undisturbed functioning of the Netherlands as an independent state, and more specifically the territorial integrity of our country. Territorial integrity is jeopardised, for example, if there is a threat of occupation of the Kingdom’s territory.
- **Economic security**: the undisturbed functioning of the Netherlands as an effective and efficient economy. Economic security could be affected if, for example, trade with an important foreign partner is discontinued.
- **Ecological security**: Having sufficient self-restorative capacity in the environment to repair damage. Ecological security can be threatened by, for example, disruption to the management of surface waters and also by climate change.
- **Physical security**: the undisturbed functioning of humans in and around the Netherlands. Physical security is put under pressure if, for example, public health is threatened by the outbreak of an epidemic, or in the event of a massive breach of a dike or an accident in a chemical plant.
- **Social and political stability**: the undisturbed existence of a social climate in which groups of people can coexist peacefully within the confines of the democratic constitutional state and shared core values. Social and political stability can be threatened if changes occur in the demographic makeup of society (e.g. solidarity between generations), in the social cohesion or in the extent to which the population participates in social processes.

These five interests are all interconnected; if one is damaged, others may be damaged too. An infringement of physical security could thus put social and political stability under pressure.
2.5. National security strategy
The interwoven nature of Dutch foreign policy and Dutch security policy is also reflected in the country’s National Security Strategy (SNV in Dutch). Territorial security can be endangered not only by an internal threat (terrorism, guerrilla warfare, civil war), but also by external factors (another state or an international terrorist network). For a trading nation such as the Netherlands, economic security is sensitive to disruptions in international trade, even if those disruptions occur a long way from national territory. To protect society and the population against internal and external threats, the government has formulated the National Security Strategy. This is designed to protect the Netherlands’ vital interests in order to prevent social disruption.

2.6. Defence policy
The aim of Dutch defence policy is to use the effective formation, upkeep and deployment of the armed forces to serve as an instrument to implement the government’s security policy. Dutch security policy makes a distinction between internal security (national territory, including overseas territories) and external security (outside the Netherlands). For internal security, the most obvious task is the provision of military assistance for disaster relief, crisis management, search and rescue, and other tasks under civil authority. For external security, NATO is the cornerstone of Dutch security policy, and is also a priority for the armed forces in terms of activities, procedures and doctrine.

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26 Other tasks are the control of borders, airspace, territorial waters, protection against damage of vital communication and information systems via digital networks (cyberspace), and military protection of transport routes.
2.6.1. Cohesion in policy
The Dutch defence effort focuses on national interests, the protection and promotion of Dutch values and foreign policy objectives. As stated previously, our country has a vested interest in a stable and peaceful international environment, as it relies heavily on good international relations and international security structures. The Netherlands therefore pursues an active peace and security policy, a key element of which is the comprehensive approach. This means that the Netherlands, when asked to do so and provided it has the required parliamentary support, takes part in international deployments. The Netherlands will participate by using the armed forces in the planning and execution of activities for conflict prevention, de-escalation, stabilisation and, if the security situation does not allow the deployment of civil organisations, rebuilding. The Netherlands is thus willing to assist in the resolution of security problems within and outside Europe, even at great distances, in view of the fact that, for many different reasons, confrontations and conflicts a long way from home can still pose a threat to our security. An active security policy therefore includes the will to intervene promptly if national interests are at stake or if security problems occur elsewhere in the world. In principle, this occurs in an allied context or within a coalition of states. It is then important to apply an integrated package of the various political, military and economic means of power and civil capacities that the Netherlands has at its disposal.

2.6.2. Joint, multinational and interagency operations
The use of a comprehensive approach for the deployment of the armed forces is expressed in multinational and interagency planning and execution, which almost always occurs in a joint setting.

Joint operations are the norm, because each of the Services has capacities that complement each other. Ensuring the integrated deployment of these complementary capacities of different Services will achieve optimum effectiveness.

Multinational operations are the norm, because states are seldom willing or able to operate alone. In the Netherlands' situation, multinational operations are the norm because the country has chosen to be a member of NATO, to operate as part of the EU or as part of other security organisations of multinational composition. In specific cases, in which, for instance, no consensus can be reached to operate as a collective, the country will choose to operate in a coalition of
The Netherlands armed forces will, therefore, almost always be deployed under an umbrella strategy that is formulated by an alliance or coalition. This does not preclude the exclusive deployment of Dutch forces for small-scale operations, a situation which generally arises in national operations.

Interagency operations are the norm because, under the comprehensive approach, military capability is also deployed in conjunction with other means of power. This is based on the accepted fact that military capability alone cannot resolve a conflict of interests, a security problem or a conflict.

It is, therefore, highly unlikely that the Netherlands armed forces would be deployed independently or without allied or interagency coordination.

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27 Also known as a coalition of the willing.
28 An example is a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO), in which the Netherlands evacuates citizens with Dutch nationality from an unsafe area.
29 Or, if the military are operating in a coalition of nations, coordination with the other members of the coalition.
3. The armed forces as a government instrument

3.1 Introduction
One of the principles on which the Dutch state system is based is that the armed forces are an instrument of the government. To understand the thinking behind the operational deployment of the armed forces, it is necessary to understand the context of that deployment. This context is made up of the legal framework, the assigned main tasks, the strategic functions that the government can perform to achieve its objectives and the decision-making process in respect of the deployment. This context affects the deployment of parts of the armed forces and thus military doctrine itself.

This chapter looks successively at the legal principles of deployment within and outside national borders and at the assigned tasks. Attention will then focus on the strategic functions that may be performed as part of the selected grand strategy. Finally, the decision-making process for the deployment of parts of the armed forces and the control of forces during that deployment will be discussed.

The armed forces as a government instrument in a historical perspective

Decisions in the Netherlands about war and peace and about the deployment and tasks of the armed forces were traditionally made by a small ruling elite. When the Kingdom was established in 1815, these powers were constitutionally invested in the government (head of state and cabinet). Initially, the king alone bore the political and military leadership. He had ‘supreme command over the fleets and armies’. After the state reforms of 1848 and the introduction of ministerial responsibility, the cabinet – specifically the Ministers of War, the Navy and the Colonies – was put in charge of directing the armies and the navy and developing military policy.

For a long time, the highest military command, supreme command in wartime, lay with the monarch and his family. Since the time of the Republic, members of the House of Orange had steadfastly filled the role of the highest military commander and did so again during the expeditions at the time of the Belgian Revolt of 1830 and 1831 and in the mobilisation for the Franco-German War of 1870. Because of the lack of male Oranjes at the end of the 19th century, this position of the royal house was not to last. In the mobilisation of 1914, the armed forces were for the first time given a commander in chief from the top of the professional military ranks. This happened again in 1939, on the eve of the Second World War. In the Dutch East Indies, the governor-general was both the civil-administrative representative of the Dutch Crown and the commander in chief of the land and naval forces operating there.
Until 1940, actual deployment of the armed forces was confined mainly to the colonies. In the 19th century in particular, the Royal NL Navy and the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army undertook many expeditions to ‘pacify’ the East Indies. The government did not request official permission for this kind of operation, nor was there any official accountability procedure. The colonial authorities waged war with the local princedoms, without any formal declaration of war. On the subject of the authority to declare war, the Constitution originally stated (in the 1815, 1848 and 1887 versions) that war would be declared by the king, who would immediately notify both chambers of the States General accordingly. When the Constitution was revised in 1922, this clause was amended, and the law now stipulated that the King could not declare war ‘without the prior approval of the States General’. The revision of the Constitution in 1983 meant that it was no longer the king who could make a declaration of war, but the government.

The Ministries of War and the Navy were merged in 1959 to form the Ministry of Defence. The Dutch military after the Second World War was, like its predecessors, an organisation that was segregated according to Service and specialisation. From 1948, the overarching part of the organisation was the United Chiefs of Staff Committee (CVCS in Dutch), a consultative committee of the commanders in chief of the Services. In the 1960s, because of the need for better coordination of the increasingly intensive allied and international cooperation, the chairmanship of the CVCS developed into a permanent function. The full-time chairman of the CVCS was given his own joint staff. This structure grew in the 1970s to form a policy directorate for operations, which in 1976 became the Defence Staff. From then on, it was headed by the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS).

The end of the Cold War brought with it a need for changes. The military became a smaller, more flexible and expeditionary instrument. Deployment for international crisis management operations became a main task alongside the general defence task. The ongoing ‘internationalisation’ of the deployment of Dutch forces led to an expansion in the tasks of the CDS and his staff. The catalyst was the fall of Srebrenica in 1995. After that, the Defence Staff became fully responsible for the planning, preparation, execution and evaluation of international operations. Over the years, this responsibility grew to become a fully-fledged overall command and in 2005, the armed forces were definitively placed under the single command of the CDS, who is now known as the Chief of Defence (CHOD). The CHOD thus became the highest national military-strategic authority.
The new, expeditionary era was characterised by a greater social and political focus on operations. On deployment, the armed forces were under scrutiny and politicians were keen to increase their control. The domestic political-strategic contextualisation of the armed forces was rendered verifiable and more concrete by the introduction of deployment criteria. In 1993, the cabinet drew up a list of evaluation criteria, which was formalised in 1995 in what became known as the Frame of Reference for participating in military operations. This contained 14 points for determining the political desirability and practical feasibility of participation by Dutch military personnel in international crisis management operations. The Frame of Reference for participating in military operations underwent some changes in 2001 and 2009. Since then, the 2009 Frame of Reference for participating in military operations has served as the starting point for decision making and supplying information to parliament for the deployment of military forces, for which the information provisions pursuant to Article 100 of the Constitution apply. This relates to the deployment or supply of the armed forces for the purposes of maintaining or promoting the international legal order.

Public opinion, which for a long time seemed to be developing into an important element in the decision making, has only had a limited impact over the years. Government and parliament do take note of the signals, feelings and perceptions picked up from the public, but at the same time, the Frame of Reference for participating in military operations has not contained the criterion of ‘public support’ since 2001, unlike the original version. In any event, the Netherlands always showed a great deal of support for international peacekeeping and peace support operations, and the level remained constant for a long time. In the case of operations conducted in the first decade of the 21st century, however, in which there were significant physical risks for the participating troops and great uncertainty about the Netherlands’ direct interest as well as the desired results, support has been more limited. The Dutch people have proved more critical of the deployment of Dutch troops in these cases.

In 2000, an active duty of information on the part of the government to parliament in respect of the deployment of military personnel was laid down in Article 100 of the Constitution. This duty of information has led to the development of a procedure that allows parliament to perform its verification task, which includes the use of notifications, interim reports and final evaluations. Although parliament does not officially have a right to consent, an operation without a clear parliamentary majority is inconceivable.
3.2. The international legal framework
The deployment of the military instrument outside national borders has its legal basis in international law. The rule of thumb is that the Netherlands may not operate in another country without that country’s consent. There are essentially two universal, legal principles for this: the principle of sovereignty and the prohibition of force, as expressed in the UN Charter. After looking at these two principles, this chapter will discuss several other legal principles and treaties as well as the laws and jurisdiction that apply during military operations.

3.2.1. The sovereignty principle
According to this principle, the authority of a state does not depend on another, higher authority for actions within its own country. Under the non-intervention principle, no state may intervene in the internal affairs of another.30

3.2.2. Prohibition of the use of force
Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter prohibits the use or the threat of military force in international relations. This stipulation is intended to prevent states from taking military action in the territory of or against another state, either on their own initiative or on the basis of national legislation, and with or without the use of force.

3.2.3. The use of force and the right to self-defence (jus ad bellum)
International law consists of written and unwritten rules that govern relations between states. The jus ad bellum is the part of international law that deals with the justification of military operations in another state. This law has three generally accepted legal foundations.

The first legal basis31 is the right to individual or collective self-defence, recognised in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Leading on from that, it is also the case that states may, under strict conditions, protect their citizens and, if necessary, evacuate them from another country with the use of military force. One of the conditions that apply here is that the host nation is no longer willing or able to offer those citizens the necessary protection. The second legal foundation is authorisation of the UN Security Council on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The third legal foundation is an invitation from the host nation.

30 The sovereignty principle also applies to ships (flag principle): in principle, only the flag state (the state under whose flag the ship sails) has jurisdiction over its ships.
31 Memo Rechtsgrondslag en mandaat van missies met deelname van Nederlandse militaire eenheden [Legal basis and mandate for missions involving participation by Dutch forces] (TK 29 521 no. 41, 2006-2007).
There is also some discussion about other exceptions to the prohibition of force, in particular about allowing humanitarian intervention. The Netherlands’ position is that military intervention in a humanitarian emergency can be justified on moral and political grounds. This means that humanitarian intervention is permissible as a last resort in exceptional cases and under strict conditions. The consequence of the different legal foundations is that the responsibilities and powers of military personnel can differ widely in each operation.

3.2.4. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
Operations at sea are governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This convention gives states the right to operate in open seas, so outside territorial waters, in a number of specific cases, including operations to combat piracy and the slave trade. The convention also deals with the duty to render assistance to persons in distress at sea.

3.2.5. Outer Space Treaty of 1967
Operations in outer space are covered by the UN Outer Space Treaty of 1967, of which the Netherlands has been a signatory since 1969. Signatory states to this treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, nor to install such weapons on celestial bodies, nor station them in outer space in any other manner. The treaty requires parties to use the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively for peaceful purposes, and also prohibits the setting up of military bases, installations or fortifications, testing of any kind of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies.

3.2.6. Laws and jurisdiction
The legal framework that applies during deployment outside the Netherlands is different for each operation, and even sometimes for different areas or phases of the same operation. For example, counter-drug and counter-piracy operations (law enforcement) could thus also be subject to the Code of Criminal Procedure. In all cases, the way in which the assigned tasks are performed and the authority exercised must be in accordance with the basic principles of international humanitarian law.

3.2.7. International humanitarian law
International humanitarian law (IHL), *jus in bello*, as defined in the Geneva Conventions with the associated supplementary protocols, determines the laws and jurisdiction during military operations. The
purpose of IHL is to find a balance between military necessity (the reality of the use of force) and humanity (the prevention of unnecessary suffering). IHL grants powers and imposes restrictions to this effect. The powers consist mainly of the right of combatants to take part in hostilities, while the restrictions mainly encompass rules for the methods and means of warfare and rules which govern the protection of people and goods.

IHL only applies officially if there is a situation of ‘armed conflict’; whether the situation is one of armed conflict depends on actual events and not on declarations or political views of warring parties. Even if IHL does not apply, Dutch and NATO policy is to use IHL restrictions as a safety margin for operations by the Netherlands armed forces. This prevents any confusion that might arise in respect of the powers of an intervention force as a result of its changing status in a conflict area. This status can after all range from armed enforcement of peace or enforcement of the rule of law and stability to assistance in rebuilding and alleviation of human suffering.

3.3. The national legal framework
As well as being subject to international law, military deployment is also subject to national legislation. This legislation includes, for example, stipulations about the existence of the armed forces, defines the circumstances in which the armed forces can be deployed and sets rules for their deployment and actions. First, this chapter will look at a number of articles from the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands\(^\text{32}\) and the Constitution, in so far as they determine military deployment. It will then look successively at the legal foundations for deployment in national territory, for military assistance in the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom and for military action in the event of extraordinary circumstances in the Netherlands.

3.3.1. The Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands
The Charter, which was last changed on 10 October 2010, deals with the legal order in the Kingdom and distinguishes between the affairs of the Kingdom and those of its constituent countries: the Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao and St. Maarten. With regard to the armed forces, the Charter stipulates that preservation of the independence and the defence of the Kingdom is a Kingdom responsibility (Article 3, paragraph 1.a). The Netherlands armed forces perform this task for all countries of the Kingdom.

\(^\text{32}\) Article 5 paragraph 2 of the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands reads: ‘The Constitution shall have regard to the provisions of the Charter’. The Charter thus takes precedence over the Constitution of the Netherlands.
3.3.2. The Constitution

The existence, management and deployment of the armed forces are embedded in the Dutch Constitution, mainly in Articles 97 and 100.

Article 97

1. There shall be armed forces for the defence and protection of the interests of the Kingdom, and in order to maintain and promote the international rule of law.
2. The Government shall have supreme authority over the armed forces.

Article 100

1. The government shall inform the States General in advance if the armed forces are to be deployed or made available to maintain or promote the international rule of law. This shall include the provision of humanitarian aid in the event of armed conflict.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply if compelling reasons exist to prevent the provision of information in advance. In this event, information shall be supplied as soon as possible.

Paragraph 2 of Article 97 stipulates that supreme authority over the armed forces rests with the government: the primacy of politics. That also means that the government bears political responsibility in respect of parliament, and ultimately that the government does not relinquish that supreme authority, even when it makes troops available to international organisations.

Article 100 states that the government must inform parliament in advance of deployment or provision of military forces to maintain or promote the international rule of law, unless the exception in paragraph 2 of the Article applies. In this event, parliament must be informed as quickly as possible after the start of deployment or the supply of troops. This duty of information does not apply to the defence task, which involves individual or collective self-defence as defined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Deployment for collective self-defence may occur on the basis of the international obligation to assist in Article 5 of the NATO treaty and Article 42 of the Treaty on European Union.

3.4. Main tasks

The allocation of the main tasks to the armed forces was set out by the Minister of Defence in his letter ‘New Equilibrium, New Developments’,\textsuperscript{33} he repeated this in his policy letter ‘Service Worldwide’ in 2007.\textsuperscript{34} These main tasks are an elaboration of Article 97 of the Constitution, and three main tasks can be identified:


1. protection of national and allied territory, including the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom;
2. promotion of the international rule of law and stability;
3. support for civil authorities in national law enforcement, disaster relief and humanitarian aid, both nationally and internationally.
This list is not hierarchical: the tasks are equal and must be executable at all times. The likelihood that a certain task will need to be executed may vary considerably over time.

### 1. PROTECTION OF NATIONAL AND ALLIED TERRITORY

#### 3.4.1. Main task 1

Although the general defence task will continue to exist, it is unlikely that it will need to be performed in its traditional form, namely warding off a large-scale offensive directed at one or more NATO member states. Terrorism and the proliferation and deployment of weapons of mass destruction, and all the implications they entail, now pose the most acute threat.35 Because this explicitly benefits the security of the population in NATO member states, NATO forces are now deployed outside the treaty area as well. Allied military capabilities still, however, guarantee the territorial integrity of the member states. The Defence organisation also remains responsible for the territorial integrity of the Kingdom’s Caribbean countries (Aruba, Curacao and St. Maarten) and the Caribbean Netherlands (Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba).

### 2. PROMOTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW AND STABILITY

#### 3.4.2. Main task 2

The promotion of the international rule of law and stability requires the execution of expeditionary, usually multinational, operations, and the need for this second task is increasing. This means that the size and structure of the armed forces are designed increasingly on the basis of this task. Over the years, the accent of the missions has shifted from deployment under Chapter VI of the UN Charter36 in which peacekeeping efforts are performed with the consent of the warring parties, to missions based on Chapter VII, in which force may be used if necessary for peace-enforcement.37 Particularly those operations which aim to prevent or resolve intrastate conflicts increasingly require robust action.

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36 Chapter VI of the UN Charter contains provisions for a peaceful settlement of disputes, for example by negotiation or the installation of a UN peace force. Examples of such missions include UNMEE, in which the Netherlands participated in 2000-2001, and UNMIL (Liberia) in 2003-2004.
37 Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides for the possibility of using force to counter a threat to or disruption of the peace and acts of aggression.
These operations are characterised by an intense but relatively short intervention phase at the high end of the force spectrum, followed by a lengthy stabilisation phase. Long-term stabilisation operations are costly and carry high risks. It is for this reason, and because prevention is better than cure, that there is a growing preference for participation in preventive operations, such as security sector development. A military presence, the support of diplomatic missions and the education and training of - and exercising with - other armed forces can also have a preventive effect. This second main task also includes deployment for international law enforcement, such as the protection of merchant shipping against piracy and the prevention of arms and drugs smuggling by sea. The deployment of the Netherlands armed forces for the second main task occurs wherever possible in an allied or coalition context, ideally with countries which are members of the same security organisations as the Netherlands. Examples are the missions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, as well as the counter-piracy operations around Somalia.

3. SUPPORTING LAW ENFORCEMENT, DISASTER RELIEF AND HUMANITARIAN AID, BOTH NATIONALLY AND INTERNATIONALLY

3.4.3. Main task 3
For a long time, the armed forces’ main role in respect of national security was to provide a safety net for the civil authorities in the event of shortfalls in civil capacity. With their highly specific and unique capacities, today’s armed forces have a broader range of capabilities. They serve on a regular basis as a partner in activities such as emergency relief, search and rescue, security and public order enforcement. In doing so, the armed forces have developed into a structural security partner to the police, fire service and medical services in accidents and disasters. In principle, the whole of the armed forces is available for this third main task, which also includes a number of routine activities, such as explosive ordnance disposal, coastguard operations in the North Sea and the Caribbean, and patient transport to and from the Wadden Islands.

Administrative agreements made under the Intensification of Civil-Military Cooperation (ICMS in Dutch) have established the guaranteed availability of specialist capabilities (such as airborne surveillance and security, EOD and CBRN defence38) for the armed forces. This availability is linked to response times. Military capabilities are deployed under the responsibility of the civil authorities. In exceptional circumstances, civil-military cooperation could lead to a decision to allocate operational leadership of sub-tasks, such as

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38 EOD: explosive ordnance disposal; CBRN: protection against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks
evacuations in crises and disasters, to the armed forces. Ultimate responsibility nonetheless remains with the civil authorities.

The third main task also has an international component. The armed forces could also operate internationally as a security partner in the event of deployment for disaster relief and the provision of humanitarian aid. Examples of such cases are the deployment of engineer auxiliary battalions in Iraq (1991) and Kosovo (1999), the humanitarian relief operation in Albania (1999), participation in the EU monitoring mission in Aceh (2006), the supply of transport equipment and military personnel after the severe earthquake in Haiti in 2010 and emergency relief after various hurricanes in the Caribbean, such as Hugo (1989) and Katrina (2005).

3.5. Decision making for deployment
Article 97 of the Constitution stipulates that the government has supreme authority over the armed forces. Any decision to deploy the armed forces will, therefore, always be made by or on behalf of the government. The form of the decision to deploy and the way in which it is made depends on the reason for deployment. First of all, there is a distinction between decision making in respect of the armed forces’ permanent tasks and decision making for incidental deployment. In the case of the latter, decision making for deployment within the Kingdom also differs from that outside it.

3.5.1. Decision making for permanent deployment of the armed forces within the Kingdom
Deployment of the armed forces is regarded as permanent if military personnel are performing a routine, recurring task without a particular end state. Such tasks are normally national and are performed in the Netherlands and in the Caribbean region of the Kingdom. Examples of permanent deployment include:
- military presence in the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom;
- explosive ordnance disposal;
- coastguard duties;
- airspace control, including the quick reaction alert (QRA) task;39
- search and rescue (SAR) and medical air transport for the Wadden Islands.
Decisions about this permanent military deployment are made at ministerial level and are set out in structural agreements between the Ministry of Defence and the other ministries or departments involved. These arrangements are usually in the form of an order, a covenant or a user agreement.

39 The QRA task involves keeping two F-16 fighter planes on standby 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to intercept any unknown aircraft approaching or entering Dutch airspace.
3.5.2. Decision making for incidental deployment of the armed forces within the Kingdom

Incidental deployment of the armed forces within the Kingdom is said to be the case when public institutions are assisted or supported by military forces. The method of decision making for this type of military deployment depends on the sort of assistance or support and the place it is needed.40

The following basic principles exist for military assistance or support within the Netherlands.

- **Military assistance under the Police Act.** Under this act, the armed forces may be asked to assist the police in upholding public order or in criminal law enforcement. Decision making about this type of deployment proceeds in stages. First, the question of whether the assistance can be provided by the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee will be considered. In special cases, other sections of the armed forces may be asked to assist. A decision on that will be made by the Minister of Security and Justice in consultation with the Minister of Defence. On behalf of the Minister of Defence, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Defence will decide on deployment of the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee and the Director of Legal Affairs will decide on deployment of the other Services. Deployment of special forces occurs after a consultative process agreed between the departments.

- **Military assistance under the Security Regions Act.** In the event or serious threat of a fire, a disaster or a crisis, military assistance can be provided for civil authorities. Any such request will be submitted by the chairman of the security region to the Minister of Security and Justice, who will then investigate whether the assistance requested could be provided by other civil emergency services. If this is not or only partly possible, the request will be submitted to the Minister of Defence and the CHOD can then act on the Minister’s behalf in deciding whether to provide military assistance.

- **Military support in the public interest.** If there is an urgent need for goods or services that the defence organisation can provide, a request may be submitted by an administrative body.41 This request will then proceed via the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations or the Ministry of Security and Justice. If the required goods or services are available, the CHOD may decide on behalf of the Minister to provide support.

The Defence organisation has made arrangements with other government departments and lower authorities that are referred to collectively by the term Intensification of

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40 The Secretary-General deals with this in his Directive SG A-972 Handboek militaire ondersteuning civiele autoriteiten [Handbook for military support for the civil authorities].

41 According to the Directive Militaire Steunverlening in het Openbaar Belang [Military support in the public interest] (MP 11-10-100), an administrative body is a government minister, a Queen’s commissioner, a mayor or a dike warden.
Civil-Military Cooperation (ICMS). These arrangements take the form of an order, a covenant or a user agreement. The guiding principle is that deployment of Defence means for military assistance or support will always take place under the responsibility of the civil authorities. As part of ICMS, a catalogue has been drawn up to provide the civil authorities with an insight into the agreed personnel, equipment and logistic support that the Defence organisation is guaranteed to be able to supply.

In the case of military assistance in the Caribbean region of the Kingdom, a distinction needs to be made between the Kingdom’s Caribbean countries (Aruba, Curaçao and St. Maarten) and the Caribbean Netherlands (Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba – the BES islands).

- For Aruba, Curaçao and St. Maarten, the legal basis for the provision of military assistance is the Royal Decree on instructions pertaining to the deployment of the armed forces (1987). This decree enables the governor of these countries to make sections of the armed forces available to the governments of Aruba, Curaçao or St. Maarten for the purpose of providing military assistance to maintain internal security and public order (also referred to as ‘hard’), or in disasters, accidents and disruptions to traffic or communications (known as ‘soft’). Decisions on assistance in disasters and accidents for which no specific authority is required are made by the Flag Officer Caribbean (CZMCARIB in Dutch) after a request from the governor. For assistance in maintaining internal security and public order, decisions are made by the Ministerial Council or, in urgent cases, the Minister of Defence, both following a request by the national government through the intermediary of the governor.

- As public bodies within the Netherlands, the BES islands fall under the Dutch state system. Under the BES Security Act (2010), the government representative has the authority to submit a request for military assistance to the Minister of Defence. This applies to military assistance in maintaining public order as well as in criminal law
enforcement and associated tasks for the justice department. The Minister of Defence will decide, in consultation with the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations and the Minister of Security and Justice, about the provision of assistance. The lieutenant governor or the public prosecutor will decide, after agreement with the Minister of Defence, how the assistance will be provided. In the case of disasters and calamities, the lieutenant governor of the island group can submit a request for support directly to CZMCARIB. In the case of inter-island disasters or calamities, the request will be made by the government representative.

3.5.3. Operating in exceptional circumstances in the Netherlands
A situation could arise in the Netherlands in which the usual powers of the government are no longer sufficient to allow an appropriate response or action. If there is also a vital national interest at stake, the situation could be regarded as exceptional. In such a situation, the government may be able to use what are described as special powers, which are also created in a way that deviates from the usual legislation. These powers are extremely far-reaching, and are set out in emergency powers legislation. Examples of these special powers are area clearance/evacuation and the requisition of goods and services from civilians and other government authorities. For the armed forces, the most relevant legal basis is the War Act.

3.5.4. Decision making for deployment of the armed forces outside the Kingdom
The decision to deploy the armed forces and to use military force if necessary falls under the primacy of the political leadership. Decision making on how and for what purpose the armed forces are deployed is linked to the grand strategy and international law. As part of the comprehensive approach, military deployment must be coordinated with the other instruments used by the government. The strategic objectives of a military operation are established at ministerial level and in close cooperation with military leaders. Although a number of ministries could be involved in the decision making under the comprehensive approach, it is mainly the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence who play key roles in the decision making in respect of military deployment outside the Kingdom. In NATO operations, the North Atlantic Council will decide on the deployment of NATO forces, while the Netherlands government will make the decision on the possible military contribution from the Dutch side. The Netherlands government will also make a similar decision in respect of requests for participation in a military operation that come from authorities within the EU (Political and Security Committee), the OSCE or the UN. There are situations in which (sub-)operations are then executed under national command, such as special ops and counter-piracy operations.
Deployment of the armed forces outside the borders of the Kingdom usually occurs as part of the first and second main tasks, namely:

- to protect national and allied territory (first main task);
- to promote the international rule of law and stability (second main task).

The decision-making process for deployment is virtually the same in all cases. Under Article of the Constitution, the government will inform parliament in writing in advance of decision to participate in an international operation and the conditions associated with that participation. Three instruments are particularly important in the decision making:

- the threat analysis by the Military Intelligence and Security Service and General Intelligence and Security Service;
- the Frame of Reference for participating in military operations, with points that need particular attention to ensure a well-considered decision to deploy. This includes such things as political aspects, the mandate, other participating nations, feasibility and security risks;
- the CHOD’s operational planning process.

The political process for deployment of the armed forces outside the Kingdom, to which Article 100 applies, proceeds as follows:

- If the Netherlands is requested officially or unofficially to supply a military contribution for a particular operation, a provisional political-military assessment is made. On the basis of this assessment, a decision can then be made to investigate the request further. At this point, the government will notify parliament of this intention (the ‘notification’);
- Using the points in the 2009 Frame of Reference for participating in military operations, consideration will then be given to the question of whether military deployment is desirable and feasible. A political decision to deploy is prepared by officials in the Military Operations Steering Group. As soon as all the required information is available, the government will make its decision. This will normally be done on the basis of a draft letter that deals with the topics in the Frame of Reference for participating in military operations (the ‘Article 100 letter’);
- The Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs (and any other ministers involved) will then send their joint, definitive letter to the States General, and a debate will follow. This parliamentary debate may lead to adjustments in the decision;
- Parliament will then be informed periodically about the progress of preparations for and the execution of the deployment;

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42 Joint letter from the Ministers of Interior Affairs and Kingdom Relations, Defence and Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation 30162, no. 11, 21 July 2009.
- Ultimately, every year on the third Wednesday in May, parliament will have an interim evaluation of ongoing operations;
- On completion of deployment, a final evaluation will be drawn up with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and any other ministries involved; this evaluation will also include aspects from the Frame of Reference for participating in military operations.

In deployment for purposes other than the promotion of the international rule of law, Article 100 of the Constitution does not formally apply. The decision-making process is similar, but does not necessarily comprise all the elements referred to above. The government has undertaken to inform parliament as much in accordance with the Frame of Reference for participating in military operations as possible, certainly in the case of large-scale civil missions involving military participation and in the event of missions with overlapping objectives, i.e. where deployment of the armed forces is intended to protect national and allied territory as well as to maintain or promote the international rule of law.

The duty of information in Article 100 of the Constitution not only applies to deployment but also to the supply of military units for the second main task, as it is not yet a case of a decision to proceed with the actual deployment of Dutch military personnel. This is covered by the procedure given in Article 43 of the UN Charter43, which so far has never been used in practice. The promise of Dutch troops to the NATO Response Force of the EU Battlegroups is not in itself subject to Article 100 of the Constitution. The government has, however, expressed its willingness to clarify parts of the Frame of Reference for participating in military operations, in so far as it is possible and relevant, at the time of assignment of forces for this purpose. It is aware that such an allocation is not without obligation and that it gives rise to both national and international expectations.

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43 Article 43 of the UN Charter makes provisions for the supply of forces to the UN Security Council, on its call, for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Units of the armed forces may also find themselves outside Dutch territory without there being any official deployment as defined above. This could happen, for example, in situations where military forces are training and thus contributing to a country’s security sector development. The interests are often more of an economic or diplomatic nature, for example a military presence in support of a trade mission or to support diplomatic negotiations. Decisions about this type of military contribution outside the Kingdom are made by the CHOD in close consultation with the other ministries involved.

At an early stage of the preparatory process for military deployment outside the Kingdom, a decision needs to be made as to whether a civil assessment is necessary. This is an assessment of the situation in a conflict area, in which an analysis is made of such aspects as the causes of the conflict, the civil institutions, infrastructure, activities and attitudes of civil authorities and other leaders, local population, etc. This analysis leads to conclusions about the need for the use of non-military means of power and civil capacities. Ideally, this assessment will be performed multinationally. If a civil assessment is necessary, it should be carried out as early in the process as possible, ideally before the decision making starts, as the results are important for effective military deployment.44

3.6. Rules of engagement

Once a state has a legal basis on which to operate, a clear mission, an intent and the rules of engagement (ROE) will need to be drawn up for the military units about to be deployed. ROE are mission rules for commanders of military operations and contain the official parameters in respect of the nature of and methods for the use of force.

ROE are not a means of assigning specific tasks. Commanders may curtail the relevant ROE for subordinate commanders at any time, but they cannot in principle take it upon themselves to expand them. ROE must at all times remain within the parameters of the applicable legislation, including IHL. Besides the mission

rules in the ROE, instructions for the use of force are also issued to the commander as well as to individual personnel.

Because the state has the monopoly of force, the legitimacy of the use of force must be evaluable; the ROE are instrumental here. ROE never restrict the universal right to self-defence. In a multinational deployment, ROE are established within the relevant alliance or union, or - in the case of an operation by a coalition of states - in consultation with the states participating in the coalition. On the basis of national policy or national law, a country may deviate from the agreed ROE and issue these deviations to the deployed forces as supplementary instructions. In practice, the restrictions to the ROE are designated as caveats and must be communicated to the force commander. The force commander must ensure when planning the assignments to his units that no assignments are issued that fall outside the ROE or outside the caveats that apply to those units. The Dutch senior national representative acts on behalf of the CHOD in monitoring the mandate, the application of the ROE and the observance of caveats on deployment of Dutch forces.

As the red card holder, he can intervene if necessary. The right to self-defence is an inherent right. The most relevant ROE are summarised for individual service personnel in an ‘instruction card for the use of force’ and for officers and NCOs in an aide-mémoire.

### 3.7. Direction during deployment

Deployed units from the armed forces are always under the command of the CHOD, regardless of whether these units are deployed within or outside the Kingdom’s borders. There is, however, a difference in direction between deployment within the Kingdom (under the third main task) on the one hand, and, on the other, deployment outside the Kingdom (regardless of the main task). Both situations are explained here.

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45 The senior national representative (SNR) is the CHOD’s representative in the mission area. He will advise the international force commander and block the deployment of the national contingent if necessary. This function is often combined with that of contingent commander.

46 Red card holder is a term used internationally for a designated national official who has the authority to prohibit or stop an operational action by his country’s participants in a multinational operation.

47 Provided the principles of proportionality - no more force than is necessary to stop that being used by an aggressor - and subsidiarity - the last possible resort to stop the aggressor - are adhered to.

48 In the Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations (AJP-3[B]), full command - the highest degree of authority - is defined as the military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national Services. The term 'command', as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. No NATO or coalition commander has full command over the forces assigned to him.
3.7.1. Direction of military assistance and support within the Kingdom

Once a decision has been taken to deploy the armed forces under the third main task, units are placed under civil command.\textsuperscript{49} The decision to deploy may be accompanied by conditions, restrictions and instructions for the deployment of forces or specific (weapon) systems or the interpretation of rules. These units remain under the command of the CHOD. The CHOD will provide a military adviser to support the civil authorities in the planning and execution. The CHOD will also appoint an official to monitor the mandate for each mission; this official will operate with the civil authorities in a role that is similar to that of the senior national representative and red card holder in an international deployment. These functions (military adviser and said official) will be combined wherever possible. All military operations within the Kingdom are in principle directed by the CHOD, with the exception of police tasks assigned to the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee under the Police Act; these are conducted under the competent authority (in accordance with the stipulations of the Police Act).

3.7.2. Direction of deployment of the armed forces outside the Kingdom

Once the government has made the decision to participate in a mission, the CHOD will set out in an ‘Operational directive’ the national guidelines, missions, tasks and responsibilities, as well as the arrangements that have been made for the transfer of authority (TOA)\textsuperscript{50} to the multinational force commander. The TOA is confined to the operational part of the mission. The Dutch government retains ultimate control (the supreme command referred to in the Constitution) and the CHOD has full command. The decision for Dutch troops to participate in an operation may be accompanied by national caveats for the deployment of Dutch units or specific (weapon) systems, or for the interpretation of the rules. One should be aware, however, that national caveats do restrict the multinational force commander’s freedom of action. The CHOD will ensure that this commander is mindful of the stated caveats. Even after the TOA, he will retain full responsibility for the deployed units, and is responsible for directing them. The CHOD will direct the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee in missions abroad for non-police tasks.

\textsuperscript{49} Authority over deployment of the armed forces, or units thereof, as part of the third main task means the administrative power to instruct their deployment for the purpose of conducting whatever mission the administrator deems desirable or necessary. This authority is accompanied by the administrative responsibility and thus also carries the duty of accountability for the decisions taken and the instructed deployment of military units and equipment. Command relationships determine the powers that commanders have to issue missions or orders to their subordinate commanders or units to execute the mission assigned by the competent authority. In other words, an officer who has full command authority over a unit does not thus have the authority to give that unit orders for actions or in respect of areas that do not fall under his decision-making authority.

\textsuperscript{50} The Transfer of Authority (TOA) is the handover or return of operational authority between one commander and another. It may, as in the case of all operational command arrangements, be a phased process. TOA takes place, for example, when a national contingent is placed under the commander of a multinational force commander and again when that attachment ends.
4. Fighting power

4.1. Introduction

The total of capabilities supplied by the armed forces to perform strategic functions is known as fighting power. This fighting power comprises not only personnel and equipment, but also factors such as willingness, cohesion, leadership, doctrine, power of renewal, and so on. Military doctrine encompasses not only the deployment of personnel and materiel but also that of these less tangible factors. To be able to apply doctrine, an understanding of all the factors that make up fighting power is essential.

Fighting power is expressed in a model which consists of a mental, physical and conceptual component and which is described in this chapter. The deployment of fighting power at sea, on land, in the air, in space and in the information domain will then be discussed on the basis of the specific characteristics of these domains.

**Fighting power in a historical perspective**

For centuries, the armed forces have been the state’s instrument of power. The extent to which this instrument could be used depended heavily on its potential. The term ‘fighting power’, consisting of a conceptual, a physical and a mental component, has been used in doctrine since the 1990s. These aspects were in themselves nothing new in the exercise of military power. They have always played a major role in the deployment of the armed forces, but the form they take has changed significantly since the beginning of the 19th century. Although all three components are necessary for the development of an effective military force, the emphasis placed on one of them has changed dramatically over time.

**The physical component**

From the middle of the 19th century, the development of weapons technology was constant. With the advent of automatic weapons, rapid-fire artillery, smokeless ammunition, armoured (steam)ships, aircraft and tanks or ‘battle wagons’, the effectiveness of the armed forces grew, and so too did the combat distances, on land, at sea and (eventually) in the air, as well as the ‘destructive power’. This was made possible by the continuing industrialisation of Western nations, which enabled the required mass production of weapons, ammunition, equipment, etc, to support the huge armies that had been created. The growing grip that ‘the government’ had on society also meant that more and more people and equipment could be mobilised to serve the state’s interests.

The technological advances, which can roughly be divided into increased firepower (19th century), increased mobility (first half of the 20th century), increased command
and control capabilities and computerisation (end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st century), have led to a situation in which there are now manned (weapon) systems and fewer armed men. This also means that the number of ‘combat soldiers’ (those who actually use weapons) has diminished considerably. Modern armed forces have an ever-growing need for logistic and technological support, but the smaller number of ‘fighters’ are able to deploy more and increasingly accurate and effective firepower.

The conceptual component
The introduction of conscript armies brought with it a need for a centrally formulated method of operating, enabling army leaders to ensure that unity of opinion existed within the armed forces. This meant that senior commanders ‘knew’ in which doctrinal framework their subordinate commanders were acting. Given the size of the armies and the hugely increased breadths of the front lines, this coordination mechanism was vital to be able to direct the armies effectively.

In the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, countries developed their ‘own’ doctrine, based on their own wartime experience and also particularly on the opinions of society. The philosophies of traditional military thinkers such as Jomini and Von Clausewitz (land operations), Mahan and Corbett (maritime operations) and Douhet and Mitchell (air operations) still influence the conceptual thinking of today’s armed forces.

The mental component
The mental component is the least visible of the three elements, but traditionally plays an important role in determining fighting power. In the 19th century, under the influence of the French military philosopher Charles Ardant du Picq, the main emphasis was on physical and mental strength, self-sacrifice and the ability to withstand heavy losses without losing the will to fight (and to win). At the beginning of the 20th century, generals had doubts as to whether conscripted military personnel had the required mental toughness to be able to fight in ‘modern combat’. Standards of living had, according to these generals, increased to such a level that ‘civilian’ soldiers were neither tough enough nor resilient enough. The First World War showed that they need not have worried.

Over the course of the 20th century, the emphasis shifted away from physical sacrifice and more attention was focused on matters such as motivation, team spirit, training, justification and social acceptance and support. In most Western armed forces and societies, the mental component was still associated with perseverance and operating in extreme conditions, but no longer with heavy losses. That element and the ability to cope with it virtually disappeared from military thinking.
Until the First World War, Western nations regarded the mental component as the deciding factor. The country and therefore the armed forces with the greatest resilience would ultimately win the war. Based on experiences in that war, the emphasis shifted to the conceptual element, particularly in Germany, and the physical element, mainly in France. The German generals came to the conclusion that the use of the ‘right’ doctrine should be the deciding factor, so a great deal of attention was focused on doctrine development in both the Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht. The French army was mainly concerned with the physical component, as the next war would be a repetition of the last one. If sufficient assets were available, both mobile and static, the next war could also be waged successfully. The Second World War showed that it was the physical component which would ultimately decide the outcome. The Americans deployed overwhelming amounts of materiel, while the Russians were also willing to sacrifice untold numbers of personnel.

During the Cold War, both sides also emphasised the physical component. Initially, it was in this way that the West tried to cope with the Warsaw Pact’s great superiority in terms of materiel. This proved socially and financially untenable and, partly as a result of this, more importance was attached to doctrine development. By fighting intelligently and by exploiting the technological superiority more effectively, the physical dominance could be overcome.

After the Cold War, emphasis shifted more towards the conceptual component. In the new world order, it was no longer possible to concentrate exclusively on full-scale combat. Armed forces now had to cope with a variety of threats and had to perform a wide diversity of tasks. It was not so much that these tasks, such as peace operations, peacekeeping, counter-insurgency, were new, but about the fact that issues arose that had not demanded the attention of the European armies for a long time. Now, the old doctrine developed for those tasks was once again studied and put into practice, and one of the consequences of this was that the Dutch armed forces began to rewrite their doctrine.
4.2. **The components and their relationship**

Fighting power is the ability to conduct military operations in a cohesive totality of operational functionalities and components in an optimum composition. It is more than just the availability of operational means (capacities); there must also be the willingness and ability to deploy these means (capability). If this is properly developed, it then becomes fighting power, and capacities are elevated to capabilities. Fighting power is thus made up of a mental, physical and conceptual component. These cannot be seen in isolation; they all affect one another. Sophisticated equipment is thus useless without highly motivated and well-trained personnel and without a well-considered, doctrine-based deployment method.

![Diagram: The components of fighting power](image-url)

**Figure 4.1** The components of fighting power
4.3. The mental component

Warfare is an activity conducted by people. The willingness to engage in combat if necessary plays a key role in that activity. The mental component of military operations is thus a combination of four interrelated factors: motivation, leadership, responsible organisation of the deployment of available personnel and materiel, and understanding. The mental component is extremely important, for the very reason that military personnel usually operate in conditions that not only call for great mental resilience, but which also place heavy demands in terms of conduct and attitude in a mission area. Such requirements could include cultural awareness, empathy and an open attitude, as well as the need to demonstrate appropriate initiative, creativity, even business instinct or negotiating skills and the mental attitude to exercise restraint in the use of force.

4.3.1. Motivation

Motivation is the result of training, confidence in the equipment, effective leadership and management, strong discipline, self-respect, mutual respect and a good understanding of what is going on. In practice, motivation is closely linked to high morale. Motivation can be influenced by external factors, such as public opinion. An individual serviceman’s belief that the public support deployment in a conflict, regarding the mission as legitimate and seeing that the necessary materiel is available to support the military activities contribute substantially to his willingness to fight. The media play a key role in this respect.

4.3.2. Effective leadership

The commander is the embodiment of effective leadership. That gives commanders at all levels an important role in the mental component. He is also responsible for the training prior to the mission. During the mission, it is the commander who, as leader, ensures the execution of tasks through action, motivation, inspiration and the power to instil the will to “go for it” into his personnel. On deployment, the commander is the face of the unit. His actions will shape the image held by all the other members of the unit. He is responsible for the actions of all individual military personnel under his command.

4.3.3. Organising the deployment responsibly

The way in which a commander organises the deployment of his assets will influence the mental component. By doing this responsibly, he will ensure that his personnel trust in their own abilities and in the organisation, and he will create a support base for the operation. Organising the deployment responsibly means, amongst other things, that sufficient assets (personnel, materiel and funds) are available for the successful execution of an operation. A support base is also necessary, among military personnel as well as the general population. Thorough preparation, also in education and training, and good
planning are organisational preconditions for success. In the organisation process, account needs to be taken of the impact that deployment in a mission area, constant exposure to danger, often in difficult conditions and far from home, will have on individuals.

4.3.4. Military work is about people
Deployment of the armed forces can only be effective if personnel are sufficiently motivated, trained and educated. Despite advances in unmanned technology and developments in robotics, the human factor remains key. The physical presence of military personnel is still necessary, as this is the only way to establish contact with the local population. That personal contact is essential in gaining a good understanding of needs, expectations, intentions and local conditions. Support among the local population can only be established through a physical presence: military personnel are thus relevant for more than just fighting. Furthermore, it is only people who can respond quickly to changing circumstances, read emotions and act in the spirit of the commander.
4.4. The physical component

The armed forces' operational assets form the physical component of fighting power; these are the personnel and materiel that are organised for deployment in an operation. The term 'operational readiness' is used for the planning, preparation and deployment; this is the state in which the organic unit is in a position to perform an organic task within the set response time. To ensure that the physical component has the right composition, size and quality, it is essential that there is a clear level of ambition for deployment of the armed forces. Deployment options are linked to that ambition level and form the basis for requirements and education and training programmes.

4.4.1. Personnel

With the materiel supplied, the deployed personnel must be able to conduct military activities that are within the government-set ambition level in any conditions. Recruitment and selection is designed to appoint personnel in the right numbers and of the right quality to meet this requirement. Personnel undergo special instruction and training which focus on specific elements derived from the deployment options. This means that during each phase of instruction and training, there must be attention for motivation and mental toughness (see the mental component), for knowledge of possible deployment options, for knowledge of tactics and techniques (skills and drills), for basic skills (including physical training, physical toughness) and for specialist, function-specific skills. When units or individuals are assigned to a specific mission, they might need supplementary training specifically tailored to the requirements of the particular mission. This mission-specific training may take place in the Netherlands before departure to the mission area or in a safe part of the mission area itself. This training can also be given to crews and embarked units on board ships during the outward voyage.

To keep personnel available and deployable consideration needs to be given to sustainability, motivation and mental health. More and more attention is being focused on possibilities for computerised and unmanned systems to take over tasks currently performed by people. This would mean that military operations could be conducted with fewer personnel and a lower risk of losses through physical or psychological problems.

4.4.2. Materiel

The development, acquisition, maintenance and periodic upgrading of materiel should be in keeping with the ambition level that has been established for the Netherlands armed forces. A mix of assets with different functionalities will provide the commander with the necessary flexibility to achieve his operational objectives. Innovation is highly important to allow the necessary response to further developments in operations, and this will be discussed in more detail in the context of the conceptual component.
4.4.3. **Standardisation**
Standardisation plays a major role in the effective and efficient accomplishment of objectives. Standardisation is the imposition of a particular norm or standard on the design, construction, testing and/or use of a product or on the application of a process. In striving for a certain level of standardisation in the military organisation, the aim is to achieve uniformity in operational procedures. With this standardisation, processes, activities and materiel will ultimately be interchangeable, workloads can be shared more efficiently, methods and results can be compared to each other and collaboration with other units or organisations can take place with lower adjustment costs. On the other side of the coin, standardisation might occur at the expense of flexibility and the range of available options.

Standardisation is crucial for multinational forces to be able to operate efficiently and effectively, hence the existence of a separate agency within NATO, the NATO Standardization Agency. In NATO, standardisation is defined as ‘the development and implementation of concepts, doctrines, procedures and designs in order to achieve and maintain the compatibility, interchangeability or commonality which are necessary to attain the required level of interoperability’. Standardisation can be achieved at three levels: compatibility, interchangeability and interoperability. Compatibility is the suitability of devices, systems, processes or services for use together under specific conditions without causing unacceptable interactions or side-effects. Interchangeability is the ability of one device, system, process or service to be used in place of another to fulfil the same requirements. Interoperability is the ability to act together with other units or organisations coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve common tactical, operational and/or strategic objectives.

The Netherlands supports this standardisation and is adapting its own standards (work methods and procedures, tactical and technical standards and coding) to bring them as far as possible into line with those of NATO. In doing so, the Netherlands is helping to achieve the greatest possible interoperability with its allies. A simple example is the use of the English language as standard, no longer translating concepts, doctrines or procedures into Dutch for use in a Dutch environment, even in exercise or training situations.

4.5. **The conceptual component**
The conceptual component provides the coherent, intellectual basis and theoretical foundation for the deployment of military units and troops. It is relevant for all operational levels; at the strategic level, it provides the intellectual background for effective decision making on the political-military dividing line. The conceptual component also plays a significant role in the preservation and development of the institutional memory and experience. To do so, it brings together historical experiences, developments in operational
practice (through lessons learned, analyses and experiments) and an ongoing study of the future strategic environment.

The main function of the conceptual component is to provide a conceptual framework with which military leaders can acquire an understanding of their profession and of the activities they are expected to deploy, both now and in the future. The conceptual component supplies the commander with the necessary understanding of the context in which he is operating, and is the basis for creativity, ingenuity and initiative in complex situations. The successful execution of military operations requires intellectually precise and clearly formulated opinions that are based on experience. The intellectual activity needed to arrive at clear views is known as ‘military thinking’, and it is this intellectual process that leads to concepts for strategic, operational and tactical practice. This scientific process is fed by military history, by recent conflict experiences and by innovative ideas. The concepts generated by this process are a response to challenges in military operations.

These operational concepts form the basis for doctrine. Doctrine is the formal expression of military thinking, valid for a particular period of time. This means that an armed force or Service adopts one or more operational concepts and officially accepts it or them to ensure unity of opinion for a certain period of time. These operational concepts are further elaborated and refined in doctrine publications. Doctrine is thus the core of the conceptual component, but to ensure a proper understanding, this also includes the arguments, the underlying motives, the alternatives and the context that have led to this doctrine.

The main function of doctrine is to establish unity of opinion in order to bring about effective operations. Doctrine is thus the unifying element that guarantees unambiguous definitions and ensures that all commanders use the same approach in the planning and execution of military operations. It provides a common frame of reference as a guideline for actions. But doctrine is certainly neither dogma nor a set of rules. It must always be used with discretion. Skill in the application of doctrine can only be acquired by studying the conceptual component as broadly as possible and by learning it.

4.5.1. Conceptual innovation

The conceptual component is constantly being developed through conceptual innovation, whereby consideration is given to what changes could occur because of a changing environment, new technologies\(^{51}\) and challenges\(^{52}\), or because of a new environment or

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51 E.g. the shift from armed men via manned weapons to unmanned weapons.
52 E.g. being able to have people in units and organisations work together in a form of networking.
thus in its continued relevance. This innovation is brought about through scientific debate about military operations, by research and development and by an institutionalised process in which lessons learned are interpreted, evaluated and implemented.53 Innovation can take place within organisations and also in a broader context. The innovation process encompasses all human activities directed at renewal. It is more than simply technological improvement or modernisation. Innovation can also occur in, for example, command and control, management or policy. The impact of a new way of using an existing work method or procedure for the introduction of a new weapons system, for example, could be as great as that of the new system itself with its much-enhanced effectiveness. The advent of the internet is thus a technical innovation which would probably have been less successful without the upsurge of social media (and e-business strategies).

4.6. Fighting power in the operational environment
The environment in which the armed forces deploys its assets can be divided into five domains: sea, land, air, space and the information domain, which includes cyberspace. The five domains are dynamically linked to each other; a change in one domain usually has implications for the situation in the others. If the fighting power of two or more Services is synchronised in deployment in a military operation, this is referred to in military jargon as a joint operation.54 If other military units from more countries are also involved, it becomes a joint multinational operation.

Figure 4.2 Domains in the operational environment

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54 AAP-6, NATO Glossary definition of joint: ‘...activities, operations and organizations in which elements of at least two services participate.’
If collaboration takes place with international, government and non-governmental organisations in the planning and preparation phase, the operation is referred to as joint, multinational and interagency.

Each domain has specific characteristics which help to determine the way in which a means of power is used.

- The land domain is characterised as the ‘home base’ of the actors in the international arena. It is divided into territories, separated by national borders. Natural features such as mountain ranges and rivers often form natural boundaries between territories and population groups. On the other hand, borders are sometimes established without taking any account of population groups, which can be a cause of conflict. The land domain contains many different kinds of terrain (mountains, deserts, jungle, cities, open plains), each of which affect capabilities of certain types of military operation.

- Only a small section of the maritime domain consists of territorial waters, namely those which border directly onto the coastline (within 12 nautical miles). The rest of the waters of the seas and oceans is designated as ‘public domain’, where any actor may move freely (freedom of navigation). The sea is not, however, man’s natural habitat and the domain can only be used with the aid of ships. The maritime domain has its own third dimension, namely the underwater dimension.

- The air domain includes airspace above land as well as the sea. It corresponds to the characteristics of the other two domains: above land, the airspace is divided into ‘territories’ (national airspace). Above the open sea, the airspace too is a public domain in which freedom of navigation applies.

- The space domain is physically located above the air domain (above an altitude of 100 km). Unlike the air domain, the whole of the space domain is ‘public domain’ which can be freely used by anyone.

- The information domain is different from the others in that it is not a physical domain. This domain encompasses all forms of storage and transfer of information, regardless of the form it takes (oral, on paper, via radio and television, internet or other electronic or non-electronic means). Although the information domain is often dependent on physical means in the other domains (transmitters, satellites, servers), it is in principle largely unaffected by the boundaries that apply in the other domains. The dimension referred to as cyberspace forms part of the information domain and comprises the storage and transfer of information by digital media.

Most armed forces are divided into three Services, designed for the maritime, land and air domains. Although this structure is a historical one, even today each domain has its own characteristic qualities that translate into different types of personnel, materiel, tactics and
techniques. The Netherlands armed forces are also set up for the three domains: sea, land and air. Naval, land and air forces all have their specific capabilities and their own input in operations. In addition, all the Services have an input in the information domain and they make use of the space domain. When bringing these capabilities to bear, the effects of the Services are not limited to their own natural environment (land, sea, air, space), as many effects transcend the domain to a greater or lesser extent. The underlying philosophy is that the Services support and complement each other, thereby achieving a synergetic effect.

4.6.1. Joint operations
Joint operations involve the deployment of fighting power of different Services in order to use their specific capabilities to achieve synergy in an operation and thus realise the operational objectives. The benefit of such integration can only be fully realised if the activities of the various actors are coordinated, synchronised and prioritised.

Coordination is the process in which the various capacities and activities are brought together in a harmonious order. Supplementary measures promote mutual support and the deconfliction of incompatible aspects results in the best possible use of the available fighting power.

Synchronisation in time and space. Coordination is strengthened by synchronisation, in which the capacities and activities are brought into a sequence at the right speed, in time and space. The relationship between foreseen activities and the availability of assets determines the degree of simultaneity, succession and autonomy of those activities.

Prioritisation. Coordination and synchronisation highlight conflicting requirements in time, space and means; prioritisation determines the allocation of time, space and means for the commander’s plan. Because circumstances can change, the commander must constantly assess his priorities in order to identify risks and exploit opportunities when they arise.

In joint operations, assets from different Services can also be combined. This requires more coordination and increases the complexity, and this must be balanced with the desired advantage. The capacities of the Services will usually be synchronised for deployment without disrupting organic arrangements.

In a joint operation, support relationships will be defined between the units of the different Services. One of the commanders will be designated as the supported commander and the commanders of the other Services will then be supporting commanders. This means that the supported commander’s actions primarily determine the tempo and the use of time and space; the supporting commanders will adapt their actions accordingly.
4.6.2. Characteristics of military operations in the maritime, land and air domains

The main characteristics of operations in the maritime, land, air, space and information domains are described in the following paragraphs. For the sea, land and air domains, the characteristics of the respective Services will then be discussed. Although there would appear to be a one-on-one match between domain and service, a Service will in practice also operate in other domains, as described previously.

4.7. Operating in the maritime domain

Lines of communication and intersections can be secured through superiority at sea. This occurs for civil purposes, such as trade and energy transport, and for military purposes, such as sea-based operations and the support of those on land. Emphasis appears to be shifting away from the traditional threat from submarines and large surface ships in the open sea to asymmetric and hybrid threats and protection against piracy in coastal waters. Such threats are in no way confined to territorial waters.

Operations in the maritime domain are also designed to affect the situation on land. From the sea, humanitarian aid actions and evacuations are conducted, intelligence is gathered, land-based targets are engaged and forces are brought to shore and supported on land. Sea-based support needs to be provided over prolonged periods, so sustainability is required. Ships provide substantial transport capacity for that. The maritime domain offers room to manoeuvre and the possibility of getting close to the mission area without infringing on the territorial integrity of other countries. Maritime presence prior to or early in a conflict also gives a political signal. A flotilla is an easily protectable base from which to project influence on land.

The navy and the marines specialise in amphibious operations, in which a force is brought to shore by sea. Units from other Services can also be set ashore from the sea. Amphibious operations not only involve securing a landing site or taking out targets from the sea, but are also mobile operations in which capacities on land, at sea and in the air are deployed in combination, for instance to penetrate and temporarily occupy a particular area. Amphibious units are by their very nature ‘light’, but they need to have sufficient protection, firepower and mobility, for which they always need to work with other units.

Forces operating in the maritime domain must, therefore, possess differentiated and mobile potential that can be put to use throughout the maritime environment, ranging from open seas to coastal regions, and in conditions ranging from hospitable to hostile. This potential also enables collaboration with or deployment of land forces, air forces and special ops forces. Operations by and deployment of Dutch naval forces are elaborated further in Grondslagen van het maritieme optreden (GMO) (“Fundamentals of Maritime Operations”).
4.7.1. Characteristics of naval forces

Naval forces have a number of fixed characteristics that make them useful in a broad spectrum of operations.

- **Access.** Two thirds of the earth’s surface is covered by sea; the largest part comprises open sea, international waters, the use of which is free to anyone. Naval forces are able to access most areas and have the freedom of movement to reach and remain in those areas.

- **Mobility.** Naval ships can cover hundreds of miles a day. Together with freedom of movement in international waters, this provides naval forces with important strategic and operational mobility.

- **Versatility.** Most of the larger warships have defensive and offensive capabilities for all the dimensions in a mission area (air, surface, underwater and the electromagnetic spectrum). Individual ships can operate in a wide variety of conditions. They can perform different tasks and can respond rapidly to a changing mission. Furthermore, amphibious units are able to conduct complex military actions at sea, from the sea and on land, even in extreme climatic and geographical conditions.

- **Range.** Maritime units have integral logistic support, such as recovery facilities and medical care. This provides individual ships or flotillas with range and sustainability and contributes to the ability to operate a long way from shore for prolonged periods. The range can be increased further by using supply ships.

- **Resilience.** Warships can sustain a great deal of damage before they become non-operational. Damage will have an adverse effect on performance, but crews are trained to make all systems operational again as quickly as possible. Warships are also equipped
to operate in a radiologically or chemically contaminated area with limited loss of operational power.

- **Lift.** An important element of maritime power is the provision and protection of strategic sea transport: the sea lift. This provides land and amphibious forces with the opportunity to deploy in a mission area relatively quickly and in sufficient numbers.

- **Influence.** Naval forces can help to gain access to a mission area and to influence situations on land, thus exerting a grand strategic and military influence on the situation on land.

### 4.7.2. Limitations

Naval forces are able to cover great distances independently. The speed at which a flotilla can advance is limited, however, and can be affected by weather conditions; movements are thus relatively time-consuming. This limitation can be compensated by a preventive deployment, as flotillas can operate in the open sea without territorial restrictions.

### 4.7.3. Contribution of naval forces to joint operations

Because maritime units operate in international waters, they always operate in an international environment. Composite NATO flotillas made up of forces from member states operate under international command and are supported by airborne naval and air force units.

Maritime combat operations take place at the high end of the force spectrum when battle is waged at and from the sea. At sea, naval forces engage with and defend themselves and others against hostile naval and air forces. Naval forces can also help in the defence against ballistic missiles. Other tasks include the provision and protection of sea transport for military assets and clearance of sea mines. In sea-based combat operations, naval forces do their part in the land battle by conducting amphibious and special operations, contributing to air defence and providing fire support. If aircraft carriers are available, naval forces can also provide air support.

Maritime security operations are designed to counter sea-based activities that threaten security at sea or on land. These would include tasks such as counterterrorist, counter-piracy and anti-smuggling (including arms) operations, coastguard tasks and enforcement of maritime embargoes. In the case of maritime assistance, naval forces provide support for the legitimate authorities, for example by supplying emergency aid, performing evacuations, assisting in rebuilding activities and setting up maritime capacity, conducting maritime diplomacy and gathering intelligence.
4.8. Operating in the land domain

The source of human existence lies in the land domain. Conflicts are ultimately decided on land because that is where the continued existence and wellbeing of a nation, a population, a group, an ideology, etc, can be ensured. There is by definition, therefore, always a land dimension inherent in a conflict. Hostile military forces, both regular and irregular, operate in this domain. A large part of the information domain is also situated within the land domain. Potential opponents are increasingly deploying their potential where it is difficult or impossible to bring the technological and conceptual advantages of the Netherlands armed forces to bear. This asymmetry is intensified when the conflict takes place in difficult terrain (such as mountains, swamp or desert areas, jungle) or in urban areas where the presence of the population has a significant effect on how operations are conducted. Land forces can operate decisively against regular or irregular opponents; in doing so, they operate close to or even among the population. To achieve the required physical and psychological effects, they need to collaborate with a large number of other actors, such as representatives from international and non-governmental organisations, authorities of the countries involved, etc, and the outcome of the collaboration is difficult to predict. The media also play a role. All these factors make operations in a land environment complex and dynamic. Operations by the Dutch land forces are described in the Doctrinepublicatie Landoptreden (DPLO) (“Doctrine Publication for Land Operations”).

4.8.1. Characteristics

Land forces are characterised by the following features.

- **Size.** Land operations usually require a large number of military personnel and weapon systems, so land forces are considerably larger than other Services. The number of units that can be directed in tense and high-risk situations is, however, limited. As a result, land forces have multiple organisational levels, which means that extra capacity is needed to manage the organisation.

- **Human activity.** Land operations are fundamentally a human activity; the nature of the fighting is determined more by human behaviour than by the number of weapons or the interplay of technology, although both are crucial. In combat, each individual is exposed to immediate and actual danger, and is thus subjected to severe mental pressure. More than those in the other domains, operations on land go hand-in-hand with uncertainty and chaos, violence and danger, friction and stress. Each individual reacts differently, which means that land forces make more use of techniques and drills.

- **Composition.** Operations by combat units need to be synchronised with the support provided by combat support and logistics units and with operations by other Services. To achieve this, land forces have a balanced composition, whereby the various types
of unit are brought together as combined arms units. This occurs at virtually all organizational levels.

- **Flexibility.** Land forces are organised, equipped and trained in such a way that they can provide units and formations that are capable of tactical manoeuvres, either independently or together with other units or with coalition forces. They possess the combat power that is needed to defeat or destroy an opponent, but at the same time have the flexibility to adapt and deploy other types of activity.

- **Signal effect.** The deployment of land forces is a sign of strong political involvement. By its very nature, such deployment indicates a willingness to undertake great risks, not only in terms of money but also in terms of human lives. The presence of land forces thus makes a real contribution to the credibility of a mission.

### 4.8.2. Limitations

Another characteristic of land forces is their organisational complexity. Whereas naval and air forces man their weapons, land forces arm their men. This results in larger numbers and mass, which makes leadership more complex. Moreover, more functionalities are required these days than simply the operation of a weapon. The broad set of tasks covering the entire conflict spectrum also brings limitations and usually necessitates some supplementary education and training prior to a mission.

The large numbers and many specialisms also restrict strategic mobility. While it is true that
the division between heavy and light units goes some way to compensate for this, land forces still need time to be able to deploy in a mission area.

4.8.3. Contribution of land forces to joint operations

Land forces normally play an important and often decisive role in joint operations. They are nearest to and thus the greatest threat to the opponent. In many cases, success can only be achieved by a direct confrontation, or the threat thereof, by ground troops to force an opponent to stop the fight. This is why it is often the land forces that are supported by units from other Services in particular phases of an operation. Land forces contribute to joint operations as follows:

- *Occupying and securing strategically or operationally vital ground.* Physical occupation by ground units is the only way to fully guarantee long-term security in an area. This applies particularly to urbanised areas. In the end phase of combat operations, strategic sections of terrain could consist of the locations of, for example, command and control or CBRN capacities. Occupation and control of these can make a huge contribution to the definitive elimination of an opponent. Ultimately, land forces contribute in the form of combat with opponents upon whom our will cannot be imposed in any other way. This combat takes the form of offensive or defensive confrontations.

- *Influencing the local population.* Human contact is the best way to exert influence, which is vital for long-term stability. Well-trained military personnel deployed amidst the population can significantly influence that population.

- *Ensuring a secure environment.* Stability in the longer term depends on other government and non-governmental organisations responsible for aspects such as humanitarian aid, rebuilding and restoring public administration and government functions. By maintaining a physical presence, land forces enable other organisations to do their work. These organisations can only work in an environment in which ground forces have established a certain level of security.

4.9. Operating in the air domain (airpower)

Operating in the air domain, also referred to as the third dimension, has a strong impact on the ‘underlying’ domain (sea and land). Ascendancy in this domain – in other words, freedom of operation because all other opponents lack or have been denied the freedom to operate – is vital for the execution of operations on land and at sea, as well as in the air. The ability to control the airspace enables air forces to realise strategic, operational and tactical objectives directly and throughout the mission area. Precision air support can be delivered for land and naval forces in order to provide them quickly with tactical superiority over the opponent. Information can also be obtained from the air and from space. Air mobility
makes it possible to move personnel and equipment rapidly and over great distances without being impeded by land-based obstacles. Operations by and deployment of Dutch air forces are described in ‘Airpower and Space Doctrine’ (APSD).55

4.9.1. Characteristics

Air forces have the following characteristics:

- **Altitude, speed and range.** Altitude, speed and range are hallmarks of airpower, and enable air forces to operate with speed and flexibility in the entire mission area as well as outside it. The combination of speed, altitude and range means that assets can be concentrated quickly and from a distance.

- **Deterrent role.** Their fast, accurate and destructive power enable air forces to play a deterrent role. Stealth56 technology, combined with sensors and precision weapons that can perform in any weather conditions, makes it possible to deploy airpower anywhere at any time. Awareness of this can also have a psychological effect on the opponent.

- **Flexible deployment.** Air forces are able to deploy to a mission area rapidly and with relatively low risk. They also have a small footprint and can be assigned to and withdrawn from an operation relatively easily.

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55 This publication was still being compiled at the time of publication of this NDD.

56 Definition of stealth: using form, materials or special equipment to reduce the signature (i.e., the detectability of an object - aircraft, ship, vehicle - to sensors (radar, sonar, naked eye)).
Central planning. Airpower is scarce, while the demand for it is high. These scarce assets therefore need to be centrally directed to make them as effective as possible throughout the mission area.

High-quality specialists. Air forces use high-tech and expensive equipment that requires high-quality, specialist personnel.

4.9.2. Limitations

The scarcity of air assets means that their deployment in joint operations requires thorough planning. In a dynamic environment where there is a high demand for air assets, this could affect the planned operations in terms of time and space. Central leadership and coordination is vital and so the allocation of scarce assets usually takes place at high (joint) level. Thanks to the development of high-quality supporting technology, for example improved sensor capacity, integrated night-vision devices and long-range precision weapons, environmental factors such as weather and terrain are having less and less effect on the execution of operations.

Air forces can be deployed independently or sometimes even as the only asset in a particular operation. In by far the most cases, airpower will be of a joint nature, and in these cases, airpower will perform a supporting role. The four main basic roles of joint airpower are:

Counter air (attaining air superiority): air superiority enables free use of the airspace and thus preservation of the initiative. In virtually all conflicts, attaining and maintaining air superiority is key in determining the outcome. In situations in which opponent aircraft is able to take off, air assets are forced into a defensive role and obliged to devote a relatively large amount of capacity to defensive counter air (DCA). An effective offensive counter air (OCA) campaign could prevent such a situation and thus play an important role in achieving air superiority, above both enemy and friendly territory. In operations under the second main task, the maintenance of the international legal order, the mission mandate does not always allow forces to operate outside the boundaries of the area of operations. In these cases, counter air operations and the attainment of air superiority are confined to the airspace above friendly territory. In operations in the air domain, the attainment of air superiority always remains the primary objective that must be realised before follow-up operations are possible. Once air superiority has been achieved, above both friendly and hostile territory, local populations and naval and land forces can be protected much more effectively and with less capacity. OCA can also be performed by special forces on the ground that take out enemy radar systems, missile systems and aircraft. It is rarely possible to achieve 100% air superiority. Although it is vitally important to attain air superiority in operations against a technologically equal or superior opponent, air
ascendancy may also be contested at lower altitudes by opponents in possession of portable missile systems;

- **Attack**: airpower is ideally suited to attacking strategic ground targets such as enemy leaders, energy sources and infrastructure deep in enemy territory (strategic attack) and thus break the opponent’s will and ability to fight. Airpower can be deployed for direct support of ground troops or naval forces by attacking the military capacities in enemy territory and the opponent’s lines of communication (air interdiction). Airpower can also be used to deliver direct support to ground troops in combat (close air support or close combat attack). Small teams specialising in local target identification and designation can provide additional support here.\(^{57}\)

- **Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (information gathering)**: the earth’s surface and the sea can be observed from the air and from space. Various sensors can gather information day and night in any weather conditions. Having more and better current information than the enemy provides a significant advantage in terms of preserving the initiative. This information may consist of photographs, video images, communications data and radar images of the situation on land, at sea and in the air.\(^ {58}\) By using data link networks, this information can be shared in real time with other units. This provides forces on the ground or at sea with enhanced situational awareness, which can result in rapid and accurately targeted actions and reduce the risk of blue-on-blue incidents.\(^ {59}\) Battle damage assessment – establishing the damage incurred after the event – is also an important product in this category.

- **Air mobility**: air transport enables the rapid movement of personnel and equipment over long distances to and from a mission area. Air transport in the mission area itself can also enable rapid movements above the water or above difficult terrain. Special and airmobile units can thus be deployed anywhere and quickly and transportation of casualties can be conducted quickly and relatively safely by air. Air-to-air refuelling increases aircraft range and on-station time so that they can provide support for ground and maritime forces at greater distances and for longer periods of time.

### 4.10. Operating in the space domain

As described in Chapter 1 under ‘Trends’, the use of space-based objects has become a staple of today’s society. These means are used for such purposes as satellite communications for fast, broadband communication applications, for precision navigation that regulates traffic flows efficiently and accurately, for accurate timing that facilitates global financial transactions and for remote sensing, which monitors the state of our planet’s health.

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\(^{57}\) For example, a forward air controller or a fire support team.

\(^{58}\) Also sonar images of the situation under water.

\(^{59}\) Blue-on-blue incidents refer to fratricide, or friendly fire.
The protection of the freedom to use outer space is, therefore, strategically important. Free access to space-based means is also equally important for military operations. These assets have become an integral part of both the planning and the execution of military operations. An inability to use space-based assets will impact on the effectiveness of many military systems, such as precision weapons, drones, blue force tracking[^60], early warning of incoming ballistic missiles, and on the ability to share collected information and intelligence.

### 4.10.1. Characteristics

Operations in the space domain have a number of unique characteristics and features compared to the land and air domains and, to a lesser extent, the maritime domain.

- **Freedom of operation.** Space has no territorial limits, and is public domain. Although there is no set global definition, the generally accepted lower limit is 100 kilometres above the earth’s surface.
- **Sustainability.** Military capacities that are launched into space can then be used operationally for prolonged periods, sometimes for years at a time.
- **Worldwide coverage.** Depending on the satellite orbit and the number of satellites within a system, the earth’s surface can be permanently covered.
- **Versatility of use.** Satellites can usually support different objectives in several areas at the same time. A combination of military and civil uses within one system is also possible.

The military use of space (space operations) can be divided into four areas:

- **Space control.** These operations are designed to attain and maintain superiority in respect of the enemy’s use of space capabilities. This requires situational awareness, such as knowledge of friendly and enemy capabilities as well as of space weather and space debris that could affect friendly space systems. Defensive and offensive operations can be conducted to secure superiority.
- **Space force enhancement.** By making use of systems and satellites stationed in space, effective support can be provided for military operations on land, at sea and in the air. These space capacities are thus a force multiplier. The function of these capacities is to support for the intelligence process, provide early information and warn of tactical threats and attacks. The monitoring of environmental developments (pollution), climate and other geological developments, and the support and provision of telecommunication and navigation systems also fall under this function.

[^60]: Blue-force tracking is a digital system that shows the locations of all friendly units, partly to prevent any blue-on-blue incidents.
- **Space support.** These operations focus mainly on the launch, operation and main
tenance of space capacities, including the command and control network.
- **Space force application.** This encompasses the application of military force against
  earth-based targets through the use of military assets which are stationed in space or
  which are orbiting the earth. Ballistic missile defence also belongs to this category.

**4.11. Operating in the information domain**

The information domain is regarded as a public domain which cannot be captured but in
which temporary and local information superiority can be achieved. This can be brought
about by the power of the technological assets that are used, by the substance of the informa-
tion or by a combination of the two. Military operations in the information domain are
designed to maintain an information advantage in order to retain the initiative, achieve
surprise, dominate the battlefield and protect friendly military capabilities. They also focus on
the civil environment and on the protection of vital civil capacities, namely information and
communication networks that are vital for the functioning of organisations that play an
important socio-economic role, such as health care, justice and police, air traffic control, and
so on. Such organisations cannot function effectively if information streams are interrupted
or crippled. The distribution of electricity via networks, the flow of money between banks,
regulation of information about air, rail and road transport and the supply of information
about calamities are all disseminated via information and communication networks.
The main reason for protecting military and civil information is to ensure the availability of accurate, current and reliable information. It needs to be protected against theft, manipulation, damage or destruction and all other activities undertaken by the enemy in the information domain.

To ensure that information and communication remain effective, the most vital information must be protected first. Vital information is information which, if it is destroyed, blocked or rendered unusable, will seriously endanger national interests. Access to this vital information by any unauthorised party must be denied. Defensive operations in the information domain are designed to counter external influence and internal misuse or corruption of vital friendly information systems. Offensive operations in the information domain focus on the acquisition of information and intelligence, and the deliberate release of information in order to influence a situation in support of the national interest. Activities in this domain are conducted in intelligence, information or cyber operations or a combination of these. Given that armed forces can only operate with correct, complete and up-to-date information, all capacities that provide or support it are regarded as integrated enablers for bringing fighting power to bear in the different domains.

The following forms of military activity occur in the information domain.

- exploitation: acquisition of data, information and intelligence for situational awareness;
- defence: protection of friendly data, information and communication systems, and the protection of friendly morale and public support;
- attack: information as a weapon. The use of various types of data to influence understanding. The purpose of this is to defeat opponents (deceive, confuse, morally undermine and remove support), convince sceptics (boost support) and support allies (provide moral support, maintain and increase public support).

The state can only deploy diplomatic, economic and military means of power effectively if it has ensured sufficient protection of the production, storage, transportation and delivery of information and if the content of the information is satisfactory. Furthermore, the protection of information, communication within and between the Services and the targeted distribution of information are vitally important for fighting power to be able to function effectively.

4.11.1. Characteristics

Although the actors in the information domain are often dependent on physical means in the other domains (transmitters, satellites, servers), the information domain is largely
unaffected by the boundaries that apply in the other domains. Information is the only non-physical domain.

Information exists in three main forms:
- text on paper (e.g., books and newspapers, leaflets and posters) and in digital form (internet);
- audiovisual information in images and sound (e.g., radio and television, video addresses, film, symbols, signals) and information that is actually seen and heard first hand;
- data (such as digital control data, in- and output data relevant for the proper functioning of information, communication, weapon or security systems and applications).

4.11.2. Types of activity
Information operations do not form a separate category of military operations, but have the function of coordinating all activities in the information domain (information activities). A distinction is made between defensive and offensive information activities. The activities may also focus on prevention, such as diplomacy and security sector development. The purpose of defensive activities is to protect friendly data and information supply (information security, particular forms of electronic warfare). Offensive information activities make use of information as a ‘weapon’, for example by means of deception, use of the media (psychological operations), electronic and digital warfare (cyber warfare).

Strategic communications. The concept of strategic communications is a new one. Like info ops, strategic communications are a coordination mechanism, but at strategic level. The purpose of strategic communications is to achieve consistency and coherence in word and deed between political and diplomatic statements, public information and military information activities. Strategic communications therefore belong in the comprehensive approach: the coordinated deployment of a state’s instruments of power.

61 Definition of information operations according to AJP-3.10, Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations is: “Info Ops is a military function to provide advice and coordination of military information activities in order to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other NAC approved parties in support of Alliance mission objectives.”

62 NATO defines strategic communications as: “The coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs, Information Operations (Info Ops) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), as appropriate – in support of the Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO’s aims.”
Electronic warfare. Military use of the electromagnetic spectrum is known as electronic warfare. This type of warfare is made up of three parts:

- **electronic surveillance**: the use of received electromagnetic signals for situational awareness;
- **electronic defence**: the protection of friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum against the negative effects of enemy electronic warfare;
- **electronic attack**: denying other actors effective use of parts of the electromagnetic spectrum, for example by jamming and spoofing.

Acoustic warfare. Military use of the sound spectrum, both in the air and under water, is known as acoustic warfare (AW). This type of warfare has the same sub-sections as electronic warfare (surveillance, defence and attack). Underwater acoustic warfare is conducted with the use of active and passive sonar.

**Operations security** is designed to deny the enemy any information about dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces. It thus focuses specifically on protecting the exclusivity of data, particularly data which are vitally important for the success of the mission (essential elements of friendly information). Operations security measures help to leave opponents in the dark in respect of the location of friendly forces (counter-detection) and what the plans are (counterintelligence).

**Deception.** Deception is the creation of an erroneous representation of reality by the targeted dissemination of misleading information or the deliberate emission of a false signal. The aim is to induce the enemy to react in a manner that is prejudicial to his interests, without his awareness of what is happening. This will only be successful if the enemy does not recognise the misleading information as such, but regards it as reliable, accurate and relevant. Deceiving an opponent is no simple task, however; it requires thorough preparation, a high level of secrecy and an understanding of the way the enemy thinks. There is a direct relationship between operations security and deception. Operations security denies the enemy the correct information about dispositions, capabilities and intentions; deception fills that information deficit with targeted, misleading information.

**Psychological operations** (PSYOPS) are activities used to spread messages directed at a particular target audience.

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*For further explanation about the application of operations security: JDP-2 Intelligence, CHOD, paragraph 1.5.1.*
The desired effect of these messages depends on the target audience:
- to weaken the will of the enemy or of potentially hostile target groups;
- to boost support among target audiences that are favourably disposed;
- to obtain support and cooperation from target audiences which are (still) taking a wait-and-see approach.

In psychological operations, use is made of all the familiar, everyday methods of communication to convey the message. These methods need to meet a few conditions in order to be effective.
- The message must be specific to the target audience. This means that a good understanding of the target audience is essential: culture, language, motivations and philosophies, as well as sensitivities. The skills of the target group also need to be considered. Distribution of text-bearing leaflets among small children or a largely illiterate population would, of course, be pointless.
- The message needs to be truthful, but must not compromise operations security.
- The source of the message must be clear.64

There is a clear distinction between PSYOPS and public affairs (PA). PSYOPS focus on specific target audiences in the mission area and use friendly means to convey the message. The purpose of PA is to supply general information to the public, both at home and elsewhere, by way of the media, press conferences, press releases and website messages.

Key leader engagement. As the name suggests, key leader engagement (KLE) entails the involvement of influential individuals in the military operation. Key leaders are people who, because of their position, status, power and influence, must be regarded as capable of affecting the situation in the mission area. Examples of key leaders are local authorities, leaders of local ethnic or religious groups and powerful businessmen. The purpose of KLE is to induce these local leaders to use their influence for the benefit of the mission and the objectives of the military operation. KLE is diplomacy at local level, based on personal contact. In principle, therefore, it is an activity that the military commander himself will perform in his diplomatic role. KLE can thus be regarded as a psychological operation at the personal level.

Cyber warfare (computer network operations). A trend that is rapidly gaining momentum and attracting more and more attention – and which is part of the information domain – is the one that is playing out in cyberspace. This digital environment contains all forms of

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64 These are known as white psychological operations. NATO policy does not allow the use of PSYOPS without source reference (grey PSYOPS) or those with a deliberately false source reference (black PSYOPS).
transmission and storage of digital data: internet, telephone networks, business networks, servers, databases and digital operating systems. In the digital environment, advances in technology, which can nearly always be implemented immediately, are rapid. All kinds of civil and military actors with malicious intentions are active on the internet, on government, banking and business networks, for the purpose of gaining unauthorised access to information, testing access security and seeking out weak spots, or of changing or inputting (dis)information. The resulting damage can be immense: national security can also be compromised if, for example, highly sensitive information is stolen and emergency services or security systems no longer function. For the armed forces specifically, military operations will be jeopardised if digital systems for command and control, logistics or sensor and weapon systems no longer function properly.

Defensive, offensive and intelligence operations are conducted in cyberspace too.
- Defensive digital operations are designed to protect the availability, integrity and exclusivity of friendly digital information and systems.
- Digital intelligence operations focus on the enemy’s digital systems in order to identify vulnerable areas. Intelligence operations may also be conducted to obtain information, in addition to other forms of intelligence collection.
- Offensive digital operations target the enemy’s digital systems and information. They may also be used to support the effects that need to be achieved in other domains. Offensive digital capacities differ from other military assets on a number of points. A digital attack can only be launched once, for instance, as afterwards the capacity of the ‘cyber weapon’ will be known and the weakness in the affected system will have been addressed. Furthermore, the effectiveness of a cyber attack is unpredictable, as the enemy might already have taken countermeasures.
5. Military doctrine

5.1. Introduction
Military doctrine is the expression of military thinking and defines fundamentals, principles and conditions for military operations. It is thus directed at all sections of the armed forces, both vertically (Services) and horizontally (organisational levels). To guide this diversity of doctrine, the Netherlands Defence Doctrine sets out some generic fundamentals and principles on the basis of which the doctrine is then differentiated for the various sections. This chapter thus forms the basis for Dutch military doctrine and the starting point for further doctrine development.

The chapter describes the levels of operation, the fundamentals of military operations and the joint functions of military operations as conceptual instruments. It will close by highlighting a number of aspects deemed, through national experience, to be of particular importance.

Military doctrine in a historical context

Doctrine is general in nature and identifies fundamentals, principles and conditions for military operations. Up until the Napoleonic era, there was practically no established doctrine in existence. It was usually about technical and tactical principles and necessary skills. During that period, a distinction was made for the first time between tactics and strategy. Tactics encompassed all activities on the battlefield; strategy was more about the choices about the manner and rhythm in which different battles were to be prepared and conducted. After the First World War, the operational level – the level between strategy and tactics – was designated and incorporated into national doctrine for the first time. It was the Russian and German armies in particular that gave this level a place in military activities.

After the Second World War, the following five levels of operating were eventually identified and defined: the political-strategic, the military-strategic, the operational, the tactical and the technical level. Until the end of the Cold War, the overlap between the levels was small. More so than in the case of the naval and air forces, the levels within the land forces were linked to the size of the units. The military-strategic level was the domain of the theatre commander, known in today’s terminology as the commander of the combined joint task force. Army groups and armies were active at operational level and army corps at tactical level. Because of the diminishing size of the deployed units and the expansion of command and control capabilities, interaction between the various levels increased significantly. The demarcation between the levels became considerably more vague as a result.
Over the years, the amount and detail of doctrine has increased enormously. Whereas at the beginning of the 20th century there was usually just one general book describing the strategic, tactical and even part of the technical level, nowadays the Dutch armed forces have a large number of books in which military activities are described in great detail. Since 2005, the keystone document has been the Netherlands Defence Doctrine, of which this book is the second edition. The domain-specific doctrines (naval, air, army) are separate publications: these are, respectively, the *Grondslagen Maritiem Optreden* (“Fundamentals of Maritime Operations”) (GMO), the *Doctrinepublicatie Landoptreden* (“Doctrine Publication for Land Operations”) (DPLO) and the *Airpower & Space Doctrine* (APSD). These books are refined further in general and function-based manuals, handbooks and instruction cards.

Until the end of the Cold War, the development of doctrine for land operations was largely a national responsibility. That was relatively straightforward, as at the time the defence of the North German Plain, although under NATO command, was to be conducted by national formations. The maritime and air doctrines were much more multinational (previously called ‘combined’) in nature. From the 1990s, however, the nature of military operations changed considerably as a result of the rapidly increasing number of expeditionary operations at that time. Nationally and internationally, (parts of) the Services were deployed jointly, and if they were deployed with those from other countries, they were known as combined joint operations. NATO switched deliberately to combined joint command and control in the 1991 Strategic Concept, and in ad hoc coalition groups, too, this form of collaboration, planning and direction increased. Nationally and internationally, there was a growing need to understand each other’s work methods and to improve and refine coordination; this trend has led to a situation in which it is increasingly common for joint doctrine to be developed and for synchronisation to be sought in the development of domain-specific doctrine.

5.2. Levels of military activity

There are a number of distinct hierarchical levels in the activities in military operations and each of these levels has its own characteristics. This distinction has implications for the thinking behind the application of the military instrument. Particular tasks, powers and responsibilities are assigned to each level and the activities stemming from these tasks are so different that they result in specific theories and in some cases even to specific terminology.
There are three different levels in the planning and execution of military operations:  
- the strategic level, which is sub-divided into the political-strategic level and the military-strategic level;
- the operational level;
- the tactical level, which includes the technical level.

5.2.1. The strategic level
The strategic level is sub-divided into the political-strategic level and the military-strategic level. The political-strategic level is responsible for the coordinated, systematic development and use of all instruments of power (grand strategy) of a state, alliance or coalition to promote national, allied or coalition interests. It is at the political-strategic level that the politically desired end state is formulated. The task of formulating this strategy is the exclusive responsibility of the government, regardless of whether it is acting alone or in collaboration with other governments in international organisations or in an ad-hoc coalition. The political-strategic level decides which means of power are necessary to achieve the objectives. Finally, it will draw up additional guidelines for the use of the instruments of power, such as size, duration and mandate, but without describing the mission in detail. The table below shows examples of actors at the political-strategic level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The political-strategic level translated according to the Netherlands, NATO and the EU actors:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government</strong> controlled by parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Atlantic Council</strong> with ambassadors from member states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political and Security Committee (PSC)</strong> with European External Action Service (EEAS) for Foreign &amp; Security Affairs policy areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The military-strategic level. Military strategy is the coordinated, systematic development and use of the military means of a state, alliance or coalition, integrated with other means of power if possible, with a view to achieving the objectives set by the political-strategic level. The military-strategic level is thus closely involved in the deliberations at the political-strategic level. In consultation with relevant actors from other ministries, the military-strategic

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65 In AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine, NATO defines three levels, namely the military-strategic level (the level at which armed forces are deployed and employed within an overarching political framework as part of a collective strategy), the operational level (the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained) and the tactical level (at which forces are employed to conduct military tasks and gain military objectives).
authority formulates in its strategic guidances or strategic directives a general mission statement on the basis of the military-strategic objectives. The aim is to coordinate with representatives of (other) international and non-governmental organisations and departments as early as possible in the preparation phase. This level will then assign objectives and means to operational commanders and establish any restrictions on their use, without getting involved in the detail of the execution. National, multinational and allied military-strategic authorities are also tasked with setting the requirements and allocating military means for a particular operation.

The military-strategic level translated according to the Netherlands, NATO and the EU actors:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Defence</td>
<td>assisted by the Defence Staff, representatives of other ministries and NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)</td>
<td>assisted by Allied Command Operations and other representatives and advisers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Military Staff</td>
<td>The EU has no permanent military structure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As explained in Chapter 3, the decision to use military force if necessary falls under the primacy of politics. The selected military strategy must conform to the political strategy and the frameworks of international law. The aim of this strategy is to advance the realisation of political objectives and it must be synchronised with the employment of other means of power at the government’s disposal. It is the responsibility of the military-strategic authority and the operational commanders to translate the political objectives and guidelines into achievable military objectives down to the tactical level. The military objectives must be specific, measurable, feasible, realistic and timed. The definition of the political and military strategies and the military objectives can never be the result of a one-way process. There needs to be close collaboration between political and military leaders and with all relevant departments. In reality, there is often virtually no clear dividing line between the political-strategic and the military-strategic levels. There is in effect an overlap, whereby top civil servants and military officials need to collaborate intensively to develop and prepare decisions to deploy the military instrument of power.

5.2.2. The operational level
The operational level is responsible for planning, directing and executing joint and/or
multinational campaigns\textsuperscript{67} to achieve the military objectives set by the military-strategic commander in his strategic directive. The operational level thus provides the link between the military-strategic objectives and the tactical deployment of troops. The commander of the joint, multinational force (Joint (Task) Force Commander) will, as the commander at the operational level, design, plan, execute and complete his campaign within the joint operations area (JOA). This not only requires extensive knowledge of the doctrine for the joint force and its structure and cohesion, but also of the grand strategy and the mission statement of all the nations involved in the coalition. The operations conducted as part of the campaign cover all operational themes (combat, security, peace support and peacetime military engagement).\textsuperscript{68} The table shows examples of actors at the operational level.

| The operational level translated according to the Netherlands, NATO and the EU actors: |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| Contingent commander             | as the most senior Dutch representative in a mission area    |
| Commanders of Joint Forces Commands | with headquarters in Brunssum and Naples, to split for operations into a forward HQ, e.g., ISAF |
| Operational Commander            | operational commander to be designated per operation (e.g., EUFOR ALTHEA, EU NAVFOR ATALANTA) |

The commander at the operational level will in principle be found in the mission area and will command his assigned joint multinational force in the execution of his campaign plan. This plan is designed to produce the effects necessary for the realisation of his objectives, thus contributing to the accomplishment of the strategic objectives.

\textbf{5.2.3. The tactical level}

Tactics are the employment of and actions by formations and units in order to conduct military activities in a certain cohesion and sequence. At the tactical level, forces perform actions to complete tactical assignments. In contrast to the operational level, the tactical level employs forces directly to conduct military activities, thus contributing to the accomplishment of the campaign’s operational objective. There are also examples of cases in which forces operating at the tactical level can make a direct contribution to a military-strategic objective. That applies, for example, to the use of special operations forces. Other examples are the deployment of a submarine for the collection of strategic intelligence or

\textsuperscript{67} According to AAP-6, NATO Glossary: A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces.

\textsuperscript{68} In AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, NATO recognises the four listed operational themes. They are intended to guide opinion about the type of operation that is being launched. This does not mean that it is possible to apply a strict separation between the types of operation, as operational themes can overlap or become part of one another.
the execution of strategic bombing. The technical level completes the levels structure. At the technical level, small units operate according to an established pattern, the units being individuals and (weapon) systems. At this level, the (tactical) objective of a military activity is achieved by means of a specific sequence of actions. The technical level is concerned with performing combat techniques (skills and drills), with one or more specific (weapon) systems. The actual execution of tasks in support of combat actions - in the broadest sense - also belongs at the technical level. Examples of such tasks are repairing materiel, installing and operating radio stations, replenishment at sea and air-to-air refuelling. Typical at this level are fixed procedures and the absence of an extensive decision-making process.

5.2.4. Interweaving of the levels
The need for (near) real-time information about military deployment in mission areas grows as the technical capabilities increase. Nowadays, the media as well as senior staffs and political leaders can closely monitor the execution of tactical missions. This effect is intensified by the fact that actions by units or individuals at the technical and tactical levels can have far-reaching repercussions at the operational and strategic levels, both in and outside the military domain. Commanders must therefore take account of the fact that the political-strategic level will, in certain circumstances, wish to exert influence down to the tactical and technical levels. Because of the transparent environment, this political interweaving of military activities, even at low levels, is extensive.

69 This phenomenon is also referred to with the metaphor of the ‘strategic corporal’, in reference to an article by US Marines General Charles C. Krulak; ‘The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three-Block War’, Marines Magazine, January 1999. Another term for the phenomenon is ‘strategic compression’.
This ability of political-military leaders to intervene during the conduct of an operation carries significant risks. As well as having an actual view of the situation, the man on the ground also has other expertise that is necessary to complete the picture of reality. The one carrying out the orders at tactical level can also see - sometimes immediately - the direct consequences of his actions on his surroundings and he alone will personally experience the repercussions of the decision that was made. But above all, he is the only one who is familiar with the physical environment and all the actors at work within it. Intervention by higher commanders, who have much less insight into this tactical picture, must, therefore, be executed with extreme caution.

5.2.5. Uniform approach to planning and execution of operations
All operations conducted by the armed forces are in principle approached in the same way. In the past, a distinction was made between combat, peace support and national operations. Practice has shown that this distinction has a compartmentalising effect and that in reality there are no partitions between combat and peace support operations or the force levels that exist within them. All operations are, therefore, fundamentally approached in the same way. During each operation, forces must be able to perform a wide range of military activities simultaneously. This ranges from offensive and defensive activities to those designed to establish the necessary conditions and to stabilise. The circumstances will dictate the relationship between and the priority of these various activities. A unit could thus have a stabilisation task, while one of its sub-units is engaging an enemy in combat and another sub-unit is performing a humanitarian task. All military operational functions must always be taken into consideration in the planning and execution of each operation. A uniform approach to operations is, therefore, essential for unity of opinion, while preconditions such as authority, mandate, legal basis, restrictions and the accents in the commander’s analysis, may differ.

5.3. Basic principles of military operations
The basic principles of military operations form an important part of the conceptual component. These are rules of a fundamental nature for the use of military means. They have been formed by years of military experience and are thus an excellent guide for military operations. In many cases, they can serve as evaluation criteria for the completeness and

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70 The picture of reality starts with the build-up of a unit’s own or shared operational picture (who is where, what is he doing and what are his intentions). This leads to some form of awareness of the actual situation. Together with other information, this should ideally lead to some form of understanding of the situation.

71 Reference works are available for this uniform approach, such as CDS Leidraad nr. 2, Operationeel Planningsproces (CHOD Field Manual 2, Operational Planning Process), document MC-0133/4 ‘NATO’s Operations Planning’, and SACEUR’s Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive.
feasibility of an operational concept. The correct application of these principles requires common sense and professional judgement, and can thus contribute to the success of a military operation. The basic principles of military operations must always be considered in relation to each other. On the basis of the situation, the commander will determine which basic principles are the deciding factors at any given time. Full adherence to one principle may make it difficult or even impossible to apply another. In their decision making, therefore, commanders will always weigh up the relative importance of each. In this evaluation, the commander takes into account the higher commander’s intent, his own mission and objective, the actions of other parties involved in the conflict and the factors of time and space. One exception here is the principle of legitimacy, which must be applied at all times.

Not all countries and alliances have the same principles. They make a choice, and the Netherlands is no different in that respect. The Netherlands armed forces adhere to the following principles, shown in alphabetical order.

a. Concentration of force
In order to force a decision, a point of main effort has to be established at the right time and in the right place by means of a concentration of effects. This should ensure that the local effect is such that the set objective can be achieved. It is not only numbers that determine the outcome, but also combat skills, cohesion, morale, timing, choice of objectives and the exploitation of any technological advantage. The capacity to concentrate effects quickly depends on an effective and efficient command and control system and the ability to displace rapidly. Concentration of effects normally means acceptance of relative weakness elsewhere.

b. Flexibility
A commander must have the adaptability to adjust his plans. The actual situation may differ from what was envisaged beforehand. Situations can change quickly, as a result of which adjustments could be needed. There may sometimes be unexpected opportunities to be exploited. Flexibility has a conceptual component in the thinking behind operations, a mental component (the ability of the commander and his staff to empathise and adapt) and a physical component in the choice of available assets. Flexibility requires the right mental attitude and an organisation trained to adapt rapidly to changing circumstances. This in turn depends on a command style that gives commanders the necessary leeway, such as mission command. A commander must use his own mental flexibility and that of his unit to exploit

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72 See, for example, JDP-01, British Defence Doctrine, November 2011, AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine and CFJP-01, Canadian Military Doctrine, April 2009.
73 Mission command is a command style and is discussed further in paragraph 5.5.3.
the chaos which often accompanies a crisis or combat action. The operation plans must also allow for a response to unforeseen developments and provide commanders with the greatest possible freedom of action.

c. Freedom of movement74
To be able to act efficiently and with flexibility and to be able to take the initiative when necessary, freedom of movement is crucial. A military unit which cannot move to or within a mission area will fail in the execution of its tasks. In that case, that unit will not be able to contribute to the realisation of the set objectives. This does not simply refer to the physical freedom of action that is ensured by having control of areas and infrastructure. The freedom to make one's own choices, independently of others, is needed to ensure flexibility and is thus the key to success in the implementation phase.

d. Initiative .... and daring!
Commanders should constantly strive to achieve and maintain freedom of action. This can be achieved by gaining the initiative and by acting sooner and faster than other parties. This will deliver an edge and allow situations to be turned to one's own advantage. This principle used to be regarded as an offensive action as well. It requires a style of leadership which encourages initiative and allows calculated risks to be taken. Sometimes it requires nerve and an attitude of 'who dares wins'! This show of daring is stimulated by a style of leadership under which actions shown to require daring are appreciated – as long as the inherent risk is not unacceptably high. This principle does not, however, preclude the fact that patience is required in some cases.

e. Legitimacy75
Legitimacy has a legal and an ethical side. Legal legitimacy primarily requires a legal basis for the mission. Secondly, legitimacy is based on the observance of rules that apply during the mission (laws and jurisdiction), for example, international humanitarian law, status of forces agreements76 and the rules of engagement. Legal legitimacy is an absolute fundamental and cannot be discounted in favour of other fundamentals. Legal legitimacy contributes to ethical legitimacy. This focuses on maintaining acceptance and support among the local population, the home population and public opinion; it is an important

74 NATO regards this principle as an additional consideration and not as a generally applicable fundamental, as it only applies in certain types of operation.

75 NATO regards this principle as an additional consideration and not as a generally applicable fundamental, as it only applies in certain types of operation (see AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine).

76 A status of forces agreement is an agreement with the host nation about the stationing and status of forces.
condition for the successful progression and completion of military operations. When choosing his delivery means in a particular action, for example, the commander will need to ensure that he keeps any collateral damage to an absolute minimum.

**f. Maintenance of morale**

Morale is an important factor for fighting power and thus for the success of a military operation. The commander plays a highly important role in this respect. Successful actions generate a certain form of self-respect which, in many situations, produces a vital contribution to the maintenance of morale in difficult circumstances. Long-term deployment a long way from home, in an environment in which politics also play an important role, can have a huge effect on morale. Personnel are also affected by the fact that the media are constantly looking over their shoulder.

**g. Security**

Security is a vital condition for the preservation of friendly assets, freedom of action, concentration of the force and for taking risks outside the point of main effort. Security is not, however, an objective in itself; the execution of the mission remains the key issue. A certain level of security can be achieved by physical protection and by keeping information from outsiders, and this is done by taking active and passive measures. Active measures are designed to prevent surprise by the enemy or other parties and take the form of, for example, the physical protection of bases, securing a favourable situation in the airspace, defending the friendly fleet, protecting the flanks or keeping a sufficient reserve on standby. A passive measure could be to ensure that information regarding friendly assets and plans does not fall into the hands of other parties.

**h. Selection and maintenance of the aim**

Every military operation must be designed to realise or achieve an objective which is clearly defined and attainable. If a military unit lacks a clear objective or loses sight of what has to be achieved, the military operation will in many cases fail as a result. At higher levels, the objective can be expressed in a guideline or directive setting out the desired end state. At the tactical level, commanders derive their objective from the higher commander’s intent. This intent is stated explicitly in the orders they receive, and is key in the planning, preparation and execution of the operation and enables goal-oriented actions at all levels.

**i. Simplicity**

Because of the rapid succession of events, the complexity of military operations and the constant stream of information, it is inevitable that chaos, stress and friction will arise.
Unambiguous, clear and proven procedures, straightforward plans and clear orders all increase the chances of success in an operation.

j. Surprise
Surprise is achieved by performing an action at an unforeseen place and time or in an unexpected way. A surprise operation could decide an action, combat or otherwise, in favour of friendly forces. Surprise operations can also compensate for the quantitative disadvantage of an unfavourable power ratio. The aim of surprise is to unbalance the enemy, thus ensuring that the initiative falls into friendly hands. This can be achieved through speed in thought and deed, secrecy and deception, variation in the method of operating and the use of unexpected assets. It may, however, be necessary to be completely open about the motive, mission and intentions in an operation. This transparency could then prevent a situation in which other parties or the local population misinterpret the force’s action.

k. Sustainability
Once an operation has begun, the deployed force must be able to sustain it as long as is necessary to achieve the desired effect. To guarantee the sustainability of an operation, all the required conditions must have been met. These include the political will and involvement, the availability and deployability of materiel, enough trained and fully-staffed units, resilience and a fully functioning logistics system. Logistics deliver a vital contribution to sustainability. The logistics systems need to be geared towards providing the commander with as much freedom of action as possible to implement his plan. Although logistics play a supportive role to operations, they are vitally important for the execution of the operation as a whole. Logistics preparation must, therefore, be included from the start of the planning process.

L. Unity of effort
In order to deploy the available military capacity effectively and achieve the objective, a commander needs to synchronise his assets and activities. Given that many assets from different national and international units have effects on the same objective, modern military operations place heavy demands on the interplay of military operational functions. Unity of effort is an essential condition for success. Unity of effort between military units is supported by joint doctrine, coordinated procedures, single command, synchronisation and prioritisation. In the mental sphere, team spirit, goodwill and understanding of each other’s capabilities and limitations are indispensable. Single command is the most solid basis for unity of effort. Where other actors are not part of the command structure – such as non-military actors – it is vital to strive for as much synchronisation and coordination as possible to achieve optimum unity of effort.
5.4. Joint functions in military operations

The functions in military operations are a conceptual aid for the commander and his staff in the integration, synchronisation and direction of capabilities and activities in operations. An analysis of the role and form of the operational functions ensures that commanders and staffs consider all aspects of an operation. The results of the analysis will appear in an operation concept and a plan for the deployment of forces. The strength of the functions lies in their integration; together they deliver a unit’s fighting power. The operational functions must, therefore, always be considered in relation to each other. Only a mission in which the functions are synchronised with each other will have any chance of success. The relative importance of a function also varies in accordance with the operational objective.

Furthermore, it is not the case that a particular operational function can be traced back to a particular functionality or Service. More than one functionality and Service are usually involved in performing a function. On the other hand, one functionality or unit can contribute to more than one function. The operational functions apply to all levels of military action. In the case of joint operations, the following joint functions\footnote{As well as the joint functions listed here, in AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine, NATO also regards information operations and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) as separate joint functions.} apply:

- command and control
- manoeuvre and fires
- intelligence
- force protection
- sustainability

5.4.1. Command and control
The function of command and control is about leading and managing a military organisa-
tion to achieve its objectives. Command and control is made up of the elements of leadership, decision making and control, and integrates the other operational functions to form a single concept. Planning, direction, coordination and control guarantee the vertical and horizontal integration of (military) units and assigned assets. As soon as this integration produces more synergy in the operation, command and control will form a force multiplier for fighting power.78

5.4.2. Manoeuvre and fires79
Manoeuvre and fires are inextricably linked; they are used to bring about desired effects and to avoid undesired effects, and it is with the combination of manoeuvre and fires that operational objectives are achieved. The primary purpose of manoeuvre is to gain the most advantageous position possible in respect of the enemy or other actor. Manoeuvre is much more than the displacement of weapon systems and platforms. The manoeuvre function directs the process in which fighting power is focused on achieving a decisive effect. It also includes the mobility of friendly assets and the physical control of areas that deliver an operational advantage. Effects can be achieved in both the physical and the psychological sphere. Manoeuvre in the traditional sense entails directing fighting power wherever it will have the greatest effect, and is primarily concerned with the enemy’s physical component in a positional or geographic sense. His strong points will be avoided and his weak points exploited. Manoeuvre in a broad sense also influences ‘the enemy’s will’ or ‘the actor’s understanding’. This does not occur solely in a positional or geographic sense, but through a combination of a quantitative, physical superiority and the capability for influencing actors’ understanding. This change in perception is designed to impact on morale by causing uncertainty, confusion or even paralysis on the part of the enemy. The local population can also be won in this way, as they will feel that they are being protected and supported. The preventive deployment of units in the immediate vicinity of a developing conflict can also influence understanding.

78 A detailed description of command and control can be found in the Netherlands doctrine publication JDP-5, Command and control.
79 The word fires suggests that effect can only be achieved with firearms; these days, fires also includes the use of other effectors, i.e. those delivering effect without the use of armed force.
Fires are the means of influencing one or more actors. Every action in a military operation has a certain effect and thus influences an actor. Units must be given sufficient qualitative and quantitative capacities to bring about the desired effects. It is not only the employment of armed force that produces these effects; influencing opponents by damaging their information and information infrastructure, their financial sources and their support base is a broader application. Other forms of fires are the targeted employment of assets to support favourably disposed actors and the provision of measured support to the local population. Fires are thus produced by bringing effectors to bear in the physical and psychological spheres. They are divided into firepower, which is used to achieve physical and psychological effects, and the capability of influencing the understanding of target groups or individuals. This influencing of understanding takes the form of information activities (key leader engagement, psychological operations, deception, electronic warfare, etc) and the development or restoration of government functions (e.g., training of police and military capacities as part of security sector development), thus enabling the local population to provide its own security. Public affairs and other methods of enhancing the security situation can also contribute to this effect.

5.4.3. Intelligence

Intelligence is the result of knowledge and understanding of the activities, capabilities and intentions of all relevant actors and factors. The intelligence function thus comprises more than the traditional focus on geographic features and climatic conditions in the mission area and on the (potential) enemy. Intelligence provides as complete and up-to-date a picture of the situation as possible (situational awareness) and is an essential condition for success in any operation.

Intelligence is formed by the targeted collection and analysis of information. Units have many sensors, ranging from electronic sensors to individual personnel. Furthermore, a unit will normally have a specific organisational element that is responsible for the collection and processing of information into intelligence. This organisational element is dependent on other staffs or (foreign) intelligence agencies for this task. Also, all staff officials are responsible, from within their specialist area, for contributing to situational awareness.

By translating the intelligence requirement of authorities and commanders into effective and concrete core questions for collecting agencies, the scarce intelligence capability can be deployed in the right way. Intelligence officers thus receive the necessary guidance and

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80 See also the Netherlands doctrine publication JDP-2, Intelligence.
instructions for their part in the operation. The different levels need to have their own intelligence capability to cover their specific intelligence requirement. Guiding the intelligence process is the commander’s responsibility. His interest should not merely focus on the traditional aspects of enemy, weather and terrain, but on the entire operational environment. Information about historical, cultural, social and religious backgrounds to a crisis and place as well as the role and significance of all other actors are at least as important. Using this information and the information from lessons learned in the past for future action completes the ‘circle of knowledge’, and this is referred to as the knowledge development process. Modern communication methods, the media and growing globalisation make it possible for actors to bring their influence to bear or to influence understanding over great distances, which means that it is vital to look beyond the physical boundaries of the mission area itself.

5.4.4. Force protection
For a commander, it is of the utmost importance that his fighting power be protected in all stages of an operation. The primary purpose of force protection is to maintain freedom of action so that it is and will remain possible to conduct the mission successfully. The protection function comprises all activities that are geared towards preventing undesired effects on friendly forces, and minimising or, if possible, eliminating risk. This means that protection needs to be considered at all times and at all levels in the planning and execution of operations. There are several different aspects to force protection: active and passive, physical and mental.

Full force protection could get in the way of the execution of a mission. It is, therefore, necessary to find a responsible balance between full force protection on the one hand and the execution of the task on the other. Ultimately, it is about achieving the assigned objective, not protecting the unit. The chosen protection measures will depend on the threat and the associated risks for the execution of the mission. The threat is determined on the basis of the behaviour of any opponents, the effect of terrain and weather conditions, the friendly operation and that of all other actors and factors in the operational environment. Furthermore, the threat is not only directed at the physical component of fighting power, but also – or maybe even specifically – against the mental component.

5.4.5. Sustainability
The sustainability function entails support with the materiel, personnel and financial means required to build up and maintain fighting power. Once built up, the sustainment of fighting power is vital for maintaining and continuing operations until the mission is completed. A logistics plan based on the operation is also essential for the realisation of the
objectives. Any deployment without a logistics plan based on manoeuvre, fires and force protection is doomed to failure. Properly thought-out and executed combat service support creates the required conditions. Logistic capabilities and constraints dictate the capabilities of military forces and may lead to adjustments in the mission plan.

5.5. National accents
As described earlier, the Netherlands armed forces observe and implement doctrine that has been developed and ratified in an allied context. They will normally have been involved in its development, and any doctrine which they did not help develop will have been approved by the Netherlands. Any diverging Dutch doctrine would not conform to the basic principles of ‘unity of effort’ and ‘simplicity’. This keystone Netherlands Defence Doctrine is therefore in line with the doctrine developed under the NATO umbrella. National accents have been laid by describing the fundamentals that guide Dutch military operations on the one hand and, on the other, by describing the aspects of the manoeuvrist approach, network-based operations and mission command in the following paragraphs. The chapter will close by looking at how military personnel cope with expectations and at the special responsibility of the armed forces and individual service personnel.

5.5.1. Manoeuvrist approach
The possession of sufficient fighting power is no guarantee of success. The realisation of the desired effects and the avoidance of undesired effects are brought about by the combination of manoeuvre and fires. An approach in which power is mainly deployed against identified weaknesses of other actors and in which it targets the mental component is known as the manoeuvrist approach. The aim of this approach is to influence other actors’ perception of reality, their behaviour and their actions. Important aspects here are momentum, tempo and mental agility, which in combination produce a shock effect and the element of surprise on other actors. The manoeuvrist approach requires a mental attitude that centres on creativity, the willingness to take risks, and perseverance.

The traditional manoeuvrist approach is designed to break the will of the enemy and his willingness to carry on fighting. The emphasis is thus on his mental component and not on the destruction of his physical component; direct confrontation is avoided as much as possible.

The purpose of the manoeuvrist approach is to:
- gain and retain the initiative and exert constant pressure at times and places that the enemy least expects it, thus undermining his will and his willingness to sustain the fighting;
- direct the effects of precision weapons against identified enemy weaknesses, thus breaking his cohesion;
- restricting the enemy’s ability to obtain situational awareness, thus adversely affecting his understanding.

A selective and physical elimination of capacities (people and means) is in keeping with the manoeuvrist approach. The manoeuvrist approach can be characterised by pre-emptive action, by outmanoeuvring and by disrupting the enemy. To be able to identify and exploit weaknesses, it is not only good intelligence that is required, but also a high operational tempo and multiple simultaneous activities.

A high operational tempo can be reached by rapid decision making, speed of execution and a fast-paced change of activities. This high tempo will allow penetration of the enemy’s decision-making cycle which will hinder his response; his will, cohesion and understanding will thus be damaged.

Despite the emphasis on the mental component, the manoeuvrist approach in combat always involves elements of physical mobility, firepower and control of maritime areas, ground or airspace. This approach also involves the need to bind the enemy, to deny routes, spaces and areas and to preserve vital friendly areas and key points. Defensive measures like these are, however, always a means to a higher end, namely the defeat of the enemy.
It is not always possible to break an enemy’s will to act. In the case of ideologically driven groups, other instruments will have to be sought to achieve the desired effect. This can be achieved within the philosophy of the manoeuvrist approach, by seeking the support of all actors for the operation, and also by denying external support to the enemy, as his sustainability could be partly dependent on this form of support. In this way, the enemy can be deprived of the initiative.

The manoeuvrist approach in a broader sense. Today’s conflicts and crises involve a higher number of actors. This is further intensified by our ‘open’ world, in which everyone can keep abreast of each military operation. As a result, military influence extends further than it used to and it is not only the activities in the mission area that are important. The opinion of population groups, parties, countries and organisations with which there is no physical interaction is now also a determining factor in the success of an operation.

Effective operations are determined by the approach towards all actors, not only by the way in which the enemy is approached. By extension, the ‘will of the enemy’ in the traditional manoeuvrist approach can therefore be regarded as the ‘actor’s opinion’. The opinion translates into support and thus into cohesion. Support for the friendly operation must be maintained and increased. Support for the enemy should be reduced, so that he eventually gives up. Tailoring friendly activities carefully to the will, understanding and cohesion of all actors puts into practice the effects-based approach and the manoeuvrist approach in a broader sense.

5.5.2. Network-based operations
A condition for the effective, efficient and integrated deployment of fighting power is the linking of effectors, sensors, C2 elements and communications and information systems in a single network. Along with the interoperability of these means, this network allows the friendly decision-making cycle to be accelerated and enhanced in terms of quality. The increased technological capabilities of communications and information systems contribute to the reinforcing effect of networks on fighting power. As well as the use of technology, network enhancement also involves aspects concerning process, personnel, culture and organisation. All this enables fast and targeted information flows in order to gain greater speed of action and decision making than the enemy. The reinforced fighting power through faster and better processing and dissemination of information is referred to as network-enabled capabilities.
Just as relevant as the technical network is the social network. Social networks serve to build trust between their members. Familiarity with and trust in people thus remain the basis for network-based operations. Despite all the modern technology, the deployment of liaison officers and personnel at multinational headquarters is a vital addition to network-enabled capabilities. Direct personal contact will never be replaced by the exchange of digital images, sound and text.

As part of an integrated approach, network-based operations are not confined purely to [the reinforcement of fighting power. To bring about the effective and efficient deployment of all assets in this broad context too, it is vital that, apart from the social networks referred to above, non-military actors also form part of the network. The structures and procedures therefore need to be set up in such a way as to make this possible. This means that particular consideration is needed when deciding what information should be available to whom. From the point of view of operations security or the national interest, it may be necessary to shield part of the information from some actors in the network.

5.5.3. Mission command
In the Netherlands armed forces, mission command\(^1\) is the primary style of command. Under mission command, establishing and communicating the commander’s intent is key, as full freedom of action is given to the lower executing levels. The intent focuses on the context in which the task has to be performed and on the desired results and effects, and not on the way in which they are achieved. Authority for the execution is thus decentralised. In other words, authority is delegated to the lowest appropriate level for the most effective and efficient deployment of equipment and capacities. The scarcity of assets and capabilities, as in the case of airpower, for example, may mean that the possibility of delegating this authority is limited. The Dutch doctrine publication entitled ‘Command and control’ (JDP-5) discusses mission command in more detail, along with the conditions needed to use it successfully.

5.6. Coping with expectations
Military personnel have to deal with the expectations of a variety of actors. They have to ensure that each relevant actor is given the right idea of where the military operation should lead and why certain activities are being deployed. And whatever is announced must actually take place. Coping with expectations means first of all identifying and analysing the prevailing views. Expectations are often wrong, too high or even contradictory.

\(^1\) Mission command is known as opdrachtgerichte commandovoering in Dutch and as Auftragstaktik in German.
It is, therefore, vital to create the right impression of what a force should, can and wants to do. This requires constant assessment and communication, as well as visible deeds and results. The force must say what it is doing and must do what it says. If that does not happen, the force will lose credibility and the chances of success will diminish. The right expectations can be evoked by, for instance, making clear from the outset what the ultimate goal is, for example that the local population provides its own security. The population will then be expected to deliver the required effort itself, and responsibility for security, law and order will eventually be left to the local authorities.

Coping with expectations involves more than just creating clarity. If expectations are wrong or contradictory, it may be important to steer them, for example by persuading various local actors to collaborate. The same applies to opponents; it can also be made clear to them what the response will be if they do not comply. That response must actually follow in that case. The expectations of the local population – for example, that the military presence is temporary and that the purpose of military activities is to enable the population to look after its own security – must be met by deploying only those activities that correspond to these expectations.

The essential characteristic of military operations as far as Western nations are concerned is that military personnel are authorised to use armed force; the military organisation belongs to the government’s monopoly of force. In mission areas, however, the law of the jungle applies in many cases. In preparation for this potential combat, Dutch military personnel learn, train for and drill the use of all possible means and capabilities to defeat the enemy, ideally without any friendly losses and preferably without even having to fight themselves. In certain circumstances, this can be achieved by outsmarting the enemy or by operating in such a way that the enemy decides against an armed confrontation.

By no means the least critical success factor is a demonstration by the Dutch military that it is a force to be reckoned with. Besides a show of force and a mere presence, this can also be achieved by demonstrating military professionalism, resolve and visible capacity for escalation domination. It is therefore not only weapons that can bring about the success of a mission. But this is only possible if Dutch military personnel take account of the values, work methods and convictions of other actors.

Disseminating the message established prior to the mission, portraying the desired image and acting accordingly will give the force authority and evoke respect among all the relevant actors.
5.7. Special responsibility

The supreme value of the Netherlands armed forces is their reliability as an effective instrument of the Netherlands government in the protection and defence of national interests, the promotion of the international rule of law and the fulfilment of the tasks embedded in the Constitution. An organisation alone cannot give meaning to this value; it is the people who make the organisation reliable and effective. It is, therefore, the duty of each individual serviceman and woman to make every effort to ensure that the armed forces are seen as such: reliable and effective.

The authority vested in military personnel to use force on behalf of the government demands a strong awareness of their subordination to the democratic regime and thus the serving nature of the armed forces.

We honour our dead, care for our wounded and support our veterans.
Netherlands Defence Doctrine