ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS
COMPREHENSIVE OPERATIONS
PLANNING DIRECTIVE
COPD INTERIM V2.0

04 October 2013

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
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PREFACE

1. Allied Command Operations Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) Interim Version 2.0 (V 2.0) is a complete rewrite of, and supersedes, ACO COPD Interim Version 1.0 (V1.0) issued on 17 December 2010. It articulates, in separate chapters, the operations planning process (OPP) for the NATO strategic and operational levels, in support of the NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP), to facilitate a collaborative approach to planning.

2. Each situation for which the OPP is used is different. The process and templates presented in the COPD V2.0 are a capture of best practice; they suit well a timely and systematic movement through the process from one phase to another. With appropriate training, they can be used effectively as a guide to develop appropriate operations planning products for the requisite level to support each situation.

3. The development of COPDV2.0 has considered lessons identified through use of the COPD V1.0, during operations, exercises and training, and due to change such as NATO Command Structure (NCS) reform, the introduction of the Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre (CCOMC) at SHAPE, and updated policy and doctrine. It is consistent with AJP-5 ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning’, which was recently promulgated.

4. The COPD V2.0 is issued cognisant of the fact that there is still much on-going work that will have an influence on the COPD, such as: adjusting to the roles and responsibilities of the new NCS, including Single Service Commands and deployable Joint Force Command Headquarters; changes to the mechanisms available for command and control of NATO operations; and, especially for chapter 3, the continued evolution of the CCOMC and its related processes. This substantial amount of on-going change is the reason that the COPD V2.0 remains for the time being an ‘interim version’.

5. The COPD is NATO Unclassified so that it can be used across the NATO international military community to provide common understanding, principles and approach to operations planning and training. The COPD may also be useful to other actors, subject to approval, within NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach for the promotion of a common set of procedures for operations planning.

6. Although an interim version, the COPD V2.0 is to be used during operations, exercises and training, such as the Comprehensive Operational Planning Course. This approach will further validate processes and allow improvements to be identified. Validated lessons identified can be forwarded to the COPD Custodian, through SHAPE J5.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1-1. Background.

a. Containing a broad and evolving set of challenges, the security environment continues to change; it is and will be complex, global, and subject to unforeseeable developments. In an increasingly complex world, peace, security and development are ever more interconnected. This highlights the need for close cooperation and coordination among international organisations (IOs) and the requirement that they play their respective, complementary and interconnected roles in crisis prevention and management.

b. In this environment global and regional organizations are of particular importance, including the United Nations, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The United Nations Security Council will continue to have the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. With, and in support of, such structures, the Alliance remains ready, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to contribute to effective conflict prevention, to engage actively in crisis management including non-Article 5 crisis response operations, and to stabilise post-conflict situations. But what is equally clear is the key role of the UN and relevant international organizations, as well as appropriate non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in ongoing operations and future crises. It is this requirement that puts a premium on the need for close collaboration among all actors involved in an international response and on the need to recognize the interdependence of all the elements of the international community’s efforts.

1-2. NATO’s Contribution to a Comprehensive Approach.

a. NATO recognises that the military alone cannot resolve a crisis or conflict. The Alliance’s Strategic Concept\(^1\) states, ‘[t]he lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, make clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach is necessary for effective crisis management. The Alliance will engage actively with other international actors before, during and after crises to encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of activities on the ground, in order to maximise coherence and effectiveness of the overall international effort.’

b. There is therefore a need for more deliberate and inclusive planning and action through established crisis management procedures that allow for both military and non-military resources and efforts to be marshalled with a greater unity of purpose. Adopting such a comprehensive approach to operations begins with inculcating a culture of active collaboration and transparency among those involved in crisis management.

c. For the Alliance, this includes: enhancing integrated civilian-military planning; and the development of process and structures for effective co-ordination and co-operation with other actors, to allow each to complement and mutually reinforce the others’ efforts, ideally within an overall strategy agreed by the international community and legitimate local authorities.

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\(^1\) PO(2010)0169 (19 Nov 10) paragraph 21.
d. Planning in a multi-dimensional environment generates particular challenges for both civilian and military actors. Experience shows that not only may there be no formally appointed lead agency to provide overall coordination, but that those organisations capable of reacting quickly are very often military in nature. In addition, some institutions may not wish to have formalised relationships with others. Thus, a comprehensive approach emerges through the determination of various actors to play their part to resolve a crisis. Pragmatism is often the way forward, as imperfect as this may be in an otherwise rules-based society. All levels of NATO should look for opportunities for interaction and/or collaboration under principles of mutual respect, trust, transparency and understanding, and a duty to share. Moreover it is incumbent on NATO, especially in the planning and early execution stages of an operation, to understand and to attempt to anticipate the needs and objectives of other potential contributors thus enabling subsequent coordination and cooperation.


a. The NAC will decide for each relevant crisis if NATO should act and, if so, in what manner. While every crisis is unique, the NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP) is the process by which the Alliance addresses and, subject to decisions by the NAC, aims to manage and resolve a crisis. In circumstances that will be difficult to predict, the NCMP ensures the Alliance is prepared to perform the whole range of possible Article 5 and Non-Article 5 missions.

b. Clearly each circumstance will dictate the exact steps, but the NCMP provides a default template from which deviations may be made by informed decisions. It is primarily designed to allow the relevant staffs and NATO Committees to co-ordinate their work and to submit comprehensive advice to the NAC in a timely and compelling way. In so doing, it facilitates grand strategic political decision-making by capitals, through the North Atlantic Council (NAC), early in an emerging crisis, as well as throughout its life cycle.

c. The NCMP also provides a procedural structure that allows the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to undertake some prudent preparatory planning activities in light of a developing or actual crisis in a reasonable time frame and, subsequently, to provide strategic assessments and advice, including on operations planning and throughout the execution of a mission.

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2 As articulated in the NATO Crisis Response System Manual (NCRSM).

a. In order to prepare for and conduct complex and multidimensional operations, it is necessary to conduct operations planning\(^3\) to develop appropriately detailed operations plans, which address all relevant factors for the efficient and successful conduct of an operation. MC133/4, NATO’s Operations Planning, sets out broadly the Operations Planning Process (OPP) to describe how the military supports the NCMP; it describes how the Alliance initiates, develops, coordinates, approves, executes, reviews, revises and cancels operations plans.

b. There are two categories of operations plans, both applicable for Article 5 or non-Article 5 situations:

1. Advance Planning. Designed to prepare the Alliance to deal with identified possible security risks, there are three types of advance planning operations plans: Standing Defence Plan (SDP), Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) and Generic CONPLAN.

2. Crisis Response Planning. Developed in response to an actual or developing crisis, crisis response planning calls for the development of an Operation Plan (OPLAN). For each operation, a strategic OPLAN (approved by the NAC) and an operational OPLAN (approved by SACEUR) are produced.

c. Operations planning requires specific practices and procedures for each level and the establishment of clear links between actions, effects, objectives and the end state and, where possible, the harmonization of military, political, civil and economic planning.

d. Regardless of the situation, the underlying premise for operations planning is that military operations are required to counter threats, from opposing forces or other sources, or to contain violence and hostilities. This pertains to both Article 5 Collective Defence and Non-Article 5 Crisis Response and encompasses conventional, unconventional and asymmetric threats. Our opponents, including political leaders, the population and the military, possess their own “will”, influenced by their own culture, perspectives and vital interests, to pursue goals in opposition to our own. It is therefore imperative during all operations planning to attribute to our opponents and opposing factions the potential to willingly oppose our operations with their full potential when their aims conflict with our own.

e. During the conduct of operations planning, it is important for commanders at all levels to properly appreciate the relevant information environment and its potential impact on the planning for and conduct of military operations. Commanders need to be fully cognisant of how military activities, especially those involving the use of force, may communicate strategically and influence perceptions of a wide variety of audiences. In the design of operations, commanders and their staff need to consider various ways to create the desired effects, including both lethal and non-lethal measures as appropriate, to ensure those selected support the overall strategic intent.

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\(^3\) Operations planning is defined in AAP-06 as, ‘...the planning of military operations at the strategic, operational or tactical levels. Note: The preferred English term to designate the planning of military operations at all levels is “operations planning”. The term “operational planning” is not to be used so as to prevent confusion with operational-level planning.’

a. Purpose.

(1) Set within the context of a NATO contribution to a comprehensive approach, the purpose of this Allied Command Operations (ACO) Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) is to outline the military procedures and responsibilities governing the preparation, approval, implementation and review of operation plans\(^4\) to enable a common approach to operations planning. This includes the associated documents which are required in order to execute the mission allocated to SACEUR and subordinate operational commanders.

(2) The COPD is NATO Unclassified\(^5\) to permit distribution within the international military community, where appropriate, to offer a set of common principles and an approach to operations planning and training.

b. Application.

(1) The COPD is applicable to all operations planning activities at the NATO strategic and operational levels of command and can be adapted to the component/tactical level in order to enhance collaborative planning activity. The following should be considered in the use of the OPP at each level as described in the COPD:

(a) Role of Commanders.

1/ Design, planning and execution are human matters where commanders lead and staff support. Commander’s guidance at every level provides staff with the vision of how a challenge is to be tackled and provides subordinates with the freedom to operate within the broader context of the mission.

2/ Commanders will remain in charge of their planning process in their own headquarters. They may adjust the process outlined in the COPD in order to adapt it to the situation, while noting the common benefit of similar procedures to enhance collaboration vertically and laterally.

(b) Collaboration.

1/ The planning process sees SACEUR informing the decision-making process at NATO Headquarters (NATO HQ) and establishing the right conditions for the operational level commander to achieve the operational objectives successfully. No formal SACEUR product will be developed without guidance from NATO HQ or significant input from the designated operational commander.

\(^4\) The process described in the COPD can also be used as a basis for the development of advance planning operations plans: SPD, CONPLAN and generic CONPLAN.

\(^5\) C-M(2002)60, The Management of Non-Classified NATO Information, describes the release of NATO Unclassified information outside NATO.
2/ For collaborative planning to work effectively, it is vital that planners, at each level, not only have a common understanding of the crisis situation and a common approach to developing the necessary plans to support NATO involvement, but also for them to understand how the commander and staff operate at the next higher level so they are able to contribute to and influence the process. In that respect, each level should structure its planning organisation in a way that is compatible and allows for easy interface and collaborative planning.

(c) Guide versus Directive.

1/ As a common framework for collaborative operations planning, the COPD is deliberately detailed, to support training, while giving experienced planners, at the strategic (Chapter 3) and operational\(^6\) (Chapter 4) levels, the necessary tools to fully appreciate all elements of the most complex crisis and produce high quality operations plans.

2/ The COPD’s processes attempt to cover all expected scenarios; however, as planners become more familiar with the concepts of the COPD, it should be used to guide the development of necessary output rather than followed paragraph by paragraph without consideration to the actual requirement of each specific situation.

3/ The detail provided in the COPD must also not be mistaken as generating a requirement for a complex and detailed plan; rather, it is designed to help the planners develop a product of clarity and simplicity capable of providing the necessary guidance to execute the commander’s vision.

(2) A number of publications will complement the COPD process most notably the NATO Crisis Response System Manual (NCRSM), MC133/4 NATO’s Operations Planning, the Bi-SC Knowledge Development Handbook and the NATO Operations Assessment Handbook. In addition, the COPD draws on Allied Joint doctrine.

c. Process.

(1) Operations planning is oriented towards a NATO end state and strategic objectives (military and non-military) established by NATO’s political military authorities and carried out within the political limitations and resource constraints set by these authorities.

(2) Changing conditions from an unacceptable to an acceptable state will require the creation of effects that are necessary to achieve planned objectives and contribute to the achievement of the NATO end state. This central idea of

\(^6\) With recent changes to the NATO Command Structure and possible command and control of NATO operations, COPD V2.0 has been written with respect to a generic Operational (Joint) Commander/Headquarters vice the previous approach focused on a NATO Command Structure Joint Force Commander/Command.

1-5

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
planning determines the combination and sequencing of actions in time and space using available resources with the greatest potential to create the required effects.

(3) The military strategic level seeks to translate political-strategic guidance into military strategic direction for the operational commander, and to establish at the strategic level the conditions necessary for the operational commander to plan and execute his mission. At the operational level, planning seeks to transform strategic direction into a scheduled series of integrated military actions, carried out by joint forces, to achieve operational objectives efficiently and with acceptable risks. The aggregation of operational objectives contributes to the achievement of strategic objectives.

(4) Strategic planning begins with an in-depth study and analysis of the crisis and its root causes, within the constraints of the time available. An analysis of the various actors and systems at play within the engagement space\(^7\), including their motives, strength and weaknesses, interactions and inter-dependencies, will contribute to the identification of the best possible strategic approach for NATO, including where appropriate a range of options for NATO’s military contribution within the context of a comprehensive approach to crisis resolution. Once approved by the NAC, the selected option will serve as the basis for the development of strategic planning direction and then, through a collaborative planning process, the development of a strategic concept of operations (CONOPS) and OPLAN.

(5) At the operational level, the process begins with a review of the situation based on the strategic analysis of the situation and the mission to develop a clear appreciation of “what” must be accomplished, under what “conditions” and within what “limitations”. Based on this appreciation, it then focuses on determining “how” operations should be arranged within an overall operational design. The operational design provides the basis for subsequent development of the operational concept as well as the detailed plan.


a. The following general principles for operations planning, paraphrased below for brevity, are promulgated in MC133/4, NATO’s Operations Planning (7 Jan 11); they are applicable when considering the design of NATO operations in today’s modern strategic environment:

(1) **Strategic Coherence.** It is essential that the planning process be coherent internally, as well as externally with other actors, as appropriate.

(2) **Comprehensive Understanding of the Environment.** Coherence in the planning and conduct of operations requires building/fostering a shared comprehensive understanding of the situation from the very beginning of planning and maintaining this understanding throughout the process. In order to support the commander’s decision making process, we need to understand, but only to the

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\(^7\) Engagement Space - That part of the strategic environment relevant to a particular crisis in which the Alliance may decide, or has decided, to engage. Note: the engagement space can be initially viewed through several conceptual models. The most common in NATO are the following six PMESII domains (recognizing this list is not exhaustive): political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information. (Proposed definition).
best extent in the time available, the complexity of the operating environment and the linkages, strengths, interdependencies and vulnerabilities therein. The process undertaken to understand the environment is continuous from commencement of planning through operation termination.

(3) **Mutual Respect, Trust, Transparency and Understanding.** Operations planning in support of NATO's Contribution to the Comprehensive Approach must be underpinned by a culture of mutual respect, trust, transparency and understanding. This is built through information sharing and practical cooperation and must be encouraged to allow collaboration and cooperation across NATO bodies, among civil and military actors, and with relevant non-NATO actors and local authorities.

(4) **Consultation and Compatible Planning.** Mutually supportive, compatible, and wherever possible, concerted and harmonised planning is fundamental for success of a comprehensive approach. Therefore, operations plans must meet the politically agreed level of interaction with external civil and military actors and at a minimum allow consistency between our actions and desired effects, and those of external actors. Accordingly, NATO's operations planning, and the associated information exchange and classification procedures, must encourage and enable concerted effort, collaboration and cooperation wherever possible.

(5) **Efficient Use of Resources.** During planning, decision makers must be made aware of the risk of not adequately resourcing an operation. In addition, to maximize effectiveness, planners must take into account the core competencies of both military and non-military contributing actors to the fullest extent possible within the international response to the crisis.

(6) **Flexibility and Adaptability.** The operating environment of a particular modern crisis is complex and continually changing. Adversaries possess a 'will' and are thus unpredictable, complex and adaptive. Thus, no planning process can guarantee prediction. Plans must allow flexibility and adaptability within the mission and agreed political and resources framework. Regular operations assessment is required to guide execution of military operations towards achievement of their objectives and their contribution to the achievement of the desired NATO end state.

b. In addition, ACO operations planners should consider the following two additional general principles:

(1) **Commanders lead and staff support.** Informed processes and tools guide and enable the preparation of a commander’s decision making, but they are not an end in themselves. A commander’s intuition, experience and military judgement remain paramount. Operational art, guided by the commander, remains an essential aspect of operations planning.

(2) **Mission Command.** Through mission command, commanders generate the freedom of action for subordinates to act purposefully when unforeseen developments arise, and exploit favourable opportunities. Mission command encourages the use of initiative and promotes timely decision-making. Commanders who delegate authority to subordinate commanders need to state
clearly their intentions, freedoms and constraints, designate the objectives to be achieved and provide sufficient forces, resources and authority required to accomplish their assigned tasks.

1-7. The Engagement Space.

a. Modern crises are characterized by complex interdependencies; conflicts are underpinned by a combination of historical, political, military, social, cultural and economic issues. These issues are generally interdependent and, consequently, the solutions required to address these issues are of a varied nature. NATO currently recognizes six (6) domains under the PMESII construct within an engagement space, though others may be included in future. They are:

   (1) **Political.** Any grouping of primarily civil actors, organisations and institutions, both formal and informal, that exercises authority or rule within a specific geographic boundary or organisation through the application of various forms of political power and influence. It includes the political system, parties and main actors. It must be representative of the cultural, historical, demographic and sometimes religious factors that form the identity of a society.

   (2) **Military.** The armed forces, and supporting infrastructure, acquired, trained, developed and sustained to accomplish and protect national or organisational security objectives. This also covers the internal security aspects of a country.

   (3) **Economic.** Composed of the sum total of production, distribution and consumption of all goods and services for a country or organisation. It includes not only economic development of a country, but also the distribution of wealth.

   (4) **Social.** The interdependent network of social institutions that support, enable and acculturate individuals and provide participatory opportunities to achieve personal expectations and life-goals within hereditary and nonhereditary groups, in either stable or unstable environments. It covers the social aspects such as religion, a society’s structure, the legal and judicial system, policing and supporting infrastructure, humanitarian, etc.

   (5) **Infrastructure.** The basic facilities, services, and installations needed for the functioning of a community, organisation, or society. Includes logistics, communications and transport infrastructures, schools, hospitals, water and power distribution, sewage, irrigation, geography, etc.

   (6) **Information.** The entire infrastructure, organisation, personnel, and components that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information. Encompasses the information and communication media.

b. Through an analysis of the goals, strength, weaknesses and interdependencies of the main actors within these six domains, knowledge is developed about the behaviour of...
the main actors within the engagement space. That knowledge is then used by decision makers at all levels to determine how these actors might be influenced in ways that achieve the Alliance’s strategic objectives and end state, thereby contributing to the international community aims.

1-8. Instruments of Power.

a. Conditions in each of the six system domains of the engagement space can be influenced by the application of one, or a combination of, the four instruments of power:

(1) Military. The military instrument refers to the application of military power, including the threat or use of lethal and non-lethal force, to coerce, deter, contain or defeat an adversary, including the disruption and destruction of its critical military and non-military capabilities. It can also refer to the constructive use of military forces to secure and/or support stabilization and reconstruction or as a tool in helping solve complex humanitarian disasters and emergencies. The military is NATO’s main instrument.

(2) Political. The political instrument refers to the use of political power, in particular in the diplomatic arena cooperating with various actors, to influence an adversary or to establish advantageous conditions. NATO member nations employ NATO and other IO’s to combine their political power and influence on the international scene, speaking and acting with the same purpose, to create greater effect.

(3) Economic. The economic instrument generally refers to initiatives, incentives and sanctions designed to affect the flow of goods and services, as well as financial support to state and non-state actors involved in a crisis. The aggregation of the economic instruments of NATO nations could act as a significant lever, provided that nations would use their economic instruments in a way that supports the achievement of the NATO end state and also other stated international community goals.

(4) Civil. The civil instrument refers to the use of powers contained within areas such as the judiciary, constabulary, education, public information and civilian administration and support infrastructure, which can lead to access to medical care, food, power and water. It also includes the administrative capacities of international, governmental and non-governmental organizations. The civil instrument is controlled and exercised by sovereign nations, IOs and NGOs. Nonetheless, through interaction and enhanced mutual understanding, NATO can work with those that have access to the civil instrument of power in order to coordinate with them, and possibly adjust our own activities to create synergies with theirs.

b. In order to achieve a lasting solution, modern operations require the complementary and coherent application of the various instruments of power. As a security Alliance, NATO exercises control over only the military (primarily) and the political (partially) instruments of power. While commanders have primarily the military instrument at their disposal to contribute to resolving a crisis, the NAC can also use the

10 The NCRSM (2011) refers to “diplomatic” options for dealing with a crisis.
political instrument through the office of the Secretary General.

c. The other instruments are controlled by IOs and states or NGOs and, consequently, the Alliance must often coordinate or de-conflict its own actions and plans with the relevant non-NATO actors involved. In most cases, the Alliance will be involved in a supporting role in order to provide a degree of security and stability that allows the other instruments to work and operate in the engagement space in order to establish acceptable conditions in the other five domains.

d. In accordance with direction and guidance from the political strategic level, the use of these instruments must be planned and, where feasible, de-conflicted and harmonized with the non-NATO instruments that are being levered by relevant non-NATO actors inside the engagement space. This will facilitate the harmonization of NATO’s military and non-military, and possibly political, planning with non-NATO political, civil, military and economic planning, whenever possible. Such coordination will take place at a number of levels within the international, governmental and non-governmental actors concerned, for example at the institutional and regional HQs and field office levels.

1-9. NATO End State, Objectives and Effects.

a. NATO End State.

(1) The NATO end state\textsuperscript{11} is defined as, ['t]he NAC statement of conditions that defines an acceptable concluding situation for NATO’s involvement.' At the conclusion of NCMP Phase 3 (Development of Response Options), if the NAC decides that NATO is to be involved in efforts to resolve a crisis, as NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach to its resolution, it will release a NAC Initiating Directive (NID), which includes the NATO end state. The NATO end state of an operation and associated NATO strategic objectives (military and non-military) are identified and defined politically by the NAC, informed by military advice from SACEUR and the advice of the Military and other Committees in NATO HQ.

(2) During the execution of an operation, the NAC will determine when the NATO end state has been achieved. SACEUR, supported by his subordinate commanders, will assist this process through the submission of periodic operations assessments on the progress of each operation, including when military objectives are considered to be achieved.

b. Objectives.

(1) An objective is defined as '[a] clearly defined and attainable goal to be achieved'. In NATO, in the spirit of mission command, objectives are assigned to a commander by the next higher level (i.e. operational objectives assigned to the operational commander by SACEUR).

(2) In the NID, the NAC promulgates strategic objectives\textsuperscript{12} (military strategic

\textsuperscript{11} This NATO end state is not to be confused as a ‘military end state’, as used in some national doctrine. A separate ‘military end state’ is not articulated in NATO military plans. Military ‘ends’ to be achieved are expressed through the use of objectives.

\textsuperscript{12} The NCRSM illustrative NID template includes ‘supporting objectives’. While labelled as military and/or non-military objectives (to be achieved within means and capabilities), the examples listed are ‗provision of support to International Organisations (IO), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO), etc‘. These activities are intended to assist to pursue, progress and sustain the main strategic objectives. As such, these
objectives (MSOs) and non-military strategic objectives) to prescribe the ‘ends’ to be achieved by NATO military and non-military efforts in support of the achievement of the NATO end state. SACEUR informs the development of MSOs with military advice, including the submission of Military Response Options if requested by the NAC, supported by designated operational commanders.

(3) The focus of military planning, following receipt of the NID, is on the achievement of the MSOs and their contribution to the achievement of the NATO end state, while considering necessary military support for the achievement of NATO non-military strategic objectives. SACEUR assigns operational objectives to designated operational commanders as part of their assigned mission. Initially these operational objectives are issued as ‘provisional’ until the operational commander has conducted his mission analysis, following which requests for amendments can be discussed with SACEUR.

(4) During the conduct of the operation, regular operations assessments are conducted to inform on mission progress. As military objectives are considered achieved commanders inform their next superior commander. SACEUR will inform the NAC when he considers the MSOs achieved. The termination of a NATO military operation will be decided by the NAC when the NATO end state is considered achieved or, following achievement of NATO strategic military ‘ends’, when the military is no longer needed in support of remaining strategic non-military ‘ends’ necessary for achievement of the NATO end state.

c. Effects.

(1) An effect is defined as, ‘[a] change in the state of a system (or system element), that results from one or more actions\textsuperscript{13}, or other causes.’ NATO uses effects in the planning for, and conduct of, operations at the military-strategic and operational levels\textsuperscript{14}.

(2) Derived from objectives, effects\textsuperscript{15} bridge the gap between objectives and actions by describing what changes in a system are required, including changes in the capabilities, behaviour or opinions (perceptions) of actors within the operations environment and to the strategic environment. Effects play a crucial role because they provide a focus for actions and contribute to the achievement of objectives and the end state. Effects must be measurable and should be limited in number.

(3) Effects can be grouped into two categories physical and non-physical. Although all physical effects will lead to some form of non-physical effect, their primary purpose will be to influence the capabilities of actors, while non-physical effects are principally directed towards an actor’s behaviour (also referred to as

\textsuperscript{13} Actions are defined generically as ‘the process of doing something to achieve an aim.’ For the purposes of the COPD, an action can also be thought of as the process of engaging any instrument at an appropriate level in the engagement space in order to create (a) specific effect(s) in support of an objective.

\textsuperscript{14} MCM-0041-2010, MC Position on the Use of Effects in Operations, dated 20 July 2010.

\textsuperscript{15} For guidance on how to write an effect see COPD Annex A.
the cognitive domain). This change in the behavioural or physical state of a system (or system elements), which results from one or more actions, or other causes, may be further categorised:

(a) **Desired Effects.** Those effects that have a positive impact on the achievement of objectives.

(b) **Undesired Effects.** Those effects that disrupt or jeopardize the achievement of objectives.

Planning attempts to identify and develop a plan to create desired effects, while mitigating undesired effects.

(4) The use of effects in operations planning helps in prioritizing efforts to achieve NATO’s objectives and in the efficient allocation of resources. However, planners should remember that a proper effects determination is only possible through a sound understanding of the crisis situation, the main actors to be influenced and the cultural aspects of the environment within which an operation will be taking place.

1-10. Design of Operations.

a. **International Design.**

(1) International crises are by nature complex and evolve over time. At their outset it is likely that all will not share the same understanding of the problem nor will they universally have the same view on how to react to it. Actors in the international arena (e.g. international or regional organisations, nations, NGOs) will engage (or not) in line with their interests and/or responsibilities in their own time and a manner of their choosing. These actions may be coordinated or not, and complementary or competing. As mentioned previously, this serves only to highlight the need for close cooperation and coordination among IOs and the requirement that they play their respective, complementary and interconnected roles in crisis prevention and management.

(2) Therefore at no time, especially as a crisis emerges, will there be a universally agreed international end state, expressing desired final conditions, or objectives, except in a more general sense. Neither would there be a formal ‘international design’, similar to the NATO operational design as explained below, where actions of the four instruments of power (military, political, economic and civil) are organised along lines of engagement towards international objectives to the international end state.

(3) In a theoretical sense, if there were a universally accepted expression of an international end state to a particular crisis by an organization that had control of all four instruments of power, an international operations design could be expressed as shown in Figure 1.1. This overly simplistic diagram is only shown here to aid understanding of this section and how the sections that follow relate – there should be no expectation that such a diagram for the resolution of a crisis will ever exist.
b. NATO Design.

(1) Strategic Design.

(a) The NCMP is designed to assist the NAC determine if a NATO response to a particular crisis is warranted and, if so, what would be the desired outcome of such a response. The need for NATO involvement and the possible role NATO could play would be the subject of dialogue between NATO, at the political level, and relevant players and international actors. If the NAC determines that a NATO response is necessary, they describe the NATO ‘ends’ to be achieved as a NATO end state and strategic objectives (MSOs and non-military strategic objectives).

(b) The NAC would then promulgate the desired NATO ‘ends’ (NATO end state and strategic objectives), with other direction and guidance in a NID, which directs crisis response planning by the NATO military authorities and political and non-military staffs and bodies.

(c) SACEUR would focus ACO military planning on realising the military ‘ends’ to contribute to the achievement of the NATO end state and supporting, as required, the realisation of strategic non-military ‘ends’. ACO planning would be conducted in a collaborative manner, in cooperation with relevant international, regional, national and local actors, which would require timely devolution of authorities for interaction with these actors by each level, commensurate with the assigned objectives. This would ensure NATO military plans are complementary to other NATO strategic non-military activities and coordinated with relevant non-military and non-NATO actors at each level. The product of this planning would be a strategic OPLAN, to be approved by the NAC, and an operational OPLAN to be approved by SACEUR.

(d) While a diagrammatic overall NATO strategic design is not produced, in the same manner as at the operational level, an ‘illustrative’ example is shown below in Figure 1.3. The scope of SACEUR’s strategic OPLAN would address the elements shown in green, as a contribution towards achievement of the NATO end state.

(2) Operational Design.

(a) SACEUR assigns a designated operational commander(s) a mission, including operational objectives to be accomplished. Through the operational estimate, a commander develops a final operational design, which is an expression of the Commander’s vision for the transformation of the unacceptable operational situation at the start of an operation into a series of acceptable operational conditions at its end. This is done through establishing decisive conditions (DCs) along different lines of operation (LoOs), leading to the achievement of operational objectives, while contributing to the achievement of strategic objectives and NATO end state.
(b) Figure 1.4 depicts the relationship of the operational design to the illustrative overall NATO strategic design and the theoretical international design.
Figure 1.2 - NAC Determination of NATO Role and Ends
Figure 1.3 - Illustrative Overall NATO Strategic Design
Figure 1.4 - Operational Design Relationship
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Allied Command Operations
Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive
Interim V2.0
(Chapter 2 – Situational Awareness)

04 October 2013
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CHAPTER 2
SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

2-1.  Introduction.

a.  NATO Strategic Concept.  The Alliance, in its 2010 Strategic Concept, has undertaken to continually monitor and analyse the international environment to anticipate crises and, where appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts, including through diplomatic and political measures.  The Concept also guides engagement with other international actors, including encouraging collaborative analysis.

b.  NATO Policy.  The Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR’s) Terms of Reference (TOR) details responsibilities for his Area of Responsibility and Areas of Interest (AOR/AOI), including those beyond NATO’s territory, and the need to monitor and analyse regional instabilities, military capabilities, and transnational issues that may directly or indirectly impact NATO’s security interests.  Further, the NATO Crisis Response System Manual (NCRSM) and MC 166 series (NATO Intelligence Warning System (NIWS)) provide more detail on SACEUR’s role in Indications and Warning of potential or actual crises, and AD 65-11 provides the complementary direction and guidance for the management of intelligence production in Allied Command Operations (ACO).

c.  Strategic Environment.  The strategic environment has evolved into a highly complex, dynamic and adaptive system with many new, state and non-state, actors (both local and international).  Understanding their relationships and their interdependencies within an agreed AOI is key to identifying emerging crises with potential impact to NATO’s security interests and for timely preparation for the conduct of possible NATO operations.  NATO requires capabilities and procedures that can monitor, assess and warn of impending crises in the vicinity of NATO territory or beyond, to provide strategic warning to decision-makers in a timely and effective manner.  SACEUR, in carrying out the responsibilities of monitoring, assessing and warning of impending crisis within the AOR and beyond, conducts horizon scanning, information/knowledge management and knowledge development (KD) to facilitate detection of potential crises further in advance and the development of situational awareness (SA) and understanding of emerging crises for the conduct of prudent preparatory and formal planning activities.

d.  Understanding.

(1)  Within a military context, understanding is the perception and interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context, insight and foresight required for effective decision-making.  This includes answering the main questions of who, what, where, when, why and how to provide the context and narrative of events.  In turn, this informs when the application of military power may be necessary to achieve strategic objectives or when its use should be avoided, such as when political or diplomatic means, in consultation with others,

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1 MC 0053-4, 12 Apr 10.
3 AJP-2 (A) - Allied Joint Intelligence, Counter Intelligence and Security Doctrine, Ratification Draft.
may achieve the same ends.

(2) Understanding flows from developing a detailed perspective of an actor, group, environment or situation. Building an 'enhanced' understanding, necessary for operations planning, takes time and, therefore, it may not be immediately available at the moment of emergence of a potential crisis. This highlights the importance of horizon scanning activities, and the necessity for prompt direction to focus on emerging crises of relevance to the Alliance. Also, as a crisis situation continues to evolve, development of an understanding of it is an on-going process, with the need for continuous holistic re-evaluation of developments of potential challenges to NATO and its security interests.

(3) Developing a holistic understanding of a crisis is by its very nature, a multi-agency and multisource process, which requires drawing on all available NATO and non-NATO expertise (both military and non-military). A sufficiently broad, inclusive, flexible and adaptive approach needs to be taken to accommodate a wide range of experts, both within and external to the formal NATO structure. Such experts may provide the necessary subject matter expertise to understand the possible operating environment.

(4) Understanding of an emerging crisis is built over time including horizon scanning, development of initial SA and throughout the Operations Planning Process (OPP). The development and sharing of understanding is further enhanced through information/knowledge management, KD and stakeholder engagement capabilities.

e. Knowledge Development.

(1) Knowledge is the meaning rendered from data and information, using the skills acquired through experience or education, that contributes to the theoretical or practical understanding of a subject. Iteratively applied, the KD process converts basic data to more usable information, information to awareness (what is happening) and awareness to understanding (why it is happening). This contributes to the preparation for and execution of NATO’s missions by providing higher levels of awareness and understanding that can support NATO senior military leaders and political officials in their political-military, strategic and operational level decision-making processes.

(2) In general, KD is a proactive, collaborative and iterative process, carried out at all levels of ACO, and contributed to by all functional and special staff. While some functional areas (e.g. Intelligence) have their own internal processes, their output contributes to the overall knowledge requirements of their headquarters and ACO.

(3) While the structure and processes of each headquarters may be unique, ideally all those involved in NATO planning and operations would have some resident civil expertise and additional mechanisms to obtain further specialist advice when required. Drawing on NATO and non-NATO entities, these subject matter experts (SMEs) would apply regional and thematic (political, economic, social, information and infrastructure) expertise towards the development of contextual understanding of external actors in crisis or current operation situations especially as they impact Alliance interests.
f. **Stakeholder Engagement.** Due to the nature of modern crises, crisis prevention and crisis management efforts demand a comprehensive approach by many stakeholders. Through established mechanisms (especially in the early stages of a crisis) or devolved authorities, appropriate engagement with relevant stakeholders, for the horizon scanning or OPP activities being conducted, will facilitate development and maintenance of a holistic understanding of an emerging crisis of interest to NATO. As there is a risk of inadvertent, damaging impact from ad hoc or casual communication with other actors, there is a need for a more structured and considered approach to stakeholder engagement.

2-2. **Information Management for Crises and Operations.**

a. Information Management (IM) is a discipline that directs and supports the handling of information throughout its life-cycle ensuring it is the right information in the right form and of adequate quality to satisfy the demands of an organisation. The NATO Information Management Policy (NIMP)\(^4\) establishes a framework to ensure that information is handled effectively, efficiently and securely in order to serve the interests of NATO. This includes managing all aspects of information throughout its life-cycle. Within this policy, the term ‘information’ is used to embrace all information, including related data, required in support of NATO’s missions, whether such information originates in NATO civil or military bodies or is received from member nations or non-NATO sources. Such information, and the media and resources used to record and process it, shall be managed in accordance with the NIMP and other relevant NATO agreements and legal obligations.

b. The efficient and effective management of information and knowledge is a critical success factor for achieving NATO’s goals and objectives. The principles and objectives of the NIMP, as directed in the Primary Directive on Information Management (PDIM), are to be applied in all ACO endeavours in the planning and conduct of tasks and activities under NATO’s crisis management and operations planning processes, as well as in the conduct of operations.

2-3. **Horizon Scanning.**

a. Horizon scanning\(^5\) is a collaborative effort drawing on all NATO political and military capabilities at all levels to assess potential risks and threats to NATO’s security interests. Within ACO, horizon scanning should provide SACEUR with timely, accurate, relevant, predictive and wide-ranging contextualised information and intelligence, to help prevent strategic surprise and deliver a decision advantage to NATO political-military authorities. Throughout, SACEUR will draw on advice from his military commanders, including those who may be given specific responsibilities for monitoring an AOI.

b. Specifically, a horizon scanning capability should:

   (1) Enable crisis identification within designated AOI by continuously monitoring the security environment. SACEUR has responsibility for AOI beyond NATO’s territory in which NATO commanders monitor and analyse regional

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\(^5\) Strategic Concept, Lisbon. “NATO will continually monitor and analyse the international environment to anticipate crises and, where appropriate, take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts.”
instabilities, military capabilities, and transnational issues\(^6\) that include military aspects, in order to identify their potential military consequences which may directly or indirectly influence NATO’s security interests.

(2) Establish, maintain and, as appropriate, share an initial perception of emerging crisis situations relevant to NATO’s security interests.

(3) Understand transnational issues of interest to the Alliance. In reviewing the global geo-political situation and transnational issues, in terms of possible threats and risks to NATO security interests, the following should be considered:

(a) Threats or acts of armed attack or aggression.

(b) Proliferation and delivery of weapons of mass destruction.

(c) International terrorism/extremism.

(d) Instability from failed and failing states.

(e) Environmental and humanitarian disaster.

(f) Security of vital resources.

(g) Organised/Transnational crime, for example human trafficking and narcotics.

(h) Hostile information activities and propaganda directed at NATO.

(i) Cyber threats.

(4) Maintain a matrix of potential crisis regions/countries (and related relevant actors) not addressed in the NIWS or Potential Crisis Update List (PCUL). This matrix should be based on factors derived from NATO policy and command guidance; it should also provide a methodology to reduce the range of possibilities and ensure their relevance to NATO.

(5) Take maximum advantage of non-NATO expertise, including assessments, analysis and networks of experts, as authorised.

(6) Contribute to identifying and defining SACEUR’s AOI. Taking account of the prevailing geo-political situation, SACEUR may designate AOI for approval by the Military Committee (MC) or the North Atlantic Council (NAC)/Operations Policy Committee (OPC).

(7) Identify indications and warnings. Indications and warnings may be identified and reported by NATO operations centres monitoring an AOI, as well as by nations. They are shared and assessed using the NIWS, which is designed to share information and assessments from nations, NATO Headquarters (NATO HQ) and ACO to provide early warning of any developing threat, risk or concern.

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\(^6\) Transnational issues, which include military aspects, encompass activities such as: terrorism/extremism; proliferation and delivery of weapons of mass destruction; malicious cyber activities; military technological developments; and the military use of space.
that could impact on NATO security interests.

(8) Continuously review SACEUR’s AOR/AOI for changing trends.

(9) Continuously review warning problems (WPs) and indicators and identify new WPs for inclusion in the NIWS or raise as ‘problems’ in the PCUL\(^7\).

2-4. Situational Awareness.

a. Situational Awareness (SA)\(^8\) is the human perception of all available elements of information in relation to a specific situation that allows for a more holistic and informed interpretation of reality. SA contributes to all phases of the process by providing a holistic understanding of the environment.

b. Levels of Situational Awareness. Different levels of SA\(^9\), perception, comprehension and projection, reflect the range of contextual understanding to support decision-making.

(1) Perception involves the processes of monitoring, indicator detection, and simple recognition leading to an awareness of multiple situational elements (objects, events, people, systems, environmental factors) and their current states (locations, conditions, modes, actions) to provide an initial awareness of the environment.

(2) Comprehension requires integrating this information to understand how it will impact upon goals and objectives. This includes developing an initial understanding of the AOI as it pertains to NATO.

(3) Projection involves the ability to make assessments as to the range of possible outcomes that potential actions may have within the engagement space or operational environment leading to a more enhanced understanding. This is achieved through building knowledge on the status, dynamics and interrelations of the elements and more detailed comprehension of the situation and then extrapolating this information forward in time to provide estimates of how it could affect future states of a potential AOI.

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\(^7\) AD 65/11 - ACO Standing Policy and Procedures for Intelligence Production Management, 13 Mar 13.

\(^8\) Pre-doctrinal Bi-SC Knowledge Development Handbook, 09 Feb 11.

\(^9\) With consideration to Endsley, Mica, “Towards a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic Systems”, Human Factors, 1995, Figure 1 p. 35, and pages 35-40.
c. Develop Initial Situational Awareness of the AOI.

(1) Appreciate the Nature of Threats, Challenges and Trends. All available information and intelligence related to the AOI should be reviewed to provide an initial view of the potential scale and scope of threats and challenges to NATO’s stated security interests from the emerging crisis. This should include identifying indicators to be monitored over time to establish trends.

(2) Identify the Main Actors in the Area. Typically there will be a variety of state and non-state actors, including potential adversaries, partners and others, whose actions and influences contribute to or mitigate potential risks or threats to NATO’s interests in the area. Each actor has its own interests and acts in pursuit of those interests in accordance with their capabilities and motivation. These actors can be viewed as systems, comprised of different elements that interact in accordance with their attributes with other systems to influence their behaviour in pursuit of their interests. Their actions will also create effects that may have other consequences. Actors may be:

(a) Nation states and non-state entities.

(b) Organisations including governmental, security forces, International Organisations (IOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and Private Volunteer Organisations (PVOs), as well as commercial enterprises and multinational corporations.

(c) Groups including political interest groups, social power and influence groups, as well as different ethnic, religious, tribal or clan groups.

(d) Individuals, including decision-makers, leaders, opinion leaders, and opinion formers.

Once the main actors in an area are identified, contact should be initiated, if possible and authorised, with appropriate and relevant actors and trusted experts who can contribute to building understanding.
(3) **Develop Encyclopaedic Information about Actors and Systems in the Area.** Drawing on information and intelligence provided by J2/KD, the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC) and other staff, planners ensure that their information and knowledge are at the appropriate level of granularity to support operations planning.

d. **Develop Information/Knowledge Requirements.**

(1) **Determine Information/Knowledge Requirements**\(^{10}\). Based on the initial awareness of the situation and its potential for development, the staff determines specific requirements for information/knowledge to support the analysis and decision-making during the different phases of the OPP. Some of these requirements may be generated through the identification of any Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) required at this point to support timely decision-making and their supporting Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs)\(^{11}\). These requirements, managed through the request for information process, may include further knowledge about the capabilities and behaviour of different actors, their relationships and influences, as well as key factors within the strategic environment.

(2) **Confirm or Develop other Information Sources.** KD elements must collect information and knowledge from all sources. In addition, it is highly likely that international, governmental and non-governmental organisations are already engaged in the AOI. They represent a potentially vast source of information and knowledge about different aspects of the area related to humanitarian assistance, development and reconstruction, including logistics, transportation and communications infrastructure.

(3) **Coordinate Requirements between Levels.** It is important that knowledge management (KM) elements at each level (i.e. strategic, operational and component) coordinate their knowledge requirements across all levels through liaison elements to make the best use of all available means in NATO.

e. **Acquire Information and Develop Knowledge about the Designated AOI.**

(1) **General.**

(a) A product plan is developed to acquire and analyse the information necessary to generate the required knowledge to better understand the situation.

(b) Different actors have their own internal dynamics and external linkages within one PMESII\(^{12}\) domain, or even crossing several domains. It is possible to understand actors and resources that are linked as a system

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\(^{10}\) Knowledge Requirement - A specific need for understanding about a situation, a system, or an element of a system in order to make a decision.

\(^{11}\) To satisfy PIRs, J2 staff initiate requests for intelligence through SHAPE to the NIFC as well as to nations in accordance with the NATO intelligence Collection and Coordination of Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM) process.

\(^{12}\) PMESII – Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information (e.g. Systems within the Engagement Space). The PMESII model is a way to explain the inter-related elements or domains of a complex operations environment. All analysis should integrate a gender perspective in line with the Bi-SC Directive 40-1, dated 08 Aug 12. Note that AD65-11 uses ‘PMESII plus’ which is described as PMESII, plus technological and environmental elements.
or a system of systems with each having numerous distinct system elements. Creating effects in one domain often influences conditions in another domain, system or system element.

(c) Analysing the systems in an AOI can contribute to a more detailed understanding about the environment and the roles played by the different actors including any actions that have established the conditions that characterise the current situation and/or may influence its likely development.

(2) Analyse AOI Systems.

(a) Complex Adaptive Systems. The complexity of a given situation depends on the number, composition and structure of the different systems and the ways they interact. The structural complexity of a system is directly proportional to the number of related systems and system elements, while the system’s interactive complexity is related to the freedom of action of each individual part and the number of linkages among the components. Complex systems that are able to learn and adapt in response to their interaction with other systems and changes in the operational environment can be considered complex adaptive systems. A system analysis will enhance the understanding of complex adaptive systems, as well as the nature of the problem, and supports the development of possible response options.

(b) System Analysis. A system analysis examines potential adversaries, friendly and neutral actors holistically as complex adaptive systems to understand their behaviour, capabilities and interaction within the operational environment. This analysis will reveal strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities and other critical factors, including an actor’s capacity for adaptation, which provides insight into how they can be influenced. The following are basic steps in the system analysis:

1/ Analyse/update the composition of the system and identify essential subsystems and system elements in its PMESII aspects.

2/ Identify system strengths and weaknesses. This process will identify key system elements, which will assist centre of gravity determination, as well as its ability for adaptation during interaction with other systems.

3/ Identify relations between system elements. Next it is important to determine how key actors (individuals, groups and organisations) interact with each other and which interrelationships are particularly important. Relationships between a system’s elements will influence its strengths and weaknesses as it interacts with other systems. This will reveal potential vulnerabilities. It is important to identify those vulnerabilities that have potential for exploitation. Identify which system elements are associated with each system’s vulnerabilities. Examining the key personalities, organisations, facilities, features and materiel associated with the vulnerable system elements should begin to reveal whether they
might be influenced by an action that could in turn create a desired effect on the system.

(c) Influence Diagrams. Influence diagrams can be used to help visualise a systems relationships, including critical requirements, capabilities or vulnerabilities and can help appreciate where the behaviour of system elements can be influenced or affected in either a positive or negative way. Such a visual representation helps in understanding situations that may be complex in terms of structure, interactivity and adaptation. These diagrams can also depict objectives, criteria for success and decisive conditions, as appropriate. An example of such a diagram is shown below in Figure 2.2.

![Influence Diagram](image)

Figure 2.2 - Example Influence Diagram (TOPFAS)

f. **Establish and Share Common Situational Awareness.**

(1) **Share Information, Knowledge and a Common Operating Picture.** Establishing common SA may be achieved by drawing information from any number of sources and displaying it using a number of tools such as Joint Common Operational Picture\(^\text{13}\) (JCOP) or Tools for Operations Planning Functional Area Service (TOPFAS) as a medium for sharing information or collaborating on an agreed AOI.

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\(^{13}\) Note that NATO Common Operational Picture (NCOP) is in development to replace JCOP.
(2) **Further Develop the Knowledge Base**\(^{14}\). KM elements will orchestrate the further acquisition of information about assigned AOIs. These acquisition efforts require functional expertise from across the HQ as well as collaboration with external organizations to build up a repository of information, expertise and contacts about any given area and its main actors. This repository of information must be accessible through shared work-spaces to support further analysis and planning. Therefore, it is imperative that information about the area is collected, organised and stored in a manner that ensures that it can be managed and shared efficiently and effectively within the HQs, with other HQs and with relevant external actors, using common schemes.

(3) **Monitor the situation in area of interest.** The current operations centres will continuously monitor designated areas, paying close attention to CCIRs established by the operational commander and SACEUR. They will be aware of the current activities of each actor in the area and will look for any changes that might impact the overall situation. They may submit requests for information to fill gaps or gain a better understanding of the scope, scale and impact of changes on the overall situation.

2-5. **Knowledge Development Process.**

a. The KD process\(^{15}\) covers the acquisition, integration, analysis, and sharing of information and knowledge from relevant military and non-military sources. It includes analysis of the relationships and interactions between systems and actors taking account of different PMESII and environmental factors to enable a Commander and staff to better understand the situation as well as the possible effects of Military, Political, Economic and Civil actions on different systems and actors. The KD process supports horizon scanning activities and the entire OPP, including the planning and execution of operations, as well as periodic operations assessment.

b. An effective ACO-wide KD process will contribute proactively to shared SA and an understanding of potential crises and conflict situations. This supports timely and informed political and military authority decision-making, at all levels, and interaction with cooperating national and international actors by:

   1. Improving understanding and ability to influence issues, which integrate into wider actions, events and third party activities that impact upon Alliance interests.

   2. Avoiding the consequences of inappropriate engagement by ensuring relationships with non-NATO entities are within the bounds of NAC/MC direction, SACEUR’s TOR and command intent.

   3. Allowing external organisations to develop effective relations with ACO.

   4. The steps in the KD process are:

\(^{14}\) The knowledge base is a collection of data, information, knowledge, expertise and established contacts that is distributed, inter-linked and standardised.

\(^{15}\) To support the KD process, HQs at the Strategic level and below require capabilities to coordinate and prioritise requirements, draw together information/Intel from internal NATO and external sources, analyse it and make it available to decision makers and other relevant entities. Within the NATO Command Structure (NCS) the manner in which this will be accomplished is under review.
(a) Determine Knowledge Requirements. Based on a review of the AOI and coordinated end user requirements, knowledge requirements can be determined. This also involves the gathering and cataloguing of gaps in knowledge that derive from strategic, operational, and component ACO decision-making processes. KM responsibilities in this step include coordinating who will satisfy specific knowledge requirements.

(b) Develop Product Plan. Involves the development of a plan for developing a knowledge product and determining the sources or information and knowledge that will be required. This will involve drawing on existing or developing new networks of SMEs internal and external to NATO, including a requirement to establish information sharing agreements.

(c) Acquire Required Data and Information. Based on the product plan, the designated lead acquires data and information from internal and external networks of SMEs to support generating the required knowledge product.

(d) Generate Knowledge. Involves collaborative activities, systems of system analysis, modelling or simulation to integrate and analyse information and intelligence, resulting in a knowledge product that satisfies one or more knowledge gaps.

(e) Transfer Knowledge. Involves activities to manage accessibility and establish permissions (Release and Disclosure Rules) for sharing knowledge products with the original requesting organization and other organizations, internal to NATO and external Non-NATO entities.

Figure 2.3 - The Knowledge Development Process
(5) Feedback. All of the above activities include an essential mechanism for receiving and acting on feedback. This involves activities to collect and evaluate feedback received from knowledge product consumers and to take necessary actions to improve all aspects of the process.

(6) Information and Knowledge Management. An essential supporting element of the KD process, KM is a multi-disciplined approach to make the best use of information, insights and best practices, to facilitate the achievement of organisational goals. KM, and its intrinsic component IM, is the means by which NATO organisations determine what knowledge is required, manage existing knowledge and identify knowledge gaps to be filled, including who will fill them (e.g. Civil Military Analysis\(^\text{16}\) (CMA)/Civil-Military Interaction (CMI)/Intel other). It also includes managing the Knowledge Base (KB) which is a collection of data, information, expertise, established contacts and already developed knowledge that is distributed, inter-linked and standardised. Managing the KB involves activities to care for the KB (governance, storage, assurance), enhance its capabilities, and purge out-dated or no longer required knowledge products.

(7) KD requires close coordination with the Information Knowledge Management (IKM) staff to ensure effective and efficient acquisition and management of information within a HQ. This requires clearly established procedures for:

(a) Assigning information owners, authorities and responsibilities to all staff elements involved in the OPP.

(b) Creating and managing shared information space where all relevant information, knowledge products and automated information displays can be pulled from NATO Secret and/or mission secret wide-area networks.

(c) Sharing geo-spatial information using available core and functional services as well as establishing gateways to access national databases.

(d) Archiving and sharing key authoritative documents including relevant NAC and other strategic level documents as well as other international actors’ documents.

(e) Developing information capabilities and procedures to share relevant information/knowledge with non-NATO entities.

\(^{16}\) An envisioned SHAPE structural entity, the CMA branch applies regional and thematic (primarily Political, Economic, and Social) expertise through research and analysis activities, in order to develop products contributing to SACEUR’s contextualized understanding of emerging and on-going crises and current operations especially as they impact Alliance interest.
Allied Command Operations
Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive
Interim V2.0
(Chapter 3 – Strategic Level)

04 October 2013
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CHAPTER 3
STRATEGIC LEVEL

3-1. Introduction.

   a. This chapter describes the strategic level operations planning process (OPP) carried out by Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), as guided by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) direction and guidance. It is designed to develop strategic products for consideration by NATO military and political authorities in order to support their decision-making on the strategic direction for NATO in response to a crisis within the framework of a comprehensive approach. The strategic OPP comprises six phases that are aligned with the NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP), to harmonise the interface between SHAPE and NATO Headquarters (NATO HQ), as depicted in Figure 3.1.

   b. The process outlines the necessary interaction with the political-military level (i.e. NATO HQ) and collaboration with the operational level (e.g. Joint Headquarters (JHQ), Headquarters Allied Joint Force Command (HQ JFC), etc) for its efficient conduct.

3-2. Strategic Process and Products.

   a. Within NATO's operations planning there is a clear division of responsibilities for initiation, development, endorsement, approval, execution, revision and cancellation of operations plans. These responsibilities are divided between the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Military Committee (MC), SACEUR and subordinate NATO Commanders. The NAC is the highest political authority within the Alliance and as such is responsible for the initiation and approval of all strategic operations plans developed in response to an actual or developing crisis. The MC is the senior military authority in NATO and is responsible to the Council for the overall conduct of the military affairs of the Alliance. It is the primary source of military advice to the Council and the Secretary General (SECGEN).

   b. In accordance with the NCMP, the following NAC decisions drive the activities at the strategic level:

      (1) To initiate a comprehensive Political-Military Estimate (PME), including:

         (a) A formal analysis of a potential crisis, including the tasking of the development of a SACEUR's Strategic Assessment (SSA).

         (b) Strategic response options, including the tasking of the development of Military Response Options (MROs).

      (2) To initiate operations planning by issuing a NAC Initiating Directive (NID).

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1 Comprehensive approach can be described as a means to enhance a complementary, compatible response to crisis by all relevant actors.

2 The PME spans Phase 2 (Assessment) and Phase 3 (Response Options) of the NCMP.
(3) To approve strategic concept of operations (CONOPS) and operation plans (OPLANs).

(4) To initiate activation of forces in preparation for deployment by issuing a NAC Force Activation Directive (FAD).

(5) To execute an operation by issuing a NAC Execution Directive (NED).

(6) To conduct Periodic Mission Reviews (PMRs) by tasking SACEUR to provide strategic operations assessments of progress towards achieving NATO strategic objectives and their contribution to achievement of the desired NATO end state.

(7) To revise strategic aspects of an ongoing operation by tasking SACEUR to provide a strategic assessment and possible military options for the adaptation of operations (including the NATO end state and strategic-level objectives) according to strategic and operational conditions.

(8) To plan for transition and termination of military operations by following normal procedures.

c. The phases of the strategic OPP, as shown in Figure 3.1, are specifically designed to develop strategic assessments, planning products, directives and orders, in support of the NCMP, required by the political-military and operational levels. The processes and products for each phase are described in the following sections of this chapter.

d. Each situation for which the OPP is used is different. The process and templates presented in this chapter are a capture of best practice; they suit well a timely and systematic movement by the NAC through the process from one phase to another. With appropriate training, they can be used effectively as a guide to develop appropriate strategic level operations planning products to support each situation.

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3 Other documents can assist functional experts with their contribution to the development of strategic operations planning products, such as Functional Planning Guides (FPG) as described in MC133/4 ‘NATO’s Operations Planning’ (e.g. the Allied Command Operations (ACO) Functional Planning Guide – Logistics (currently a draft)).
Figure 3.1 - Political Military, Strategic and Operational Level Processes
3-3. **Organisation for Strategic Planning and Direction.**

a. Appropriate cross-functional bodies within SHAPE provide the basis for collaboration and synchronisation of activities with the political-military and operational levels as well as with Nations and non-NATO organisations. These cross functional bodies also facilitate the seamless transition between planning and execution to ensure continuity in situational awareness and knowledge development (KD) over time. The principal elements involved in crisis response operations at SHAPE are:

1. **The Crisis and Operations Panel (COP).**
   
   (a) The purpose of the COP is facilitate the provision of SACEUR direction and guidance to the SHAPE staff, for effective SHAPE management of the military aspects of crises and Alliance operations in a proactive, comprehensive manner.

   (b) Chaired by SACEUR or another member of the Command Group (CG) (i.e. Deputy SACEUR (DSACEUR) or the Chief of Staff (COS)), the COP is composed of the Vice-Chief of Staff (VCOS), the Deputy Chiefs of Staff (DCOS) and several key advisors including the Director Special Operations, Strategic and International Affairs Advisor (SIA), Legal Advisor (LEGAD), Strategic Communications Advisor and Civil Actors Advisor (CIVAD). Other advisors can also be included as required (e.g. Gender Advisor (GENAD), Medical Advisor, Provost Marshal and Public Affairs (PA)).

2. **The Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre.** The Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre (CCOMC) is the focal point for crisis and operations management at SHAPE. Its processes facilitate comprehensive planning and solutions, through the flexible and scalable cross-functional ‘whole of SHAPE’ approach.

3. **The Response Direction Group.** The Response Direction Group (RDG) is a cross-functional staff organization activated in SHAPE, under an Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS) J5 lead, for all aspects of crisis response planning deliverables.

4. **The Staff elements.** All SHAPE Divisions support the CCOMC and, when assembled, the RDG to contribute to the strategic level process, which may also include parallel functional processes that feed into it. The following are examples of some of SHAPE staff elements and roles during the conduct of the OPP:

   (a) **J2** is responsible for directing and managing the intelligence production to satisfy SACEUR’s Prioritized Intelligence Requirements (PIR). J2 coordinates and directs intelligence production across the Allied Command Operations (ACO) Intelligence Organizations (e.g. HQ JFCs, Single Service Commands4 (SSC), Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF).
HQ), etc) and the NATO Intelligence and Fusion Centre (NIFC), and coordinates intelligence with IMS Intelligence and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) as necessary.

(b) **Civil-Military Interaction (CMI).** The J9 CMI branch provides a strategic engagement and outreach capability, primarily composed of civilian experts in specific domains including Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and International Organisations (IOs), Development, Stabilization & Reconstruction, Humanitarian, Rule of Law and Governance. It is responsible for coordinating with cooperating civilian organisations and for developing awareness and contextualised understanding of non-military aspects of the situation including the activities of international, non-governmental and governmental organisations in the area of interest.

(c) **Civil-Military Analysis (CMA).** The CMA branch applies regional and thematic (primarily Political, Economic and Social) expertise, including to research and analysis activities, in support of the development of the contextual understanding of emerging crises and ongoing operations, especially with regard to how they may impact Alliance interests.

(d) **Knowledge Development Direction (KDD) Section.** An essential element of the KD process is Knowledge Management (KM) which is a multi-disciplined approach to achieve organization objectives making best use of information, insights and best practice. At the strategic level a KDD Section will be responsible for managing both SACEUR and ACO overall knowledge priorities and requirements, and ACO’s knowledge base. It will direct information gathering and knowledge development across ACO and establish formats, procedures and standards to maintain accessibility, currency and accuracy.

(e) **Strategic Communications Staff.** The SHAPE Chief Strategic Communications and staff are responsible for: maintaining awareness of conditions in the strategic environment; co-ordinating timely engagement with NATO HQ; and ensuring that Strategic Communications (StratCom) and influence activities and effects are considered and ultimately co-ordinated in all aspects of the planning and execution of an operation. StratCom staff are guided by the political-military discussions, and direction and guidance of NATO HQ staffs; they will routinely consult and collaborate with subject matter experts (SMEs) from across the functional and advisory staffs to ensure comprehensive guidance and analysis is formulated.

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5 The NIFC is a multi-national intelligence organisation with intelligence analysts from participating member nations. It provides SACEUR with timely, actionable, intelligence in support of the planning and execution of operations. The NIFC produces baseline intelligence, including encyclopaedic information, analysis products, target products, orders of battle, and assessments, as tasked by SHAPE J2.
3-4. **External Coordination.**

a. To facilitate the conduct of the OPP, SHAPE will liaise and/or coordinate, as appropriate and approved, with external organisations and bodies, such as NATO HQ, subordinate commands including the nominated JHQ, NATO agencies and other relevant international actors.

(1) **NATO HQ.** The following are examples of some of the NATO HQ bodies with whom SHAPE, at an appropriate level, may interact during the OPP, due to their political-military crisis management responsibilities.

(a) **Strategic Analysis Capability (SAC).** The SAC will help provide the SECGEN and the Chairman of the MC with timely and comprehensive analysis of potential and emerging crises that may affect NATO, to support their possible consideration and/or discussion by Allies. In addition the SAC will provide an "interface" role between the intellectual, policy, and practical aspects of possible emerging challenges and NATO’s crisis management structures and processes.

(b) **Crisis Management Task Force (CMTF).** A CMTF, composed of designated representatives from the IS and the IMS, may be activated by the SECGEN. It provides an executive level forum for cross-functional staff coordination at the political-military level within NATO.

(c) **IS Division of Political Affairs and Security Policy (PASP).** PASP provides a source of information and contacts related to regional, economic and security affairs, and relations with other IOs and Partner countries including: Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Enlargement Policy; Multilateral Policy, especially with the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU) and the World Bank; Russia and Ukraine Relations; Partnership for Peace (PfP); Regional Affairs and the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD); Conventional Arms Control Policy; Defence and Security Economics; and political aspects of non-proliferation and arms control.

(d) **Civil-Military Planning and Support (CMPS) Section.** The CMPS Section maintains: a Comprehensive Approach Specialist Support (COMPASS) database of national civil experts in the political, stabilization and reconstruction and media fields; and a roster of other civil experts from business/industry and governments/administrations of Member and/or Partner countries with expertise in areas such as: Movement and Transportation (air/land/sea); Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN), Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); Public Health; Critical Infrastructure; Energy Security; Civil Communications; Food and Agriculture, Missile Defence; and Industry⁶.

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(e) **Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).** In the event of a natural or technological disaster, including a CBRN incident, the EADRCC will be responsible for coordinating, in close consultation with UNOCHA and the stricken nation, the response of EAPC Countries to a disaster occurring within the EAPC geographical area. This coordination work includes MD and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) countries and partners across the globe, as appropriate. The EADRCC can also respond to requests from nations where NATO is engaged militarily.

(f) **NATO HQ StratCom.** StratCom falls under the direct authority of SECGEN and the NAC. There are several elements within NATO HQ that enable and support development of StratCom, providing information, contacts, analysis, trends and guidance related to the international, regional and local information environments, including those of NATO members, partners and external organisations. These elements include:

1/ Private Office of the SECGEN (StratCom Advisor to the SECGEN).

2/ Public Diplomacy Division (StratCom Cell).

3/ NATO Spokesperson.

4/ NATO StratCom Policy Board (SCPB). A standing SCPB has been established to act on behalf of SECGEN and the NAC in accordance with the NATO StratCom policy, under the direction of Assistant Secretary General Public Diplomacy Division (ASG PDD).

5/ IMS (StratCom and PA Advisor and Information Operations (InfoOps) Staff Officer).

6/ NATO Media Operations Centre.
PHASE 1 - INITIAL SITUATIONAL AWARENESS OF A POTENTIAL/ACTUAL CRISIS

Section 1 - General

3-5. Introduction.

a. **Purpose.** The NCMP is initiated once there are indications that suggest that there is an emerging crisis that may affect NATO’s security interests. These indications could come from the NATO Intelligence and Warning System (NIWS), Allies, SACEUR or other sources. At the strategic level, the purpose of Phase 1 - Initial Situational Awareness of a Potential/Actual Crisis is to assist with the identification of relevant emerging crises, and to support NAC and/or NATO HQ staff in their NCMP Phase 1 activities.

b. **Overview.** Phase 1 activities are managed by the CCOMC. They normally begin when their horizon scanning activities identify an emerging potential/actual crisis that may have implications to NATO’s security interests. On direction from the COP, the issue may be returned back to a CCOMC scanning activity, the CCOMC may build an initial understanding of and monitor the crisis and/or conduct an initial estimation of the crisis and its possible implications to NATO, and/or it can elevated to NATO HQ. In addition, SHAPE may also support NATO HQ staff, as appropriate and directed, with the development of any initial advice.

c. There may be multiple emerging crises under analysis at any one time. SACEUR and the COP will continue to be updated on any Phase 1 activities for a given emerging crisis and provide direction as required, including when continued Phase 1 activities are no longer required.

d. **Prerequisites.** Phase 1 activities will normally be directed in response to indications of an emerging potential/actual crisis from the CCOMC horizon scanning process.

e. **Main Activities.** The main activities of Phase 1 are depicted in Figure 3.2

f. **Desired Outcome of this Phase.** The desired outcomes of Phase 1 are:

   (1) Appropriate indications and warnings and initial appreciation of relevant emerging crises are provided to SACEUR and, if SACEUR decides, the NAC, in a timely fashion.

   (2) An initial understanding of an emerging crisis is developed, which can be shared for collaborative situational awareness when authorized.

   (3) An initial estimation of the emerging crisis is developed, to include an appreciation of the nature of the problem and the possible implications for NATO.

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7 Tools for Operations Planning Functional Areas Services (TOPFAS) Systems Analysis Tool (SAT) provides a mechanism to capture and share information and analysis of the crisis; in Phase 1, consideration should be given to establishing a SAT database to assist collaboration and use of TOPFAS throughout the strategic OPP.
(4) When requested, appropriate SHAPE support, as directed, is provided to NATO HQ International Staff (IS)/International Military Staff (IMS) staff.

(5) Appropriate analysis is performed, as directed, to inform the development of SACEUR’s strategic military advice (SMA).

(6) Prompt return to horizon scanning activities for emerging crises not deemed relevant.

g. **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.**

(1) **CCOMC.** As directed by the COP, the DCCOMC is responsible for leading the cross-functional effort for the conduct of Phase 1 activities and raising to SACEUR/COP those emerging crises with potential impact to NATO’s security interests. The CCOMC is ‘supported’, as approved, by all SHAPE directorates and Special Staff, including through the provision of information, intelligence and knowledge (e.g. J2 Ops (including NIFC as tasked by J2), CMA, CMI, Cyber Defence (CD), etc).
h. **External Coordination.** Phase 1 activities at the strategic level are facilitated by liaison and coordination with a variety of external entities, authorized and appropriate for the emerging crisis under investigation. These may include but are not limited to the following:

1. **NATO HQ.** On behalf of IMS Director Intelligence, the Warning Secretariat is the manager and focal point for the NIWS, which is the Alliances’ strategic indicator-based system to provide warning to decision-makers of any developing threat, potential threat, risk or concern that could impact on NATO’s security interests. As indications and warnings begin to indicate a potential emerging crisis of interest to NATO, the IS and IMS staff will develop an initial analysis of the situation for the SECGEN. Liaison and coordination with some or all of the following NATO HQ entities may be required during Phase 1: SAC, CMTF, IS (PASP), CMPS, EADRCC, and elements that enable and support StratCom development.

2. **JHQ.** Intelligence and knowledge for specific areas of interest will be developed in collaboration with JHQs, using common procedures for developing and sharing information. As authorized, the CCOMC will collaborate with JHQ staff in their analysis of the emerging crisis.

3. **Other Relevant International Actors.** Within a comprehensive approach, SHAPE and other HQs may require specific authorisation to coordinate directly with other IOs, such as the UN, EU, or International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). With guidance from the COP, and using existing authorities or mechanisms (e.g. CIVAD, NATO HQ IS(PASP), open source information), the CCOMC will increase their understanding of the emerging crisis, and its potential implications for NATO through information available through other relevant international actors, if appropriate.

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8 Normally, unless a NATO Force Structure Joint Headquarters (NFS JHQ) has been generated following deployment of a HQ JFC (as a JTF HQ) and assigned specific responsibilities, the HQ interacting with SHAPE during Phase 1 activities would be a HQ JFC, AIRCOM or MARCOM.

9 Such as AD-65-11 - ACO Standing Policy And Procedures For Intelligence Production Management.
Section 2 - Process

3-6. Appreciate Indication of a Potential/Actual Crisis.

a. Indications of an emerging crisis, which may affect NATO’s security interests, are identified by the CCOMC; they can come: as result of horizon scanning, as an appreciation of an on-going operation, as Indications and Warnings from the NIWS, or directly from Allies or other sources.

(1) The source of the initial indications of the emerging crisis, the urgency of the situation and the magnitude of the possible impact to NATO’s interests are to be considered when determining what strategic Phase 1 activities are appropriate.

(2) Emerging crises that may have an impact on NATO interests are of course by nature very politically sensitive; staff need to continually balance the need to develop an understanding of an issue and be prepared for possible subsequent phases against the possible ramifications of exposing NATO concern before Allies have agreed.

(3) As appropriate, consideration should also be given to discussing the issue with the relevant NATO HQ staff at an appropriate level, including early coordination with the NATO HQ SITCEN, SAC and relevant staff in the operations divisions of the IS and IMS.

b. COP. The COP will provide guidance and direction for the conduct of strategic Phase 1 activities for the possible emerging crisis, to include:

(1) The submission of indications and warning of an emerging crisis to NATO HQ, with potential impact to NATO’s security interests, including initial military considerations, as appropriate. If at this point the IS/IMS develops an initial analysis for the SECGEN of the emerging crisis, the CCOMC would coordinate any SHAPE efforts to support as required.

(2) The necessity for no additional action. The COP would then direct CCOMC to return to scanning.

(3) The necessity to conduct additional Phase 1 activities, including to direct the CCOMC:

(a) To develop an initial understanding of, and monitor, the emerging crisis.

(b) To conduct more detailed analysis to deepen the understanding of the emerging crisis and consider possible implications to NATO.

Guidance may also be provided on authority for or restrictions on interaction with external actors.

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10 The NIWS is specifically designed to share information and assessments from nations, NATO HQ and ACO to provide early warning of any developing threat, risk or concern that could impact on NATO’s security interests.
c. As Phase 1 for a particular relevant emerging crisis may continue for a significant period of time, this step of Phase 1 will be repeated as necessary to inform, and seek direction and guidance from, the COP due a change in the situation, or as a result of NAC discussion of the issue and subsequent direction.

3-7. Develop an Initial Understanding of, and Monitor, the Emerging Crisis.

a. **Develop Initial Understanding.** The CCOMC will develop an initial understanding of the emerging crisis, including the development of an initial system perspective of the area of interest (e.g. across the PMESII domains), focusing on potential adversaries, friendly and neutral actors as well as other aspects of the engagement space relevant to the potential security risks and threats. To assist the development of an initial understanding of the emerging crisis, the CCOMC will:

(1) **Widen Stakeholder Co-ordination.** As authorized and when appropriate, the CCOMC will:

   (a) Consult with external crisis identification community.

   (b) Deepen the involvement of the SHAPE staff (J-Staff, Special Staff, and CCOMC enablers). The input from SIA, CIVAD, GENAD and LEGAD is especially important early in any analysis.

(2) **Appreciate Existing Information and Intelligence.** The CCOMC, and supporting directorates/divisions and Special Staff, will gather, collate, organize and analyse existing information and intelligence on the emerging crisis.

(3) **Identify Information, Intelligence and Knowledge Requirements.** Following their initial appreciation of the existing information and intelligence, and whenever required throughout their analysis, the CCOMC will identify information, intelligence and knowledge requirements needed to improve their understanding of the emerging crisis.

   (a) Establish Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs) for SACEUR. The CCOMC determines SACEUR’s initial CCIRs which focus on understanding the scale, scope and timeframe of the risk or threat to NATO’s interests and how such a situation might be influenced by military and non-military means.

   (b) Establish SACEUR’s PIRs. Based on its analysis of SACEUR’s CCIRs, SHAPE J2 is responsible for the development of SACEUR’s PIRs. PIRs for the area of interest provide the basis for tasking intelligence production within ACO as per ACO Directive 65-11. PIRs also support collection and coordination of intelligence requirements management with NATO HQs and nations.

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11 A functionally, physically, and/or behaviourally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements forming a unified whole. (Proposed definition).

12 PMESII – Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information (e.g. Systems within the Engagement Space). Through a regularly updated gender analysis (including social, cultural, economic, health etc. aspects) a gender perspective will become an integrated part of all six domains.
(c) Identify other Priority Information and Knowledge Requirements. In many cases NATO intelligence may not be the most appropriate source or means for collecting information and developing knowledge. Therefore, the CCOMC must identify those other priority information and knowledge requirements about the area of interest as a basis for collection/acquisition and management and engage with the appropriate staff or agencies (e.g. NATO HQ IS/IMS, CIVAD, GENAD, CMI, CD, CMA, non-NATO entities, etc).

b. **Monitor Emerging Crisis.**

   (1) **Maintain and Further Develop Initial Understanding.** The CCOMC will continue to maintain, and if time allows deepen, its understanding of the emerging crisis. It will continue to, as appropriate, task or ask for the collection/acquisition of information/intelligence to fill the identified gaps. As new information/intelligence becomes available, it will update SHAPE’s understanding of the emerging crisis, and its relevance to NATO’s interests. To assist this activity, it will also continue, within delegated authority, to cultivate appropriate expertise to broaden their understanding of the crisis.

   (2) **Monitor and Report.** The CCOMC will continue to evaluate if a threat to NATO’s security interests exists. Periodically it will update the COP on the potential crisis under analysis, especially if the situation deteriorates and threatens NATO’s interests further.

### 3-8. Initial Crisis Estimation.

a. The COP may direct that the analysis of the crisis be deepened, especially regarding potential security implications for NATO. The CCOMC would then conduct an initial estimation of the crisis, including analysing the nature of the problem, possible implications for NATO security, and, as appropriate, develop recommendations for submission to the COP. Throughout this work, the CCOMC will continue to identify information, intelligence and knowledge requirements to fill shortfalls in understanding.

   (1) **Characterise the Nature of the Problem.** The CCOMC will analyse: the nature, scale, scope and pace of the problem; the principle actors and their roles; and the international interests and engagement, including legal aspects and the information environment.

   (2) **Determine Extent of Impact and Implications for NATO security.** The CCOMC will analyse the possible extent of the impact and implications for NATO by considering:

      (a) The urgency of any possible required response.

      (b) The assessments, goals and actions of relevant Partners and actors, using delegated approvals or through NATO HQ.

      (c) Any known international community or other actor response.

      (d) The potential risks and threats to the NATO.
(e) Possible future military roles for NATO.

(f) The impact of the crisis/issue on other ongoing NATO operations.

(3) Develop Recommendations. Based on the understanding developed, the CCOMC makes recommendations to the COP on the need to advise NATO HQ of the emerging crisis, including military considerations for precautionary or preparatory activities. These considerations, for example could include, a request to the NAC for authority to declare certain Crisis Response Measures (CRMs), while they consider the indications and warnings and decide if a move to NCMP Phase 2 is warranted.
PHASE 2 - STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT
Section 1 - General

3-9. Introduction.

a. **Purpose.** The purpose of Phase 2 - Strategic Assessment is to develop and coordinate SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment (SSA) of an emerging or potential crisis in support of the PME. A strategic assessment may also be conducted for an on-going NATO operation as part of work leading to development of a revised OPLAN.

b. **Overview.**

   (1) Phase 2 begins with a tasker\(^\text{13}\) for SACEUR to conduct a strategic assessment after the NAC formally decides to move into Phase 2 of the NCMP. This phase includes: formal activation of an RDG and nomination of a JHQ as required (through a Strategic Warning Order\(^\text{14}\)); development of the SSA of the crisis; and coordination with NATO HQ, selected JHQ, ACO subordinate HQs and, as appropriate and authorized, external organisations. In addition, the NAC decision to move into Phase 2 of the NCMP, which initiates the PME, may include guidance on and authorisation of CRMs\(^\text{15}\) for declaration by SACEUR.

   (2) Phase 2 ends with SACEUR’s submission of the SSA, which will form the basis of the NMA advice for NAC consideration. SACEUR also may, in the SSA, recommend to the NAC to invoke the Fast-Track Decision Making (FTDM) process\(^\text{16}\).

   (3) Should time constraints dictate, the NAC may request that the SSA and the MROs are submitted at the same time. If this is requested\(^\text{17}\), in addition to Phase 2 details provided below, refer to Phase 3 of this chapter for details on the development of MROs.

   (4) Ideally, the CCOMC would have developed an initial understanding of the situation/emerging crisis and can transfer it to the RDG; this would aid the RDG’s work on the early portion of the Strategic Assessment process (e.g. developing a strategic appreciation of the crisis). However, with a rapidly emerging crisis it is possible that there will have been little time for Phase 1 activities; in this instance the RDG will have to rapidly develop an initial understanding of the crisis, within the time available, to facilitate completion of the Strategic Assessment to meet MC

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\(^{13}\) The tasking would cover the NAC decision sheet that requests NMA advice; the tasking may provide additional guidance and other details such as timings for submission of the SSA.

\(^{14}\) For illustrative format of a Strategic Warning Order see Annex B Appendix 1.

\(^{15}\) Pre-authorised CRM measures are described in general and listed in Annex A to Chapter 3 of the NATO Crisis Response System Manual (NCRSM). The NCRSM ‘recommends’ the NCMP Phases in which a pre-authorized CRM should be declared; however, unless the NAC provides restrictions on the declaration of certain pre-authorized CRMs, once they move the NCMP into Phase 2 SACEUR can declare any pre-authorized CRMs when deemed necessary. The NAC can also direct SACEUR to declare certain CRMs.

\(^{16}\) For explanation of Fast Track Decision Making refer to Annex E of MC133/4 – NATO’s Operations Planning.

\(^{17}\) While the urgency and suddenness of a crisis may lead to the approach of combining the SSA and MROs, this will generally require more detailed NAC guidance earlier (such as draft end state (or end state conditions) and objectives). The importance of an early decision to stand up an RDG in developing situations and the provision of experienced liaisons (from both NATO HQ and the JHQ), especially in this case, cannot be understated.
and NAC timelines. Following the submission of the SSA, the appreciation of the emerging crisis will need to be continually validated and deepened to support subsequent OPP phases.

c. **Prerequisites.** Phase 2 will start on SACEUR’s direction to develop a military assessment, following tasking from the NAC.

d. **Main Activities.** The main activities of Phase 2 are depicted in Figure 3.3.

e. **Desired Outcome of this Phase.** The desired outcomes of Phase 2 are:

1. A strategic warning order is issued to the selected JHQ and other appropriate ACO subordinate headquarters, as appropriate, to alert them to be prepared to support strategic operations planning.

2. The SSA, as a part of SMA, provides the NAC with:

   (a) A fundamental understanding of the nature of the crisis, including its key PMESII aspects.

   (b) An appreciation of the implications for NATO, including potential strategic risks and threats.

   (c) An appreciation of potential strategic ends, ways and means.

   (d) Military considerations relevant to the situation to inform the NAC on the applicability of the use of the NATO military instrument to assist with the situation resolution, including any recommendation for the use of the FTDM process, to assist them to develop the necessary direction for SACEUR to develop MROs, if they so decide.
f. **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.**

(1) **CCOMC.** The CCOMC will transition relevant information, intelligence and knowledge to support the RDG, along with selected members who participated in the initial analysis of the emerging crisis. The CCOMC will continue to monitor the crisis situation and provide information and intelligence to the RDG. If a Strategic Assessment Team (SAT) is authorized to deploy, the CCOMC would establish reporting mechanisms and ensure coordinated interaction, especially with the RDG.

(2) **RDG.** The RDG is a task-organized, cross-functional team assembled to conduct the Strategic Assessment, under the lead of ACOS J5. It will be supported by the CCOMC, all SHAPE directorates and Special Staff as required and approved.
g. **External Coordination.** Subject to COP direction, SHAPE’s requirements for liaison and coordination during Phase 2, at an appropriate level, should be considered, including with:

1. **JHQ (Joint Operations Planning Group)**\(^{18}\) (JOPG)). The designated JHQ will typically be tasked to deploy a liaison element\(^{19}\) to SHAPE to assist the RDG with communication with the JOPG and the provision of coordinated operational input. If the Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) deploys during Phase 2, the RDG may receive their reports and have the possibility of interaction with them through the JOPG.

2. **NATO HQ.** Liaison and coordination with some or all of the following NATO HQ entities may be required:

   (a) **IS/IMS.** A liaison element from NATO HQ (IS/IMS) may be requested to support the RDG to facilitate their appreciation of the current NATO HQ staff perspectives of the evolving situation. It could include a CMPS liaison officer to advise on Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) aspects and, as required, representation from among IS Operations (IS(Ops)), IMS Plans and Policy (IMS (P&P)), and/or IMS Operations (IMS(Ops)).

   (b) **CMTF.** The CMTF complements the lead committee’s role and, as directed by the NAC, facilitates coordination with the UN and other IOs regarding NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach, including to facilitate and/or conduct pre-operations planning consultations with international actor’s staffs. As appropriate and if requested, SHAPE staff at an appropriate level may be approved to participate in the CMTF and in pre-operations planning consultations.

   (c) **Operations Policy Committee (OPC).** The OPC or other committee assigned as ‘lead’ by the NAC would coordinate political-military crisis management advice. As early as the PME, NCMP Phases 2 and 3, a Strategic Political-Military Plan\(^{20}\) (SPMP) may begin to take shape if deemed necessary.

   (d) **Civil Emergency Planning Committee (CEPC).** The CEPC advises the NAC on the availability and effective utilisation of civil resources in an emerging crisis and facilitates the integration of civil support and advice on civil issues. It ensures co-ordination in matters related to the cooperation between NATO military and civil authorities and civil emergency preparedness. It also advises on the need to consider specific measures of NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS).

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\(^{18}\) While JOPG is used throughout the COPD, operational level headquarters will have various names for their planning bodies.

\(^{19}\) Ideally the JHQ liaison element will include an experienced operational level planner, familiar with the JOPG and planning processes of the JHQ they represent.

\(^{20}\) Note – there is currently no standard format for a SPMP. Each case is tailored to the specific requirement.
(e) **EADRCC.** The EADRCC is mandated to respond to civil emergency situations in the Euro-Atlantic area, and to function as a clearing-house mechanism for the coordination of requests and offers of assistance.

(3) **Relevant NATO Agencies.** NATO Communication and Information Agency (NCIA), NATO Support Agency (NSPA), etc.

(4) **Other Relevant International Actors.** With guidance from the NAC, SACEUR and/or COP, and using existing authorities or mechanisms (e.g. CIVAD, NATO HQ IS (PASP), open source information), the CCOMC will increase their understanding of the emerging crisis, and its potential implications for NATO through information available through other relevant international actors, if appropriate (e.g. UN, the EU, the African Union, and relevant international, governmental (including gendarmerie/police organisations) and non-governmental organisations).

### Section 2 - Process

#### 3-10. Initiate SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment.

a. **Review NAC Decision Sheet and Relevant Tasking.** The RDG will review the tasking to determine any requirements for additional guidance and/or clarification. It should be recognised from the outset whether this is an urgent situation requiring an immediate response or a developing situation requiring a more deliberate approach within the context of an overall strategy. The review should focus on understanding:

1. The nature of the task\(^{21}\) and any guidance and direction\(^{22}\).
2. The time available.
3. The political aim, possible NATO role, desired NATO end state, or end state conditions, and strategic objectives\(^{23}\), if stated.
4. Potential military and non-military roles.
5. Requirements for clarification.
6. Requirements for external coordination.

b. **Determine Potential Requirements for Fast Track Decision-Making.** The RDG must immediately determine whether the situation requires an urgent response and deployment of rapid deployable forces, as articulated in a current, relevant contingency

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\(^{21}\) It is possible that the NAC may request MROs to be submitted along with the SSA. If this is the case, the guidance provided in Phase 3 ‘Military Response Option Development’ should also be consulted.

\(^{22}\) At this point there may be an initial NATO HQ IS/IMS analysis available, which can add some context to the NAC direction and guidance, or it can be used to assist development of the understanding of the crisis from a NATO HQ point of view.

\(^{23}\) MC133/4 – NATO Operations Planning outlines military, non-military and supporting objectives at the NATO strategic level, where supporting objectives may be military or non-military in nature but must be achieved within means and capabilities. At this stage however, any strategic objectives articulated may be more general in nature.
plan (CONPLAN)/generic CONPLAN. If so, it may be that the NAC invoke the FTDM process. When the NAC decides that NATO should respond to the crisis, and that the FTDM process is required, it will issue political guidance and task SACEUR to urgently provide a strategic OPLAN and conduct specific enabling activities. SHAPE will then, as early as possible, develop a strategic OPLAN based on the CONPLAN/generic CONPLAN as applicable, including a ‘draft’ Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) with identified requirements and contributions.

c. **SACEUR’s Initial Guidance.** SACEUR’s initial guidance will direct the RDG. ACOS J5 will, through the COP, inform SACEUR of: essential elements of the NAC Decision Sheet and any MC direction and guidance, the nature of the problem, the time available and should be prepared to advise on the following:

1. Preparation and/or deployment of a SAT and the need to request requisite authorities through CRMs.
2. The recommended JHQ to be involved in the strategic assessment process, including the requirement to prepare and/or deploy an OLRT, as required.
3. Requirements for external coordination.
4. Timings for review of the draft SSA.
5. Issues to be clarified.

d. **Review NATO Political Guidance and Policy Statements.** Given that most crises develop over time, it is likely that the NAC has developed a view and may have issued policy statements regarding a NATO position. The RDG must quickly analyse NATO policies and declarations and other official statements by the NAC and the SECGEN, including the latest press releases, to review and understand NATO’s current position regarding the crisis and specific strategic issues.

e. **JHQ Selection.** A JHQ would be selected on the basis of geographic location of the crisis, NATO Response Force (NRF) responsibilities, current commitments or other relevant factors.

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24 See MC133/4 NATO’s Operations Planning or the NCRSM (2011) for further details on FTDM.
25 A ‘draft’ CJSOR is the result of the Force Generation Conference and reflects nations’ force offers and details the proposed force package for the operation.
26 The concept for deploying a SAT to the crisis area, when authorized by the NAC, to facilitate the completion of a strategic estimate for the crisis is nascent. A Civil-Military Assessment and Liaison Team (CMALT) has also been used in the past, with co-leads (one representing the political-military level and one representing the strategic military level). In the comprehensive environment, this may be the model for the future, vice a purely military team. Limited in size, a SAT will be tailored to the particular crisis and may include operational level representation; the deployment of OLRT would have to be coordinated with any deployed or deploying SAT. The deployment of a SAT may also require coordination with National Military Representatives. It would always require arrangements with sponsors in the area, including the host nation and/or a national embassy. The conduit from the RDG to the SAT would normally be through the CCOMC to ensure they retain full awareness.
27 In most cases, the JHQ chosen early in the OPP would likely be the HQ JFC with NRF responsibilities; however, there are many options for C2 of NATO operations at the operational level. It will not until MROs are developed and one selected by the NAC, with the initiation of planning and the promulgation of a NID, that it will be clear who is best positioned to command the operation. This commander would normally develop the CONOPS and OPLAN but may not have been the designated JHQ or involved directly in the planning to that point. Throughout planning, staff will have to be sensitive to this issue to mitigate early any possible issues to maximize planning efficiency and effectiveness.
Draft Warning Order. The RDG will draft a Strategic Warning Order to the selected JHQ and other appropriate ACO subordinate commands. It should cover issues such as key NAC and MC documents, a request for operational input during the planning process, provision of liaison elements to SHAPE, possible contribution to a SAT, preparation and/or deployment of an OLRT and proposals for CRM implementation. The Warning Order will include the timeline for any products to be provided to SACEUR. Standing up a JOPG will be under the direction of the nominated COM JHQ.

g. CRMs. CRMs cover a wide range of military capabilities and provide various measures for planning, preparing and activating national capabilities to meet NATO operational requirements.

(1) Guided by the NCRS SME, the functional SMEs of the RDG will review requirements for CRMs, based on the situation, and recommend selected measures for SACEUR approval, including, at an early stage, CRMs for the preparation and deployment of a SAT and/or an OLRT. In particular, the RDG should review CRMs including in the following subject areas:

A  Manpower
B  Intelligence
D  Force Protection
E  General Operations
I  Psychological Operations (PsyOps)
L  CBRN Defence
J  Electronic Warfare
K  Meteorology/Oceanography
M  Logistics
O  Forces Readiness
P  Communications and Information Systems

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28 JHQ is used as a general term for any Headquarters that can be assigned as the operational command for an operation, reporting directly to SACEUR (SHAPE), and would thus lead the planning effort at the operational level (e.g. in garrison – HQ JFC; AIRCOM; MARCOM; NFS JHQ; or deployed – a JTF HQ). The operational headquarters selected will have to be, or augmented to be, ‘sufficiently’ joint for the mission assigned.

29 Depending on the situation, SHAPE may have already alerted the designated JHQ to prepare its OLRT for deployment or may have received a request for this authorisation from the JHQ. Authorisation to prepare and deploy an OLRT is devolved to SACEUR by the NAC through CRMs and this authority may already have been provided, perhaps in a NAC Decision Sheet. If not, the requirement to prepare and (in the future) deploy an OLRT should be considered by the RDG with CRMs requested accordingly. Any guidance for tailoring the OLRT as well as its preparation and deployment should be developed by the RDG, especially the use of deployable CIS, arrangements for initial entry, coordination with host nation and public affairs/PsyOps.

30 The NCRSM lists CRM ‘subject areas’ – see NCSRM Chapter 3 Section 1 paragraph 11; these letters are not to be confused with the CONOPS/OPLAN letters as outlined in Annex C to COPD V2.0.
Q Critical infrastructure and Services
S Public Affairs

(2) SACEUR is authorized to declare a CRM once the declaration authority has been devolved. When the NAC decides to initiate Phase 2 of the NCMP, the NAC Decision Sheet authorises SACEUR to declare any of the pre-authorised CRMs identified in Annex A to Chapter 3 of the NATO Crisis Response System Manual (NCRSM), subject to any limitations imposed by the NAC, without further consultation with, or requests being sent to, NATO HQ. To declare other CRMs, SACEUR must request that the NAC devolve the declaration authority for each CRM. The NAC can also direct SACEUR to declare a certain CRM.

(3) The RDG functional SMEs will provide justification and rationale to support each recommendation they make for declaration of a CRM, or devolution of CRM declaration authority. The JHQ may also submit requests for CRM declaration, which would be validated by the appropriate RDG functional SME. Considerations for declaration of a CRM will be situation dependent, including whether a crisis is in its early or advanced stage. The justification would normally include the following type of information:

(a) The aim that the originator intends to achieve by the CRM declaration.

(b) The implications of declaring the CRM(s).

(c) The implications if the request or recommendation is not authorised.

(d) An estimate, if possible, of the lead-time needed to implement a declaration.

(e) Considerations for the desired area of applicability, like NATO territory, or parts thereof, or to the area of the crisis that is beyond NATO territory.

(f) Any other factors.

(4) Requests for devolution of declaration authority can be made to the NAC by SACEUR at any time. Depending on the situation, the RDG can prepare recommendations on CRMs with the submission of the SSA or separately as the situation dictates. The RDG needs to be proactive in recommending requests for the devolution of declaration authority to ensure that SACEUR has the requisite authorities, with additional NAC guidance as required, prior to the time they are needed.
(5) Once SACEUR has the appropriate declaration authority and decides to declare a certain CRM, a Declaration Message is issued; nations and JFCs, respond with an NCRS Implementation Report reflecting their implementation decisions. Once implemented, SHAPE functional SMEs are responsible for monitoring and assessing the effectiveness and results of the implementation of declared CRMs; they also are responsible to recommend the cancellation of the implementation of a CRM when it is no longer required.

(6) Throughout this process, the RDG NCRS SME provides advice on the use of CRMs, including for SACEUR, as required, through the RDG leadership. The RDG NCRS SME also assists the CCOMC with: forwarding requests to the NAC for devolution of CRM declaration authority; and the administration of CRM messages and the use of the NATO Crisis Response Tracking Application (NCRTA).

h. **Lessons Learned.** The RDG J7 SME should be tasked to begin to collate and analyse relevant lessons learned from previous operations in similar circumstances. Initial analysis will be factored into the analysis of strategic ends, ways and means, which is later in the SSA development process. Lessons learned are available through the use of the NATO Lessons Learned Portal (NLLP) and NATO Lessons Learned Database (NLLDB), which are managed by the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC). The SHAPE historical office and JALLC can be consulted and asked to assist with historical analysis.

3-11. Develop a Strategic Appreciation of the Crisis.

a. **Determine the Nature, Scale and Scope of the Problem.** The RDG reviews and updates the system perspective of the crisis developed in Phase 1. The aim is to identify the main conditions in the current situation that the NAC has deemed or might deem to be unacceptable and the principal actors and factors contributing to the problem and its resolution (including the main international actors and their role in the crisis). This analysis of the problem will continue to be refined, as necessary, as the strategic appreciation of the crisis matures; the description of the problem should eventually include any major threats or risks posed by the problem, such as the potential consequences of not taking action (e.g. ethnic violence, regional instability, interruption to lines of communication (LOC)/energy) or of taking action (e.g. potential for collateral damage to civilians, infrastructure and cultural sites). It should also include a description of the most urgent aspects of the crisis.

b. **Analyse the Strategic Environment.** The RDG reviews and updates the analysis of the strategic environment (PMESII, meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) and geospatial) developed during Phase 1, while identifying any critical gaps in information and knowledge. This analysis will be developed with an integrated gender
perspective\textsuperscript{33} and should consider Children and Armed Conflict\textsuperscript{34} (CAAC) issues. The aim is to identify: those key issues, factors and actors influencing the crisis; and its possible causes and possible resolution.

c. **Analyse Key Factors.** Throughout the strategic assessment process, the RDG identifies the key factors that define the problem and which must ultimately be addressed when resolving it. They analyse these factors making deductions about strategic implications and drawing conclusions relevant for further analysis and planning. This is a continuing process that provides the foundation for developing and maintaining a current strategic appreciation of the situation. The RDG will inevitably identify gaps in information, intelligence and knowledge that will generate collection/acquisition requests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Deduction</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A significant factual statement of information known to be true that has strategic implication.</td>
<td>The implications, issues or considerations derived from the fact(s) with strategic significance.</td>
<td>The outcome or result reached that requires action in planning or further analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the current state of affairs or trends?</td>
<td>So what is the significance of the factor?</td>
<td>So, what can or should be done?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Military capability</td>
<td>• Threat to neighbours</td>
<td>• Deterrence required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Poverty level</td>
<td>• Support for government</td>
<td>• Requires economic, civil actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Scale of ethnic violence</td>
<td>• Risk to stability</td>
<td>• Stability requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Support for extremists</td>
<td>• Accessibility of populations</td>
<td>• Elements of StratCom guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Access to media</td>
<td>• Violation of human rights</td>
<td>• Contribution to the protection of vulnerable groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Scale of sexual and gender based violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.4 - Factor-Deduction-Conclusion Table

3-12. **Analyse the Principal Actors and Their Role in the Crisis.**

a. Typically, there will be a variety of state and non-state actors, including potential adversaries (Red), partners (Blue) and others (Green), whose actions, in varying degrees have contributed to the conditions that characterise the crisis. These actors can be viewed as systems, comprised of different elements, which interact with other systems to create effects intended to support their goals. Their actions will also create effects that may have other consequences in the crisis.

b. Appreciating these actors’ goals, capabilities and motivation will be key to understanding how to influence them. It is important to challenge and validate all

\textsuperscript{33} As per Bi-SC Directive 40-1, ‘Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure’ (Dated 08 Aug 12), ‘integration of a gender perspective is a way of assessing gender-based differences of women and men reflected in their social roles and interactions, in the distribution of power and the access to resources’.

\textsuperscript{34} As per MCM-0016-2012, Children and Armed Conflict, dated 10 Jul 12.
analysis and assumptions, and to ensure that the expected actions/reactions and capabilities of all actors are realistic. The following RDG specialties should regularly ‘step back’ to look at RDG work from the perspective of others: potential adversaries (Red) - Intel, partners (Blue) - Military Partnership and CMI, and others (Green) - CMI.

c. Analyse the Capabilities and Behaviour of Each Actor. Based on the analysis of the strategic environment, including any analysis of the actors, the RDG must identify those actors who will have the greatest influence in the current crisis. The RDG must then understand the effects\textsuperscript{35} caused by the actions of each actor to gain insight into how best to influence them. Building on the existing knowledge of each actor, the RDG should:

(1) Review Essential Subsystems and/or Elements of Each Actor System. By leveraging the analysis of external entities, the RDG should be able to describe the network of interrelated systems and systems elements in the different PMESII domains that determine the capabilities and capacity of each main actor to act and to influence other systems and system elements in different domains. Actor systems may be comprised of:

(a) Individuals, including decision-makers, leaders, opinion leaders and opinion formers.

(b) Groups including political interest groups, social power and influence groups, as well as different ethnic, religious, tribal or clan groups usually linked to the above individuals.

(c) Organisations including governmental organisations, including the security forces, IOs, NGOs, Private Volunteer Organisations (PVOs), criminal organisations and transnational organisations as well as commercial enterprises and multinational corporations.

(d) Nation states.

(2) Appreciate the Goals and Objectives of Each Actor. The RDG reviews the statements and actions of each actor to appreciate what they seek to achieve as well as the conditions they may desire as an end state to the crisis.

(3) Appreciate the Main Characteristics of Each Actor. The RDG considers the motivation of each actor including the influences of history, culture, values, beliefs and prevailing attitudes of their members, and the personality traits, psychological profiles, motives and interests of key individuals. At this point it is also useful to begin to appreciate the receptivity, susceptibility and vulnerability of actors to different types of military influences, as well as their ability to adapt to changes in the strategic environment.

(4) Appreciate the Capabilities of Each Actor. The RDG reviews key system elements and influences to identify strengths and weaknesses of each

\textsuperscript{35} Effect - A change in the state of a system (or system element), that results from one or more actions, or other causes. (Proposed definition).
actor that influence their ability to achieve their goals and objectives. System
network diagrams help in determining positive and negative influences as well as
critical dependencies. This will point to actors’ Centres of Gravity (COGs) as well
as any deficiencies.

(5) **Appreciate the Main Actions**\(^{36}\) of Each Actor and their Potential
Effects. Actions are typically directed at some other actor, system or system
element to create specific effects with the intent that the cumulative effect will
establish conditions required to achieve the actor’s objective. However, actions
may create other undesired effects with different consequences. It is critical at this
point that the RDG appreciates the relationship between each actor’s capabilities,
actions, effects and objectives as a basis for gaining insight into their behaviour.

(6) **Appreciate Possible Response to NATO Involvement.** Based on their
understanding of the different actors, the RDG should appreciate the likely
response of each actor to a possible NATO response. This will provide an initial
indication of potential adversaries, partners and neutrals. It may also highlight
relationships that are conditional.

(7) **Identify and Address Knowledge Gaps.** The analysis of actors will
highlight gaps in knowledge. The RDG should capture any additional
requirements for information, intelligence and knowledge and issue
collection/acquisition and analysis tasks.

d. **Analyse Strategic COGs**\(^{37}\). The RDG must determine the COGs of friendly and
opposing actors and determine what vulnerabilities can be exploited in opposing actors
and what Alliance and friendly actors’ vulnerabilities must be protected. If required, the
RDG may find it necessary to determine the COG of certain neutral actors. Based on the
system (PMESII) analysis of potential adversaries, partners and others, the RDG will
examine the foundations of each actors/system that gives it strength and determine
possible strategic COGs.

e. A strategic COG will represent the primary strength\(^{38}\) for an actor to achieve its
strategic objective. Further analysis of possible strategic COGs draws upon the systems
analysis of the principal actors (opponent, partners, neutrals and alliance) to identify their
COGs and determine their critical capabilities (what gives each COG its strength), critical
requirements (what it needs to be effective) and critical vulnerabilities (how can it be
influenced). There is no set starting point. A COG may seem obvious for some actors;
however, working through capabilities, then requirements and vulnerabilities (each of
which may have a bearing on the other) may result in a different conclusion. Care must
be taken to ensure that the RDG focuses at the strategic level in their COG analysis.
Having completed the process the RDG must deduce what can be exploited and what
should be protected.

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\(^{36}\) Action - The process of doing something to achieve an aim (Collins Oxford English Dictionary, 11ed). In the sense of this paragraph, an
action can be considered the process of engaging any instrument at an appropriate level in the engagement space in order to create (a) specific
effect(s) in support of an objective.

\(^{37}\) Centre of gravity - Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its
freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. (AAP-06).

\(^{38}\) For example, the power of the regime, the will of the people, ethnic nationalism, an alliance etc.
### Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix

**Actor:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deduced Aim and Desired Outcome</th>
<th>What is the actor’s main goal and what conditions do they seek to establish by their actions?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centre of Gravity</strong></td>
<td>…is a principal source of strength of power for achieving one’s aim. What is the primary element of power upon which an actor depends to achieve their strategic objectives?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Critical Capabilities</strong></td>
<td>…is the primary ability (or abilities) that gives the COG its strength. What are the primary means that enables the COG to gain and maintain dominant influence over an opponent or situation, such as to threaten or coerce an opponent, or to control a population, wealth distribution, or a political system?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Critical Vulnerabilities</strong></td>
<td>…exists when a critical requirement is deficient, degraded or missing and exposes a critical capability to damage or loss. What are the weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationship and influences through which the COG may be influenced or neutralised?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Critical Requirements</strong></td>
<td>…are specific conditions, components or resources that are essential to sustaining those capabilities. What are those key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationship and influences required to generate and sustain the COG’s critical capabilities, such as specific assets, physical resources, and relationships with other actors?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Conclusion**

Which weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities and influences could be exploited in an opponent and protected in a friend to change the capabilities, relationship and behaviour that would lead to improved conditions in the engagement space?

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**3-13. Appreciate International Interests and Engagement in the Crisis.**

a. **Determine International Legal Aspects.** Throughout the process the legal aspects of the crisis based on international law, treaties and agreements, as well as relevant UN resolutions, will be reviewed for understanding and applicability.

b. **Appreciate International Interests and Objectives.** The RDG will analyse policy statements made by international community actors regarding the crisis to determine their specific interests and the level of consensus. As a minimum this review should consider statements by the UN, IOs such as the G8 and EU, as well as other regional...
organisations. Direct coordination and liaison with any of these organisations should be considered in accordance with NAC guidance, and coordinated as applicable through HQ NATO.

c. **Appreciate International Commitments.** The RDG will identify the main non-NATO entities in the crisis area, including those engaged in humanitarian aid, human rights, protection of minorities, refugees and displaced persons, legal assistance, medical care, women’s rights and empowerment, reconstruction, agriculture, education and general project funding. It is critical that the RDG understands the mandate, role, structure, methods and principles of these organisations as a basis for determining possible areas for interaction and/or cooperation. Therefore, the RDG should review interaction of the main organisations to include:

1. The lead agencies coordinating efforts in different sectors (e.g., governance, development, security, humanitarian).
2. The nature, level and scope of commitments.
3. Goals and objectives, as well as major obstacles to achieving them.
5. Potential roles for NATO to enable international efforts, gain synergies and limit interferences, including security and theatre logistic (including medical) support as well as Public Information/Affairs aspects.
6. Possible areas for cooperation and interaction.
7. Priorities for coordination and liaison.
8. Required degree of interaction with each significant non-NATO actor.

d. **Appreciate the Information Environment.** The SSA will include an analysis of the information environment from the strategic perspective, which will serve as a basis for developing and evaluating possible activities and effects in the strategic information environment. This analysis includes consideration of potential audiences, main actors in the information environment and their networks, aspects of opinion building including key leaders, perception management and information flow, specific information systems and media. Additionally, it will provide the status of own and adversary information activities in coordination with J2.

1. **Audiences.** Potential audiences will be identified in broad terms. Audiences can be divided into three main categories, which can be interrelated and overlapping in some instances:

   (a) **Alliance Audiences.** Alliance internal and domestic audiences, as well as troop contributing partner nations, may be addressed by appropriate Alliance information activities.

   (b) **International Community Audiences** include other countries and individual actors, in particular from neighbouring countries, local influential
countries and non-NATO entities involved in the region, with whom the Alliance’s messages should be coordinated. The selection of international audiences will have to be approved based on a sound analysis of their roles and stance related to the situation and mission (e.g. ‘favourable’, ‘neutral’, ‘opponent’ or ‘sources of instability’).

(c) **Local Audiences** cover the wider population of the host country, local media, formal and informal authorities, including the local government(s), affiliated opinion leaders and opinion formers, and other actors at the local level. As above, the identification of local audiences needs to be based on a sound analysis of their roles and stance related to the situation.

(2) **StratCom Considerations.** This appreciation may highlight considerations to be factored by NATO HQ into the future development of mission-specific StratCom objectives and guidance. These considerations will be included in the SSA.

e. **Appreciate the Media and Public Affairs Environment.** Media attitudes and perceptions may reflect, or influence, public opinion and ultimately can influence political will in support of an operation. PA, InfoOps, and PsyOps (facilitated by StratCom) should collaborate in developing an understanding of the level of media interest amongst different audiences as well as any prevailing or underlying attitudes or influences that affect such audiences. Working within the StatCom guidance and objectives issued by NATO HQ, this appreciation will underpin future PA plans and activities to engage with selected audiences via the media in order to gain and retain strategic initiative. It includes a requirement to:

(1) **Appreciate Media Infrastructure and Assets for Production.** This appreciation examines the availability, affiliation and reach of assets as well as the stance and credibility of content. Understanding the various media outlets is essential to inform any analysis of their potential impact and to assist the efficient dissemination of information.

(2) **Appreciate Prevailing Attitudes and Issues in the Region.** The analysis of media content helps to understand prevailing attitudes and key issues, which provides further insight into the different aspects of the crisis as well as potential support and opposition to a possible NATO response. This appreciation provides the basis for determining requirements for InfoOps and, separately, PA, as well as the best use of resources to deliver relevant information to selected populations.

f. **Appreciate International Common Aims, Objectives and Desired End State Conditions.** Based on their appreciation of the international situation regarding the crisis, including its legal aspects, and drawing on engagement with the international community, the RDG can then provide a summary of the most likely common aims and objectives of the international community at large as well as essential conditions that must be established. They should highlight any significant areas of disagreement.
3-14. **Appreciate Security Implications for NATO, Including Potential Strategic Risks and Threats.**

a. **Determine Security Implications for NATO.** The RDG determines the possible implications that the situation will have on NATO’s security interests, including potential strategic risks and threats.

b. **SHAPE Threat Assessment.** Those strategic issues that pose a potential risk or threat to NATO’s security interests are further developed by SHAPE J2 into a SHAPE Threat Assessment, which is based on a fused intelligence picture that addresses the combination of threat capability and intent. The Threat Assessment provides a general narrative, a specific threat statement and an assessed threat level.

3-15. **Appreciate Potential Strategic Ends, Ways and Means**

a. At this point the RDG should appreciate potential strategic ends, ways and means, as follows:

1. **Ends** - What are the essential conditions that need to be established to secure NATO’s interests?
2. **Ways** - How can military, political, economic and civil instruments be used to create coherent effects that will establish the essential conditions?
3. **Means** - What military, political, economic, and civil instruments of power are available to NATO and cooperating partners to create desired effects?

During this analysis the RDG should consider:

1. Possible different levels of NATO’s ambition in contributing to the international effort to establish the essential conditions, in terms of urgency and burden sharing with other international and regional organisations.
2. The use of direct or indirect engagement in support of IOs to establish essential conditions.
3. Different risks to be accepted in terms of achieving NATO strategic objectives.
4. Preventive options, a component of the NCRS which are, by design, broad in nature. They are the starting point for defining an appropriate initial Alliance response to the crisis, when these options by themselves are not enough to solve the crisis at its very early stages. A coherent approach to crisis

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39 While this work will not be articulated directly in the SSA, it is a necessary intellectual step leading to the development of Military considerations, which concludes the SSA.

40 Instruments of power as described in Chapter 1. Examples of how the instruments of power can be used are also shown on page 3-33.

41 Details on NCRS Preventive Options can be found in the NCRSM Chapter 2, arranged in ascending order of gravity.

42 When appropriate, and depending on the circumstances of an emerging crisis, the use of the components of the NCRS may be guided by the applicable illustrative crisis situations described in the Chapter 7 of the NCRSM. These illustrative crisis situations cover a wide spectrum of hypothetical Article 5 and non-Article 5 crises. In all cases the suggested use of the NCRS is indicative only.
management will require NATO to consider appropriate responses from a range of
diplomatic, economic and military Preventive Options in the light of the prevailing
circumstances, while exercising close political control at all stages.

b. Appreciate Potential Strategic Ends - the Desired NATO End State, NATO
Strategic Objectives and Strategic Effects.

The desired NATO end state and the corresponding strategic objectives will establish the
ends for potential response options; the achievement of these ends would use the
different means and ways available to the Alliance in cooperation with other national and
international actors within a comprehensive approach to create the necessary strategic
effects.

(1) Review Appreciation of the NATO Political Context. The RDG should
review their appreciation of the political context of the situation, including any
NATO statements or policy documents that provide an understanding of NATO’s
position on the crisis or its impact on NATO’s strategic interests. The political
context is often directly linked to the provisions of an international mandate or
agreement providing legal authority for resolving the crisis. The NAC Decision
Sheet requesting SMA should summarize this context and may provide additional
direction and guidance on NATO’s strategic interests, or the possible NATO role,
from which to understand or develop the desired NATO end state and strategic
objectives.

(2) Political Limitations. The RDG reviews any limitations (restraints or
constraints). These will factor into the analysis of NATO end state and strategic
objectives.

(3) Develop Necessary Assumptions. There will be some gaps in
information and knowledge at the time of the analysis of the situation or planning,
for example how the main actors will react to the involvement of NATO. In these
cases the RDG may find it necessary to make certain assumptions as a basis for
further analysis or planning. To be valid, an assumption must be logical, realistic,
and necessary for the planning to continue. The RDG must never assume away
problems for which planning should cater such as dealing with adversary
capabilities or assuming unrealistic friendly capabilities and successes.
Assumptions should be rigorously reviewed and kept to a minimum. While an
assumption allows planning to continue, it is also a weakness in the structure of
the plan. The RDG will control assumptions and ensure that they are regularly
reviewed. If assumptions are changed, added or deleted, the RDG will have to
determine if this change has a consequence in terms of the planning or analysis
done to that point.

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43 End state - The NAC statement of conditions that defines an acceptable concluding situation for NATO’s involvement. (Proposed definition).
44 Restraint - A requirement placed on a commander that prohibits an action.
45 Constraint - A requirement placed on a commander that dictates an action.
46 Assumption - In planning, a supposition made about the current situation and/or the future course of events to complete an estimate of the situation and decide on the course of action. (AAP-06).
(4) **The Desired NATO End State and Strategic Objectives**\(^4\).

(a) **Appreciate Possible Essential Strategic End State Conditions.** With consideration to conditions which are considered necessary to be established to end the crisis or conflict on acceptable terms, the RDG must appreciate which essential strategic end state conditions need to be established to secure NATO’s interests. The NAC request for a SSA may already include a possible desired NATO end. If so, compare the RDG list of essential strategic end state conditions (developed in paragraph 3-15 a. above) against the NAC-provided desired NATO end state.

(b) **Desired NATO End State and Strategic Objectives.** The RDG considers any NAC-provided desired NATO end state and strategic objectives in the context of its analysis of the main actor systems and influencing factors, which define the problem and describe the strategic conditions required to establish an acceptable solution to NATO’s interests. If necessary, the RDG will propose alternative wording for the desired NATO end state and strategic objectives. In addition, if a possible NAC desired NATO end state and strategic objectives are not provided, the RDG will propose a possible desired NATO end \(^4\) and strategic objectives based on the analysis of the system and problem definition.

(5) **Determine Desired NATO Strategic Effects.** Establishing the conditions described by the proposed NATO end state and strategic objectives will require changes in actor systems, including their interaction and influence on the environment. Through system analysis, the RDG will determine the required changes in the system(s) to achieve the NATO strategic objectives. The desired changes in the conditions of these system elements are reflected in desired NATO strategic effects. These effects can be created through the application of the instruments of power available to the Alliance.

c. **Appreciate Potential Strategic Ways - Determine Potential Use of Instruments of Power.** The RDG will primarily develop military lines of engagement\(^4\); however, it will recognise logically that some NATO strategic objectives can be achieved and desired effects can be created using military, political, economic or civil means, or some combination of these. In addition, in modern conflict or crisis, the military instrument is often not decisive; therefore, there is a need to consider how to coordinate and synchronise the application of different sources of power toward a common purpose, leading through desired strategic effects to a strategic objective(s) and the NATO end state.

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\(^4\) MC133/4 – NATO Operations Planning outlines military, non-military and supporting objectives at the NATO strategic level, where supporting objectives may be military or non-military in nature but must be achieved within means and capabilities. At this stage however, any strategic objectives articulated may be more general in nature.

\(^4\) An alternate to proposing an alternate possible desired NATO end state could be the articulation of some of the end state conditions that must exist for NATO’s interests to be considered secured.

\(^4\) Strategic line of engagement - A logical line that connects military, political, economic and/or civil actions in time and purpose through strategic effects to strategic objective(s) and the end state. (Proposed definition).
(1) Based on their appreciation of the strategic ends, the RDG should identify possible applications of available sources of power.

(2) The RDG may use the following matrix at Figure 3.6 to assist in their analysis of how the different instruments of power may be used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application of Instruments of Power - Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Limited</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Readiness</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dialogue High Level Visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA Interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.6 - Application of Instruments of Power - Examples

(3) When considering possibilities for leveraging different instruments of power to create strategic effects, the RDG should consider:

(a) Countering critical capabilities of potential adversaries by exploiting critical vulnerabilities in the critical requirements of opposing COGs, as well as critical system elements and influences.

(b) Enhancing critical capabilities of potential friends by covering critical vulnerabilities in friendly COGs, as well as critical system elements and influences.

(c) The implications that may result from the use of force to establish essential conditions or create strategic effects.
(d) If actors, other than NATO, could be used to establish essential conditions or create strategic effects (e.g. when considering the use of the military instrument).

(e) Different risks to be accepted in terms of achieving NATO strategic objectives.

(f) Any relevant lessons learned from previous military operations.

d. Appreciate Potential Strategic Means Available to the Alliance. The RDG, with input from the NATO CMPS Section, operational commands, and any cooperating external organisations, should develop a coherent appreciation of the different instruments of power available to the Alliance, as well as other possibly cooperating non-NATO entities, which might be able to create strategic effects required to achieve one or more strategic objectives. As a minimum, this should include appreciations of:

1. Political (diplomatic), civil and economic efforts.

2. Readiness and availability of deployable forces, including the NRF and other Graduated Readiness Forces (GRF) as well as deployable communications and information systems (DCIS), and the potential impact to other on-going NATO operations.

3. Partner forces operational capabilities.

4. Availability of strategic lift and transportation assets.

5. Support by potential host nations (HNs) in the crisis area.

6. Availability of UN/IO logistics resources in the area.

3-16. Develop Military Considerations.

a. The SSA concludes with an articulation of military considerations deduced during the RDG’s analysis of the situation. If the NAC decides that the Alliance could become involved in the crisis, the SSA and its military considerations should assist the NAC in providing the necessary direction (through a NAC Decision Sheet requesting options) for SACEUR to develop MROs. The military considerations for each situation will vary and may include some of the following: applicability of the military instrument; use of the NATO military instrument; and non-NATO interaction requirements.

b. Applicability of the Military Instrument. The general applicability of the military instrument to the resolution of the situation can be presented, including any implications that may result from the use of force. This may describe if the military instrument would be decisive, instrumental in establishing the security conditions necessary for other instruments/actors to be decisive, or just supporting.

c. Use of NATO Military Instrument. The RDG should consider their appreciation of: the implications for NATO’s security interests, including potential strategic risks and threats; strategic ends, ways and means; the applicability of the military instrument to the situation, and other actors available to assist within the security environment. The SSA
should outline considerations on the application of the NATO military instrument of power to assist in resolution of the situation, including: necessity, suitability, availability and existing constraints. With care to remain at the strategic level, it may further describe how the military instrument may be used to achieve strategic objectives and effects. Further considerations that could be discussed are:

(1) The NRF (suitability, availability, implications of its use for this purpose).

(2) FTDM. The SSA should outline if the use of FTDM procedure is warranted, when a relevant, current CONPLAN is available.

(3) Possible Impact on Other NATO Operations. The SSA should outline if this situation has implications for other on-going NATO operations (e.g. geographical proximity, involves actors involved with NATO in another on-going operation, or possible competition for limited resources).

(4) Proposed Military Strategic Objectives (MSOs). The RDG should consider their appreciation of: the implications for NATO's security interests, including potential strategic risks and threats; strategic ends, ways and means; the applicability of the military instrument to the situation, and other actors available to assist within the security environment. To this point, the desired NATO end state (or end state conditions), strategic objectives and strategic effects have been developed with consideration to the use of any of the instruments of power; they are thus not tailored for any one specific instrument of power (e.g. military). If deemed useful to highlight how the NATO military instrument may be used to assist in the resolution of the situation, the RDG may propose MSOs that describe the strategic aims to be achieved with military power; these may assist the NAC to provide guidance and direction for MRO development, if they direct their development. It is critical that the RDG recognises that the development of MSOs is an iterative process, and any objectives developed at this stage are likely to change or be refined later.

(5) Relevant Lessons from Previous NATO Operations. The development of military considerations should consider any relevant lessons from similar NATO operations.

(6) Recommendations on additional CRMs, including the need to deploy the OLRT, and Alert States.

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50 An objective is, 'a clearly defined and attainable goal to be achieved'. (Proposed Definition).

51 In analysing or developing MSOs, the RDG should consider what they can do in response to a crisis, such as: separate warring parties; enforce compliance with truce/peace agreements and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of illegally armed groups; train, mentor and assist local security forces; contribute to stability and reconstruction, assist in disaster relief and development assistance; and to contain, deter, influence coerce or destroy potential adversaries.

52 Chapter 6 of the NCRSM defines NATO Alert States and provides guidance for their declaration and the declaration of related CRMs.
d. **Non-NATO Interaction Requirements.** The RDG may develop an initial list of significant non-NATO actors with whom SHAPE and the designated JHQ will be required to interact at the early stages of planning. The SSA would request authorities for this interaction, if not previously authorized, or a confirmation of the modalities for this interaction for this purpose.

3-17. **Coordinate and Submit SSA.**

a. **Coordinate Key Issues with NATO HQ.** In accordance with COP guidance, RDG SMEs should identify and coordinate as required any key issues with their counterparts in NATO HQ. Particular attention should be paid to:

   (1) International legal issues.
   
   (2) Requirements for StratCom objectives and guidance.
   
   (3) Requirements for additional interaction at the strategic level with significant non-NATO actors.
   
   (4) Issues requiring further political guidance.

b. **Seek SACEUR’s Approval and Further Guidance.** ACOS J5 in coordination with DCCOMC will oversee the final preparation and staffing of the SSA, for approval by SACEUR. This includes any required internal coordination, the completion of the draft SSA, the provision of any required briefings (e.g. to the COP), and gaining SACEUR’s approval of the key appreciations, military considerations, and any key issues for further coordination.

c. **Submit SSA.** SACEUR will submit the SSA to the MC, with a copy to the National Military Representatives (NMRs) at SHAPE. The MC will in turn include the SSA with their SMA for further NAC considerations. There may be circumstances when, due to the urgency of the crisis, the NAC may task SACEUR to include possible MROs with the initial strategic assessment. SACEUR would then submit, in one document, the SSA and MROs.
PHASE 3 - MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS DEVELOPMENT

Section 1 - General

3-18. Introduction.

a. **Purpose.** The purpose of NCMP Phase 3 – Response Options Development is to finalize the desired NATO end state and further develop the strategic, political and military response strategy for the Alliance to deal with the crisis at hand. At the Strategic Military level, Phase 3 articulates military options for NAC consideration in support of their PME process.

b. **Overview.**

   (1) Phase 3 begins with a tasking for SACEUR to develop MROs after the NAC formally decides to move into Phase 3 of the NCMP. The RDG will then be tasked to identify possible MROs, selecting several for development; they develop the strategic framework for each MRO and consider requirements needed to support it. Next, they analyse, evaluate and compare the MROs, including identifying strategic risks, and develop recommendations. Following coordination with COM JHQ, they present the MROs to SACEUR for consideration.

   (2) Given the complex interdependent nature of modern conflicts, MROs must be developed with an in-depth understanding of the comprehensive nature of the crisis, keeping in mind that actions in the military domain will also have direct or indirect effects in the non-military domains, and vice versa. As such, this phase should be preceded by the completion of a SSA, to commence this phase with an understanding of the crisis and the military considerations related to how the military instrument may be used to assist its resolution. If a formal SSA has not been conducted, the RDG should conduct the intellectual thinking outlined in the previous phase as a basis for the development of MROs.

   (3) Phase 3 ends with SACEUR approving and then submitting the MROs to the NAC (through MC).

c. **Prerequisites.** Phase 3 will normally begin with the NAC tasking SACEUR to develop MROs. However, it is important to note that the NAC may also request the development of MROs when requesting the SSA, if time constraints dictate.

d. **Main Activities.** The main activities of Phase 3 are depicted in Figure 3.7.

e. **Desired outcome of this phase.** The desired outcome of Phase 3 is a series of suitable, feasible, acceptable and distinguishable MROs for achieving MSOs that will contribute to the establishment of the desired NATO end state conditions, within the context of a comprehensive approach. These MROs should inform the MC and the NAC on possible uses of the NATO military instrument to assist with crisis resolution; from these military options and other advice, if the NAC decides to move into NCMP Phase 4 - Planning, they should have sufficient detail from which to develop a NID.
f. **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.**

(1) **CCOMC.** The CCOMC will continue to monitor the crisis situation and provide information and intelligence to the RDG. If not yet deployed, a SAT may be authorized to deploy during Phase 3; its deployment would have to be coordinated with the deployment of any OLRT. The CCOMC would establish SAT reporting mechanisms and ensure coordinated interaction, especially with the RDG.

(2) **RDG.** The RDG develops the MROs under an ACOS J5 lead, supported by the CCOMC and SHAPE directorates and Special Staff, as required and approved.
g. **External Coordination.** Subject to COP direction, SHAPE’s requirements for external coordination should be re-evaluated for Phase 3, including:

1. **JHQ (JOPG).** The designated headquarters’ JOPG and the JHQ liaison element at SHAPE will assist the RDG in the development of viable MROs, including the identification of capabilities needed for each MRO and through provision of formal advice on the draft MROs. If the OLRT is deployed, the RDG may receive their reports and have the possibility of interaction with them through the JOPG.

2. **NATO HQ.** Continued SHAPE liaison and coordination with NATO HQ bodies, at an appropriate level, will facilitate Phase 3 activities (e.g. NATO HQ (IS/IMS), CMTF, OPC, etc). The NATO HQ (IS/IMS) liaison element could be requested to remain to support the RDG during Phase 3.

3. **Relevant NATO Agencies.** If not already in place, a liaison officer from NCIA and NSPA should be provided to the RDG.

4. **Other Relevant International Actors.** Contact is required with appropriate organizations as authorised to ensure the ongoing and planned actions of others are considered in the development of MROs and to explore areas for mutual cooperation. Normally, especially in the context of pre-operations consultations, this interaction is conducted through either the CMTF or PASP (e.g. UN, the EU, the African Union, and relevant international, governmental and NGOs), with SHAPE participation.

5. **Potential Host Nations** as authorised and required to facilitate and support the appreciation of options.

6. **The Joint Electronic Warfare Core Staff (JEWCS).** If requested, JEWCS can provide Electronic Warfare input to an RDG for the development of MROs.

**Section 2 - Process**

3-19. **General.**

a. Based on the guidance received from the NAC, MC, SACEUR and/or the COP, the RDG should develop Military Response Options (MROs), each outlining a military mission, MSOs, military strategic effects (MSEs), military strategic actions (MSAs) and capability requirements, as well as possible complementary non-military actions (CNMAs). MROs should be clearly distinguishable from one another; they must be unambiguous and sufficiently detailed to provide decision makers with clear and realistic options in response to a crisis. They need to be developed with consideration to a comprehensive approach by the wider international community for resolution of the crisis, keeping in mind that actions in the military domain will also have direct or indirect effects in the non-military domains, and vice versa. After MROs have been selected and developed, they will be analysed, evaluated and compared in order to assist SACEUR to select a preferred MRO to recommend to the NAC.
3-20. Review Political Guidance and Direction.
   a. The RDG initiates the development of the MROs by reviewing the guidance and direction from the NAC, MC, SACEUR and/or the COP regarding the overall NATO political aim, possible impact to NATO’s interests, possible NATO role(s), desired end state\textsuperscript{53}, strategic objectives including military\textsuperscript{54} and non-military strategic objectives, limitations\textsuperscript{55} and assumptions.

   b. **Analyse Desired NATO End State and Strategic and, if promulgated, Military and Non-Military Strategic Objectives.** If provided, the RDG analyses the desired NATO end state, to determine what end state conditions are to be established. They then analyse any provided strategic objectives. If these objectives have not yet been articulated as military and non-military strategic objectives, the RDG analyses the possible strategic aims to be achieved with military power, which will form the basis for the MSOs.

3-21. Appreciate Lessons Learned from Similar Previous Operations.
   a. The RDG should make every effort to consider lessons learned from previous operations during the development of MROs. The RDG J7 SME, tasked during the development of the SSA, can update the RDG on relevant lessons.

3-22. Select and Develop MROs.
   a. **Select MROs for Development.** With consideration to their analysis of the political guidance, and with a view to their work for the SSA, including military considerations and possible strategic ends, ways and means, the RDG will identify possible MROs. Normally, MROs would be designed to achieve strategic military ends to support one desired NATO end state; however, depending on the situation and guidance received, MROs leading to different NATO end states may be developed. MROs should consider a comprehensive approach by the wider international community to the resolution of the crisis; they should not duplicate effort of other actors and should consider: any stated NATO non-military objectives, potential NATO role (including lead, support or participation), and the need to complement other on-going activities. MROs may be a series of independent, non-related options, from which one or more could be chosen by the NAC, or they may be a series\textsuperscript{56} of related options which are graduated to...

\textsuperscript{53} The illustrative NID format in MC133/4 indicates that an overall NATO mission statement (vice a military mission statement) may be included as can ‘supporting objectives’ (which are to be achieved within means and capabilities). If either of these are provided at this point, they should be analysed as part of the political guidance received for the development of MROs.

\textsuperscript{54} MC133/4 – NATO Operations Planning outlines military, non-military and supporting objectives at the NATO strategic level, where supporting objectives may be military or non-military in nature but must be achieved within means and capabilities. At this stage however, any strategic objectives articulated may be more general in nature.

\textsuperscript{55} These limitations may include a ‘task’ to support certain non-NATO organizations during the possible operation.

\textsuperscript{56} One possible intellectual approach to developing MROs is a series of related MROs that describe: “what NATO MUST do”, “what NATO SHOULD do” and “what NATO COULD do”. In this approach, each MRO builds on the previous, therefore reflecting greater levels of ambition; however, they are normally based on a single NATO end state. These may be understood as follows:

1. The **“MUST”** Option: This is the minimum military activity recommended for NATO to do to assist with the resolution of the crisis, because no other actor or instrument of power alone can create the required effects needed to achieve the NATO end state.

2. The **“SHOULD”** option: In addition to the minimum that is recommended for NATO to do militarily, this option is supplemented by what may possibly be done by other actors, but should really be done by NATO (for example for reasons of coordination or capabilities).
reflect NATO’s possible levels of ambition with respect to its participation in an emerging crisis. Initially, the RDG should attempt to identify as many potential MROs as possible. From those MROs identified, the RDG should then select the most viable MROs for further development. While the number of options to be developed is not limited, three unambiguous and sufficiently detailed options is a good starting point to provide the NAC with clear and realistic options in response to a crisis.

b. **Organize RDG for MRO Development.** Once the MROs for development have been selected, the RDG leadership (Head Planner/Deputy Head Planner) normally identifies a small sub-syndicate\(^{57}\) for each selected MRO. A sub-syndicate lead is chosen based either on strategic planning expertise or subject matter expertise related to the aim of the MRO (e.g. air operations SME for an air centric MRO). Some RDG SMEs (e.g. LEGAD) may have to support the development of multiple MROs.

c. **Develop MRO Strategic Framework.** The RDG develops the strategic framework of each MRO. The MRO strategic framework is a tool for the RDG to provide clarity on what each MRO describes; it helps to focus thinking and the development of detail needed to develop a full MRO. It includes the MRO mission (including MSOs), MSEs, MSAs and CNMAs\(^{58}\).

\(^{57}\) If the ‘must/should/could’ construct is chosen for the approach for developing MROs, the strategic framework for all MROs may be developed by a small core, and then as each is developed it is passed to the applicable sub-syndicate for development of details and refinement.

\(^{58}\) As planning progresses the elements of the MRO will be captured in the documents developed or refined into other elements of those documents (e.g. CNMAs, may appear in a CONOPS or OPLAN as non-military objectives (promulgated in the NID by NAC; not assigned to SACEUR), assumptions or preconditions for success, etc. The MRO strategic framework will not appear as such in a strategic CONOPS or OPLAN.

\(^{3}\) The “COULD” option: Reflects the aggregate of the MUST and SHOULD options, plus other activities or contributions which ought to be done by other actors, but which could also eventually be done by NATO because of political or other considerations.

(1) **Analyse the Strategic Military Mission (SACEUR’s Mission)**\(^{59}\). Each RDG sub-syndicate discusses the MRO to gain a common appreciation of its aim and purpose. They develop an initial description of the MRO mission; at this stage, this may be a descriptive paragraph that will be used to guide development of the MRO strategic framework. Following the development of the MRO strategic framework, each RDG sub-syndicate will refine the MRO description into a strategic military mission statement (which includes the MSOs). In most cases, each MRO will have a separate mission statement; however, it is possible that multiple MROs may have the same mission statement, with only the manner in which the objectives will be achieved to differentiate the MROs (e.g. two MROs with the same MSOs, one being conducted with ‘boots on the ground’ and one through a combination of air and/or naval actions, in cooperation with other organizations on the ground).

(2) **Analyse and, if required, Determine Military Strategic Objectives.** MSOs to describe the strategic aims to be achieved by NATO military power may be provided by the NAC; however at this stage it is still possible to develop and consider alternatives. The RDG analyses the MSOs provided by the NAC or

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3. The “COULD” option: Reflects the aggregate of the MUST and SHOULD options, plus other activities or contributions which ought to be done by other actors, but which could also eventually be done by NATO because of political or other considerations.

While the MUST, SHOULD, COULD construct may be useful during the development of MROs, they should be given a distinct name; they should not be referred to as MUST, SHOULD, COULD in the submission to the NAC.

57 If the ‘must/should/could’ construct is chosen for the approach for developing MROs, the strategic framework for all MROs may be developed by a small core, and then as each is developed it is passed to the applicable sub-syndicate for development of details and refinement.

58 As planning progresses the elements of the MRO will be captured in the documents developed or refined into other elements of those documents (e.g. CNMAs, may appear in a CONOPS or OPLAN as non-military objectives (promulgated in the NID by NAC; not assigned to SACEUR), assumptions or preconditions for success, etc. The MRO strategic framework will not appear as such in a strategic CONOPS or OPLAN.

59 A mission is described in a clear, concise statement detailing who will conduct the operation, what is to be achieved, when it will take place, where it will occur, and why it is being conducted.
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develops MSOs, with reference to the NAC guidance received (including the NATO end state or end state conditions), any current systems analysis of the crisis and also the previous analysis from Phase 2, including the essential conditions deemed necessary to secure NATO’s interests and any previous draft MSOs. In analysing or developing MSOs, the RDG should consider what they can do in response to a crisis, such as: separate warring parties; enforce compliance with truce/peace agreements and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of illegally armed groups; train, mentor and assist local security forces; contribute to stability and reconstruction, assist in disaster relief and development assistance; and/or to contain, deter, influence coerce or destroy potential adversaries.

(3) **Determine the Military Strategic Effects.** The RDG then analyses the desired NATO end state (or end state conditions), the MSOs, the strategic environment and the ‘problem’ to determine precisely the MSE that must be created using principally military means to achieve each MSO. This may include MSEs in support of a NATO non-military objective or other essential support to envisioned Non-NATO military or non-military efforts. By closely examining the critical capabilities and critical vulnerabilities identified during the analysis of the COG, as well as the identified critical system elements and critical influences, the RDG should be able to clearly state the strategic changes in the capabilities of actors and systems that could be achieved using military means for each MRO.

(4) **Determine Military Strategic Actions.** Next the RDG states the MSAs\(^6\) that would likely create the desired strategic effect given the analysis and understanding of the actor/system. The RDG must provide arguments to conclude that a certain military action directed at a specific actor/system or system element would have the potential to create the desired effect in terms of changes in its actions, capabilities or condition. Analogous to the relationship of operational actions to operational objectives and effects, MSAs are an intellectual tool to assist the RDG to develop and communicate sufficient detail of an MRO for it to be clearly appreciated by the NAC/MC and the operational level. MSAs may be ‘activities’ to be done by strategic forces or assigned to one or more operational commanders. They assist further in the identification of force capability requirements. Following SACEUR’s submission of the MROs and subsequent approval by the NAC of a selected response option, and its military contribution, MSAs assist the RDG to develop the provisional missions, including objectives, for the operational commander(s) (e.g. COM JHQ), which will be included in the Strategic Planning Directive\(^6\) (SPD).

(5) **Determine Required Complementary non-Military Actions.** In many cases the desired MSE cannot be created by military action alone or could be created more effectively by a combination of complementary military, political, economic and civil actions. The RDG needs to recognize the ideal mix of non-

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\(^6\) Action - The process of doing something to achieve an aim (Collins Oxford English Dictionary, 11ed). In the sense of this paragraph, an action can be considered the process of engaging any instrument at an appropriate level in the engagement space in order to create (a) specific effect(s) in support of an objective.

\(^6\) At the issue of the SPD the MSAs cease to have utility; they are not to be construed to have the intent of constraining COM JHQ in the conduct of the operational estimate, including the development and selection of an operational level course of action.
military actions needed to support creation of the effect as well as those actions that would contribute to the overall synergistic effect of military action.

d. **Determine Force Capability Requirements.** With the input of liaison elements from the designated operational commands, the RDG estimates, in broad order, the primary military capabilities that would be required to perform the mission, create the desired effects and achieve the desired objectives. These capabilities should, if possible, describe these requirements in terms of the Bi-SC agreed capability codes used by NATO and nations in defence planning to facilitate force generation (FG) by nations. The RDG should also identify any enabling capabilities that may be required to pre-deploy, using the RDG Force Generation Branch (FOG) SME to advise of desired military capability areas which may be challenging to force generate.

e. **Determine the Main Support Requirements.** The RDG RES SME will coordinate and provide advice on the main implications of the logistics, engineering and medical support requirements for each option to verify feasibility and to facilitate a rough financial estimate. Support input will include appreciations of:

1. Force deployment, including Strategic lift requirements and costs for NATO.
2. Theatre logistics requirements for establishing and operating staging bases, air and sea ports of debarkation (APOD/SPOD), storage and distribution of all classes of supply, maintaining LOC, and developing infrastructure.
3. Logistic Support to non-NATO entities.
4. Military Engineering (MILENG) support.
5. Medical support.
6. Host nation support (HNS).
7. Contracting/Multinational solutions.

Budget estimates will be based on a rough order of magnitude appreciation of the financial implications based on experiences from other missions and database/models to identify, as is possible, both military budget (MB) and NATO Security Investment

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62 The NCRSM states that MROs would contain an ‘estimation of the volume and nature of forces, and resources needed’ for each MRO. MROs will identify the capabilities required, and, if possible, some qualification can be given with respect to size can be given (e.g. for land forces - Division or Corps+). While this may be a way to illustrate possible force size and thus differential between MROs, reasonably accurate figures will not be available until COM JHQ conducts an operational estimate for a specific mission (after receipt of the SPD), and conducts a troops-to-actions analysis.

63 For details see Bi-SC Agreed Capability Codes and Capability Statements, dated 14 October 2011 (SHAPE/CPPCAMFCR/JM/281143 and 5000 TSC FRX 0030/TT-7673/Ser:NU0053).

64 FOG may at this point elect to conduct informal force sensing with nations to get a sense of the viability of certain MROs, or desired military capabilities.

65 The RES RDG SME will seek and coordinate the support input needed for each MRO, either within those SMEs that have been nominated to support the RDG (core or support) or through ‘reachback’ to the requisite SHAPE office of responsibility (e.g. Medical, JENG, Transport, J8, etc).

66 Strategic movement is a collective responsibility where NATO and Nations have specific and shared responsibilities (MC 336-2, Mar 02).
Programme (NSIP) aspects. Estimates will identify requirements, which are eligible for common funding in accordance with NATO regulations\(^67\), in advance of mission approval, as part of a package of enabling funding (Initial Enabling Budget Requirements).

\*f. Determine Preliminary Command Arrangements.* The RDG determines the principal command arrangements required for each option. These will *broadly* address the following:

1. Proposed theatre of operations (TOO)\(^68\), required for the conduct or support of the military option.

2. Proposed Joint Operations Area (JOA)\(^69\), required for the conduct of operations.

3. Essential Command and Control (C2) structure, in terms of required operational and component levels of command as well as requirements for forward deployment versus reach back. The possibilities for command\(^70\) at the operational level may be quite different for each MRO; however, the chosen HQ will need to be sufficiently ‘joint’ for the C2 of anticipated assigned forces. The implications of each option need to be considered in the evaluation and comparison of MROs (e.g. HQ JFC deploys as JTF HQ – what residual HQ JFC responsibilities remain, with early considerations of possible manpower reinforcement and the mechanism\(^71\) best suited to manage this reinforcement (either a Crisis Establishment (CE) or a reinforced Peacetime Establishment (PE))). In addition, especially for the deployment of any NATO Force Structure (NFS) JHQ, supporting arrangements from the NATO Command Structure (NCS) need to be considered. The feasibility of the C2 structure in terms of deployment and sustainment of DCIS should be considered.

4. Potential coordination and liaison requirements, with international, governmental and/or non-governmental entities.

5. Rules of engagement (ROE). At this stage, it is not necessary to develop a detailed ROE request (ROEREQ), but rather to develop an understanding of the key aspects of ROE that will be required to support each MRO, especially for the use of force, articulated as a short textual statement. This effort would be led by the RDG operations SMEs and the LEGAD.

\(^{67}\) Such as PO (2013)0056, Revised Funding Arrangements for Non-Article 5 NATO-Led Operations and Missions, 06 Feb 13.

\(^{68}\) Theatre of operations - An operational area, defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, for the conduct or support of specific military operations in one or more joint operations areas. Theatres of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations in depth and over extended periods of time. (Proposed definition).

\(^{69}\) Joint operations area - A temporary area defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency- or mission-specific and are normally associated with combined joint task force operations. (AAP-06).

\(^{70}\) The RDG, when considering these options, should identify if there is a requirement to apprise, through a Strategic Warning Order, additional operational commands of the need to begin to follow the operations planning activity, in case they are chosen to command the ensuing operation.

\(^{71}\) Standard Manpower Procedure (SMAP) 15 - NATO Manpower Reinforcement Policy (change 19 to MC 0216/4-AAP–16 (D)).
d. **Determine Legal Requirements.** The LEGAD must review each option to determine critical legal requirements, which may require timely action by the NATO Office of Legal Affairs. Specific consideration should be given to requirements for:

1. Ensuring an appropriate legal basis for the option.
2. Negotiating Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), Memorandum of Understandings (MOU) and technical agreements/arrangements, in order to get country clearance for transit, over flight, staging, basing and support with host nations and transit countries as required.
3. Negotiating any necessary additional agreements for mission support with host and third nations (e.g. handover of suspected criminals, handling and prosecution of suspected pirates, etc).

h. **Determine StratCom Requirements.** The RDG determines the principal requirements for StratCom to be addressed within the overall StratCom objectives and guidance promulgated by NATO HQ. Facilitated by the RDG StratCom SME and utilising the information disciplines, this includes determining:

1. Potential audiences and any need for prioritisation.
2. Potential effects to be created through StratCom activities.
3. Possible effects in the information environment from military actions.
4. Requirements for policy guidance on methods to enable and promote relationships with all appropriate actors (civil, military, governmental, and non-governmental) in the information environment including:
   a. NATO-wide engagement strategy.
   b. Approval of interagency information activities.
   c. Harmonisation of information activities amongst Alliance members and with partners.
   d. Determination of related information sharing requirements.
5. Required capabilities and resources in support of PD, PA, InfoOps and PsyOps activities, including but not limited to:
   a. Staffing and funding of a dedicated Media Operations Centre.
   b. Employment of NATO TV.
   c. Embedding of commercial media.
   d. Staffing and funding of a NATO SECGEN Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) office and spokesperson in theatre.
(e) PsyOps capabilities.

(6) Requirements and provisions for linguistic, cultural and religious expertise.

(7) Politically imposed StratCom-related constraints and/or restraints.

(8) Themes to stress and themes to avoid from the political perspective.

i. **Determine non-NATO Interaction Requirements.** NATO may already have, within a comprehensive approach framework, standing agreements and frequent interactions with some of the IOs involved in the crisis engagement space. In addition, as part of the SSA, the RDG would have already provided an early indication of interaction requirements. The RDG will update the list of significant non-NATO actors and the degree of interaction required with each at the strategic level (mutual awareness/exchange of information, de-confliction, synchronization of effects, coordination or mutual support, etc.). It is essential that NATO HQ be apprised of both the list of IOs with which planners at the strategic and operational levels will be required to interact and the degree of interaction they estimate will be needed with each. This information should be included as part of the MROs. Where necessary, a request should also be included for authorisation to interact with organisations not already on an NATO HQ-approved list\(^2\), or to interact to a degree not previously authorised by the NAC.

3-23. **Analyse, Evaluate and Compare MROs.**

a. **Analyse MROs.** The RDG should first perform an analysis of each MRO in terms of three basic criteria: suitability, feasibility and acceptability.

(1) **Suitability.** The MRO should seek to:

(a) Create the effects required to achieve NATO MSOs and contribute to the achievement of the NATO end state.

(b) Avoid creating effects that would undermine the achievement of NATO strategic objectives.

(c) Avoid creating effects that would negate the effects sought by significant non-NATO actors who are working toward goals that: support or help our own objectives; or establish conditions that support the aims or goals of the international community.

(d) Cater for foreseeable reactions by the main actors and changes in the strategic environment.

(2) **Feasibility.** The strategic means are likely to be made available by nations, to accomplish the SMAs and CNMAs identified for the given MRO.

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\(^2\) Based on standing agreements, MOU, etc with non-NATO organisations.
(3) **Acceptability.** The potential use of military force will be acceptable to nations in terms of:

(a) International law.

(b) Moral constraints.

(c) Likely costs and potential risks compared with the expected strategic outcome.

(d) Implications\(^{73}\) of the chosen C2 arrangement (e.g. deployment of a HQ JFC).

b. **Determine Strategic Risks.** The RDG should then determine if there are any strategic risks associated with each MRO, which relate to the possibility and consequences of failure in achieving an MSO at an acceptable cost. The RDG should carefully examine the degree to which military ends, ways and means are balanced with objectives and the potential consequences resulting from potential deficiencies. The strategic risk evaluation matrix\(^{74}\) depicted in Figure 3.8 provides a tool for conducting an analysis of strategic risk in three steps:

1. First, the determination of the nature of strategic risks in terms of the possibility something will go wrong and, if so, the severity of the consequences.

2. Second, the determination of what can be done to mitigate the strategic risk by limiting the possibility and the consequences. This may lead to the need to review/change the MRO strategic framework to properly mitigate the identified strategic risk.

3. Third, reaching a conclusion as to the acceptability of the strategic risk as a basis for recommending whether the option should be retained or eliminated.

c. **Evaluate and Compare Military Response Options.** The RDG, with support from assigned systems analysts and SMEs, should then evaluate each MRO and then compare them against each other. With consideration to the crisis situation and the guidance received, this is a subjective appreciation of the likely outcomes resulting from the application of the different means and ways within the strategic environment and the interaction with, and between, the different actors. In evaluating and comparing the different military options, the RDG should consider:

1. Inherent advantages and disadvantages of the various MROs. The RDG can draw on their analysis of the MRO’s suitability, feasibility and acceptability and strategic risks. The RDG can also consider: the likely costs compared with expected strategic benefits of the various MROs; the time required to begin to impact the situation; and, if possible, a rough order magnitude sense of the time required to achieve the MSOs or the anticipated length of NATO commitment.

\(^{73}\) C2 options can also have implications to operational level planning as well as execution; if the chosen MRO identifies a C2 construct other than the current JHQ, this new commander will want to be involved in the development of the operational CONOPS/OPLAN. Mitigations for this possibility should be discussed when the possible issue is first apparent.

\(^{74}\) Normally, each risk is evaluated independently with its own table.
(2) Potential impact on ongoing operations.

(3) Strategic risks and possibilities for mitigation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>Consequence for</th>
<th>Severity</th>
<th>Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actions of the opponent(s).</td>
<td>Desired NATO end state.</td>
<td><strong>Extremely high</strong> - could result in failure to accomplish mission.</td>
<td>High.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions of friendly actors.</td>
<td>NATO Strategic Objective, including Military Strategic Objective.</td>
<td><strong>High</strong> - could result in failure to achieve one or more objectives.</td>
<td>Moderate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in strategic conditions.</td>
<td>Military Strategic Effect.</td>
<td><strong>Moderate</strong> - could result in difficulty to achieve one or more objectives or create military strategic effects.</td>
<td>Low.</td>
</tr>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk Mitigation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Can we neutralise the source?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Can we reduce our vulnerability to the source of the strategic risk?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Can we limit the consequence and/or severity of the occurrence?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Can we reduce the probability of occurrence?</td>
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<tr>
<th>Conclusion</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unacceptable</strong> - risk mitigation cannot reduce the strategic risk to an acceptable level.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conditionally acceptable</strong> - strategic risk can be reduced to an acceptable level by taking actions to:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Modify the desired NATO end state and/or strategic objective.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase the availability of strategic means.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjust the ways that military and non-military instruments are applied.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acceptable</strong> - no risk mitigation actions required.</td>
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</table>

Figure 3.8 - Strategic Risk Evaluation Template

d. **Develop Recommendations.** Based on their analysis, the RDG should develop their recommendations to assist SACEUR to select which MRO to recommend to the NAC/MC, based on the best balance between probability for success, effectiveness and acceptable risks. Recommendations should also address:

(1) Preconditions for success. Those strategic conditions that must be created at the political level to posture for operational success. These may include arranging transit, over-flight and staging areas as well as legal agreements of the status of forces and HNS. They will also include the changes needed in the non-military domains to support military efforts and to address the current crisis in a sustainable manner.

(2) Pre-deployment of enabling forces.
(3) Requirements for CRMs. The RDG functional SMEs would develop recommendations on which pre-authorized CRMs SACEUR could declare to ensure preparation if the emerging crisis continues to develop and leads to NATO involvement. If the OLRT has not been deployed, the RDG should discuss with the JOPG the need for it to be deployed to support COM JHQ’s planning effort. The RDG can also identify CRMs that should be considered for declaration for each MRO, if chosen by the NAC, as a basis for planning. This would include specifying which of the identified CRMs that are not pre-authorized for which the devolution of declaration authority should be requested.

(4) Partner and Non-NATO Nation involvement. Whilst this is a political issue handled by the NAC, the RDG should provide recommendations where this impacts on specific capability requirements or pre-operations training.

3-24. Coordinate and Submit MROs.

a. Coordinate with the nominated JHQ. The draft MROs are coordinated with the nominated JHQ to ensure broad concurrence with the proposed MROs and seek formal operational advice.

b. Final Coordination with NATO HQ. The NATO HQ liaison officers supporting the RDG should provide input on any potential outstanding issues. Major issues may need to be resolved before staffing the MROs to SACEUR, at the RDG leadership level or through the COP or SACEUR as appropriate.

c. Seek SACEUR’s Approval. ACOS J5, in coordination with DCCOMC, will oversee the final preparation and staffing of the MROs, for SACEUR’s approval. Final internal coordination will normally be facilitated through a briefing to the COP on the main elements of the MROs and proposed recommendations.

d. Submit MROs. Once the MROs have been approved by SACEUR, they will be forwarded through the MC to the NAC, with a copy to the NMRs at SHAPE.

e. Other RDG Activity. If requested, and with COP guidance, the RDG will be available to assist the CMTF and/or the OPC in drafting the NID, the release of which concludes the PME process that spans Phase 2 and 3 of the NCMP at the political-military level. In parallel at this point, especially when time is a critical factor, the RDG may wish to begin drafting a SPD in anticipation of a possible NAC decision to move the NCMP into Phase 4 – Planning.
PHASE 4 - STRATEGIC PLAN DEVELOPMENT
Phase 4A - Strategic Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Development
Section 1 - General

3-25. Introduction.

a. **Purpose.** Phase 4 - Strategic Plan Development is split into two distinct parts: Phase 4a - the development of a strategic CONOPS; and Phase 4b - the development of a strategic OPLAN. The purpose of Phase 4a is to detail SACEUR’s concept for the conduct of a NATO-led military operation, in concert with other non-military and non-NATO efforts, to achieve the NATO MSOs and establish conditions required to assist in the achievement of the desired NATO end state.

b. **Overview.** Phase 4a begins with the receipt of the NID with MC guidance following the submission of MROs to the NAC. Phase 4a covers the development of the strategic CONOPS, based on the selected MRO, including coordination of operational requirements with designated operational commands and political-military coordination with NATO HQ. Early in the process, a SPD is issued to the designated operational level Commander (COM JHQ). Phase 4a ends with submission of the strategic CONOPS to the NAC (through the MC).

c. **Prerequisites.** Phase 4a requires a NID with MC guidance. It is supported by the previous development of an SSA and/or MROs, and requires an up-to-date systems understanding of the environment.

d. **Main Activities.** The main activities of Phase 4a are depicted in Figure 3.9.

e. **Desired outcome of this phase.** The desired outcomes of Phase 4a are:

1. The SPD is issued to provide authoritative direction to SHAPE, designated JHQ and ACO subordinate commands, enabling COM JHQ to conduct an Operational Estimate and issue timely guidance to subordinates.

2. SHAPE and the designated JHQ collaborate effectively in the development of strategic and operational level CONOPS based on clear strategic direction and operational requirements.

3. The Strategic CONOPS is submitted to the MC/NAC, describing SACEUR’s concept for the conduct of a NATO-led military operation, including essential operational requirements, support and C2. The illustrative statement of requirements (SORs) provided with the CONOPS adequately describe the requirements for the type and scale of forces and capabilities required to implement the military strategic concept, including the required force capabilities and flow into the theatre (including preliminary deployment information), as well as requirements for theatre capabilities and manpower for deploying HQs.

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75 Statement of requirements is used here as a general term to capture any requirements needed to implement the military strategic concept, including an ‘illustrative’ CJSOR, TCSOR, manpower SOR and/or ROEREQ.
(4) The resulting strategic direction and guidance are sufficient to allow the designated JHQ to proceed, in close cooperation with SHAPE, with the development of the operational OPLAN.

f. **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.**

(1) **CCOMC.** The CCOMC will continue to monitor the crisis situation and provide information and intelligence to the RDG. A SAT, if deployed, would...
normally be used for Phase 2 and 3 activities, with the OLRT taking more prominence in Phase 4; however, it could remain deployed to support Phase 4 activities, especially if it was a combined political-military/strategic military team.

(2) **RDG.** The RDG will develop the strategic CONOPS under an ACOS J5 lead, supported by the CCOMC and SHAPE directorates and Special Staff, as required and approved.

g. **External Coordination.** The SHAPE requirements for external coordination for Phase 4a are typically the same as for Phase 2 and 3. It is essential at this point that arrangement for liaison and coordination is established, as authorised by the NAC, with relevant non-NATO actors. If a SPMP is to be developed by NATO HQ, SHAPE liaison should be established with the NATO HQ body drafting such a document. Finally, NCIA and NSPA, if not already engaged, should be tasked to provide a liaison to the RDG.

(1) **JHQ (JOPG).**

(a) The weight of effort switches from the strategic level to the operational level in this phase. The development of the strategic CONOPS relies heavily on the work of the operational level, especially their development of the operational requirements to support COM JHQ’s concept for the operation. Regular interaction between the JOPG and the RDG throughout the phase is essential.

(b) If the chosen MRO articulated a commander other than the one whose HQ conducted Phase 2 and 3 with SHAPE, then the way forward for the development of the operational CONOPS and OPLAN will have to be decided, which may need SACEUR to discuss with the commanders involved.

**Section 2 - Process**

3-26. **Initiate Strategic CONOPS Development.**

a. **Review NID, and MC, SACEUR and/or COP Guidance.** With receipt of the NID (and MC guidance), the RDG reviews the NAC’s political direction and any MC, SACEUR or COP guidance regarding the selected response option to confirm and evaluate the impact of any changes regarding:

(1) The NATO end state, mission, role, and strategic objectives, including MSOs.

(2) Political limitations and assumptions (including arms control instruments).

(3) The legal basis and mandate for the operation.

(4) The overall comprehensive strategic approach.

(5) The JHQ selected to conduct planning for the operation.
(6) Guidance on resources.

(7) Participation of partners and other non-NATO Nations.

(8) The list of significant non-NATO actors with which SACEUR is authorized to interact during the planning for the operation, including the degree of interaction authorized for each, if described.

(9) The StratCom objectives and mission-specific guidance.

(10) Authorisation or direction to declare additional specific CRMs.

(11) Any other guidance, including timing for CONOPS delivery to NAC and/or MC.

b. Selection of JHQ. If the C2 of the chosen MRO articulates a commander other than the currently identified COM JHQ, the original selection of the JHQ may have to be revisited. Ideally, during MRO development this issue would be discussed and mitigated when first apparent. The solution chosen may require SACEUR to discuss with the two commanders. The option chosen must facilitate efficient and effective planning, while facilitating the role of the chosen commander in the operation operational design. As required, the RDG will draft, for SACEUR release, a document to formalize the chosen approach.

c. Update Planning Milestones and Work Plan. The NID and MC guidance will typically establish deadlines for the submission of planning products and may also establish other critical timings related to crisis management. Therefore, the RDG must update its planning milestones and adjust its work plan within SHAPE as well as with subordinate commands and other organisations to make the best use of available time, including as a minimum:

(1) The release of SPD.

(2) The submission of the COM JHQ’s draft operational CONOPS, including an ‘illustrative’ CJSOR, Theatre Capability Statement of Requirements (TCSOR) and/or a manpower SOR.

(3) The submission of the draft strategic CONOPS to SACEUR, with an ‘illustrative’ CJSOR, TCSOR and/or manpower SOR (in the form of a request for PE reinforcement or a CE, as appropriate).

(4) Further requests for authorisation to implement specific CRMs as required to prepare and activate specific capabilities.

76 The NATO HQ StratCom objectives and guidance may be developed into a SECGEN authorised StratCom framework, in collaboration with ACO StratCom staff.

77 Options may include: leaving the original COM JHQ to plan the operation; having the new commander plan the operation using key staff members but using the original JHQ staff; and moving the planning to the headquarters of the new commander, with support from the original JHQ. Discussion on this issue should start during the finalization of the MROs in Phase 3. SACEUR would have to formally document the chosen relationship to replace that articulated in the original Strategic Warning Order.
The RDG, through the ACOS J5 (and in coordination with DCCOMC), should discuss their initial thoughts and work plan with the COP.

d. **Establish Liaison and Coordination for Collaborative Planning.** The RDG should re-evaluate its requirements for liaison and coordination. The primary organisations that are typically involved in Phase 4a are the same as described for Phase 2 and 3. The RDG should call for any other expertise they may require, such as from NCIA and the NATO HQ CMPS Section. It is essential at this point that arrangement for liaison and coordination is established, as authorised by the NAC, with relevant non-NATO actors. The NID should establish the strategic military and non-military roles and objectives, and articulate NAC authorization for interaction with non-NATO actors. During MRO development, the RDG developed an initial list of non-NATO interaction requirements. This should be reviewed with the additional guidance received in the NID, and the RDG should specify precisely those governmental and non-governmental organisations with which collaboration and coordination is determined to be crucial; the RDG should confirm that they have the authorities or the mechanisms to engage all of these organizations (e.g. through CIVAD, CMI or NATO HQ IS (PASP)). Liaison may be required with the following:

1. Designated international, regional and governmental organisations.
2. Host nation governments and governments of transit countries.
3. EADRCC.

Given the nature of NATO information security policy, it is essential that a suitable means for sharing information with relevant international actors be developed.

e. **Prepare and/or Deploy the OLRT.** Depending on the situation, SHAPE may have already authorized the designated JHQ, through CRMs, to prepare and or deploy its OLRT. Authorisation to prepare and deploy an OLRT is devolved to SACEUR by the NAC through CRMs and this authority may already have been provided, perhaps in a NAC Decision Sheet such as the NID. If not already devolved, the authorization for SACEUR to declare the OLRT related CRMs should be requested. The requirement to prepare and/or deploy an OLRT at this point should be considered by the RDG in concert with the JHQ; if deemed necessary, the RDG would recommend to SACEUR to declare the applicable CRM for preparation or deployment of the OLRT. Any guidance for tailoring, preparing or deploying the OLRT should be developed by the RDG, especially the use of deployable CIS, arrangements for initial entry, coordination with host nation PA, InfoOps and PsyOps.

3-27. **Update the Selected Military Response Option.**

a. Based on their review of the NID and any additional MC, SACEUR and/or COP guidance, the RDG should update the selected MRO as a basis for the development of the CONOPS and, especially, the SPD. The RDG should assign a core group to review the selected MRO strategic framework, followed by a quick review and update of the other elements of the MRO by the functional SMEs that developed them. Any issues that require clarification or further guidance are coordinated with NATO HQ or presented to the COP, with recommendations.
b. **Review MRO Strategic Framework.**

(1) The strategic framework of the selected MRO provides the overall context for engaging military forces to achieve NATO MSOs within a comprehensive approach. The RDG should update the strategic framework of the closest MRO to suit the guidance received in the NID. This includes analysing the impact of any changes in the NID to the wording of MSOs and ensuring the MSEs support them.

(2) **Criteria for Success.** If the NATO end state and/or the MSOs received in the NID are vague, then the RDG should develop criteria for success to aid clarity of how the military has interpreted the political intent. This will also assist the conduct of strategic Operations Assessment.

(3) **Strategic Planning Assumptions and Preconditions for Success.** The RDG should capture any additional strategic planning assumptions or preconditions for success that are identified during the review of the MRO strategic framework. For example, the RDG needs to analyse if the strategic non-military objectives in the NID encapsulate the identified CNMA in the MRO strategic framework; if not, the RDG will need to develop additional strategic planning assumptions or preconditions for success to ensure these areas of necessary supporting or complementary activity are captured.

(4) **Strategic Phasing and Sequencing.** If needed, the RDG will develop a description of the strategic phases of the operation or the intended sequencing of strategic military effects. Each phase should have a clear purpose; however, this does not preclude the possibility for a phase to overlap with another. This phasing and sequencing will facilitate coordination and harmonisation of military and non-military actions with cooperating authorities and organisations, as well as Alliance political control. The following political-military decisions may influence the main phases of the strategic framework:

   (a) Activation of forces in preparation for deployment (FAD).

   (b) Authorisation for pre-deployment of enabling forces (Activation Pre-Deployment).

   (c) Execution of an operation including the deployment and employment of forces (NED).

   (d) Transition and eventual termination of military operations.

(5) Elements of the MRO strategic framework will be further developed by the RDG collaboratively with the designated JHQ during Phase 4 to ensure that all essential strategic conditions are addressed in the strategic CONOPS when it is subsequently forwarded through the MC to the NAC for approval.

c. **Consider Required Service Support.** For the updated selected MRO, with consideration to NAC and COP guidance, consider the possible theatre logistics architecture required to support the MRO, such as: strategic LOC; access to the theatre
and entry points, including APODs and SPODs; intermediate staging bases (ISB), if required; etc. Consider the various aspects of Service Support, including the following:

1. Logistic Support Concept.
2. Logistic Standards and Requirements.
3. Movement concept.
4. HNS concept.
5. Supply and Maintenance concept.
6. MILENG Support concept.
7. Medical Support concept.
10. Manpower.

Develop initial thoughts, guidance or requests for operational input for inclusion in the SPD.

d. **Consider Required Command and Signal.** With consideration to NAC and COP guidance, consider the possible C2 arrangements and communication concept required to support the updated selected MRO, within the constraints of the theatre logistic architecture and the communications means available. Develop provisional C2 arrangements and initial thoughts, guidance, or requests for operational input on the communication concept for inclusion in the SPD.

3-28. **Establish SACEUR’s Strategic Intent and Guidance.**

a. It is of critical importance for SACEUR to clearly articulate the strategic military intent, including the effect that military forces are to create, or the military support to non-military efforts, in collaboration with other cooperating international, governmental, and non-governmental organisations to contribute to the achievement of the desired NATO end state. It is important for the RDG to confirm the strategic intent, including SACEUR’s vision and aim for the conduct of the operation, to ensure a correct focus.

1. SACEUR’s Strategic Intent. SACEUR’s strategic intent may include:
   (a) An appreciation of the intentions of adversaries.
   (b) Strategic criteria for success (related to the NATO end state or MSOs or any conditions that military forces must establish).
(c) The strategic main effort\textsuperscript{7a}.
(d) Limitations (any additional constraints or restraints).
(e) Cooperation with Non-Military and Non-NATO efforts (e.g. other instruments of national or international power).
(f) Acceptance of risks.
(g) Critical desired effects and any effects to be avoided.
(h) Phasing and/or sequencing of strategic military effects.

(2) SACEUR’s Strategic Guidance. The RDG should also seek initial SACEUR guidance on other issues to guide the further development of the military strategic concept. This guidance could include, among others, the following:

(a) CCIRs.
(b) Pre-deployment of enabling forces.
(c) Use of the NRF.
(d) CRMs to be requested.
(e) ROE and the Use of Force.
(f) Targeting guidance.
(g) StratCom.
(h) PA Guidance.
(i) CMI and inter-agency coordination.
(j) Involvement of Partners.
(k) Critical Timings.

3-29. Develop and Issue the Strategic Planning Directive.

a. The SPD is issued to provide authoritative direction to SHAPE, the designated COM JHQ and other ACO subordinate commands. The SPD provides the top down guidance needed to generate bottom up requirements which can then be incorporated into the strategic CONOPS. It provides essential direction and guidance to allow COM JHQ to commence an Operational Estimate. As such, its release should not be overly delayed to refine the content; rather it should provide a succinct capture of the direction, detail and guidance to date to act as a start point for the collaborative planning between SHAPE and JHQ functional staff, with a request for operational input. It is critical to

\textsuperscript{7a} The main effort is \textit{[a] concentration of forces or means in a particular area and at a particular time to enable a commander to bring about a decision}. (AAP-06).
direct the JHQ to determine operational requirements that must be reflected in the military strategic concept.

b. The SPD format is based on that of the strategic CONOPS, but can be adjusted as required to suit the requirement. The content of the SPD (see the SPD format and guidance at Annex B Appendix 4) is a synthesis of the RDG work to date and is derived from: NAC guidance, including the NID, SACEUR intent and guidance, and the updated selected MRO, etc. Where appropriate a gender perspective should be included in the development of the areas addressed in the SPD. Some of the specific areas of the SPD are:

1) **Missions and Objectives for Subordinate Commanders.** Based on the MSOs assigned by the NAC, SACEUR’s mission and the strategic framework of the selected MRO, and in the spirit of mission command\(^{79}\), SACEUR will assign missions\(^{80}\) (including operational objectives) to subordinate commanders as a basis for their planning. The missions/operational objectives contained in the SPD will ideally be discussed between the RDG and JOPG prior to the issue of the SPD. At this stage the operational commander will not have yet conducted a mission analysis. Therefore, the operational commander may seek from SACEUR amendments to the assigned mission/objectives, if required, following its completion.

2) **Theatre of Operations and Joint Operations Area.** The SPD provides guidance on the proposed TOO and JOA, and requests operational input on whether they meet requirements.

3) **Force and Theatre Capability Requirements.** The RDG will provide provisional force capability requirements, derived from the revised selected MRO, which should be used as a start-point basis for planning.

4) **Coordination of Requirements.** Direction and guidance on a range of issues, necessary for the conduct of operational estimate and planning and determination of operational requirements, is developed and promulgated in the SPD, including:

   a) **SACEUR’s Critical Information Requirements.** Possible changes in strategic conditions that may necessitate decisions at the military strategic level. SACEUR’s CCIR should guide subordinate commands in developing their own CCIRs, PIR and Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI).

   b) **CRMs.** The RDG should initially direct subordinate commands to develop and justify requirements for the implementation of additional CRMs. As these are generated, the RDG will validate their requirement

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\(^{79}\) For explanation of mission command see AJP01D.

\(^{80}\) A mission is a clear, concise statement detailing who will conduct the operation, what is to be achieved, when it will take place, where it will occur, and why it is being conducted. It includes, by its nature, the authority and freedom of action required to achieve the assigned objectives while clearly articulating the role of the subordinate command in contributing to the higher command’s mission accomplishment as envisioned in the higher Commander’s Intent. For every command there is only one mission.
and include them in the strategic CONOPS. Throughout the planning process, the RDG\(^{81}\) must keep account of the requests for the devolution of CRM declaration authority, CRMs declared and their state of implementation. Where CRMs have only been partially implemented, or delayed, the RDG must appreciate the associated risks to the mission.

(c) **ROE and the Use of Force.** In parallel to their development of targeting guidance, the RDG should provide initial guidance in the SPD on the use of military force, including lethal and non-lethal measures. Subordinate commands use this guidance to develop their ROE requirements and justification.

(d) **Targeting.** Based on the NID and any specific national guidance available as well as SACEUR’s initial intent and guidance, the RDG, with input from Ops/Intel staff (to include InfoOps) and the LEGAD, should provide initial targeting guidance and direct subordinate commands to further determine: the target sets that may be illustrated by example target categories; and, as far as possible, categories of TSTs, which could need to be engaged due to the threat that they pose to, or the opportunity that they would present for, the success of the NATO mission.

(e) **Force Protection.** The RDG develops guidance and direction for force protection, focusing on strategic threats and risks that require actions by NATO and nations during deployment and entry into the TOO.

(f) **Military Police.** The RDG develops guidance and direction for Military Police Operations, focusing on security, detention and stability policing functions, and strategic threats and risks that require actions by NATO and nations during deployment and entry into the TOO.

(g) **StratCom.** The RDG develops StratCom guidance and direction for subordinate commands to generate requirements or focus their operational-level planning. This paragraph provides a general StratCom overview and may refer to specifics contained in an Annex to the SPD (or issued under separate cover). Direction and guidance will cover military support to PD, PA and InfoOps/PsyOps; it may also include general advice to the wider staff on the potential impact of military activities to communicate strategically or influence audience perceptions.

(h) **Public Affairs.** Specific direction on the PA mission and specific PA objectives of NATO’s engagement in the region.

(i) **Civil-Military Co-operation.** Specific direction to subordinate commands should be given to generate requirements or focus their operational-level planning regarding CMI.

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\(^{81}\) While an RDG needs to monitor the state of the implementation of CRMs, and the related implications, a RDG is a non-permanent body. The CCOMC is therefore the focal point for the monitoring of CRM implementation.
(j) **Inter-agency Coordination.** Guidance on how inter-agency coordination will be managed.

(k) **Partner Involvement.** In accordance with the NID and SACEUR’s direction and guidance, the SPD should provide initial guidance on the preparation, certification and integration of partner forces, including arrangements for information sharing. These provisions for partner participation will be developed and subsequently described in the strategic CONOPS.

(l) **Environmental Protection.** The SPD should provide initial guidance on environmental protection requirements, measures and considerations, consistent with operational imperatives.

(m) **Operations Assessment.** Operations assessment planning is integral to operations planning. The SPD should provide initial guidance to direct the development of operations assessment criteria, methodologies and reporting requirements. These will be developed for the strategic CONOPS.

(n) **Lessons Learned.** The SPD should provide guidance for capturing operational and strategic lessons and best practices developed to promote operational effectiveness and strategic success.

(o) **Exit Criteria.**

1/ In NATO the military only contributes to setting the overall conditions required for termination of ‘all’ Alliance activities – or those conditions described by the NATO end state. ‘Exit criteria’ are those conditions that must be established prior to the conclusion of the NATO military activity called for in the operation described by the strategic plan, and the transition of residual authorities to a proper authority. These exit criteria may be: solely those conditions set by the achievement of the MSOs; they may be those that define the conclusion of NATO military support to any non-military or non-NATO activity, as prescribed by the NAC, beyond that specifically required for achievement of the MSOs; or other conditions set by the NAC, such as the arrival of a replacement international security force in theatre.

2/ Ideally these ‘exit criteria’ would be clear from the outset of planning however, it is likely that they will continue to evolve throughout planning and even execution. In the end, it will be the NAC that will determine when the NATO end state has been reached, or, prior to reaching the end state, when military operations can be concluded. If no exit criteria are provided in the NID by the NAC for the termination of military operations, some initial exit criteria should be developed, for the JOPG to factor into their operational estimate and which will be further developed for NAC consideration with the submission of the strategic CONOPS.
Critical Timings. Planning deadlines and key planning events, such as FG and deployment conferences, as well as critical timings related to the activation of forces, the pre-deployment of enabling forces, initial entry, transfer of authority (TOA), transition (if known), etc should be provided.

c. **Service Support.** Brief description of, or guidance on, the overall Service Support concept (e.g. logistic, movement, MILENG, medical, HNS concepts, etc), with request for operational input including on any broad order costs.

d. **Command and Signal.**

(1) **Command and Control.** The SPD should give broad order guidance on Command authority in terms of transfer and delegation of authority. Guidance should also be provided on external liaison and the conduct of combined operations. Finally, further detail may be required on the identification and the responsibilities of any supporting commands. It is important to provide clear guidance and direction on these issues in the SPD, and allow the COM JHQ to develop C2 requirements based on the operational concept.

(2) **Communications and Information Concept.** Broad guidance to the JHQ on NATO communications systems, networks, support and interaction with external agencies.

e. **Forward Strategic Planning Directive to the JHQ.** The SPD, based on SACEUR’s intent, provides direction for the JHQ, and other supporting commands, to guide the development of the operational CONOPS. Once SHAPE issues the SPD and the JHQ has completed its mission analysis, consideration may be given to sending a liaison element to the JHQ to collaborate during operational concept development to ensure harmonisation between the operational and strategic CONOPS; however, the liaison elements provided by the JHQ to the RDG may serve this purpose.

3-30. Development of the Strategic CONOPS.

a. The strategic CONOPS establishes SACEUR’s concept for the conduct of a NATO-led military operation, in concert with other non-military and non-NATO efforts, to achieve the NATO MSOs and conditions required to assist in the attainment of the desired NATO end state. Following release of the SPD to COM JHQ, the drafting of the strategic CONOPS begins (see the CONOPS format at Annex B Appendix 5), incorporating the detail and guidance contained in the SPD as a start point. While the work on the strategic CONOPS remains the responsibility of the RDG, it will be, as required, supported by those directorates and divisions and Special Staff; this may at times mean that they work in parallel on a certain supporting task, while keeping the RDG apprised, with the end result being fed into the development of the strategic CONOPS (e.g. logistic planning conferences, FG activities, etc).

b. To be submitted to the NAC for approval, the strategic CONOPS draws on NAC guidance, SACEUR’s strategic intent and guidance, and the updated selected MRO; it also incorporates the JHQ’s main operational requirements for the successful conduct of operations, including the deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces. As such, it cannot be finalized without input from the operational level following COM JHQ’s
operational estimate; this input is normally provided, in addition to regular collaborative activity between the RDG and the JOPG, through submission of a draft operational CONOPS[^2].

c. It is important during the development of the strategic CONOPS that external liaison and collaboration[^3] be continued, to maintain situational awareness and to ensure it meets the requirement and supports the operational commander’s concept for the operation. RDG leadership should remain apprised of the political environment, which will be accomplished through various conduits, such as the CCOMC, SHAPE liaison to the CMTF, the COP, and the liaison officers from NATO HQ. Functional experts at the various levels should discuss functional issues, as required, to ensure clarity (e.g. the legal mandate - LEGAD at SHAPE, JHQ and NATO HQ).

(1) **Maintain Coordination with NATO HQ.** ACOS J5, in concert with the DCCOMC, must ensure that the RDG maintains close coordination and cooperation with NATO HQ IS/IMS. Normally, a SPMP would not be expected to be developed/refined in parallel to the development of the strategic CONOPS, as this could drive major change to political guidance in the NID (e.g. end state, military objectives); however, the RDG must remain abreast of any developments in this area, especially the development of non-military aspects to ensure the military concept remains complementary.

(2) **Maintain Collaboration with the nominated JHQ.** Throughout the CONOPS development, the RDG will collaborate with the JOPG to ensure that: the nominated JHQ has as much flexibility as possible in its operational design and concept development within the selected MRO strategic framework; and the operational requirements are understood and properly reflected in the strategic CONOPS. Normally, the strategic CONOPS should not be submitted to SACEUR before elements of the operational concept are developed enough to be included.

3-31. Development of Strategic CONOPS Annexes.

a. In addition to commencing the main body of the strategic CONOPS, the RDG selects, and assigned functional SMEs begin to develop, the annexes that support the strategic CONOPS. A list of possible annexes for inclusion, and some additional considerations for annex/appendix development, can be found at Annex C.

b. Those annexes highlighted in Annex C are mandated[^4] by the NAC for inclusion with a strategic CONOPS; however, while the appendices listed provide an indication of what is covered in a particular annex, they are not mandated for inclusion (as at the time

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[^2]: What is submitted to SACEUR/SHAPE by the operational level before submission of the strategic CONOPS to the MC and the NAC should be discussed as the SPG is developed, and, if necessary, agreed between SACEUR and COM JHQ. Normally this will be in the form of a ‘draft’ operational CONOPS, but in the past this requirement has been satisfied by the submission of a rough draft operational OPLAN, with the essential elements of a CONOPS completed. If an operational CONOPS is submitted, it will not be formally approved by SACEUR until approval of the strategic CONOPS by the NAC; once the strategic CONOPS is approved, this may drive adjustments to the draft operational CONOPS prior to its final approval. After submitting a draft operational CONOPS, COM JHQ continues with operational OPLAN development; following the approval by the NAC of the strategic CONOPS, approval of the operational CONOPS by SACEUR will be actioned.

[^3]: Collaborative planning tools such as VTC and operational functional services such as TOPFAS should be used to the extent possible. However, caution must be used by the RDG and JOPG as early review of draft work can cause premature and unnecessary staff activity. Good communication between the RDG and JOPG is essential to the correct collaborative use of these tools.

[^4]: MC133/4 (Jan 11) Annex B.
of the CONOPS development there may be insufficient detail to do so). At the time that
the CONOPS is developed, the main annex itself may be enough to provide and
understanding to the NAC and to provide guidance and direction to the operational level.


c. Annexes in addition to those mandated for inclusion with a strategic CONOPS can
be selected for development if it is felt that strategic direction and guidance on these
issues is required; all annexes selected for development, even if not mandated for
inclusion, should be submitted with the strategic CONOPS to the NAC for approval.

d. Throughout the development of the strategic CONOPS: the content of the
selected annexes will continue to be identified, developed and refined; and the RDG
should, as required, re-evaluate the annexes and appendixes selected for development.

3-32. Coordinate Strategic Military Requirements in NATO’s Contribution to a
Comprehensive Approach.

a. The civil and economic instruments of power reside with nations, including
Alliance members, and coordination of these efforts will most likely be carried out under
the auspices of the UN or other IOs such as the EU. Coordination must be made at the
political level of NATO to ensure that the efforts of the Alliance are harmonised with non-
military efforts. It is also essential that the development of the strategic CONOPS is
synchronised with those plans of significant cooperating non-NATO actors and that this
interaction has the support of the NAC. Key areas for confirmation:

   (1) Non-military support to military operations.

   (2) Military support to non-military efforts.

   (3) Logistics support.

b. By this point the mechanisms for liaison and coordination with relevant non-NATO
entities should be established (e.g. authorities for direct engagement or mechanisms for
this interaction (e.g. perhaps through NATO HQ IS PASP)). The CIVAD and the CMI
staff will normally be the conduit for this interaction for the RDG.

c. These issues may also be discussed during CMTF sessions or in direct pre-
operations planning consultation sessions. The RDG must continue to remain aware of
these discussions and factor implications derived from their analysis into their work on
the strategic CONOPS.

3-33. Coordinate Operational Requirements.

a. One of the most important aspects in the development of strategic CONOPS is the
determination of the operational requirements needed to realize the strategic concept.
While a collaborative effort between the strategic and operational levels, this work
originates at the operational level as they devise their estimates of the requirements
needed to support COM JHQ’s operational concept. Requirements are articulated using
four main products: the CJSOR, the TCSOR, a manpower SOR and a ROEREQ; at the
time of the submission of the strategic CONOPS to the NAC these are termed as
‘illustrative’. In addition, the annexes of the draft operational CONOPS will articulate
various requirements that need to be validated and, if required, captured in the strategic
CONOPS and annexes, such as the need for implementing additional CRMs, and target sets and, where appropriate, illustrative target categories of time sensitive targets (TST) for each phase of the operation\textsuperscript{85}.

(1) **Coordinate the development of the CJSOR.** The development of the CJSOR during crisis response planning is perhaps the most critical step in the development of an executable OPLAN. It is developed in parallel with the CONOPS under the lead of the RDG FOG SME. An initial ‘illustrative’ CJSOR is normally prepared by the JHQ, in consultation with their Component Commanders; within the RDG, the FOG SME leads the validation and the coordination of the CJSOR with the JHQ. The version of the CJSOR that exists at the time of the submission of the strategic CONOPS is normally submitted with it for illustrative purposes, as an ‘illustrative’ CJSOR\textsuperscript{86,87}, to provide nations with an *early* indication of the type and scale of forces required to implement the strategic concept. It then is continued to be refined until the strategic CONOPS is approved by the NAC and a NAC FAD is issued; the CJSOR is then formally released to nations as the ‘provisional CJSOR’, as a precursor to the commencement of the formal FG process. The provisional CJSOR represents SACEUR’s minimum military requirement for forces to conduct the operation within acceptable risks; it ultimately determines the viability of the operation in terms of its suitability to achieve agreed objectives, acceptability of costs and risks and the feasibility of deployment, employment and sustainment. The minimum essential information that must be confirmed in the provisional CJSOR is:

(a) Force/capability requirement, including strategic and theatre reserve and any detailed capability requirements.

(b) Echelon that indicates size.

(c) Commander’s Required Date.\textsuperscript{88}

(d) Required destination.

(e) Priority of arrival.

\textsuperscript{85} MC-471/1, NATO targeting policy, dated 15 Jun 07.

\textsuperscript{86} In the Force Generation process (as described in MC133/4), use of ‘provisional’ and ‘draft’ to qualify the CJSOR have specific connotations. The ‘provisional’ CJSOR is provided to nations with the Activation Warning message (ACTWARN) to commence formal force generation, following the NAC approval of the strategic CONOPS and issue of a FAD. The ‘provisional’ CJSOR evolves into the ‘draft’ CJSOR as the result of the Force Generation conference, which reflects nations’ force offers. Accordingly throughout this chapter, the term ‘illustrative’ will be used to describe the version of the CJSOR provided to SHAPE with a draft operational CONOPS by COM JHQ, and to describe the CJSOR provided by SACEUR to the NAC/MC with the strategic CONOPS, for ‘illustrative’ purposes. This approach to terminology will also be used to describe the other SORs (e.g. TCSOR and manpower SOR) at the various stages (e.g. illustrative TCSOR (with strategic CONOPS), provisional TCSOR (up-to-date version provided to nations at the time of a Force Generation conference), draft TCSOR (following the Force Generation conference), and TCSOR (with the OPLAN)).

\textsuperscript{87} While the ‘illustrative’ CJSOR provides an early indication of the type and scale of forces and capabilities required to implement the military strategic concept, it will not necessarily provide sufficient detail for nations to prepare their force offers; this detail will be provided in the ‘Provisional’ CJSOR.

\textsuperscript{88} Commander’s required date - The latest date, calculated from G-day, established by the theatre commander, on which forces are required to be complete in their final destination and organized to meet the commander’s operational requirement. (AAP-06). G-day - The day on which an order is or is due to be given to deploy a unit. Note: Such an order is normally a national one (AAP-06).
(f) Command authority to be transferred to the gaining NATO Commander.

(2) **Coordinate TCSOR.** The TCSOR identifies critical theatre-level capabilities, normally considered as national responsibilities, which may exceptionally be considered as eligible for NATO common funding by the Resource, Planning and Policy Board (RPPB). At this point in the planning process, DCOS PLANS (Joint Capability Planning Division (JCAP)) will seek to identify which theatre capabilities meet the criteria established in existing eligibility guidelines, and which ones may require an exceptional agreement for common funding by the MC and the RPPB. Whenever possible, TCSOR requirements are provisionally identified at the operational level by the designated JHQ, with a rough estimate of the funding requirements, during the development of the strategic CONOPS; they will be fully coordinated at the conclusion of the FG process. This coordination requires:

(a) Identifying which TCSOR capabilities are expected to be provided by nations as well as those that will have to be outsourced, subject to the specific approval by both the MC and the RPPB.

(b) Estimating the cost for all TCSOR capabilities eligible for common funding in accordance with NATO regulations.

The TCSOR that exists at the time of the strategic CONOPS submission is normally submitted for illustrative purposes, as an ‘illustrative’ TCSOR.

(3) **Coordinate Manpower Requirements.** Manpower planning in the RDG is led by DCOS RES SMEs, in collaboration with the JOPG, with contributions from other directorates to identify personnel to fulfil the force C2 requirements by NCS HQs, NFS HQs, Multi-national HQs, NATO Nations and Non-NATO Troop Contributing Nations (NNTCN) including Partner Nations. The product of the manpower planning is either a request for PE reinforcement or a CE. If possible, the JHQ will provide an ‘illustrative’ manpower SOR with the submission of the draft operational CONOPS. If detailed manpower requirements are not available at that time, the JHQ should comment on the perceived manpower needs. The RDG will validate the operational requirements and submit an ‘illustrative’ manpower SOR with the strategic CONOPS (in the form of a request for PE reinforcement or a CE) or some considerations on manpower requirements for submission under Service Support in the main body of the strategic CONOPS.

(4) **Coordinate Illustrative ROEREQ.** An illustrative ROEREQ is normally submitted with the strategic CONOPS to help illustrate the ROE that are considered necessary for the authorisation for, or limits on, the use of force during military operations. The operations staff, supported by the LEGAD, lead this activity within the RDG; in dialogue with their operational level counterparts they

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89 SACEUR will determine the need for reinforcements in coordination with the respective Commanders and will coordinate the provision of the appropriate personnel from the pool of identified reinforcement personnel from within the NCS and by asking nations for personnel from outside NCS. Subject to MC endorsement and NAC approval, SACEUR will decide if the conduct of an operation requires reinforcing a PE or a transition to a CE. (SMAP 15 – NATO Manpower Reinforcement Policy - change 19 to MC 0216/4 - AAP–16 (D).
may develop the initial draft ‘illustrative’ ROEREQ or wait for an initial JHQ draft. It is validated and developed for submission with the strategic CONOPS. While the ROEREQ is not ‘approved’ by the NAC at this point, they may give direction for ROE refinement prior to the submission of the ROEREQ for approval with the strategic OPLAN. Depending on the NAC direction, this may impact other areas of the strategic CONOPS, and necessitate its amendment; as such, as the ‘illustrative’ ROEREQ is developed it should be discussed with the NATO liaison officers, IMS staff and NATO HQ LEGAD, as appropriate.

3-34. **Contribute to the Implementation of NATO’s StratCom Objectives and Guidance.**

a. **Review Strategic Political Guidance.** The NAC will provide mission-specific strategic political guidance on StratCom activities (including StratCom objectives) as part of the NID or under separate cover. This StratCom guidance may include a PD approach, a PA approach and an InfoOps/PsyOps approach in accordance with the NATO StratCom policy, to contribute to the achievement of NATO’s strategic objectives.

b. **Develop the Initial Concept for Implementing the StratCom Objectives and Guidance.** ACO’s initial StratCom concept will detail how ACO intends to implement the military aspects of NATO HQ’s StratCom objectives and guidance. It will be developed by the StratCom staff (and led by its RDG SME) in collaboration and in parallel with the information specialisations. The concept will develop StratCom aims, themes and messages matched to audiences, which will contribute to creating the desired strategic effects and achieving the strategic objectives. StratCom staff will also assist the RDG in the determination of limitations and operations assessment criteria, and provide advice and coordination regarding other military activities affecting the information environment at, and below, the strategic level, including appropriate interagency interfaces. This initial ACO StratCom concept may have been sent as an annex to the SPD (or under separate cover) in order to solicit operational level feedback, as well as to allow the operational level to begin planning on agreed aspects of the concept immediately.

3-35. **Consider Operations Assessment at the Strategic Level.**

a. Operations assessment planning must remain an integral part of operations planning at strategic and operational levels from the outset. Initial strategic guidance will have been provided in the SPD to direct the development of operations assessment criteria, methodologies and reporting requirements. This guidance and direction should be built upon during the development of the strategic CONOPS, in concert with the JOPG.

b. In general, operations assessment at the strategic level focuses on appreciating the progress towards creating the MSEs and achieving the MSOs, and their contribution to the achievement of the NATO end state; it needs to also consider other progress in the engagement space. As such there is some subjectivity to operations assessment at the strategic level. The RDG should determine which other relevant non-NATO actors have operations assessment capabilities or sources of data that may be of use to the NATO operations assessment effort; this may lead to recommendation for additional interaction authorities or mechanisms, or lead to discussion of these issues during any pre-operations planning consultations.
c. While the strategic CONOPS would normally only include general description of strategic operations assessment, with necessary direction and guidance for the operational level, design of strategic operations assessment should ideally commence during the initial phases of planning. This work contributes to the process of defining system state changes and actions by ensuring that these can indeed be observed and measured. Furthermore, the process of determining metrics increases understanding of the corresponding effects, objectives and exit criteria, and may lead to revision of the wording of strategic effects or exit criteria, or the development or adjustment to any criteria for success developed for MSOs or the NATO end state.

(1) Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs). The RDG should determine what change in specific conditions (desired specific changes in the behaviour or capabilities of a system or subsystem) is specifically described by the MSEs; they should then begin to develop MOEs, which when monitored over time will assist the determination if these changes in conditions have been realized, and the effects thus created. This effort will help to validate if the strategic military effects, as described in the SPD, are measurable, or if changes to their wording is recommended. The RDG in collaboration with the JOPG operations assessment staff should also analyse whether the MOEs determined can be measured efficiently and effectively.

3-36. Develop the Strategic Service Support Concept.

a. Determine the Theatre Logistics Architecture. Within the RDG, the support staff will further develop the theatre logistics architecture, in collaboration with the JOPG, based on the NID and SACEUR’s initial intent and guidance as promulgated in the SPD. The principal aspects that must be established include:

(1) Strategic LOC.
(2) Access to the theatre and entry points, including APODs and SPODs.
(3) Intermediate Staging Bases, if required.
(4) Possibilities for HNS.
(5) Theatre LOC.

b. Develop Logistic Roles and Responsibilities. Support staff continue to lead in the development of the logistics support concept in coordination with nations during an Initial Logistics Planning Conference which is conducted as early as possible to:

(1) Inform nations about the strategic service support, including movements, the provision of supplies and medical support.
(2) Evaluate key factors influencing service support (e.g. choke points).
(3) Review the proposed logistic C2 structure.

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90 Measure of Effectiveness - A metric used to measure a current system state. (NATO Operations Assessment Handbook).
(4) Determine optimal methods of logistic support arrangements including:
   (a) Multinational joint theatre logistics.
   (b) HNS.
   (c) Lead nation and role specialised nation.
   (d) Multinational integrated logistic units.
   (e) Multinational logistics units.
   (f) Multinational integrated medical units.
   (g) Multinational medical units or medical framework/lead nation requirements.
   (h) Contractor support.

c. **Coordinate HNS Arrangements.** Based on the results of the Initial Logistics Planning Conference, the support staff and LEGAD ensure that essential legal arrangements are in place to allow the support staff to initiate requests for HNS, to summarise requirements and outline the scope of the desired arrangements.

d. **Coordinate the Deployment and Sustainment Concept.** Within the RDG and working closely with the designated JHQ, support staff continue to lead in the development of the strategic Service Support Concept as part of the strategic CONOPS, including the following:

   (1) Movement concept.
   (2) HNS concept.
   (3) Supply and Maintenance concept.
   (4) MILENG Support concept.
   (5) Medical Support concept.
   (6) Contractor Support.
   (7) Funding.
   (8) Manpower.
3-37. Develop the Concept for Command and Control.

   a. Develop the Concept for Command and Control Arrangements. The RDG must review the NID, MC guidance and SACEUR’s initial intent/guidance to determine the C2 structure required to conduct the mission within the constraints of the theatre logistic architecture and the communications means available. This work is done in dialogue with the operational level, through the JOPG, to capture COM JHQ’s C2 requirements to support the operational concept.

   b. Develop the Communications and Information Concept. The communications and information concept developed by the RDG CIS and Cyber Defence Directorate (CCD) SMEs describes in principle the provision of CIS for the operation, based on SACEUR’s strategic concept and the operational requirements developed by the designated JHQ. Since the C2 structure and the size of the HQs will vary according to the mission, the DCIS architecture will be adapted to support C2 arrangements based on operational information exchange requirements (IERs) - who needs the information, what the information is, where it comes from and how the information exchange occurs. CIS for the operation will use the existing NATO General Communications System (NGCS) and DCIS, as well as nationally provided systems. Communications will be grouped into three levels:

   (1) Level 1 - Theatre/Strategic Level Communications. Theatre communications will link SHAPE, JHQ, Component Commands (CCs) and other HQs when required. Theatre communications link forward deployed HQs and subordinate Commands that are in direct support of the operation. These links are characterised by high volume information flow, security and timeliness in support of command, control, intelligence and support of the forces.

   (2) Level 2 - Component Communications. Force-level communications between CCs and their subordinate formations are a CC responsibility. However, they can have access to secure and non-secure common-user NATO SECRET Wide Area Network (WAN) and NATO UNCLASSIFIED WAN services, recognised air, maritime and common pictures, and intelligence imagery/data systems. Transport of information will occur over NATO or National UHF and SHF SATCOM, commercial SATCOM, UHF tactical SATCOM (TACSAT), HF and U/VHF radio, microwave, and landlines (commercial and military).

   (3) Level 3 - Deployed Unit/National Unit Communications. Communications within national units are the responsibility of, and organic to, the units themselves. Level 3 CIS will consist primarily of terrestrial links, UHF/VHF or HF radio, as conditions permit and the nations can provide.

3-38. Review of Draft Operational CONOPS.

   a. Normally, the strategic CONOPS will not be submitted prior to receipt of the draft operational CONOPS, including their ‘illustrative’ statements of requirements (e.g. illustrative CJSOR, TCSOR and/or manpower SOR). This serves two purposes: first, a final check that the operational level has correctly interpreted all elements of strategic

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91 If the JHQ and its commander deploys, the JHQ is referred to as a JTF HQ.
direction and guidance; and second, a final check that all elements needed in the strategic CONOPS, which need NAC approval, have been identified and included. Appropriate RDG functional SMEs should review all elements of the operational CONOPS, including annexes. Any issues identified should be resolved by functional SMEs through discussion with their operational counterparts or through amendment of their portion of the strategic CONOPS. Any major issues needing direction or resolution prior to staffing the strategic CONOPS should be identified and briefed to the RDG ‘lead’, the COP or SACEUR, as appropriate. The RDG should ensure that the JOPG receives appropriate feedback on any issues that may need to be addressed in the operational CONOPS prior to SACEUR approval (following approval of strategic CONOPS by the NAC).

3-39. Coordinate and Submit Strategic CONOPS.

a. **Final Coordination with the nominated JHQ.** Ideally, prior to submission, the JOPG is afforded the opportunity to comment on the draft strategic CONOPS and the illustrative\(^{92}\) CJSOR, TCSOR, manpower SOR and ROEREQ that will normally accompany it. The JHQ liaison element should also review the draft strategic CONOPS as it develops and raise any potential issues. Depending on the JHQ JOPG capacity (as they will be dealing with the component level CONOPS development at the same time), a complete review of the draft strategic CONOPS may not be possible; if this is the case the RDG should ensure that any major issues or possible areas for differences of opinion are discussed between the RDG and the JOPG. Major issues may need to be resolved before staffing the strategic CONOPS for approval, at the RDG leadership level or through the COP, SACEUR as appropriate.

b. **Final Coordination with NATO HQ.** The NATO HQ liaison officers supporting the RDG should provide input on any potential outstanding issues. Major issues may need to be resolved before staffing the strategic CONOPS for approval, at the RDG leadership level or through the COP, SACEUR as appropriate.

c. **Seek SACEUR’s Approval.** ACOS J5, in coordination with DCCOMC, will oversee the final preparation and staffing of the strategic CONOPS, and illustrative SORs, for approval by SACEUR. Final internal coordination will normally be facilitated through a briefing to the COP on the main elements of the strategic CONOPS and proposed recommendations. SACEUR may require an operational CONOPS review with subordinate commanders to further ensure strategic synchronisation, or this understanding of the operational CONOPS, and any related issues, can be addressed by the RDG in the briefing.

d. **Submit Strategic CONOPS for NAC approval.** Once the CONOPS has been approved by SACEUR, it will be forwarded through the MC to the NAC for their approval, with a copy to the NMRs at SHAPE.

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\(^{92}\) The term ‘illustrative’ is used here to indicate that these SORs are still in development. The versions that exist at the time the strategic CONOPS is normally submitted with it for illustrative purposes, to give the NAC an understanding of what will be required to realize the strategic concept. These SORs will continue to be developed, with a final provisional CJSOR, draft TCSOR and draft CE issued to nations with the ACTWARN after NAC approval of the strategic CONOPS and issue of the FAD.
Phase 4B - Strategic OPLAN Development and Force Generation
Section 1 - General

3-40. Introduction.

a. **Purpose.** The purpose of Phase 4b – Strategic Plan Development and Force Generation is first to identify and activate the forces and capabilities required to implement the strategic CONOPS and accomplish the mission within acceptable risks. Second, it specifies, for MC endorsement and NAC approval, the sequence of the strategic activities and operations, including the deployment, employment, sustainment and C2 of NATO-led forces, for the accomplishment of the agreed NATO military mission, as well as the possible necessary interaction required with cooperating non-NATO entities.

b. **Overview.** Phase 4b involves two interrelated processes (Strategic OPLAN Development and Force Generation) that must be harmonised to ensure that the plan being developed is adequately resourced in terms of the capabilities being generated. They are conducted in parallel at the strategic and operational levels to: identify and confirm national commitments; to balance the force package against mission requirement; and to appreciate risks from any critical shortfalls. The activation and pre-deployment of enabling forces may also be included.

(1) **Force Generation (FG).** Following NAC approval of the CONOPS and the issue of a NAC FAD, FG can be formally initiated by SACEUR to coordinate force activation with member nations, partner and other non-NATO nations designated by the NAC, as required, in coordination with the JHQ. FG continues throughout Phase 4b in parallel to the strategic OPLAN development.

(2) **Strategic OPLAN Development.** Immediately following SACEUR’s submission of the strategic CONOPS, pending NAC approval, the development of the strategic OPLAN begins to further coordinate the arrangements required to implement the CONOPS. It includes further development and coordination of the arrangements required to implement the strategic concept, including legal agreements, deployment, force protection, information strategy, sustainment, C2, training support and certification, and operations assessment. Strategic OPLAN Development ends with a viable strategic OPLAN endorsed by the MC and approved by the NAC.

c. **Prerequisites.**

(1) **Force Generation.** Although informal coordination with nations will begin during Phase 2 - Strategic Assessment and Phase 3 - MROs Development, the formal initiation of FG requires the following:

(a) NAC approval of strategic CONOPS, or NAC FTDM direction to develop an OPLAN.

(b) NAC FAD and MC guidance.
(c) A provisional CJSOR based on the force/capability requirements established by the designated operational Commander.

(d) NAC guidance on the participation of Partners and other non-NATO nations.\(^{93}\)

(e) Updated status of forces available to NATO.

(2) **Strategic OPLAN Development.** The following are required to initiate Strategic OPLAN Development:

(a) Strategic CONOPS, including illustrative SORs (e.g. illustrative CJSOR, TCSOR, manpower SOR (either a request for PE reinforcement or a CE), and/or ROEREQ, pending NAC approval.

(b) NAC and/or SACEUR’s direction and guidance.

(c) Arrangements for collaboration with contributing and host nation(s), NATO HQ and operational commands.

d. **Main Activities.** The main activities of Force Generation and Strategic OPLAN Development are depicted in Figures 3.10 and 3.11, respectively.

e. **Desired outcome of this phase.**

(1) **Force Generation.** FG needs to ensure provision of an adequate force package to provide the right forces, at the right place, at the right time and in the right sequence in accordance with the operational concept. While this depends on nations’ decisions, which will be influenced by political considerations, activities by SHAPE should focus on the following additional criteria:

(a) Force/capability requirements are balanced with the mission, can be supported from forces available to NATO and reflect the level of political will.

(b) Nations receive force/capability requirements, including planned employment, command relations and preliminary deployment information, to allow timely decisions.

(c) Information related to national contributions clearly establishes the forces capabilities and command authority to be provided as well as any caveats on force employment.

(d) Critical shortfalls in force/capabilities required for mission success are identified and filled through force balancing or reported through the MC to the NAC with an appreciation of the risks and suggested mitigation possibilities.

\(^{93}\) The NAC may indicate the desirability for participation by Partners and other non-NATO nations in the NID, a subsequent decision sheet, or in the FAD.
(2) **Strategic OPLAN Development.** The strategic OPLAN, with an associated TCSOR and ROEREQ, is submitted to the MC/NAC and approved, while meeting the criteria for timeliness and adequacy as follows:

(a) Timeliness.

1/ Planning products are produced in time to allow subordinates to initiate and complete required planning and preparation.

2/ Essential strategic planning aspects are covered in the plan.

3/ Planning and execution are integrated incrementally as required.

(b) Adequacy.

1/ The legal framework, including an international mandate and SOFAs, as well as arrangements with host nations and nations allowing transit, are established and satisfy mission requirements.

2/ Force capabilities and resources satisfy minimum military requirements for mission accomplishment within acceptable risk.

3/ The flow of forces into the theatre supports the operational Commander’s scheme of manoeuvre.

4/ C2 arrangements, including liaison and coordination with NATO and non-NATO actors, as well as CIS and ROE, allow effective integration and employment of forces to achieve MSOs. This includes the establishment of mechanisms to share information with relevant non-NATO actors while preserving operations security.

5/ Theatre support and sustainment meet operational requirements.

6/ Contingency planning requirements have been identified and prioritised to cover identified risks.

f. **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.**

(1) **CCOMC.** The CCOMC will continue to monitor the crisis situation and provide information and intelligence to the RDG. It will finalise preparations, supported by SHAPE directorates, as required and approved, for management of operation execution.

(2) **RDG.** The RDG will develop the strategic OPLAN under an ACOS J5 lead, supported by the CCOMC and SHAPE directorates and Special Staff, as required and approved. At times SHAPE staff elements may work in parallel on a certain supporting task, while keeping the RDG apprised, with the end result being fed into the development of the strategic OPLAN (e.g. logistic planning conferences,
FG activities, etc). In addition, the RDG will typically be supported by the following:

1/ SHAPE Allied Movement Coordination Centre (AMCC), for deployment planning.

2/ Bi-SC Military Partnership Directorate (MIP), for coordination with partners and other non-NATO nations as authorised by the NAC.

(3) Force Generation Branch. During Phase 4b, SHAPE FOG plays a central role, in close cooperation with the RDG, in coordinating force/capability requirements with nations as well as the designated JHQ. Close coordination with the AMCC is required to ensure that deployment information for each force is coordinated with the JHQ and provided to nations. The Bi-SC MIP, collocated with SHAPE, provides a means for coordinating potential force contributions with partners and other non-NATO nations, as authorised by the NAC.

g. External Coordination. The SHAPE requirements for external coordination for Phase 4b are typically the same as for Phase 4a, including:

(1) NATO IS and IMS planners, including CMTF. This includes liaison with any NATO HQ body developing a SPMP, if one was deemed necessary.

(2) The supported JHQ and supporting commands.

(3) Troop contributing nations (TCNs), including members, partners and other non-NATO nations, in accordance with NAC guidance. This may be accomplished through the EAPC and or the MIP.

(4) Cooperating non-NATO entities, as designated or authorized by the NAC, including international, governmental and non-governmental organisations.

(5) ACT, with respect to mission training and exercises.
3-41. Review Force Requirements, Force Availability and Possible Contributions.

a. **Update the Status of Forces Available to NATO.** Once the NAC directs SACEUR to develop MROs, it will also issue a request to nations to update the status of
their available forces within a given time period (dependent upon the urgency of the situation). The SHAPE FOG staff should follow-up on the progress of the nation’s activities to update the status of forces available to NATO. Force data should be validated and saved in the NATO common database of forces available to SACEUR and designated JHQs. This request for an update should:

(1) Include a reminder to nations that updates on the status of land, air and maritime forces available to NATO be submitted in the form of Order of Battle Land, Air and Maritime messages to SACEUR.  

(2) Advise commanders of the NRF on stand-by and the NRF to prepare to update their NRF readiness reporting.  

(3) Request the MIP at SHAPE to update Partner Operational Capabilities.  

(4) Request SHAPE support staff to update core logistics database as required.

b. **Review and Refine Force/Capability Requirements.** The development of force/capability requirements is an iterative process that commences with the development of MROs. Requirements, initially stated as force capabilities, are refined during subsequent phases of planning by the JHQ and designated component/subordinate commands in terms of specific force types. FOG, in cooperation with the RDG, reviews the development of these requirements against the current readiness and availability of forces for NATO to ensure that they remain within realistic limits for the anticipated duration of the operation.

3-42. **Review NATO CRMs.**

a. To ensure that capabilities are ready and available to meet potential operational requirements, FOG confirms with the RDG the CRMs for which devolution of declaration authority has been requested by SACEUR from the NAC, or that have been declared by SACEUR, noting their state of implementation. If necessary, FOG discusses with the RDG how additional CRMs could be declared to ensure national capabilities are prepared and activating to meet NATO operational requirements.

3-43. **Initiate Force Activation.**

a. **Contribute to the Preparation of the NAC FAD.** The RDG (assisted by the RDG FOG SME) may provide input during the drafting of the FAD to ensure that the following requirements are adequately addressed:

(1) Pre-deployment of enabling forces.

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94 MC 53/3, Terms of Reference for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, authorises SACEUR to request periodic national order of battle reports in peacetime and accelerated order of battle reporting by national authorities during periods of crisis or conflict. Bi-SC Reporting Directive 80-3 Volume III establishes the operational information requirements, reporting templates and procedures.

95 Details of the NRF Readiness Reporting Procedures are laid down in AD 80 96 NRF Directive Annex A, dated 24 Apr 13.

96 The overall force composition should be gender-balanced as appropriate for the mission (see Bi-SC Directive 40-1, dated 08 Aug 13).
(2) Authorisation for SACEUR to negotiate with Partners and other non-NATO Nations for force contributions.

(3) Authorisation for SACEUR to negotiate host HNS arrangements.

(4) Specific guidance on the deployment of forces and TOA\textsuperscript{97}.

b. **Finalise the ‘Provisional’ CJSOR.** As the MC and then the NAC digest the strategic CONOPS, the CJSOR is refined by the RDG (led by the RDG FOG SME). It will be released to nations as ‘the’ provisional CJSOR with the Activation Warning\textsuperscript{98} (ACTWARN) message, following approval of the strategic CONOPS and release of the NAC FAD, for the generation of the forces described. To ensure an effective and accurate FG process, it is important that the provisional CJSOR contains enough detail of the requirements for nations to prepare their force offers.

c. **Issue the ACTWARN and the Provisional CJSOR.** The RDG FOG SME drafts the ACTWARN message, with RDG assistance as required, to provide the essential information required by nations to determine national force contributions.\textsuperscript{99} The ACTWARN should also establish arrangements for coordinating national contributions including the scheduling of a FG conference, if required, and the submission of national force preparation (FORCEPREP) messages. The provisional CJSOR is approved and formally released by DSACEUR. The ACTWARN, provisional CJSOR, provisional manpower SOR (either a request for PE reinforcement or a CE) and provisional TCSOR are transmitted using the Allied Information Flow System (AIFS) and the AIFS Integrated Message System (AIMS) to establish the release authority by SACEUR and confirm receipt by nations.

3-44. **Coordinate National Offers and Request Forces.**

a. **Review National Force Offers.** Nations should acknowledge receipt of the ACTWARN and, depending on the circumstances, respond with either informal force offers or a formal FORCEPREP identifying force commitments to fill specific serials on the provisional CJSOR. National offers and commitments are consolidated and reviewed against the overall requirements, as a basis for developing and coordinating proposals with nations to eliminate redundancies and fill shortfalls.

b. **Conduct Formal Coordination with Nations.** Formal bilateral coordination with nations will be required to clarify and confirm offers and commitments as well as to discuss proposed adjustments. FOG must determine the requirements and scheduling of conferences for multilateral coordination of forces, manpower and theatre capabilities required for the operation.

\textsuperscript{97} Transfer of Authority. Within NATO, an action by which a member nation or NATO Command gives operational command or control of designated forces to a NATO Command. (AAP-06).

\textsuperscript{98} In lieu of an ACTWARN, DSACEUR may send nations a formal ‘calling’ letter to initiate force generation.

\textsuperscript{99} Bi-SC Reporting Directive 80-3, Volume III, Section 14 (ACTWARN).
c. **Prepare and Conduct a FG Conference.**

(1) The purpose of the FG conference is to establish national commitments to provide the forces, capabilities and manpower called for in the provisional CJSOR, provisional TCSOR and provisional manpower SOR. The conference is prepared by FOG and chaired by DSACEUR. It requires participation from potential TCNs, as well as the designated COM JHQ and the subordinate/CCs. FOG, coordinated with the RDG, must decide whether it is appropriate to include members, partners and other non-NATO nations in a single conference or to conduct separate conferences.

(2) The FG conference typically begins with a review of the strategic CONOPS, as approved by the NAC, and then addresses the force capability requirement described in each serial of the provisional CJSOR to confirm which nation(s) will commit to providing the required force capabilities. The opportunity for negotiation, both in and out of session, requires that FOG (assisted by the RDG as required) prepare any issues with DSACEUR in advance. The conference result is a ‘draft’ CJSOR with national commitments for each serial, which sets the stage for the Initial Logistics and Movements Conferences that are typically convened immediately following the FG conference. Coordination of required manpower and theatre capabilities can be accomplished during the conference or separately.

d. **Issue the Activation Request (ACTREQ) Message.** Based on national commitments established in the draft CJSOR, FOG prepares the ACTREQ requesting nations to formally confirm their force contributions to the force package in the draft CJSOR, and to identify the forces that they intend to provide by sending a FORCEPREP message initially, followed by the required order of battle (ORBAT) force data to SACEUR by a specified date. The ACTREQ should also provide instructions for confirmation of manpower and theatre capabilities. The RDG should provide input, as required, for the ACTREQ development, including the following:

(1) Deployment requirements.

(2) Command Relationships (related to TOA).

(3) ROE (in effect for the deployment phase).

(4) Preparations.

(5) PA Guidance.

3-45. **Activate Enabling Forces for Pre-Deployment.**

a. **Review Requirements for the pre-Deployment of Enabling Forces.** When there is an urgent requirement to establish an early NATO presence in the theatre, the NAC may authorise the pre-deployment of enabling forces\(^{100}\) as soon as they are

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\(^{100}\) Enabling forces – those forces required at the beginning of an expeditionary operation to establish conditions required for the early and rapid entry of the main force into the theatre of operations and deployment within the JOA. (Proposed definition).
available and prior to the NAC approval of the OPLAN and NED. This requirement should have been identified during the development of strategic response options, including MROs, and addressed in the NID or during the operational estimate by the designated JHQ. In any case it should be ensured that these requirements are reflected in the FAD, addressed in the ACTWARN, coordinated with nations during the FG conference and, finally, included in the ACTREQ. Requirements for the pre-deployment of enabling forces typically include:

1. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).
2. Special operations.
3. CIS, including CD.
4. Security of LOC, entry points and lodgement areas.
5. Joint Logistics Support Group (JLSG) HQ.
6. Reception, staging and onward movement of forces.
7. PA, InfoOps and PsyOps.
8. Civil-military cooperation.
9. Logistics and contracting support.

b. **Request Enabling Forces for pre-Deployment.** Based on commitments coordinated with nations and specific requirements established in the ACTREQ, contributing nations should respond by identifying in their FORCEPREP messages those enabling forces they are prepared to deploy into the theatre in advance of an ACTORD.

c. **Direct Activation Pre-deployment.** Once the NAC has authorised SACEUR to deploy enabling forces to the theatre, the RDG prepares the Activation Pre-deployment (ACTPRED) message for approval and release by SACEUR. The ACTPRED authorises the pre-deployment of enabling forces and their TOA to SACEUR, as well as the release of initial NATO common funding.

### 3-46. Appreciate Force Contributions and Balance the Force Package.

a. **Process National FORCEPREP Messages.** Nations respond to the ACTREQ with FORCEPREP messages which provide detailed information regarding the forces they will contribute to the force package, including the readiness status, planned command relationships and any caveats on employment. They should also provide updated ORBAT force data.

b. **Prepare and Issue the Draft Allied Force List (AFL).** The RDG FOG SME will consolidate the nations’ force contributions as reported in their FORCEPREP messages, update the CJSOR and produce the AFL for the entire force package. It should be reviewed by the RDG to identify shortfalls and sent to the designated JHQ for comment. The force package data will be used during plan development and therefore must adhere
to NATO information standards so that it can be shared among different HQs and used with automated operations and logistics functional services.

c. **Balance the Force Package.** Based on their appreciation of the impact of any capability shortfalls, FOG (supported by the RDG) may initiate further bilateral coordination or recommend a further force balancing conference to address shortfalls with nations. The aim of force balancing is:

   (1) To balance the force package against the mission requirements within acceptable risks.

   (2) To balance the operational, support and C2 elements to allow efficient and effective employment.

Therefore, a deliberate cross-functional review of the entire force package with the designated JHQ and subordinate/CCs may be required to identify any issues and develop recommendations for DSACEUR’s consideration and presentation to the troop-contributing nations (TCNs). The resulting force balancing decisions may require additional ACTREQ and FORCEPREP messages, as well as changes to the CJSOR and the corresponding AFL.

d. **Appreciate Strategic and Operational Risks from Shortfalls in Critical Capabilities.** COM JHQ should provide an appreciation of the operational risks resulting from any critical shortfalls following force balancing. The RDG must also analyse the strategic risks related to capability shortfalls and the strategic risks associated with potential lack of progress in the non-military domains. FOG, in collaboration with the RDG, will then provide recommendations to DSACEUR as to whether these risks are acceptable along with the possibilities for mitigation. If risks are not acceptable with mitigation, then those considered to be unmanageable should be identified with the strategic OPLAN when submitted, for consideration and acceptance prior to its approval.

### 3-47. Coordinate Integration of Non-NATO Forces.

a. **Review Requirements for Integrating Forces from Partners and non-NATO Nations.** The NID should provide an initial indication of the NAC’s desire to allow participation by partners and other non-NATO nations and may authorise SACEUR to coordinate directly with designated nations. The subsequent NAC FAD should clearly state those partners and other non-NATO nations to be included in the force activation process and the degree of Information and Intelligence Sharing. These nations are kept informed through the EAPC and the Bi-SC MIP at SHAPE. They are notified of requirements by the ACTWARN and ACTREQ messages and may be invited to attend FG and force balancing conferences.

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101 Refer to MC 567.

102 Offers by partners and other non-NATO nations must be certified initially by SACEUR and determined by the NAC to be politically acceptable as preconditions for a formal invitation by the NATO Secretary General to contribute to the operation.
b. **Review and Advise on Initial Force Offers from non-NATO Nations.** The RDG FOG SME informs the RDG and the JHQ of initial offers received from non-NATO nations. The RDG (led by the FOG and MIP SMEs) should consider these offers and develop input for DSACEUR including in the following areas:

   1. MC initial certification of forces and inclusion of nations in the FG process, or
   
   2. Force evaluation and certification, as a prerequisite for further consideration, or
   
   3. If force offers are not to be further considered at this point.

c. **Arrange for Certification of non-NATO Force Contributions.** The RDG (led by the MIP SME) must determine the specific requirements for the evaluation and certification of non-NATO force offers and develop arrangements for the conduct of evaluations by ACO or member nations. These evaluations should determine the suitability and acceptability of these force offers and provide the basis for SACEUR’s recommendation to the MC to finally certify these forces as part of a NATO-led force. To the extent possible, the existing Operational Capabilities Concept Evaluation and Feedback (OCC E&F) Programme should be used as the basis for certifying Partner forces. Arrangements will be documented in Annex GG of the strategic OPLAN. Certification should take account of the following:

   1. Suitability of the force to meet specific CJSOR capability requirements.
   
   2. Interoperability with NATO forces, including communications security.
   
   3. Readiness for deployment to the theatre and employment in the JOA.
   
   4. Sustainability by the contributing nation.

d. **Establish Coordination and Liaison with ACO HQs.** Once non-NATO force offers have been certified, formal letters of agreement will be signed between NATO and the respective nations. The RDG should be prepared to assist in specifying any particular requirements regarding the participation of these non-NATO nations in the operation, including any C2, legal, financial and information security arrangements. In addition, the RDG should coordinate the required provision of liaison officers to SHAPE and ACO subordinate HQs, as required.

3-48. **Integrate Forces with OPLAN Development.**

   a. **Review Requirements for Integrating Force.** FG will typically be conducted in parallel with OPLAN development at both the strategic and operational levels. The CJSOR, with the corresponding AFL, provides information regarding force capabilities and limitations, including any caveats on employment, as well as their support requirements. Operational level planning by the JHQ will focus on the deployment and logistic support of forces within the theatre and their operational employment within the JOA. Strategic planning will focus on the strategic aspects of deployment, C2, intelligence, cooperation with other non-military means, sustainment and communications.
b. **Coordinate the Allied Disposition List (ADL).** The ADL establishes the time-phased flow of the force package’s force components into the theatre and to the final destination in their designated areas of operations, including APODs and SPODs as well as the transfer of command authority to the gaining NATO force Commander. It provides the basis for all deployment, sustainment and C2 planning for the operation and is included in Annex A of the strategic OPLAN. The ADL requires multi-level cross-staff coordination including the following functional areas:

1. Operations.
2. Movements.
3. Logistics.
4. MILENG.
5. Communications and information systems.
6. Legal.

c. **Issue the Coordinated ADL.** The coordinated ADL should be approved by DSACEUR and released to nations as well as ACO subordinate commands as a common basis for strategic and operational level plan development. Ideally, the ADL should be issued as an electronic data file based on common information standards to allow rapid processing using automated functional services for operations and logistics planning.

d. **Maintain Configuration Control of the ADL.** The RDG FOG SME must establish and maintain configuration control of the ADL by coordinating and validating proposed changes that may result from further force balancing actions as well as planning with nations and ACO subordinate commands. Changes must be published in revised versions of the ADL and transmitted using the AIFS/AIMS to confirm receipt.

3-49. **Activate Forces for Deployment.**

a. **Issue the Activation Order (ACTORD) Message.** Once the strategic OPLAN is endorsed by the MC and approved by the NAC, the NAC will issue a NED if and when they decide to initiate the execution of the operation. The NED provides the authority for SACEUR to issue an ACTORD message to all participating nations and commands, which initiates the process for TOA of national forces to SACEUR, the deployment of NATO forces and the release of NATO common funding. The RDG assists the CCOMC in the preparation of the ACTORD to ensure that any critical information is included, such as:

1. Deployment of forces will be coordinated by the AMCC and conducted in accordance with SACEUR’s Multinational Detailed Deployment Plan (MN DDP).
2. Specifying conditions for TOA of forces to SACEUR on arrival in theatre.
3. Release of common funding.
(4) ROE within the theatre.

(5) PA/media policy/military information campaign in effect.

b. **Process ORBATTOA Messages from TCNs.** Upon receipt of the ACTORD, nations should respond by sending an order of battle transfer of authority (ORBATTOA) message to SHAPE to transfer the requested command authority to SACEUR and delegate authority to the gaining command. The CCOMC will pass ORBATTOA messages to the gaining JHQ and track TOA to ensure that all forces are brought under NATO command authority.
Figure 3.11 - Strategic OPLAN Development Main Activities
3-50. **Initiate Strategic OPLAN Development.**

a. Following the submission of the strategic CONOPS for NAC approval, the RDG will normally be directed to begin development of the strategic OPLAN; alternatively, this phase begins once the NAC approves the strategic CONOPS and directs the development of the strategic OPLAN.

b. **Review Guidance and Direction.** The RDG leadership should review the following, seeking command guidance as required: any changes to the strategic CONOPS, necessary to gain NAC approval; any issue raised in SACEUR’s review of the strategic CONOPS and the JHQ’s Operational CONOPS; and/or any additional NAC, MC, SACEUR or COP guidance.

c. **Update Planning Milestones and Work Plan.** The NID and MC guidance will typically establish deadlines for the submission of the OPLAN. Therefore, the RDG must establish planning milestones and adjust its work plan within SHAPE as well as with subordinate commands and other organisations to make the best use of available time, including as a minimum for:

1. The review of the approved strategic CONOPS.
2. The submission of the operational CONOPS for SACEUR final approval.
3. The submission of COM JHQ’s draft operational OPLAN.
4. The submission of the draft strategic OPLAN to the COP, including:
   a. Submission, review and coordination, and revision of initial drafts, including all annexes and appendices.
   b. External review and coordination.
5. Further requests for authorisation to implement specific CRMs as required to prepare and activate specific capabilities.

Much of the work in this phase will be done in parallel; therefore, it is important for the RDG to ensure sufficient plenary sessions, or other mechanisms, to ensure that all RDG staff retain the same situational awareness.

d. **Convene RDG.** The RDG will be convened to accomplish the following:

1. Review the status of political-military developments at the MC and NAC.
2. Review requests from the supported JHQ and supporting commands.
3. Address issues raised by SACEUR.

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103 This section is written for the development of a strategic OPLAN; it can be used as a basis for the production of other strategic operations plans (e.g. CONPLAN, generic CONPLAN or Standing Defence Plan(SDP)).

104 MC133/4 states that CONOPS approval (by the initiating authority) is not a pre-requisite for further plan development, although it is required for the plan’s full development and submission.
(4) Review coordination required with relevant non-NATO actors, including security issues linked to information, knowledge and intelligence sharing.

(5) Develop the strategic OPLAN. The strategic CONOPS is used as the start point for the strategic OPLAN (see the OPLAN format at Annex B Appendix 5).

(a) Specific sections of the OPLAN main body will be assigned to specific RDG functional experts.

(b) The RDG will re-evaluate the Annexes necessary to support the strategic OPLAN to determine if any new annexes/appendices are required. Throughout strategic OPLAN development: the content of the selected annexes/appendices will continue to be identified, developed and refined; and the RDG should, as required, re-evaluate those needed for inclusion. Each annex/appendix will be assigned to a specific RDG functional expert for development.

(6) Establish arrangements for transitioning the OPLAN to the CCOMC for its execution.

e. **Review Liaison and Coordination for Collaborative Planning.** The RDG should re-evaluate its requirements for liaison and coordination. The primary organisations that are typically involved in Phase 4b are the same as those described for Phase 4a. The RDG should confirm that they have the authorities or the mechanisms to engage all relevant governmental and non-governmental organisations (e.g. through CIVAD, CMI or NATO HQ IS (PASP)). RDG leadership should remain apprised of current issues and developments associated with the crisis through the CCOMC, and the liaison officers from NATO HQ. If deemed necessary by the NAC, a SPMP will be developed at NATO HQ; SHAPE liaison at an appropriate level should be established with any NATO HQ body drafting such a document.

f. **Appreciate Approved Strategic CONOPS and Seek Operational CONOPS Approval.** The RDG must factor any changes in the strategic CONOPS, which resulted during its staffing for NAC approval, into the strategic OPLAN development. Once the strategic CONOPS is approved, the RDG must inform the JOPG of any changes, especially if they impact the operational CONOPS. The operational CONOPS is staffed to SACEUR for approval or, if needed, returned to COM JHQ for amendment prior to staffing to SACEUR.

g. **Review Strategic Planning Requirements.** The focus of the RDG during strategic OPLAN development should be on integrating and synchronising military actions, including those of the supported JHQ and other supporting NATO commands and agencies, with non-military actions by NATO and non-NATO actors within a comprehensive approach. The aim must be twofold:

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105 Depending on the necessary pace of the planning for a particular crisis, the draft operational CONOPS may remain a ‘draft’ to allow the JHQ to concentrate on the development of the operational OPLAN; if this is the case any points that result from the RDG review of the draft operational CONOPS or due to the changes in the strategic CONOPS, necessary to gain NAC approval, must be passed to the JHQ so they can be factored into operational OPLAN development.
(1) First, to ensure that required strategic resources, capabilities and supporting activities are coordinated and arranged to facilitate operational success during execution by the designated JHQ within the JOA.

(2) Second, to ensure that these activities are synchronised with supporting and/or supported activities by other relevant actors within the framework of a comprehensive approach.

Responsibilities must be clearly established for operations in the theatre that are external to the JOA, including rear areas, the communications zone and strategic LOC, as required. Therefore, the RDG should focus on strategic and theatre-level planning requirements associated with, but not limited to, the following:

(1) Coordination of military activities in theatre with supporting/supported activities by non-NATO actors within the framework of a comprehensive approach.

(2) Employment of strategic resources – ISR, deterrence, StratCom, targeting, theatre and strategic reserves, CMI, etc.

(3) Command and Control – delegation and TOA, areas of responsibility, coordination with relevant non-NATO actors, ROE, operations assessment at the strategic level, etc.

(4) Force preparation and sustainment – training, evaluation and certification, theatre logistic support, capability development, force rotation, etc.

(5) Strategic deployment – movements architecture, coordination and de-confliction of transportation resources, operation of strategic LOC and ports of debarkation, etc.

(6) Force Protection - strategic LOC, staging areas, theatre entry points and the communications zone, etc.

h. Review the Status of Planning. OPLAN development at the strategic level depends on critical planning actions by NATO HQ and participating nations, as well as input from the designated JHQ and relevant non-NATO actors. It requires that close coordination and liaison be maintained with these different HQs and nations, especially during the FG process in order for the RDG to remain abreast of developments and raise issues requiring further attention. Critical areas that directly impact on OPLAN development, particularly during crisis response planning, include:

(1) Legal Arrangements. Legal requirements for the operation should have been identified with the strategic MROs and further specified in the strategic CONOPS. The LEGAD SME in the RDG must be proactive in working with the NATO LEGAD to ensure that these previously identified essential legal arrangements are being put in place, while ensuring that the RDG is updated on their status.
(2) **StratCom.** Any changes in the StratCom objectives and guidance\(^\text{106}\) by NATO HQ must be immediately noted and incorporated in the strategic OPLAN. Any considerations resulting from the JHQ’s review of the StratCom concept equally must be immediately noted, evaluated, and incorporated into the strategic OPLAN as appropriate. Additionally, NAC approval of StratCom guidance in the main body of the strategic CONOPS and the StratCom, PA, InfoOps and PsyOps annexes is critical to moving forward with pre-deployment tasks.

(3) **Targeting.** The RDG should update the status of NAC targeting guidance (and caveats) and approval of the target sets and illustrative target categories identified by SACEUR in the strategic CONOPS to allow detailed planning to proceed in line with political guidance.

(4) **ROE.** An illustrative ROEREQ should have accompanied the strategic CONOPS to support the JHQ requirements for the potential use of force in the accomplishment of the mission. The RDG should review the status of any NAC guidance on the illustrative ROEREQ and discuss the implications with the JOPG.

(5) **Planning by Subordinate and Supporting Commands.** The RDG should be updated on the status of planning by the designated JHQ and supporting commands, with particular attention to:

(a) The status of operational CONOPS/OPLAN development.

(b) Coordination of supporting/supported requirements.

(c) Issues and concerns.

(d) Requirements for additional assistance, expertise and/or liaison for their planning.

(e) Coordination with designated relevant non-NATO actors.

i. **Planning with Relevant non-NATO Actors.** OPLAN development will likely require detailed coordination with relevant non-NATO actors, as authorised by the NAC. It is important to review planning requirements, the current status of planning and the arrangements that will be made to facilitate coordination, including the delineation of responsibilities between SHAPE and the designated JHQ.

j. **Review the Status of Force Generation.** FG activities will be ongoing in parallel with other planning activities. As required the RDG will support FOG during the FG process. The RDG FOG SME should regularly update the RDG on progress in filling the provisional CJSOR and identify force balancing issues and associated risks so that they may be factored into planning. As they become available, FG products should be shared within the RDG and other planning groups to track the status of national commitments and the resolution or mitigation of force shortfalls.

\(^{106}\) The StratCom objectives and guidance may be developed into a SECGEN authorised StratCom framework, in collaboration with ACO StratCom staff.
k. **Coordinate NATO CRMs.**

(1) **Review Requirements for CRM.** The RDG should continuously review requirements for CRM to enhance NATO’s preparation and readiness, in particular:

- A Manpower
- B Intelligence
- D Force Protection
- E General Operations
- I PsyOps
- J Electronic Warfare
- K Meteorology/Oceanography
- L CBRN Defence
- M Logistics
- O Forces Readiness
- P Communications and Information Systems
- Q Critical Infrastructure and Services
- S Public Affairs

It is especially important that the RDG remain apprised of developments in the FG process; they should discuss with FOG how CRMs could assist in ensuring that capabilities are ready and available to meet potential operational requirements.

(2) **Process CRM Requests and Track Implementation.** Based on their appreciation of requirements identified during planning, as well as any requests from the designated JHQ, RDG functional area SMEs should develop requests within their areas of responsibility for further CRM declaration, with the necessary operational justification. As required, SACEUR issues a Declaration Message and nations respond with an NCRS Implementation Report reflecting national implementation decisions. If declaration authority for these addition CRMS has not yet been devolved, SACEUR will seek NAC approval. The automated NCRS Tracking Application is used by the CCOMC and the RDG to assist with tracking the status of implementation by nations.

I. **Consider Transition to CCOMC for Execution.** The planning for the future transition from the RDG to the CCOMC for execution should be considered early in OPLAN development. The RDG should be reinforced by additional CCOMC staff, who will assume staff responsibility during execution. Arrangements should be made to
ensure continuity between planning and execution across all functional areas. This must balance the requirements for those who developed the plan to oversee its execution with the need to continue planning during the conduct of operations.

3-51. Develop International Legal Arrangements.

a. Confirm Legal Requirements for the Operation. The further development of the plan and its eventual execution require that international legal provisions are in place. These must be reviewed by the RDG and typically include the following:

   (1) The international mandate.

   (2) Status of forces with host nations in the theatre.

   (3) Legal agreements on transit, basing and support of forces and the use of infrastructure and facilities.

   (4) Additional legal agreements/arrangements for mission support with host and third nations (e.g. handover of suspected criminals, handling and prosecution of suspected pirates, etc).

b. Establish or Review Status of Forces Agreement(s). SOFAs are required with individual countries to establish the legal status of forces as they enter and operate within the theatre. Where there is no recognised legal government, a UN mandate\(^\text{107}\) must establish the legal status. On behalf of NATO, SOFAs are negotiated by the NATO HQ LEGAD based on operational requirements developed by the RDG LEGAD in coordination with the designated JHQ. They should be in place prior to entry into the theatre of NATO-led forces. In lieu of a SOFA concluded in a treaty-like form, an “exchange of letters” with respective political authorities must as a minimum provide for the following:

   (1) Transport of arms and ammunition.

   (2) Carrying of individual weapons.

   (3) Use of the electromagnetic frequency spectrum.

   (4) Control of airspace.

   (5) Use of lethal and non-lethal force.

   (6) Legal responsibility of the TCNs.

   (7) Status and/or authority of Medical personnel and assets.

c. Conclude HNS Agreement(s). Following the establishment of the SOFA, a HNS agreement must be negotiated by SHAPE with the respective host nation(s) on behalf of the JHQ and TCNs. It represents the formal establishment of overarching principles for the provision of HNS between the SC, the TCN(s) and the HN and establishes the basis

\(^{107}\) A UN mandate may be considered to have come from a specific UN resolution, or a decision taken or approved by the UN.
on which the HNS planning process can be built. It should support the operational needs of the JHQ and therefore requires RDG input. The process is led by DCOS RES in coordination with LEGAD, J8 and the Provost Marshal. According to NATO HNS doctrine (AJP 4.5) and pending HN approval, this agreement is normally concluded as a MOU.

d. **Develop follow-on HNS Arrangements.** These follow-on HNS arrangements, according to NATO HNS doctrine and pending HN approval, could take the following form:

   (1) **Technical Arrangement (TA).** TAs will be developed at the JHQ level to amplify the concept and procedures for the provision of HNS common to all participants.

   (2) **Joint Implementation Arrangement (JIA).** JIAs will be developed at the component level and they will include financial obligations, serving as the fundamental “contracts” between the HN and TCNs for provision of specific HNS.

3-52. **Synchronise Military and non-Military Activities within a Comprehensive Approach.**

a. **Confirm Interaction with other NATO and Relevant non-NATO Actors.** Depending on the degree of coordination authorised and achieved with other NATO and relevant international actors, it is critical that the RDG confirm more precisely the specific areas for interaction and activities which, based on a common agreement of the purpose, require synchronisation.

b. **Coordinate Supported/Supporting Relationships with other NATO and Relevant International Actors.** The RDG must establish in principle the complementary supported and supporting relationships and agree the nature of the support to be provided as well as any mechanisms for coordination. It may be necessary to develop memoranda of understanding or letters of agreement to establish a more formal basis for cooperation in the theatre.

3-53. **Plan for the Employment of Strategic Resources.**

a. **Review Planning Requirements for Employment of Strategic Resources.** Recognising that the designated JHQ is responsible for the employment of forces within the JOA, strategic level planning should focus on integrating and synchronising the employment of strategic resources external to the JOA and in support of the JHQ to facilitate operational success. Planning must be closely coordinated with the supported JHQ as well as contributing nations, supporting commands and non-NATO entities as required. Planning should address, but should not be limited to, the following:

   (1) Strategic and theatre level ISR.

   (2) Strategic containment, deterrence, coercion or attack.

   (3) StratCom, and how delivery of effects/activities may communicate strategically.

   (4) Targeting.
(5) Cyber Defence.

(6) Integration of non-military instruments.

(7) Theatre and strategic reserves.

b. **Plan Strategic and Theatre Level ISR.** In any operation, especially an expeditionary operation, there will be a requirement to improve situational awareness within the theatre. This leads to requirements for the advance deployment of ISR sensors, such as NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control System (NAEW&CS), to the theatre, as well as requesting the deployment or positioning of national capabilities required for the development of theatre intelligence. The RDG should review and update SACEUR’s CCIRs and refine PIRs with the supported JHQ to plan and, if need be, request activation and pre-deployment of ISR assets. Planning must provide for C2, support and protection of ISR once deployed.

c. **Plan Strategic Enabling, Containment, Deterrence, Coercion or Attack.** The RDG is responsible for planning the integration and synchronisation of NATO military activities with non-military actions by NATO and cooperating relevant international actors to implement SACEUR’s strategic concept. These activities in principle will be external and complementary to operations by the supported JHQ within the JOA and therefore require close coordination with the JHQ planners, particularly with regards to C2 and support within the theatre. They are typically developed to isolate the JOA from adverse influences and to establish favourable conditions for the theatre among nations adjacent to the JOA as well as others engaged in the theatre.

(1) Strategic integration and synchronisation of military and non-military actions may be required to:

(a)Enable – provide assistance and support to:

1/ Nations adjacent to the JOA to provide operational support to NATO operations and to prevent attacks by illegally armed groups and the flow of arms from their territory.

2/ IOs and nations external to the theatre for post-conflict security sector reforms, stabilisation and reconstruction.

(b) Contain – prevent threats or acts of aggression or armed violence in adjacent areas from spreading within the theatre and into the JOA.

(c) Deter – to convince potential opposing forces that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains.

(d) Coerce – threaten or actually employ force to enforce sanctions required to compel adversaries to comply with the international mandate as a condition for subsequent operations in the JOA.

(e) Destroy/Neutralise – employ lethal and non-lethal force to eliminate the military capacity of an adversary to carry out the international mandate.
d. **Develop Strategic Targeting.** The RDG develops strategic targeting requirements and identifies priority targets as an integral part of planning strategic activities. Targets are selected from available databases based on an understanding of key elements and nodes in specific systems that must be influenced to further influence or exploit critical vulnerabilities in the COG of an adversary or protect vulnerabilities in own COG. It requires that the RDG identify high-value targets and select those that offer the greatest payoff in terms of creating the required strategic effects. Coordination with nations is required to develop a single integrated database for the theatre that supports the development and maintenance of the Joint Prioritised Target List (JPTL) by the supported JHQ and prioritised strategic targets by SHAPE.

e. **Plan Strategic/Theatre Reserves.** The strategic concept should have identified the requirement for strategic or theatre reserves that typically remain on call out of the theatre. Further planning will be necessary with the supported JHQ to determine more precisely the level of readiness required for deployment based on possible contingencies. These requirements and arrangements for activation as well as in theatre reconnaissance and rehearsals should be addressed with contributing nations.

f. **Integrate Military and non-Military Instruments.** The RDG must confirm the actions of other cooperating entities that should be integrated and synchronised with NATO military actions within the theatre. On this basis the RDG should establish suitable mechanisms on behalf of the supported JHQ for coordination and the exchange of information in theatre.

3-54. **Plan StratCom.**

a. **Review Requirements for StratCom.** StratCom must be an integral component of planning based on the mission-specific StratCom objectives and guidance adopted by the NAC. Therefore, it is critically important that the RDG be proactive in providing the necessary planning support in line with the strategic concept and in coordination with the supported JHQ. Planning for StratCom, supported by the StratCom staff, should include the following:

1. Review NATO strategic objectives, including MSOs, and effects and consider and provide input regarding the impact of military actions on the information environment.

2. Further develop narratives, themes and master messages for different audiences.

3. Determine StratCom aims and match to audiences and targets in conjunction with an over-arching engagement strategy.

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108 Strategic targeting processes should include mechanisms for identifying natural and cultural resources, and mitigating the adverse effects of joint operations upon them.

109 Available information sources and databases that provide the level of detail required to support targeting, including national databases such as the U.S. Modernised Integrated Database (MIDB), may be combined to produce a single Integrated Database (IDB) for the theatre.

110 As described in AD 80-70, a high-value target (HVT), ‘can be considered as a target the adversary commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. The loss of HVTs would be expected to seriously degrade important adversary functions throughout the commander’s area of interest.’ (AD 80-70).
(4) Establish responsibilities and arrangements for military support to PD, PA, InfoOps and PsyOps.

(5) Develop criteria for the assessment of StratCom activities and the impact of military activities on the information environment.

(6) Coordinate StratCom activities with non-military and non-NATO entities.

(7) Ensure limitations are taken into account.

(8) Appreciate risks to StratCom and develop mitigation actions.

(9) Identify and establish required mechanisms to address issues of strategic and/or political importance, including but not limited to Civilian Casualties (CIVCAS) and counter-propaganda.

b. Review NATO Strategic Objectives, including Military Strategic Objectives, and desired effects. NATO strategic objectives, including MSOs, and desired effects are developed to ensure that NATO achieves its end state. NATO’s actions must be clearly understood to gain support from governments, populations and other groups in the theatre as well as to influence the actions of adversaries. The RDG, with the support of StratCom Advisors, must continually analyse the objectives and desired effects in light of current strategic conditions to ensure that military activities, including those of the information disciplines, are coherent, aligned and contribute to desired effects for each phase of the operation.

c. Further Develop Narratives, Themes and Master Messages for Different Audiences. Based on their understanding of the different perspectives and biases of the different audiences, StratCom should develop an over-arching, resonating narrative, upon which themes and master messages can be based. StratCom must then refine the themes and master messages depending on the strategic conditions, taking into account audience receptiveness, susceptibility and vulnerability to different historical, social, cultural, and religious references. This may include the necessity to establish agreed terminology to be used by all actors in the information environment when referring to adversaries and local populations. Here those in the RDG charged with considering the perspectives of others (Intel, Military Partnership and CMI) as well as systems analysts and other experts from the CMA team may be able to assist.

d. Determine StratCom Aims and Match to Audiences in Conjunction with an Over-arching Engagement Strategy. The Alliance (and its partners if applicable) must act in close concert in the delivery of agreed themes, messages and actions based on a planned and coordinated design to deliver specific StratCom aims. Where possible, other international actors, opinion formers and elites should be integrated into this approach through a coordinated engagement strategy at all levels within the wider local, regional and international public to promote support for NATO actions.

e. Develop Operations Assessment Criteria for the Evaluation of StratCom Activities and the Impact of Military Activities on the Information Environment. To evaluate the effectiveness of activities and messages in achieving the StratCom aims and contributing to the desired effects, StratCom must assist the development of
operations assessment criteria and MOEs within the larger cadre of the overall operations assessment effort. These should be closely coordinated for the conduct of operations assessment at the strategic level, including with InfoOps, PA and planning.

f. **Establish Responsibilities and Arrangements for Military Support to PD, PA, InfoOps and PsyOps.** On the basis of coordination with NATO IS and IMS, the supported JHQ and relevant cooperating non-NATO actors, StratCom, must clearly establish responsibilities and coordination mechanisms for the conduct of military activities in support of PD, PA, InfoOps and PsyOps within the theatre.

g. **Coordinate StratCom Activities with Relevant Non-military and Non-NATO actors.** To promote coherence in StratCom among the non-military and relevant cooperating non-NATO actors, StratCom should arrange a suitable venue in consultation with the NATO SCPB, to coordinate and harmonise the principal aspects of StratCom activities in the theatre and within the wider international community. In particular, arrangements and mechanisms must be agreed that will allow regular coordination of information activities during the subsequent phases of the operation and in response to urgent information requirements as a result of events on the ground.

h. **Appreciate Limitations.** There will likely be restraints and constraints imposed by political-level guidance and conditions in the JOA. These must be taken into account to ensure the StratCom effort remains focused and does not exceed the level of ambition of the nations.

i. **Appreciate Risks to StratCom and Develop Mitigation Actions.** Risks to StratCom can take many forms, including but not limited to message incoherence, information fratricide and rising expectations. These risks must be evaluated and mitigation actions planned against them.

j. **Identify and Establish Required Mechanisms to Address Issues of Strategic and/or Political Importance.** There is a need to identify and establish required mechanisms to address issues of strategic and/or political importance, including, but not limited to, CIVCAS and counter-propaganda. Mechanisms are required to address issues of political and/or strategic sensitivity to prevent an erosion or loss of NATO’s credibility and prevent the development of a gap between what NATO says and does and the perception of NATO at all levels. These mechanisms can take many forms, but two important issues are CIVCAS and propaganda. Responsive, thorough mechanisms for identifying, investigating and releasing information on all credible CIVCAS claims caused by NATO forces must be implemented and coordinated at all levels. Equally, implementation of a proactive counter-propaganda mechanism coordinated at all levels is a must. Failure to do either of these mechanisms will result in a rapid loss of NATO’s credibility in the theatre and perhaps even within the wider international community.

3-55. **Plan for Command and Control.**

a. **Review C2 Planning Requirements.** NAC approval of the strategic CONOPS will confirm command responsibilities, the main components of the command structure, and the definition of the JOA and the TOO. FG will have identified the HQs and C2 assets provided by nations to meet C2 requirements. Further planning within the RDG, the supported JHQ and other supporting commands will typically identify additional
requirements and refinements in C2 arrangements for the operation. The RDG will have
to ensure that the C2 is adequate for the multinational nature of the forces from all
contributing nations and articulates arrangements for coordination with non-NATO
entities.

b. **Refine Responsibilities for Theatre Level Activities and Functions.** OPLAN
development requires further coordination between strategic and operational levels to
establish planning responsibility for theatre activities and functions external to the JOA.
On this basis, the RDG should coordinate and further develop the command
responsibilities and arrangements, including liaison and coordination requirements, with
the supported JHQ.

c. **Establish Arrangements for Coordination with Cooperating non-NATO
   Entities.** Coordination with cooperating non-NATO entities should include arrangements
and mechanisms to be established for coordination and the exchange of information to
synchronise actions in theatre. Typically the key issues to be developed within the RDG
will be related to the following:

   1. Physical arrangements and facilities in theatre required to host a
      coordination centre, including the possibilities to collocate with a leading, relevant,
      non-NATO entity.

   2. Developing the required information sharing agreements for the release
      and sharing of mission specific information, knowledge and/or intelligence with
      non-NATO entities in accordance with NATO information security policy.

d. **ROE.** The RDG (led by operations SMEs, assisted by the LEGAD) will refine the
   ROEREQ, in collaboration with JOPG SMEs and coordination with NATO HQ staff as
   required (e.g. NATO HQ LEGAD). Any issues that cannot be resolved at the functional
   SME level are to be raised to the RDG leadership, COP or SACEUR as appropriate,
   including major differences between what the JHQ is requesting and what the RDG
   recommends.

e. **Plan for CIS and CD.** The strategic CONOPS included a CIS concept based on
   known C2 requirements and CIS constraints. CIS planning, led by the RDG CCD SME
   and in close coordination with NCIA, will refine and implement the CIS concept based on:
   the actual CIS capabilities available, including bandwidth and CIS and CD capabilities in
   the force package; and the further definition of C2 requirements across different
   functional areas.

3-56. **Plan for Strategic Operations Assessment.**

   a. C2 plan development should also include planning for the conduct of strategic
   level operations assessments and contributions to PMRs. Initial planning for operations
   assessment is coordinated within the RDG; however, the CCOMC is responsible for the
   conduct of Operations Assessment during execution. Operations Assessment planning
   involves many different functional areas, including a RDG CCOMC SME, and available
   systems analysts and operational analysts, as required. It should include the following:
(1) Refining any criteria for success developed during the development of the strategic CONOPS.

(2) Developing MOEs, including thresholds and rates of change.

(3) Determining data collection requirements.

(4) Establishing requirements for operations assessments and reporting by ACO subordinate commands based on either the periodic analysis of trends or event driven estimates to address unexpected changes in the situation.

(5) Coordinating requirements for the exchange of information with relevant, cooperating, non-NATO actors regarding specific operations assessment criteria or MOEs.

(6) Establishing responsibilities for collection, reporting, coordination with relevant non-NATO actors and analysis.

Depending on the time available for initial planning, some of the details described above will have to be refined by the CCOMC during execution.


a. Review Strategic Requirements for Force Preparation and Sustainment. The purpose of planning for force preparation and sustainment is to ensure the forces required to mount and conduct operations are fully capable of meeting mission requirements. It includes the following main areas:

(1) Resource management and capability development.

(2) Mission training and certification of HQs, personnel and forces.

(3) Logistic support to the force in theatre.

(4) Rotation of HQs, personnel, forces and reinforcements\textsuperscript{111}.

b. Resource Management and Capability Development. The preparation and sustainment of a NATO-led operation requires the provision and management of NATO resources as well as the development of capabilities to meet theatre requirements.

(1) FG focuses on identifying national contributions to fill requirements for forces, HQs, personnel and certain theatre capabilities.

(2) The planning for acquisition of new capabilities, funded through NATO common funding, is managed by the DCOS Resources Directorate Urgent Capabilities Management Branch (UCM) in close coordination with the RDG and JCAP. Particular attention should be given to detailing requirements to support enabling and initial entry operations, establishment of the theatre C2 network, operating ports and facilities. Project development and programming is

\textsuperscript{111} See paragraph 21 SMAP 15 – NATO Manpower Reinforcement Policy (change 19 to MC 0216/4 - AAP–16 (D)).
coordinated throughout the operation through the Crisis Management Requirements Board (CMRB).

(3) Budget requests are developed and coordinated by J8 as part of the planning process. Particular attention should be given to theatre level HQs and critical theatre level enabling capabilities\(^{112}\), sustainment of CEs and contracting of local services such as interpreters and security. Details are articulated in Annex FF - Financial Support.

c. **Plan for Mission Training and Certification of HQs, Personnel and Forces.** The RDG should ensure that mission training, validation and/or certification requirements for HQs, personnel and forces deploying to the theatre have been developed by subordinate commands. The RDG should ensure that essential information related to pre-deployment training and certification is included in Annex BB - Training and Mission Rehearsals. In addition, the RDG should coordinate the following on behalf of the supported JHQ and other supporting commands:

1. **Mission Rehearsal Training and Exercises** with ACT and its training centres to plan and conduct mission-specific collective training and exercises for deploying HQs and forces as required.

2. **Evaluation and Certification** of HQs and forces with the J7 Evaluation Branch (J7 EVAL) and nations according to existing readiness evaluation programmes for NATO forces, as well as with MIP and partner nations in accordance with the OCC E&F Programme.

3. **Pre-deployment Training** with ACT and the various schools and centres under its control as well as nations to ensure that augmentation and rotating personnel receive mission-specific individual training.

4. **Support for In-Theatre Training** with ACT and nations, including the host nation(s) as required, to establish the capabilities to conduct training in-theatre.

d. **Plan Logistical Support to the Force in Theatre.** The concept for logistics, included in the strategic CONOPS, described how joint multinational logistic support to the force would be accomplished in theatre. During strategic OPLAN development, support staff coordinates detailed planning required with TCN and HNs on behalf of the supported JHQ and other supporting commands to ensure that supplies and services will be delivered to the force to meet operational requirements for each phase.

e. Logistical conferences arranged by the RDG support staff will be required to confirm logistic arrangements, especially with the HN(s) and TCNs, to ensure that they meet operational needs and allow for a sufficient build-up of logistic resources, including stockpiles for Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (POL) and critical munitions. Any shortfalls in HN support may require the activation and deployment of additional logistic units. With the possibility of significant operational impact, the following areas must be closely coordinated with other RDG planning activity and the resulting details articulated in the strategic OPLAN Annex R - Logistics:

\(^{112}\) As per PO(2013)0056, dated 06 Feb 13.
(1) Logistical Standards. Logistical standards must reflect the expected operational tempo and demands for each phase based on estimates from the supported JHQ and supporting commands.

(2) HNS. The level and scope of HN support must be confirmed based on close contacts with the HN(s) including access to specific facilities, infrastructure and logistic operating units, especially ground transportation. Provisions must be made for TCN to coordinate with HN(s) within guidelines established by SACEUR.\(^{113}\)

(3) National Responsibilities. National responsibilities for specific logistic functions under framework, lead or role specialisation nation arrangements must be confirmed in particular for critical logistic activities such as POL distribution.

(4) Theatre Infrastructure. Critical theatre infrastructure requirements such as the improvement of the APOD/SPODs, LOC, and facilities must be identified and prioritised against operational requirements.

(5) Multinational Solutions. Multinational Solutions supporting the mission like a JLSG, Contractors or multinational enablers have to be specified; their tasks and responsibilities and those of nations need to be clearly delineated.

f. **Plan for the Rotation of HQs, Personnel and Forces.** The RDG should anticipate the requirement to sustain the operation through to its termination and develop initial plans\(^ {114}\) for the following:

(1) Rotation of HQs and forces through FG considering the likely tempo of operations and the possibility to adjust force levels over time as well as national rotation requirements.

(2) Rotation of personnel reinforcement in deployed HQs based either on an approved reinforced PE or CE in accordance with NATO personnel management policy.\(^ {115}\) The reinforcement process will be maintained electronically and include the structure, job descriptions and sources identified for each PE or CE post.


a. **Review the Requirements for Planning the Deployment of Forces.** The strategic deployment of forces into a TOO and their onward movement into and within the JOA constitutes a strategic manoeuvre and must be planned as an operation requiring the expertise of operations, movements and logistic planners. Planning should cover the entire sequence of activities required for mounting, embarkation, debarkation, reception, staging and onward movement to the final destination in the JOA. It requires close coordination with:

(1) AMCC.

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\(^{113}\) Refer to AJP-4.5 (A) Allied Joint Host Nation Support Doctrine & Procedures, May 05.

\(^{114}\) Long-term responsibility for planning rotation of forces will fall to FOG.

\(^{115}\) See AAP 16 D.
Legal arrangements must be in place or assumed regarding the status of forces, transit authorisations and over-flight clearances. Details of the deployment of forces are articulated in Annex S – Movements to the strategic OPLAN.

b. **Design and Develop the Theatre Movements Architecture.** The design, development, implementation and control of the strategic movements architecture from ports of embarkation to the ports of debarkation in the theatre is a SHAPE responsibility, coordinated closely with the supported JHQ. Responsibilities for onward movement into the JOA must be delineated. The RDG must confirm as early as possible the strategic LOC and confirm with the HN(s) the availability and capabilities of the following:

1. APOD/SPODs and other key transportation nodes such as railheads.
2. Staging areas and reception facilities.
3. LOC into the JOA.

c. **Finalise the Force Flow.** Based on detailed planning for the employment, sustainment, support and C2 of the force based on the AFL force package, the RDG must confirm the final force flow with the supported JHQ and release the ADL. Specific deployment requirements must be established for each force in the AFL according to the final force flow including the following:

1. Strategic LOC and entry points into the theatre.
2. Final destination in the JOA.
3. Commander’s required date for the full operational capability of the force for employment at final destination in the JOA.
4. Priority for sequence of movement.\(^{116}\)
5. Command authority to be transferred.

d. **Establish Command Authority and Responsibilities for Deployment Operations.** The RDG must confirm specific requirements and responsibilities for the conduct of specific aspects of deployment operations with the supported and supporting commands as well as with the HN(s) for the following critical activities:

1. Mounting operations to prepare assigned HQs and forces for deployment.

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\(^{116}\) Priority is set to allow de-confliction at PODs.
(2) Security of entry points, staging/reception areas, and LOC within the theatre.

(3) Operation of port facilities and reception areas.

(4) Operation of staging areas.

(5) Control of onward movements into the JOA.

e. **Coordinate Detailed Deployment Plans (DDP) with Nations.** The ADL is released by SACEUR and establishes the required flow of forces into the theatre on behalf of the supported JHQ. It provides the authority for the AMCC to coordinate with nations on behalf of SACEUR for the strategic deployment of HQs and forces to their required destination, including the coordination of strategic LOC, modes of transportation and strategic lift. On this basis, each TCN develops DDPs for its forces for coordination and de-conflict by the AMCC, who will create a multinational DDP (MN DDP) that will best achieve the required flow of forces into the theatre once an ACTORD is issued.

f. Deployment planning is coordinated with nations at the strategic level but requires close involvement of the supported JHQ and other supporting commands in a series of Movement Planning Conferences, as follows:

(1) **Initial Movement Planning Conference (IMovPC).** The IMovPC is hosted by the AMCC as soon as possible after ACTWARN and will provide the first step on the deployment planning cycle. The JOPG representative will attend to ensure that the movement plan reflects the operational Commander’s intent. IMovPC should review and confirm the following:

   (a) Overall concept of operations.

   (b) HN resources to include APODs, SPODs and railheads.

   (c) Requirement for sharing logistic and infrastructure resources with relevant non-NATO actors operating in the JOA.

   (d) Required force flow based on the ADL.

   (e) Movement control organisation network and point of contact register.

(2) **Main Movement Planning Conference (MMovPC).** The purpose of the MMovPC is to coordinate the details of the actual deployment of forces based on national deployment planning. The main activities of the MMovPC are:

   (a) Review the DDPs.

   (b) Start the initial de-confliction process, including de-confliction with cooperating relevant non-NATO actors operating in the JOA, as required.

   (c) Start the strategic air and sea appreciation and identify national shortfalls.
(d) Confirm HN support agreements as well as resources and throughput capabilities.

(3) **Final Movement Planning Conference (FMovPC).** The aim of the FMovPC is to provide a fully co-ordinated and de-conflicted Multi-National NDDP agreed by all HQs, TCNs and the HN(s). The MN DDP will form the basis of all further movement planning in support of the plan.

3-59. **Plan Force Protection.**

a. **Review Strategic Requirements for Force Protection Planning.** Force protection\(^{117}\) planning at the strategic level should focus on requirements and measures to be taken to protect the NATO forces from identified risks and threats to strategic LOC and the TOO, especially with respect to the possible use of WMD, including theatre ballistic missiles, from within or beyond the theatre. Close coordination is required with the supported JHQ and supporting commands as well as TCNs and HN(s). Details are articulated in Annex J - Force Protection. Particular attention should be given to protection of forces in transit, choke points, air and sea ports as well as reception and staging areas where concentration of personnel and equipment may be vulnerable to attack. Force protection planning should consider the following four areas:

2. Active Defence.
4. Recuperation.

b. **Protective Security.** The RDG should establish requirements for protective security of strategic activities, facilities and deployment operations. Coordination is required with the supported JHQ and supporting commands, as well as TCNs and HN(s), for the specific protective measures to be taken to address the specific risks and threats, especially from WMD and Cyber.

c. **Active Defence.** Based on the appreciation of the threat of attack from beyond the JOA and or the theatre, the RDG should provide guidance regarding defensive measures to deter, prevent, neutralise, or reduce the effectiveness of potential attacks, including defence against surface, sub-surface, air, rocket and missile attack. The RDG should coordinate any requirements to establish supporting command relations for the provision of active defence measures including:

1. Counter-air operations.
2. Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD).

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\(^{117}\) Force protection is defined as, ‘[a]ll measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force’. (AAP-06). It consists of the following diverse notional capabilities: Security, Military Engineering Support to Force Protection, Air Defence, Force Health Protection, Consequence Management and CBRN Defence.
(3) Port and harbour defences.

(4) Defence of strategic LOC.

(5) Defence of staging, lodgement and rear areas as well as other vital areas.

(6) CBRN defence.

(7) Counter terrorism.

d. **Passive Defence.** Force protection planning should also develop passive defence measures necessary to minimise the likelihood of conventional and CBRN attacks on forces and facilities during deployment and entry into the theatre and to limit the potential consequences. Passive defence guidance should specify measures to limit the exposure of HQs, personnel, forces and facilities and deal with such attacks to ensure their survival and ability to continue operations with minimal loss of effectiveness. Passive defence guidance should also specify requirements, including training requirements, to prepare HQs, personnel and forces deploying into a potential CBRN environment to sustain operations under CBRN conditions.

e. **Recuperation.** Planning for recuperation is primarily the responsibility of the supported JHQ but may require the coordination of strategic resources to deal with risks and threats with more serious potential consequences. Close coordination with the supported JHQ and supporting commands, as well as possibly with the HN(s), will be required to identify contingency recuperation measures that may be required to assist with the recovery from the effects of a major attack, especially from a CBRN attack or Release Other Than Attack (ROTA) and Toxic Industrial Material (TIM) attack. In particular, the RDG should confirm organisational responsibilities and command authorities at strategic and operational levels to ensure timely and effective recuperation action.

f. Strategic planning for recuperation should consider requirements to generate additional capabilities for:

(1) Damage Control (DAMCON).

(2) Rescue operations, including search and rescue / combat search and rescue (SAR/CSAR).

(3) Mass casualty handling.

(4) Decontamination.

3-60. **Review of Draft Operational OPLAN.**

a. Normally, the strategic OPLAN will not be submitted prior to receipt of the draft operational OPLAN. This serves two purposes: first, a final check that the operational level has correctly interpreted all elements of strategic direction and guidance; and second, a final check that all elements needed in the strategic OPLAN, which need NAC approval, have been identified and included. The RDG review should include a review by appropriate functional SMEs of all elements of the operational OPLAN, including
annexes (such as the CJSOR), the TCSOR and the ROEREQ. Any issues identified should be resolved by functional SMEs through discussion with their operational counterparts or through amendment of their portion of the strategic OPLAN, in discussion with the RDG leadership. Any major issues needing direction or resolution prior to staffing the strategic OPLAN should be identified and briefed by ACOS J5, in collaboration with DCCOMC, to the COP or SACEUR, as appropriate. The RDG should ensure that the JOPG receives appropriate feedback on any issues that may need to be addressed in the operational OPLAN prior to SACEUR approval (following approval of strategic OPLAN by the NAC); this will also facilitate any final preparations and planning being done by COM JHQ in the interim, especially any finalization of component level plans.

3-61. Coordinate and Submit Strategic OPLAN.

a. **Coordinate Draft Strategic OPLAN.** Final coordination of the strategic OPLAN, and associated TCSOR and ROEREQ, ensures that responsibilities, authorities, resources, arrangements and actions are in place for all essential strategic activities called for in the plan. This typically requires a deliberate review by the RDG with the liaison officers supporting the RDG, supporting commands and representatives from cooperating relevant non-NATO actors if feasible, as well as HN(s) and TCNs as required.

b. **Conduct Final Evaluation of Strategic Risk.** Based on the outcomes from coordination of the strategic OPLAN, the RDG should conduct a final evaluation of strategic risks, including in particular any risks resulting from shortfalls in critical capabilities or gaps in coordination with relevant non-NATO actors that might put the operation at risk. Recommendations are developed for presentation to SACEUR regarding any risks considered unacceptable at this point or the possible need for any further contingency planning to mitigate identified risks.

c. **Seek SACEUR’s Approval.** ACOS J5, in coordination with DCCOMC, will oversee the final preparation and staffing of the strategic OPLAN, TCSOR and ROEREQ for approval by SACEUR. Final internal coordination will normally be facilitated through a briefing to the COP on the main elements of the strategic OPLAN and final risk evaluation, with any significant issues and risks that might jeopardise the mission highlighted. SACEUR may require an OPLAN review with subordinate commanders and the senior representative from cooperating relevant non-NATO actors to further ensure strategic synchronisation.

d. **Submit Strategic OPLAN for NAC Approval.** Following SACEUR approval of the strategic OPLAN, including the main body and all required annexes, the TCSOR and ROEREQ, it is forwarded to the MC (with a copy to the NMRs at SHAPE) for MC endorsement and NAC approval.

3-62. Promulgate Approved Strategic OPLAN and Seek Operational OPLAN Approval.

a. Following submission of the strategic OPLAN to the NAC, in advance of their approval, the RDG should prepare for promulgation of the strategic OPLAN (e.g. develop

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118 In accordance with agreed security requirements and arrangements.
promulgation letter, etc). Once the strategic OPLAN is approved, the RDG will submit the strategic OPLAN for promulgation. They must also inform the JOPG of any changes, especially if they impact the operational OPLAN. The operational OPLAN is staffed to SACEUR for approval or, if needed, returned to COM JHQ for amendment.
PHASE 5 - EXECUTION

3-63. Introduction.

a. **Purpose.** The purpose of Phase 5 - Execution is to facilitate, with strategic advice, direction and guidance, the commencement and conduct of a NATO military operation for the achievement of MSOs to contribute to the achievement of the NATO end state.

b. **Overview.** Coordinated by the CCOMC, Phase 5 includes all strategic level activities to ‘execute’ the strategic OPLAN. These activities include supporting the initiation and conduct of the operation, including periodic review of strategic progress (e.g. strategic Operations Assessment) and, as required, conducting a plan review.

c. **Prerequisites.** The commencement of Phase 5 requires: the decision by the NAC to execute the operation, and the promulgation of a NED, and the FG of the forces described in the strategic OPLAN.

d. **Main Activities.** The main activities of Phase 5 are:

   (1) Coordinating the actions necessary to initiate an operation.

   (2) Implementing the strategic OPLAN.

   (3) Monitoring and facilitating the operation, including identifying and managing strategic risks and issues, and the continued generation of resources necessary for operational success.

   (4) Assessing the relevance of current plans and directives with stakeholders, and, when required, conducting a plan review (using Phase 2-4 process as appropriate).

   (5) Force generation for operation sustainment.

   (6) Reviewing the strategic-level progress of operations (e.g. strategic Operations Assessment).

e. **Desired outcome of this phase.** The desired outcomes of Phase 5 are:

   (1) Smooth commencement of the operation, with the JHQ supported by SHAPE as required, including through the issue of an ACTORD, TOA messages to devolve authority, and a ROE implementation message (ROEIMP).

   (2) Provision of accurate and timely SMA, including PMRs, to inform NAC and assist their decision-making for the conduct of the operation towards achievement of the NATO end state.

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119 Subject to policy guidance. To be developed further.
(3) Provision of strategic direction and guidance to COM JHQ for the execution of the operation and support to ensure operational success.

(4) Revised/new strategic operations plans, as directed by the NAC.

(5) The establishment of the conditions in the engagement space, and the achievement of the MSOs, by military-led NATO forces as directed by the NAC, including successful military support of any NATO non-military activities, to contribute to the achievement of the NATO end state.

f. Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.

(1) CCOMC. During execution, the CCOMC is the focus of SHAPE cross-functional effort to enable SACEUR to execute strategic C2 of the operation. It maintains routine engagement (at the appropriate level) with subordinate and NATO HQ staff. It is responsible for coordinating actions necessary to initiate, facilitate and monitor the execution of the operation, including by identifying strategic risks, assessing the relevance of current plans and directives (in concert with J5), the review of strategic level progress (e.g. Operations Assessments), and supervision of contracts with strategic implication (e.g. fuel). The CCOMC is also responsible, with support from across SHAPE (including J2, CMA, CMI, etc), to ensure the maintenance and improvement of situational awareness and understanding of the operation, including that it is shared as appropriate.

(2) RDG.

   (a) Once the NED is issued by the NAC, the RDG will transition the OPLAN to the CCOMC for execution, along with some personnel involved in the planning (e.g. the RDG operations SME and others) and disband.

   (b) Depending on the urgency of NATO’s response to the crisis, a SPMP, if deemed necessary, may not have finished (or even been commenced) prior to the execution of the NATO military operation. The RDG, albeit reduced in size, may be retained to assist the development of a SPMP and to consider, as it develops, the need for review of the strategic OPLAN.

(3) The Staff elements. With CCOMC as a focal point, all SHAPE directorates and Special Staff will support Phase 5 activities as required. They will also provide information, intelligence and knowledge, in accordance to COP priorities (e.g. J2 Ops, J6 CD, CMA, CMI, etc). In addition, the resolution of some issues raised during execution will be assigned to an appropriate staff element, which must coordinate with the CCOMC to ensure common situational awareness.
g. **External Coordination.** Phase 5 activities at the strategic level are facilitated by liaison and coordination with a variety of external entities, authorized and appropriate for the ongoing NATO military operation. These may include but are not limited to the following:

1. **NATO HQ.** Close coordination with any NATO HQ body involved in political-military execution activities is paramount. The CMTF, formed to assist staff activities during appreciation of the crisis and planning, will transition into a Steering Group or directly into the standing Operations Task Force (OTF) under IS(Ops), in which SHAPE will normally participate. If a SPMP is still in development, or is developed in this phase, liaison and coordination is required with any NATO HQ body involved in this work.

2. **JHQ.** Close coordination between SHAPE and the JHQ will remain a necessity, but the main conduit will shift from those bodies involved in planning (e.g. RDG and JOPG) to those associated with execution (e.g. CCOMC and the Joint Operations Centre (JOC)). To facilitate the needed communication, especially in the transition from planning to execution, the JHQ liaison element may initially remain but would move from the RDG to the CCOMC.

3. **Other Relevant Actors.** Within established authorities and mechanisms, and guided by NAC and/or COP guidance, the CCOMC will coordinate strategic execution activities with relevant actors. This may be facilitated through the provision of liaison officers to the CCOMC.

3-64. **Considerations for Execution.**

a. **Preparation for Execution.** The seamless commencement of a NATO military operation is facilitated by appropriate and informed strategic level support. In the period leading to the finalization of the strategic OPLAN and the generation of the necessary forces, the RDG should have been (if not already) reinforced by CCOMC staff, who will assume responsibility for execution, to ensure the development of a sound understanding of the situation and the planning conducted. The CCOMC should begin to draft an ACTORD and a ROEIMP, in preparation for a NAC decision to initiate the execution of the operation.

b. **Initiation of Operation Execution.** Once the NAC decides to initiate the execution of the operation, they will issue a NED. The CCOMC will finalize the ACTORD and ROEIMP and staff them to SACEUR for release. The CCOMC (supported by FOG) will manage the TOA of the forces. They will also begin the integration of the new operation with the CCOMC battle rhythm. Part of this effort is to refine and validate information exchange and reporting requirements, procedures and mechanisms. This is a very dynamic period and may see the associated support to the CCOMC at its largest until operation execution stabilises.

c. **Execution.** The main strategic functions during execution are the provision of situational awareness and understanding and military advice to the NAC, and strategic C2 of the operation within ACO. At NATO HQ, the CMTF will transition to an OTF under an IS(Ops) lead; SHAPE will provide representation at an appropriate level to this important coordination forum. The CCOMC provides continuous monitoring and analysis...
of operational events and developments in order to facilitate operations, identify strategic issues and risks, and deliver strategic-level situational awareness and understanding. The CCOMC will coordinate and, as appropriate and authorized, share information with NATO stakeholders, external relevant actors and partners. Issues that require strategic resolution would be assigned to an appropriate lead directorate, division or Special Staff. Periodically, or as required, the CCOMC will review the strategic level progress of the operation (strategic Operations Assessment) and appreciate the relevance of current plans.

d. StratCom Framework. The NATO HQ StratCom objectives and guidance may have been developed into a SECGEN authorised StratCom Framework in parallel with the military planning process. The SHAPE Chief Strategic Communications will ensure that development of such a document is aligned to the StratCom guidance articulated in the NID and developed in the strategic CONOPS and OPLAN. Should a SECGEN authorised Framework not be deemed necessary, ACO may develop its own to ensure evolving StratCom considerations are articulated to the Alliance, its partners or TCNs.

e. Force Generation. The FG process continues during the execution phase with active dialogue with the operational command and the TCNs. It focuses on filling any remaining shortfalls in the original CJSOR, validating and filling any new operational requirements, and ensuring that contributions are sustained over time either by another or the same nations.

f. Operations Assessment at the Strategic Level.

(1) Operations assessment of the engagement space involves monitoring and evaluating the outcome of all actions taken across the whole engagement space and all associated effects (details are in Chapter 5). From a military standpoint, OPLANs require periodic operations assessment in order for informed adjustments to be made. Progress of actions, creation of effects and achievement of objectives towards the achievement of the NATO end state are all evaluated via a continuous cycle. This cycle measures current status and trends, and provides feedback to the planning and decision process. This operations assessment process applies to all levels; at the strategic level a PMR is the normal 'operations assessment' product provided to the NAC. A 'PMR' will include, as part of its analysis, a gender perspective.

(2) Data collectors who support the operations assessment process may be non-NATO assets, further highlighting the requirement for interaction and cooperation where possible amongst all instruments and relevant actors. Operations assessment and the KD process are closely related through system analysis which provides the backdrop for operations assessment to understand how to measure effects and actions.
PHASE 6 - TRANSITION

3-65. Introduction.

a. **Purpose.** The purpose of Phase 6\(^{120}\) - Transition is to coordinate the transition and termination of a NATO military operation; this involves the handover of responsibility to proper authority (e.g. the UN, other IOs (e.g. EU) or indigenous actor) in the crisis area and the withdrawal of forces under NATO military command, in a controlled manner so as to avoid this action being a destabilising influence in the region.

b. **Overview.** Throughout the execution phase of an operation, periodic operations assessments will be conducted to evaluate the progress made towards the desired objectives and the NATO end state; eventually SACEUR will conclude that the MSOs have been achieved and, with consideration to the overall conditions of the NATO end-state to which military efforts contribute, will recommend to the NAC that planning for transition and termination of the NATO military operation should commence. This phase covers all the activities for the transition and termination of a NATO military operation to facilitate the transition of NATO military responsibilities to proper authority and the withdrawal of forces under NATO military command. Depending on the situation transition and termination may be able to be managed within the construct of the existing strategic and operational OPLANs; alternatively, appropriate operations planning activities may be needed, leading to NAC approval for a specific transition strategic CONOPS or OPLAN. As the exact moment for transition may be difficult to define, Phase 5 and 6 are likely to overlap.

c. **Prerequisites.** The commencement of Phase 6 requires: a NAC decision sheet to begin preparation for transition and withdrawal of NATO forces under military command, with SACEUR and/or COP direction and guidance; or SACEUR (and/or COP) direction and guidance to commence considering the issues associated with a future transition and withdrawal. Each situation will be different; the NAC guidance and direction may necessitate commencing with a strategic assessment (including military considerations), proposal of military options, a transition CONOPS or a revised/new OPLAN. This activity will be supported by the most recent Operations Assessment of the operation (e.g. PMR) leading to the decision to commence transition planning.

d. **Main Activities.** The main activities of Phase 6 are:

1. Provision of SMA to assist NATO HQ and NAC decision-making for the transition and termination.

2. Activities to appreciate and/or conduct transition planning, including as required strategic assessment, MROs, and strategic transition CONOPS and/or OPLAN, and coordination/approval of the operational transition CONOPS and/or OPLAN.

3. Coordination and/or collaboration between SHAPE, NATO HQ, JHQ and relevant actors.

\(^{120}\) Subject to policy guidance. To be developed further.
(4) Provision of strategic guidance and direction and support to COM JHQ to facilitate the transition and termination of NATO military operations.

e. **Desired outcome of this phase.** The desired outcomes of Phase 6 are:

(1) SMA to assist NATO HQ and NAC decision-making for the transition and termination of NATO’s role in the crisis, including the associated military operation(s).

(2) Either:

(a) Strategic military direction and guidance to COM JHQ, to assist in managing the transition and termination of the NATO military operation within the current strategic and operational OPLANs.

or

(b) Strategic and operational transition OPLANs. Development of appropriate products for the NAC, as requested, leading to their approval of a revised or new strategic OPLAN (e.g. strategic assessment, military options, transition CONOPS and/or transition OPLAN). Following NAC approval of the strategic OPLAN, SACEUR approval of the operational transition OPLAN.

(3) The transition and termination of NATO’s military operation has been completed, in a controlled manner so as to avoid being a destabilising influence in the region.

f. **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.**

(1) **CCOMC.** The CCOMC is responsible for identifying to the COP when operations assessments begin to indicate that the need for transition activities is emerging. The CCOMC leads initial transition thinking (e.g. to consider future base closure, or termination of contracts with strategic implication (e.g. fuel)). It will support the RDG if one is established to conduct transition and termination planning activities. Once the manner of transition/termination is agreed, the CCOMC will coordinate/facilitate the strategic-level transition and termination of the NATO military operation. As an operation nears completion, the CCOMC will manage all the post operation termination activities, such as end of mission reports, archiving operation information, completing post operation analysis (e.g. lessons learned process), etc.

(2) **RDG.** If required, the COP will establish an RDG, under an ACOS J5 lead, (in coordination with DCCOMC) for the conduct of transition and termination planning activities (i.e. strategic transition CONOPS or OPLAN). It will be supported by the CCOMC and SHAPE directorates and Special Staff, as required and approved.
g. **External Coordination.** Phase 6 activities at the strategic level are facilitated by liaison and coordination with a variety of external entities, authorized and appropriate for the ongoing NATO military operation. These may include but are not limited to the following:

1. **NATO HQ.** Close coordination with any NATO HQ body involved in political-military transition and termination activities is paramount. Initially, a standing Operations Task Force will exist, but as required it may be supplemented with the re-establishment of a CMTF to focus on operation transition. SHAPE may be requested to assist with formulation of any initial IS/IMS advice on transition and termination, including the evolution of an existing StratCom Framework.

2. **JHQ.** Close coordination will exist already with the JHQ for Phase 5. They will collaborate/coordinate with strategic transition/termination activities, including through the provision of liaison elements to assist collaboration, as required, between the RDG and the JOPG (as per Phases 2-4). The JHQ will manage the operational level execution of transition and termination of the NATO military operation.

3. **Other Relevant Actors.** By this point in an operation, relationships between strategic and operational levels and relevant actors would have been established; however, there may be additional actors, not yet involved in the crisis resolution, who will be relevant for the transition and termination of NATO’s military operation. The CCOMC will have to ensure they have the requisite authorities/mechanisms to engage all actors, guided by NAC and/or COP guidance, relevant to transition and termination activities.

**3-66. Considerations for Transition and Termination.**

a. Modern conflicts are complex in nature involving interdependent actors with both convergent and divergent interests and objectives. The deployment of NATO forces introduces them into an already complex system and, over time, creates interdependencies with other actors and systems (e.g. economic, civil, and political) present in the engagement space.

b. Throughout the execution phase of an operation, commanders and their staff will conduct periodic operations assessments aimed at measuring the effectiveness of their actions in creating the desired effects, establishing desired conditions and achieving objectives, to contribute to the achievement of the desired NATO end state.

c. Eventually SACEUR will consider that the MSOs have been achieved; having established the conditions required by forces under NATO military command, consideration can now be given to the withdrawal of those forces. The desired NATO end state may require military and non-military activities to establish all the conditions necessary to achieve it; thus, following the achievement of the MSOs, the continued presence of forces under military command may be required to support non-military efforts. Eventually, through operations assessment, indications will begin to highlight that military forces could be withdrawn, the timing for which will be approved by the NAC. As the exact moment for transition may be difficult to define, Phase 5 and 6 are likely to overlap.
(1) Planning for the disengagement of NATO forces must be initiated well in advance and may eventually involve a large number of non-NATO actors in order to minimize the negative effects that the departure of NATO troops may have on the overall stability of the theatre. Planning for transition may involve activities to facilitate the coordination and management of the transition and withdrawal within the construct of the current strategic and/or operational OPLANS; it also may require conduct of some or all of the activities described in Phases 2-4, culminating in a new or revised NAC-approved strategic OPLAN. The approach to transition and termination will be guided by appropriate NAC guidance and direction. As guided by the COP, SHAPE may assist NATO HQ bodies (e.g. CMTF, IS/IMS) in the preparation of advice on transition and termination of NATO military operations. The following may help guide the conduct of Phase 2-4 activities for transition planning by a RDG.

(2) Phase 2 - Strategic Assessment. Operations Assessments, including PMRs, lead to the determination that transition and termination of the NATO military operations is warranted. Depending on the timing and focus of the last strategic operations product (e.g. PMR) prior to the decision to begin transition and termination planning, there may be no need for a separate strategic assessment to support transition and termination planning. Ideally, with the PMR advising that a transition is warranted, the status of relevant actors and the impact of such a transition, including on the gender perspective, should have been assessed. If not this updated systems understanding of the operational environment should be established as a basis for further work, even if not formally tasked by the NAC. Not conducting this appreciation can be mitigated, for the consideration of options, if the requisite authorities for interaction have been received.

(3) Phase 3 - Options. Once operations assessments indicate the conditions required of military forces have been established and that these are sustainable without the current level of NATO forces in theatre, SACEUR may recommend to the NAC to be authorized to develop options for NATO disengagement (total or partial). Options may or may not necessitate revised/new strategic planning products; transition and withdrawal within the construct of the current strategic and/or operational OPLAN may be achievable with appropriate strategic guidance and direction. Alternatively, the option chosen by the NAC may see the issue of a NID to direct the production of a transition strategic CONOPS and/or OPLAN. It should be noted that the options tabled should clearly state the level of interaction with non-NATO actors required during strategic and operational planning.

(4) Phase 4a - CONOPS Development. A strategic transition CONOPS would articulate how to disengage NATO forces from the mission most effectively and efficiently. It would be developed with consideration to the different interdependencies that were created over the duration of the mission between the deployed NATO forces and possible ways to mitigate the negative effects caused by the withdrawal of forces.

121 Once this decision is made, the CCOMC would be the focus point at the strategic level to facilitate the operational level transition and termination of the operation within the construct of the current OPLANS.
(a) Mitigation measures will in most cases involve international or national actors developing transition plans and for the NATO forces to adjust their handover of responsibilities to these actors in a way that allows them as much as possible to minimize the negative impacts during this critical phase of the operation.

(b) The selected MRO will provide the basis for the development of the strategic concept and a supporting statement of the required comprehensive activities (including supporting NATO non-military efforts) required to establish the preconditions for success. The development of the CONOPS will require close collaboration with the JHQ, especially in coordinating with non-NATO actors for local risk mitigation measures and for a theatre-level handover concept. Following receipt of the NID, the RDG may develop a succinct SPD to guide COM JHQs operational estimate.

(c) SACEUR will obtain NAC approval for the strategic CONOPS for the transition. It should be noted that the overriding factor in the decision to repatriate troops should be the need to maintain stability in the theatre and to give sufficient time for a proper handover to take place. In cases where the handover will take place over a long period of time, it may be necessary to re-tool or re-role elements of the NATO forces in theatre.

(5) **Phase 4b - OPLAN Development.** OPLAN development will further amplify the schedule of strategic effects required, the supporting preconditions for success, and the general flow of forces out of theatre. It will also identify critical logistic and movement nodes for the withdrawal of NATO forces. Upon approval of the strategic transition OPLAN, NAC will issue a NED.

(6) **Execution and Operations Assessment.** Throughout the transition phase, it will be necessary to monitor execution closely and to appreciate the developing impacts of the departure of NATO forces. An operations assessment process, similar to the process used throughout the execution phase of the operation will be used, with particular emphasis on measuring negative effects. These operations assessments will allow changes, within the construct of the approved OPLAN, or identify the need for changes to the OPLAN where necessary.

d. **Process Controls.** Transition planning is designed to identify and mitigate, to the maximum extent possible, the negative risks and effects resulting from the disengagement of NATO troops. It also allows commanders to coordinate, in detail, the TOA to non-NATO actors, by allowing the Commander and staff enough freedom to develop ideas and concepts while ensuring necessary political and military control over the entire process.

e. In enabling a coordinated and deliberate transition, the detailed systemic analysis of the engagement space is necessary. This systemic analysis should place a particular emphasis on the interdependencies that involve the presence of NATO forces in-theatre. It will be essential that all relevant non-NATO actors be identified early and that proper liaison and coordination be implemented to allow these actors to be able to inform and
contribute where appropriate to the strategic and operational planning for the withdrawal of NATO forces under military command.

f. The authority to de-activate and redeploy forces, as well as to execute OPLANs, is retained by the NAC and delegated incrementally to SACEUR.

g. **Political Controls.** The NAC maintains political control of transition planning by:

   (1) Issuing direction and guidance to guide the transition and planning for it, including NAC decision sheets like a NID.

   (2) Delegating or retaining coordinating authority for planning.

   (3) Approving a strategic transition CONOPS, including approving strategic effects and endorsing the preconditions for success.

   (4) Authorising force de-activation.

   (5) Approving a strategic transition OPLAN.

   (6) Authorising force redeployment.

   (7) Authorising execution.

h. **Military Controls.** NATO military commanders maintain control of the OPP by:

   (1) Issuing transition direction and guidance, such as planning directives.

   (2) Delegating or retaining coordinating authority for planning.

   (3) Approving subordinate CONOPS.

   (4) Approving subordinate OPLANs.

   (5) Issuing deactivation messages and execution orders (when authorised).

i. **Collaborative / Parallel Planning.** The development of strategic and operational transition CONOPS/OPLANs requires collaboration and continuous coordination at the Political/Military (NAC / MC and Nations) and at strategic, operational, and component levels with relevant non-NATO actors.

j. **Coordination with Participating Nations.** Coordination with participating nations should take place as soon as authorised. This should include the early exchange of information with host nations to facilitate comprehensive planning by the host nation as well as with TCNs. Once authorized by the NAC, SACEUR will negotiate with NATO and non-NATO Nations in order to ensure a coordinated and deliberate disengagement of forces.

k. **Coordination with the Civil Environment.** Early liaison and coordination between Allied Headquarters and civil authorities and agencies is essential to the success of the NATO disengagement. This includes establishing, during the initiation of
planning, effective means for coordination and liaison, initially at the strategic level, with national governments, international organizations and non-governmental organisations. Planning by the JHQ must provide for effective cooperation with these same civil organisations within the JOA.

I. **StratCom Framework.** A well planned and executed StratCom Framework may be critical to the successful disengagement of NATO forces from a crisis area. The framework will address StratCom aims with specific respect to: audiences in the host country to re-assure them about the stability of the situation; the international community to underline NATO’s accomplishments; potential de-stabilizing actors to demonstrate NATO’s resolve; and the populations of NATO member and non-NATO partner nations to inform them about the success of the mission.

m. **Operation Termination.** Once the manner of transition and termination is decided, and transition plans are created, approved and execution initiated as appropriate, the CCOMC will conduct their normal functions as per execution and will also manage all the post operation termination activities, such as end of mission reports, archiving operation information, completing post operation analysis (e.g. lessons learned process), etc.
Allied Command Operations
Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive
Interim V2.0
(Chapter 4 – Operational Level)

04 October 2013
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CHAPTER 4
OPERATIONAL LEVEL

4-1. Introduction.

a. This chapter describes the operational level\(^1\) operations planning process (OPP) carried out by a designated Joint Headquarters\(^2\) (JHQ). The process comprises six phases\(^3\) designed to allow close collaboration between all levels of command during the different phases of the NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP) as depicted in Figure 4.1. The close alignment of the process ensures that subordinate considerations are reflected in strategic decisions and that strategic conditions are established for operational success.

4-2. Operational Process and Products.

a. The operational level OPP phases as shown in Figure 4.1 are specifically designed to develop the operational level input, planning products, directives and orders required by the strategic and component levels. The processes and products are described in the following sections within this chapter.

b. The different OPP phases support the operational commander’s decision-making related to:

1. Developing and maintaining an appreciation of the operational environment in a potential or actual operational area.
2. Contributing to the development of strategic military response options (MROs) within a comprehensive approach\(^4\).
3. The operational mission and its essential operational actions.
4. Designing the operation in terms of operational objectives, lines of operation (LoOs), decisive conditions (DCs) and operational effects.
5. Activating and preparing required forces for deployment.
6. Directing the synchronisation of joint and combined operations in cooperation with non-military and other non-NATO efforts.

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1 The Operational level is defined in AAP-06 as, ‘[t]he level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. Within NATO, the operational level is often referred to as the ‘joint’ level.
2 Normally, unless a NATO Force Structure Joint Headquarters (NFS JHQ) has been generated following deployment of a Headquarters Allied Joint Force Command (HQ JFC) (as a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQ)) and assigned specific responsibilities, the HQ interacting with SHAPE would be a HQ JFC (for crisis response planning, normally the one assigned NATO Response Force (NRF) responsibilities), Headquarters Allied Air Command (AIRCOM) or Headquarters Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM). The characteristics of a potential or existing operation will be one of the considerations in the selection of a JHQ to plan and/or command at the operational level. HQs will need to be sufficiently ‘joint’ for the command and control of assigned forces.
3 The operational level OPP articulated in the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) was developed with consideration to the 8-step Operational Level Planning Process (OLPP) articulated in AJP-5.
4 Comprehensive approach can be described as a means to enhance a complementary, compatible response to crisis by all relevant actors.
(7) Providing operational level operations assessments of progress in achieving operational objectives, and contributing to the achievement of military strategic objectives (MSOs) and the NATO end state.

(8) Providing operational input for adapting operations to meet changes in strategic and operational conditions.

(9) Planning for transition and termination of military operations.

c. The recognition of the potential need to interact with non-military organisations and structures that may have differing goals and objectives in the potential operating environment is critical to successful planning at the operational level. An early understanding of the use of the other instruments of power (political, economic and civil) is therefore essential from the outset of planning. It begins with operational input to the strategic level development of MROs with focus on complementary non-military actions (CNMAs), Strategic Communications (StratCom), pre-conditions for success, and risk; it continues through recommendations on drawing in relevant external actors into the planning process if and when appropriate. This understanding is then built upon during the operational estimate where operational actions and effects will be developed as part of the operational design, with an appreciation of the influence on, and impact of, other actors. Finally developing a liaison and coordination template for interaction with other actors for the concept of operations (CONOPS) and operation plan (OPLAN) will be another important element and will always be a balance of what the operational level sees as essential and what is politically acceptable to the NAC and NATO.

d. Each situation for which the OPP is used is different; the planning effort at each headquarters (HQ) will be conducted under different circumstances and each commander will approach the problem in their own way and style. The process and templates presented in this chapter are a capture of best practice; they suit well a timely and systematic movement through the process from one phase to another. With appropriate training, they can be used effectively as a guide to develop appropriate operational level operations planning products to support each situation.

4-3. Role of the Commander.

a. Planning is a combination of process and art. The Commander is the central figure for the conduct of the operational level OPP. Supported by personal experience and judgement, the Commander will provide direction and guidance to the JHQ staff (e.g. Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG)) to drive the conduct of staff activities to support decision-making.

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5 “Interact” might involve: coordination, cooperation, collaboration, consultation, exchange of information, toleration.

6 As described in doctrine (AJP-01(D)), operational design is both a process and a product. In general, the ‘process’ of operational design, ‘frames the problem, and then develops and refines a commander’s operational ideas – the vision of how the campaign will unfold – to provide detailed and actionable plans. Operational design continues, often interrupted by changes in strategic guidance, throughout the duration of a campaign; it should not be deemed complete or immutable from the outset and never simply implemented as a given without adaptation in the face of changing circumstances.’

7 Functional Planning Guides (FPG), such as the draft Allied Command Operations (ACO) Functional Planning Guide – Logistics, may be generated, as described in MC133/4, to assist applicable functional area staff in the conduct of their duties in support of the OPP.
b. The close relationship between the Commander and planning staff is essential for effective planning. Commanders will differ in their approaches with some leading the process and conducting their own analysis while others look to the staff to prepare products for their consideration. Regardless, the planning process enables the Commander’s vision, and it is therefore essential that the planning staff understand the way their commander thinks and operates.

4-4. Organisation for Operational Planning and Execution.

a. While the organisational structure of a JHQ will vary, it and the various cross-functional bodies used within the HQ provide for the integration of functional expertise to carry out the main operational level processes. Functional subject matter experts (SMEs), provided and as required supported by their parent functional structures, will normally commence functional staff estimates\(^8\) as early in the planning process as possible to help contribute to the JOPG. In addition, they will contribute to operational CONOPS and OPLAN development through contributions to the main documents and/or the development of annexes. In addition to collaborating within the HQ, the JHQ staff elements collaborate with their counterparts in Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and subordinate commands during all phases of operations. Key JHQ staff roles and responsibilities related to each phase that are common to all JHQs are detailed throughout this chapter.

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\(^8\) Not to be confused with the operational estimate (as described in Phase 3), a staff estimate is essentially a functional area analysis tailored to support the specific OPP phase being conducted. To illustrate, early in the OPP, functional area staff estimates commence with a collection and functional analysis of information to help the commander and staff understand the situation. Later staff estimates will be tailored to provide functional analysis in support of the determination of which courses of action are viable and which one should be recommended.
Figure 4.1 - Strategic and Operational Level Crisis Response Planning
Section 1 - General

4-5. Introduction.

a. **Purpose.** The purpose of Phase 1 - Initial Situational Awareness of a Potential/Actual Crisis is to assist NATO with the identification of emerging crises that have relevance to NATO’s security interests and support the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)/SHAPE staff in their strategic OPP Phase 1 activities.

b. **Overview.**

   (1) The NCMP is initiated by the NAC once there are indications that suggest that there is an emerging crisis that may affect NATO’s security interests. These indications could come from the NATO Intelligence and Warning System (NIWS), Allies, SACEUR or other sources, including a JHQ.

   (2) At the operational level, Phase 1 normally begins:

      (a) With Commander direction, as a result of JHQ horizon scanning activities (for areas where responsibility has been assigned to the JHQ by SACEUR) identifying that a potential/actual crisis is emerging; or

      (b) With a task/request from SACEUR/SHAPE, as a result of SHAPE coordinated horizon scanning activities.

   There may be multiple emerging crises under analysis at any one time.

   (3) The JHQ (led by intelligence/knowledge staff), in collaboration with SHAPE staff, will initiate the Comprehensive Preparation of the Operational Environment (CPOE) process for the potential/actual crisis in order to develop an initial understanding of and monitor the crisis. When warranted, the JHQ will elevate indications and warnings to SACEUR/SHAPE of emerging crises that may affect NATO’s security interests. The Commander will direct any necessary preparation activities in case a move to Phase 2 is directed. In addition, the JHQ will also support SHAPE staff, as appropriate and directed, with the development of any initial military advice.

   (4) Through direction and guidance from the Commander or SACEUR/SHAPE (depending on how Phase 1 activities were initiated), the issue may be returned to horizon scanning activities.

c. **Prerequisites.** The initiation of Phase 1 can be either directed by the Commander or by SACEUR.

d. **Main Activities.** The main activities of Phase 1 are depicted in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2 - Initial Situational Awareness of a Potential/Actual Crisis Main Activities

e. **Desired Outcome of this Phase.** The desired outcomes of Phase 1 are:

(1) Appropriate indications and warnings and initial appreciation of emerging crises are provided to the Commander, and if appropriate to SACEUR, in a timely fashion.

(2) An initial understanding of an emerging crisis is developed, which can be shared for collaborative situational awareness when authorized, to include an appreciation of the nature of the problem and the possible implications for NATO.

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9 Tools for Operations Planning Functional Areas Services (TOPFAS) Systems Analysis Tool (SAT) provides a mechanism to capture and share early information and analysis of the crisis; consideration should be given to establishing a SAT database during Phase 1 to assist collaboration.
(3) Appropriate preparation, guided by the Commander, is conducted by the JHQ to provide effective support to SHAPE’s staff development of initial military advice.

(4) Prompt return to horizon scanning activities due to the emerging crises not deemed to have impact to NATO’s security interests.

f. **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.**

(1) **Role of the Commander.** The Commander provides direction and guidance for the conduct of Phase 1 activities, including, where appropriate, the authorization for any preparatory activities.

(2) **Intelligence/Knowledge Staff.** The J2/KD staff supported by other JHQ staff as required, lead the CPOE process to develop an initial understanding of and monitor the crisis, elevating to the Commander and, if warranted, SACEUR/SHAPE appropriate indications and warnings.

(3) **JOPG.** As necessary, the core of the JOPG interacts with the intelligence/knowledge staff to identify information and knowledge requirements for development as part of CPOE development. They also may conduct activities, guided by the Commander, to support initial military advice development by SHAPE staff.

(4) **Joint Operations Centre (JOC).** The JOC contributes to continuous situational awareness by monitoring major events or incidents as well as establishing and maintaining the Joint Common Operational Picture of the area when possible.

g. **External Coordination.**

(1) **SHAPE.**

(a) **The Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre (CCOMC).** The CCOMC, led by the Director CCOMC (DCCOMC), is the focus for SHAPE cross-functional effort for the conduct of strategic Phase 1 activities. It raises to the Crisis and Operations Panel (COP) those emerging crises with potential impact to NATO’s security interests and, as directed, will further develop an understanding of and monitor the crisis. The JHQ intelligence/knowledge staff and, as directed by the Commander, the core of the JOPG will collaborate with the CCOMC in the development of an understanding of the crisis and/or the development of initial military advice on the crisis.

(b) **Civil-Military Interaction (CMI).** The SHAPE J9 CMI branch provides a strategic engagement and outreach capability, primarily composed of civilian experts in specific domains including NGOs and

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10 The CCOMC processes are under review. Consult the latest SHAPE Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management (CCOM) Handbook (HB) (available on the SHAPE portal) for more detail.
International Organisations, Development, Stabilization & Reconstruction, Humanitarian, Rule of Law and Governance. It is responsible for coordinating with cooperating civilian organisations and for developing awareness and contextualised understanding of non-military aspects of the situation including the activities of international, non-governmental and governmental organisations in the area of interest.

(c) **Civil-Military Analysis (CMA).** The CMA branch applies regional and thematic (primarily Political, Economic and Social) expertise, including to research and analysis activities, in support of the development of the contextual understanding of emerging crises and ongoing operations, especially with regard to how they may impact Alliance interests.

(d) **Knowledge Development Direction (KDD) Section.** The KDD Section will be responsible for managing both SACEUR and ACO overall knowledge priorities and requirements, and ACO’s knowledge base. It will direct information gathering and knowledge development across ACO and establish formats, procedures and standards to maintain accessibility, currency and accuracy.

(2) **NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC).** The NIFC is a multi-national intelligence organisation with intelligence analysts from participating member nations. It provides timely, actionable, full-spectrum intelligence in support of the planning and execution of operations, especially NATO Response Force (NRF), as tasked by SHAPE J2.

(3) **NATO Headquarters (NATO HQ) Civil-Military Planning and Support (CMPS) Section.** The NATO HQ CMPS maintains a Comprehensive Approach Specialist Support (COMPASS) database covering a wide range of civil/commercial/technical expertise available to NATO in the following areas: movement and transport (air/land/sea); chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) and weapons of mass destruction (WMD); medical; critical infrastructure; civil communications; food and agriculture; civil disaster response; and industrial preparedness.

(4) **Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).** The EADRCC, a NATO HQ Civil Emergency Planning Outreach Section (CEPOS) entity, is mandated to respond to civil emergencies, including natural and technological disasters, as well as requests for assistance in the event of a major CBRN incident. Countries that have North Atlantic Council (NAC) approval to use the EADRCC’s mechanism include Allies, Partnership for Peace (PfP) Partners, Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) and those in areas where NATO is involved militarily.
Section 2 - Process

4-6. Appreciate Indication of a Potential/Actual Crisis.

a. Indications of an emerging crisis, which may affect NATO’s security interests, are identified by the intelligence/knowledge staff. These indications can come from: JHQ horizon scanning (for areas where responsibility has been assigned to the JHQ by SACEUR), an appreciation by operations staff for an on-going operation, SACEUR/SHAPE; NIWS\textsuperscript{11}; Allies; or other sources.

b. The intelligence/knowledge staff apprises the Director of Operations of the indications of the emerging crisis who, within limits of devolved authority, can: decide no action is currently required, and direct the intelligence/knowledge staff to continue scanning; direct them to develop an initial understanding of and monitor the situation; or can immediately advise the Commander and seek direction and guidance.

c. The source of initial indications of the emerging crisis, the urgency of the situation and the magnitude of the possible impact to NATO are to be considered when deciding what operational Phase 1 activities\textsuperscript{12} are appropriate. SACEUR/SHAPE may direct certain JHQ activity in support of strategic OPP Phase 1 efforts.

d. Commander. The Director of Operations will apprise the Commander of possible emerging crises. The Commander will provide guidance and direction\textsuperscript{13} for the conduct of operational Phase 1 activities for the possible emerging crisis, including on:

(1) The submission of indications and warning of an emerging crisis to SACEUR/SHAPE including initial operational considerations, as appropriate.

(2) The necessity for no additional action. The Commander would then direct that intelligence/knowledge staff return the issue to scanning.

(3) The necessity to conduct additional Phase 1 activities, including to direct:

(a) CPOE commencement and the development an initial understanding of, and monitor, the emerging crisis.

(b) The activation of a JOPG core to begin to deepen the understanding of the emerging crisis, consider possible operational implications and support SHAPE staff development of initial military advice.

e. Phase 1 for a particular emerging crisis may continue for a significant period of time; therefore, this step of Phase 1 will be repeated as necessary to advise, and seek direction and guidance from the Commander due to a change in the situation, or as a

\textsuperscript{11} The NIWS is specifically designed to share information and assessments from nations, NATO HQ and ACO to provide early warning of any developing threat, risk or concern that could impact on NATO’s security interests.

\textsuperscript{12} Emerging crises can be very politically sensitive; staff need to continually balance the need to develop an understanding of an issue and be prepared for possible subsequent phases against the ‘need to know’.

\textsuperscript{13} Commander guidance may also address the sensitivity of the Phase 1 activity, with any restriction on interaction.
result of SACEUR/NAC\textsuperscript{14} direction. The responsible director assigned by the Commander to perform any Phase 1 activities (i.e. Director of Operations or Director of Plans), will update the Commander periodically, or as directed, on the emerging crisis situation, including any recommendations on the need for continued or further Phase 1 activities.

4-7. Initiate CPOE.

a. The CPOE is a crisis-specific cross-headquarters process\textsuperscript{15}, led by the intelligence/knowledge staff, to develop a comprehensive understanding of the operational environment covering all PMESII\textsuperscript{16} domains, including associated potential threats and risks, in support of planning and the conduct of a campaign\textsuperscript{17} or operation. It develops an integrated understanding of the main characteristics of the operational environment including its land, air/space, maritime dimensions, as well as the PMESII systems of main adversaries, friends and neutral actors that may influence joint operations. CPOE products will be developed as necessary to support the work of the operational OPP phases.

4-8. Develop Initial Understanding of, and Monitor, the Emerging Crisis.

a. Develop Initial Understanding. When directed, the intelligence/knowledge staff will develop an initial understanding of the emerging crisis, including the development of an initial systems\textsuperscript{18} perspective of the area of interest (e.g. across the PMESII domains). This understanding should focus on potential adversaries, friendly and neutral actors as well as other aspects of the strategic and operational environment relevant to the potential security risks and threats. This allows the intelligence/knowledge staff to identify within each system the key personalities, organisations, facilities, features and materiel and how they interact with other system elements within the environment. The development of an initial understanding of the emerging crisis will be done in consultation with other JHQ staff (e.g. Political Advisor (POLAD), Legal Advisor (LEGAD), StratCom Advisor, Special Operations Forces Advisor (SOFAD), J9\textsuperscript{19}, Gender Advisor (GENAD)) and, as appropriate, SHAPE staff, through the following activities:

   (1) Appreciate Existing Information and Intelligence. The intelligence/knowledge staff will gather, collate, organize and analyse existing information, intelligence and knowledge on the emerging crisis.

\textsuperscript{14} In some cases, when the emerging crisis has significant potential impact to NATO’s security interests, the NAC may quickly pass through NCMP Phase 1 and direct further NCMP activities; this highlights the importance of preparation before and during Phase 1 to support the later NCMP phases with timely and informed military advice.

\textsuperscript{15} The CPOE is a cross-headquarters process, supported by the various functional and special staff areas, some of which have their own functional process to support their contribution to the CPOE, such as the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) as described in the AJP-2A RD.

\textsuperscript{16} PMESII - Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information (e.g. Systems within the Engagement Space). Through a regularly updated gender analysis (including social, cultural, economic, health etc. aspects) a gender perspective will become an integrated part of all six domains. For examples of each domain see Chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{17} Campaign - A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces. (AAP-06).

\textsuperscript{18} System - A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements forming a unified whole. (Proposed definition).

\textsuperscript{19} J9 staff work in support of operations planning is aided by the use of the Bi-SC CIMIC Functional Planning Guide (SHAPE/OPI CIM /11/12-TT282641 and 5000 TSC FCO 0120/TT 8183/Ser: NU0022), dated 08 Jun 12.
(2) **Identify Information, Intelligence and Knowledge Requirements.** Following their initial appreciation of the existing information and intelligence, and whenever required throughout their initial understanding development, the intelligence/knowledge staff will identify information, intelligence and knowledge requirements needed to improve their understanding of the emerging crisis.

(a) **Determine Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).** Based on this initial analysis, the staff should advise the Commander on critical information that may be required for future operational decisions. At this stage CCIRs should focus on recognising changes in the capabilities or behaviour of specific actors that might lead to an unacceptable situation regarding NATO’s security interests and the need for a decision from the Commander, including the need to provide further direction and guidance to the staff or the necessity for further strategic guidance.

(b) **Develop Priority Intelligence Requirements.** Based on the CCIRs, the Intelligence staff will develop detailed Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) and initiate requests for intelligence through SHAPE to the NIFC as well as to nations in accordance with the NATO Collection and Coordination of Intelligence Requirements Management (CCIRM) process.

(c) **Identify other Priority Information and Knowledge Requirements.** In many cases NATO intelligence may not be the most appropriate source or means for collecting information and developing knowledge. Therefore, the intelligence/knowledge staff must identify those other priority information and knowledge requirements about the area of interest as a basis for collection/acquisition and management of information and knowledge from other sources for a complete picture.

(d) **Coordinate Requirements with SHAPE.** It is important that the intelligence/knowledge staff coordinates its collection requirements with SHAPE to avoid redundant efforts and to make the best use of all available means in NATO.

b. **Monitor Emerging Crisis.**

(1) **Maintain and Further Develop Initial Understanding.** The intelligence/knowledge staff will continue to maintain, and if time allows deepen, its understanding of the emerging crisis. It will continue to, as appropriate, task or ask for the collection/acquisition of information/intelligence to fill the identified gaps. To assist this activity, they will also continue, within delegated authority or established mechanisms (e.g. through SHAPE), to cultivate appropriate expertise to broaden their understanding of the crisis. The core of the JOPG may be activated by the Commander to begin to appreciate the crisis and assist in the activities described in this step.

(2) **Monitor and Report.** As the intelligence/knowledge staff maintains its understanding of the crisis, it will continue to evaluate if a threat to NATO’s security interests exists. Periodically and if the situation deteriorates and threatens NATO’s security interests further, they will update the Operations
Director and/or the Commander on the potential crisis under analysis who will provide direction and or guidance as per paragraph 4-6 above.

4-9. **Support Development of Initial Strategic Military Advice.**

a. In support of HQ NATO NCMP Phase 1 activities, SACEUR/SHAPE may be requested for initial strategic military advice. If requested, the core of the JOPG may develop initial operational considerations to support SHAPE staff efforts. These will be briefed to the Commander who, with a personal appreciation of the potential emerging crisis, will provide direction and guidance on their refinement and on any additional preparatory staff activity. Once approved by the Commander, the operational considerations are submitted to SACEUR/SHAPE.
PHASE 2 - OPERATIONAL APPRECIATION OF THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
Section 1 - General

4-10. Introduction.

a. **Purpose.** The purpose of Phase 2 is twofold: first, to understand the strategic situation, the nature of the problem, NATO’s desired end state, and NATO strategic objectives, including if articulated military strategic objectives (MSOs), through SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment (SSA); and second, to provide operational advice to SACEUR on the draft strategic Military Response Options (MROs).

b. **Overview.** Phase 2 at the operational level spans Phase 2 and 3 at the strategic level (e.g. Strategic Assessment and Military Response Options Development) and it is divided into two steps. The first step begins with receipt of SACEUR’s Warning Order. It includes the activation of the JOPG\(^{20}\), deploying a liaison element to SHAPE, and the conduct of an operational appreciation of the SSA. Phase 2 continues, in the second step, with the request from SACEUR to provide operational advice on the draft MROs. If, however, the NAC requests SACEUR to submit the SSA and MROs as a single document, then the two steps of Phase 2 are merged accordingly. Phase 2 ends with the provision of the Commander’s advice on the draft MROs to SACEUR, including any urgent requirements for the implementation of Crisis Response Measures (CRMs), such as the authorisation to prepare and/or deploy an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT) or other measures that may be required if SACEUR recommends the Fast Track Decision-Making (FTDM) process.

c. **Prerequisites.** Phase 2 is initiated by SACEUR’s Warning Order.

d. **Main Activities.** The main activities of Phase 2 are depicted in Figure 4.3.

e. **Desired Outcome of this Phase.** The desired outcomes of Phase 2 are:

1. The JHQ (Commander and staff (including JOPG)) has an appreciation of the strategic aspects of the crisis that will determine the context for all operational level activities.

2. An Operational warning order has been released to components and supporting commands.

3. Operational advice on the draft MROs to assist their refinement has been submitted to SACEUR, including:

   (a) The main operational conclusions and concerns on the different MROs, including operational risks and possible mitigation, and an appreciation as to MRO’s adequacy, merits and potential for operational

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\(^{20}\) Activation of the JOPG is at the Commanders’s discretion and will not always be tied to formal SACEUR tasking.
success. This appreciation includes the Commander’s MRO recommendation.

(b) Critical operational requirements, including strategic preconditions for operational success, mission essential force capabilities, interaction requirements with relevant actors, etc.

f. **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.**

(1) **JOPG.** The JOPG, as guided by the Commander, plays the leading role in the development of the operational appreciation of the SSA and the analysis and operational evaluation of MROs including their adequacy, merits and potential for operational success. The JOPG is supported by Component Commands and other JHQ branches as required, including intelligence/knowledge, operations staff (synchronization and execution, effects management), etc. The JOPG must be prepared to conduct its analysis in a dynamic collaborative process with the RDG.

(2) **Intelligence/Knowledge Staff.** Intelligence and knowledge staff will lead the CPOE process. They will also directly assist the JOPG to understand the nature of the crisis as well as the actions, capabilities and behaviour of the main actors/systems and influencing factors that account for the current situation and its development. Their support should include a holistic briefing based on the developed CPOE to the JOPG at the commencement of Phase 2.

g. **External Coordination.**

(1) **SHAPE.**

(a) **CCOMC.** The CCOMC will transition relevant information, intelligence and knowledge to support the RDG, along with selected members who participated in the initial analysis work on the emerging crisis. The CCOMC will continue to monitor the crisis situation and provide information and intelligence to the RDG.

(b) **Response Direction Group (RDG).** A task-organized, cross-functional RDG will be established to develop the SSA and the MROs, under an Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS) J5 lead, in coordination with DCCOMC. The JOPG will coordinate/collaborate with the RDG, especially to, as requested, assist in the development of the MROs. A JHQ JOPG liaison will be sent to SHAPE to assist this collaboration.

(2) **Subordinate Commands.** The component commands and other subordinate commands may be required to contribute to the development of operational advice. In which case, they should be alerted to any requirements for liaison or planning support to the JOPG.

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21 The old term Strategic Operations Planning Group (SOPG) will still be found in various documents; where this occurs, it can be thought of as roughly equivalent to the RDG depending on the context.
Figure 4.3 - Operational Appreciation of the Strategic Environment Main Activities

- Step 1 - Appreciation of the SSA
  - Initiate Operational Level Appreciation of the Crisis
  - Appreciation of the Strategic Context of the Crisis
  - Appreciate Level and Scope of International Engagement
  - Appreciate Implications for NATO
  - Appreciate Strategic Military Considerations
  - Brief Commander on SSA Appreciation

- Step 2 - Operational Advice on MROs
  - Assist SHAPE during MRO Development
  - Commander's Guidance for MRO Analysis
  - Analyse Draft Military Response Options
  - Evaluate MROs
  - Develop Conclusions
  - Provide Operational Advice

- Components
  - COM Comp HQs
  - Operational Warning Order
  - SACEUR's Strategic Assessment

- Strategic Level
  - SACEUR
  - Strategic Warning Order
  - SACEUR's Strategic Assessment

- Operational Level
  - COM JHQ
  - Operational Warning Order

- CCOMC RDG
  - Collaborative Planning and Interaction
  - Draft MROs

- Component OPG
  - Advice on MRO elements (i.e. Force Capabilities)
Section 2 - Process

Step 1 - Appreciation of SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment.

4-11. Initiate an Operational Level Appreciation of the Crisis.

a. Appreciate SACEUR’s Warning Order. On receipt of SACEUR’s Warning Order, the Director of Operations must assess the urgency of the situation and determine requirements for immediate action, including:

(1) The strategic task requested by the NAC (e.g. develop an SSA). In urgent situations, the NAC may request that SACEUR provide the SSA and MROs at the same time.

(2) Any NAC guidance, including potential military or non-military roles.

(3) The precise operational task(s) to be accomplished and any guidance.

(4) The time available.

(5) Actions stemming from declared CRMs, including implementation reports.

(6) Activation of operational crisis response bodies, including the JOPG.

(7) The need for additional guidance and/or clarification.

They will update the Commander on the details of the Warning Order and initial actions taken, and seek any additional direction and guidance.

b. Commander’s Initial Guidance. The Commander should provide direction and guidance on the following:

(1) The need to activate operational crisis response bodies (as described in paragraph 4-11 c.), including:

   (a) The JOPG.

   (b) The subordinate HQs to be involved.

   (c) Requirements for external coordination.

(2) Specific focus areas for staff analysis:

   (a) Consideration of the need for, or implications of, FTDM.

   (b) Requirements for additional NATO CRMs.

   (c) Other areas of concern.

(3) Timings for review of the operational appreciation of the SSA.
(4) Issues to be clarified.

c. **Activate Operational Crisis Response Bodies.** As directed by the Commander, the following actions will be conducted.

(1) Activate the JOPG.

(2) Issue warning orders to subordinate commands and request liaison/planning elements.

(3) Deploy a liaison element to SHAPE, if not already deployed (i.e. minimum of a JOPG experienced planner).

(4) Determine requirement for external coordination and establish liaison with other HQs, organisations, and agencies, as appropriate and authorized.

(5) Alert the OLRT for possible deployment.

(6) Update information on Area of Interests (AOIs).

(7) Confirm requirement for inclusion of operational staff in the strategic assessment team22 (SAT).

d. **Provide Advice on Potential Requirement for Fast Track Decision-Making.** In an urgent situation, requiring the early deployment of forces to a crisis area, and when a relevant contingency plan (CONPLAN)/generic CONPLAN is available, the SSA may include advice on the need to initiate the FTDM23 process. In this case, the Commander will be requested to provide advice on a potential activation of FTDM. If the NAC decides to proceed with FTDM, the JHQ will be required to:

(1) Issue warning orders to subordinates.

(2) Conduct a rapid mission analysis.

(3) Consider the readiness and availability of deployable forces.

(4) Conduct hasty planning to develop an operational OPLAN by adapting the operational CONPLAN/generic CONPLAN to the situation and mission requirements, including tailoring the illustrative Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) to the mission, based on the requirements of components.

e. **CPOE.** If not already commenced, the JHQ must initiate the CPOE process to ensure that products are available to support: development of an appreciation of the

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22 The concept for deploying a ‘Strategic Assessment Team’ to the crisis area, when authorized by the NAC, to facilitate the completion of a strategic estimate for the crisis is nascent. Recently a Civil-Military Assessment and Liaison Team (CMALT) was used, which had co-leads (one representing the political-military level and one representing the strategic military level). In the comprehensive environment, this may be the model for the future, vise a purely military team. Limited in size, a SAT will be tailored to the particular crisis and may include operational level representation; the deployment of OLRT would have to be coordinated with any deployed SAT.

23 As described in MC 133/4, NATO’s Operations Planning, 07 Jan 11.
strategic environment, analysis of potential MROs and subsequent operational level planning beginning in Phase 3 - Operational Estimate.

4-12. Appreciation of the Strategic Context of the Crisis.

a. To analyse SACEUR’s draft MROs and to initiate operational planning, the JOPG requires a thorough appreciation of the strategic aspects of the crisis that will determine the context for all operational level activities, subject to political guidance/constraints, information and time available. As the RDG develops the SSA, the JOPG will in parallel begin to develop its own appreciation of the situation as described in the process of this section; they will be kept abreast of SSA development by the JHQ liaison at SHAPE. As a start point for the JOPG, the intelligence/knowledge staff may provide a CPOE brief on the situation, if the CPOE work is sufficiently mature at this point. They can also be asked to provide products or briefings in support of the process described in this step. When the SSA is completed, the JOPG will analyse it and update or validate their developing appreciation for the strategic situation.

b. Review Available Knowledge and Assessments. The JOPG should establish the extent to which SHAPE and/or its own/other operational HQs may have already developed a knowledge base for the area and an initial strategic appreciation of the crisis. This will determine whether the immediate task is to review existing analysis or to develop an initial strategic appreciation in parallel with knowledge development. In the event that a knowledge base has been developed by another HQ, the Commander should request the temporary deployment of an intelligence/knowledge element from that HQ to transfer the required knowledge and information. In any case, the Commander and JHQ staff must quickly gain a common understanding of the nature of the crisis, the main actors, their interrelationships and the main influencing factors as described in the following paragraphs.

c. Understand the Nature, Scale and Scope of the Problem. The first step for the JOPG, supported by the intelligence/knowledge staff, is to review and update the main structural features and relationships that define the situation and the current “system” states to establish:

1. The unacceptable conditions in the current situation in terms of international norms that characterise the crisis.
2. The historical background and events leading to the crisis.
3. The PMESII factors contributing to the crisis.
4. The main actors influencing the problem and its resolution, including potential adversaries and friends, as well as the main non-NATO actors engaged in the crisis.
5. Current trends, the likely course of future events and potential outcomes.
6. Potential strategic risks and threats to NATO’s security interests.

24 This transfer may be facilitated granting access to an existing TOPFAS database for the crisis, if one exists.
(7) Critical issues requiring urgent attention.
(8) Uncertainties and gaps in knowledge.

d. **Understand the Key Strategic Factors Contributing to the Crisis.** On this basis, the JOPG needs to identify and understand those key actor systems and factors influencing the crisis and its likely causes, as well as changes required to improve the overall situation, to include:

(1) The strategic environment, including the influence of geography, hydrography, weather, and climate.

(2) Political aspects, including stability, governance, representation, political interest groups, administration, international relations and diplomacy.

(3) Military/security aspects, including the security situation and stability, internal and external threats, the armed forces, internal security forces, paramilitary forces and illegally armed groups, strategic capabilities, WMD, the provision of arms and sustainment.

(4) Economic aspects, including vital national resources and assets, production, trade and commerce, distribution, consumption, inflation and debt.

(5) Social aspects, including justice, the rule of law, social support systems, health, religion, education, welfare, gender relations, scale of Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) issues, development, cohesion, power and influence groups, displaced persons and refugees.

(6) Infrastructure aspects, including utilities, energy, transportation nodes, networks and means, communications, industry and public facilities.

(7) Information aspects, including: national intelligence; mass communications and media; information activities by different actors and social groups as well as their receptivity, susceptibility and vulnerability to messages; Cyber threats to Communication and Information Systems (CIS); and Command and Control Systems (C2S).

e. **Understand the Main Actors and their Role in the Crisis.** It is critical for the JOPG to understand the effects created by the actions of each actor, as well as the attributes of each actor's systems to gain insight into how it might be possible to influence them. A clear classification/grouping of friendly, adversary, neutral and supporting actors is required and should be conducted at this stage. Building on the existing knowledge about each actor in the knowledge base as well as insights from intelligence/knowledge staff, the JOPG should review and understand the following:

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25 As per MCM-0016-2012, Children and Armed Conflict, dated 10 Jul 12.
26 There may be a variety of state and non-state actors, including potential adversaries, partners and others, whose actions have contributed to the current crisis and may influence its future development. These actors have interests and act in pursuit of those interests in accordance with their capabilities and motivation. They can be viewed as systems, comprised of different elements, which interact with other systems to create effects intended to support their goals. Their actions will also create effects that may have other consequences in the crisis.
(1) **Political Goals and Objectives.** Review the actions and statements of each actor and its main elements to understand what they seek to achieve as well as their desired end state.

(2) **Main Characteristics.** Consider each actor’s motivations including the influences of history, culture, values, beliefs, and prevailing attitudes, as well as the personality traits, psychological profiles, motives, interests of key individuals. At this point it is also useful to consider the receptivity, susceptibility and vulnerability of actors to different types of external influences.

(3) **Capabilities, Strengths and Weaknesses.** Review the key system elements and influences to identify main attributes, strengths and weaknesses of each actor to achieve its goals and objectives. System network diagrams, including a geo-spatial view of each system, help in determining positive and negative influences as well as critical dependencies. This will point to the main sources of power, as well as any deficiencies that must be considered during the analysis of centres of gravity, critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities.

(4) **Relationships with other Actors.** Each actor will have a variety of relationships with other actors that enhance or detract from its power and influence in accomplishing its goals. Understanding the nature and basis of these relationships and how they may evolve may provide insight into how they might be influenced.

(5) **Strategies and the Use of Power.** It is essential for the JOPG to understand the main tenets of each actor’s strategy, and the instruments of power on which it depends, to appreciate the possible implications for NATO’s actions.

(6) **Actions and Effects.** It is critical at this point to appreciate the interaction between each actor’s capabilities, actions and resultant effects\(^{27}\) to gain insight into how they might be influenced, using different instruments of power to establish conditions that would improve the overall situation.

(7) **Possible Response to NATO Involvement.** Based on an understanding of the different actors, consider the likely response of each actor to possible NATO responses. This will provide an initial indication of potential adversaries, partners and neutrals. It may also highlight the strengths of these relationships including those that may be conditional.

(8) **Knowledge Gaps.** The analysis of actors will highlight gaps in knowledge. The JOPG should capture any additional requirements for information, knowledge and intelligence that will be submitted to the intelligence/knowledge staff for production.

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\(^{27}\) Effect - A change in the state of a system (or system element), that results from one or more actions, or other causes. (Proposed definition).
4-13. **Appreciate the Level and Scope of International Engagement.**

   a. **Review International Legal Aspects.** The JOPG, with advice from the LEGAD and POLAD, will review the legal aspects of the crisis in terms of applicable law and policy as well as any relevant United Nations (UN) resolutions.

   b. **Review International Commitments.** The JOPG needs to identify the relevant international actors operating in the area that could contribute to the resolution of the crisis, including those IOs, GOs and NGOs engaged in humanitarian aid, human rights, protection of minorities, refugees and displaced persons, CAAC, gender, legal assistance, medical care, reconstruction, agriculture, education, and general project funding. It is critical that the JOPG understands the mandate, role, structure, methods and principles of these organisations to determine:

   1. The lead agencies coordinating efforts in different geographical and sectors (e.g. governance, development, security, humanitarian).
   2. The nature, level and scope of commitments.
   3. The goals and objectives, as well as major obstacles to achieving them.
   5. The relevant international actors with which interaction is required, as well as the degree of interaction required with each.
   6. Potential roles for NATO to enable international efforts, gain synergies and limit interferences, including security and theatre logistic (including medical) support.
   7. Possible areas for cooperation and mutual support with early identification of supporting/supported roles.
   8. Priorities for coordination and liaison.

c. **Review the International Media and Public Opinion.** Within the JOPG, with consideration to any StratCom direction and guidance from the NAC, Military Public Affairs (PA) leads a collaborative process with Information Operations (InfoOps), Psychological Operations (PsyOps), GENAD and POLAD in developing an understanding of the level of media interest among different audiences, as well as any prevailing attitudes. This understanding will underpin future PA efforts to communicate with various audiences to gain and retain strategic initiative. The following should be done to assist development of this understanding:

   1. Appreciate media infrastructure and assets for production. This appreciation examines the availability, affiliation and reach of assets as well as the credibility of contents. Understanding the various media outlets is essential to

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28 Media attitudes may reflect, or influence, public opinion and ultimately will influence, positively or negatively, popular and political support of NATO activities and eventual mission success. The analysis of media content helps to understand prevailing attitudes and key issues; and provides further insight into the different aspects of the crisis, including potential support and opposition to a possible NATO response.
inform any appreciation of their potential impact and to assist the efficient
dissemination of information.

(2) Appreciate prevailing attitudes and issues in the region. This appreciation
provides the basis for determining requirements for InfoOps, as well as the best
use of resources to deliver relevant information to selected populations.

4-14. Appreciate Implications for NATO.

a. Appreciate Potential Strategic Risks and Threats. Based on the SSA and their
understanding of the situation, the JOPG should appreciate the possible implications for
NATO (e.g. potential risks or threats to NATO’s security interests), including any issues
requiring urgent attention.

b. Appreciate the NATO Political Context. The JOPG will appreciate the political
context, including any limitations and assumptions.

c. Understand the Provisional End-State, Strategic Objectives and Strategic
Effects. The JOPG analyses the desired NATO end state\textsuperscript{29}, strategic objectives\textsuperscript{30} and
strategic effects in the context of the main actors and systems to understand strategic
and operational conditions required to secure NATO’s security interests. This JOPG
should identify the strategic changes required in the capabilities and behaviour of specific
actor and system states and these actor’s interactions as well as their influences within
the strategic environment.


a. The SSA will conclude with a succinct synopsis of military considerations to inform
the NAC on the applicability of the use of the NATO military instrument to assist with the
situation resolution, if they so decide. If the NAC decides that the Alliance should
become involved in the crisis, the SSA and its military considerations should assist the
NAC in providing the necessary direction (through a NAC Decision Sheet requesting
options) for SACEUR to develop MROs. The JOPG should appreciate the military
considerations or other summary comments included in the SSA or its cover letter. What
is articulated under military considerations will vary for each situation, but could include:

(1) Applicability of the military instrument of power in general to assist with
resolution of the crisis.

(2) The use of the NATO military instrument of power, including necessity,
suitability, availability and existing constraints; this can include an appreciation on
the possible use of the NRF, on the need for FTDM, the possible impact on other
NATO operations, etc.

\textsuperscript{29} End State - The NAC statement of conditions that defines an acceptable concluding situation for NATO’s involvement. (Proposed definition).

\textsuperscript{30} MC133/4 (NATO’s Operations Planning) outlines military, non-military and supporting objectives at the NATO strategic level, where supporting
objectives may be military or non-military in nature but must be achieved within means and capabilities. At this stage however, any strategic
objectives articulated may be more general in nature.
(a) Military Strategic Objectives. As part of military considerations and the use of the NATO military instrument of power, the SSA may articulate provisional MSOs; if so, the JOPG must analyse them to appreciate the possible strategic aims to be achieved with military power. It is critical that the JOPG recognises that the development of MSOs is an iterative process throughout strategic assessment and option development, which must ensure that MSOs are balanced with the means and ways available for their achievement.

(3) Non-NATO Interaction Requirements. The JOPG should appreciate those actors with whom SHAPE or JHQ may need to interact to further develop and understanding of the situation and, when requested, to develop military options for possible NATO involvement.

4-16. Brief Commander on SSA Appreciation.

a. The main purpose of the appreciation of the SSA is to position the HQ for their role in MRO development with a thorough appreciation of the strategic aspects of the crisis that will determine the context for all operational level activities. It is extremely important at this stage to ensure that the Commander and the staff share the same appreciation of the strategic situation.

b. The JOPG presents to the Commander a succinct summary of their appreciation of the SSA, especially any areas where the JOPG analysis and the SSA diverge. The Commander, who will also have reviewed the SSA and developed an initial personal appreciation of the strategic situation, validates its analysis or refocuses the staff, as required, and requests further work in areas of concern.

c. While there is no requirement to provide feedback to SACEUR/SHAPE on their appreciation of the SSA, if there are divergences between the strategic appreciation of the situation and that from the operational level, these should be brought to the attention of the RDG by the JOPG or, if required, to SACEUR by the Commander.
Step 2 - Operational Advice on Military Response Options

4-17. Assist SHAPE during Military Response Option Development.

a. MROs are developed by SHAPE. MROs must provide the NAC with a series of suitable, feasible, acceptable and distinguishable military options for achieving MSOs, which will contribute to the establishment of the desired NATO end state conditions within the context of a comprehensive approach by the wider international community. Throughout Phase 2, the designated JOPG will collaborate with the RDG in the development of MROs; this is done primarily through the JHQ liaison element at SHAPE, but the JOPG could also be requested to advise the RDG in a certain area, such as with the development of capability listings for each MRO.


a. Prior to staffing the MROs to SACEUR, SHAPE will seek formal operational advice on them to assist in their finalization. The Commander, with a personal appreciation of the situation and how the military instrument at the operational level may contribute to its resolution, will provide guidance and direction to the JOPG to focus their analysis of the draft MROs for the development of operational advice.

b. The Commander, to ensure that the military ends, means (forces likely to be available) and ways are balanced and those strategic preconditions for success, including the contributions of non-military efforts, have been addressed, may ask key questions to the JHQ staff, such as:

   (1) Will the achievement of the MSO(s) establish the conditions required of the military instrument in contribution to the achievement of the desired NATO end state?

   (2) What military operations (actions) must be conducted to create the effects required to achieve MSOs?

   (3) What are the essential military capabilities (resources) required to conduct the military operations successfully?

   (4) Are the MSOs achievable with the means likely to be available and ways acceptable to political authorities?

   (5) Are the necessary strategic conditions in place to ensure operational success and effective cooperation with other instruments?

   (6) What are the operational risks (i.e. risk to mission and risk to force) and how can they be mitigated?

c. As time for development of operational advice is often limited, in addition to asking the JOPG to evaluate the feasibility of each MRO from an operational point of view and to validate the recommended MRO, the Commander may ask the JOPG to focus on certain MRO elements of concern (e.g. strategic military objectives, strategic military
effects, complementary non-military actions (CNMAs), force capability requirements, pre-
conditions for success and/or operational risks).

4-19. **Analyse Draft Military Response Options.**

a. With consideration to their previous appreciation of the SSA, the NAC guidance for 
MRO development, and the Commander’s guidance and direction, the JOPG analyses 
each draft MRO to determine their operational viability, the comparison of MROs, and the 
conclusions including which MRO is recommended. The JOPG is supported in its 
analysis by functional expertise from across the HQ as required, including system 
analysts and, to look at the MROs from an opposing actors’ point of view, the 
intelligence/knowledge staff. The JOPG should make every effort to determine if there 
are lessons from previous operations that should be considered during their analysis of 
MROs and development of operational advice. The JOPG will analyse the elements of 
each MRO and their comparison, as described by the following paragraphs, and populate 
the annexes of the operational advice template as provided in Annex D Appendix 1.

b. **Appreciate the NATO End State.** Provided in the NAC decision sheet requesting 
the submission of MROs, the desired NATO end state would describe the conditions that 
must be established at the end of a NATO engagement; these conditions may be 
established through a combination of military and non-military means. MROs would 
normally be designed to achieve strategic military aims to support one desired NATO end 
state. However, depending on the situation and guidance received, MROs leading to 
different NATO end states may be developed. The JOPG must appreciate the conditions 
described in the NATO end state, to evaluate the effectiveness of each MRO to 
contribute to establishing these conditions and achieving the end state.

c. **Appreciate the Mission.** SACEUR’s Mission\(^ {31} \) should be given by the NAC; 
however, as part of the MRO process, SACEUR can recommend a potential mission 
associated with a specific MRO. The mission\(^ {32} \) should, among other things, include the 
MSOs that SACEUR must achieve to contribute to the achievement of NATO’s end state.

d. **Appreciate Military Strategic Objectives.** Potential MSOs will be developed for 
each MRO; these may have been first proposed with the SSA. The JOPG must provide 
advice on the operational feasibility of achieving these objectives.

e. **Appreciate Military Strategic Effects.** The JOPG analyses the military strategic 
effects (MSEs) that must be created using primarily military means to achieve each MSO. 
They should also appreciate any essential support to non-military efforts or support to be 
received by non-military means. The JOPG must ensure that the changes in the 
capabilities, actions and/or influences of specific actor/systems could be created using 
military means or a combination of military and non-military means.

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31 Note that the illustrative NAC Initiating Directive (NID) template in MC133/4 (Appendix 1 to Annex D) currently presents a ‘NATO’ mission but not a SACEUR mission, with military and non-military objectives outlined.

32 A mission is described in a clear, concise statement detailing who will conduct the operation, what is to be achieved, when it will take place, 
where it will occur, and why it is being conducted.
f. **Appreciate Military Strategic Actions.** The military strategic actions\(^{33}\) (MSAs) must logically:

1. Cover the range of actions to create effects required to change the capabilities and behaviour of specific actors/systems, and lead to achievement of the MSOs.
2. Be feasible in terms of strategic power projection, operational reach and sustainment.
3. Avoid creating effects that would undermine the achievement of the NATO strategic objective(s).

\(^{33}\) MSAs are an intellectual tool to assist the development of MROs in sufficient detail for them to be understood by the NAC and the operational level. They may be 'activities' to be done by strategic forces or assigned to one or more operational commanders. They assist further in the identification of force capability requirements. Following approval by the NAC of a selected response option, and its military contribution, MSAs assist in the development of provisional missions, including objectives, for the operational commander(s) (e.g. Commander (COM) JHQ), which will be included in the Strategic Planning Directive (SPD). With the issue of the SPD, the MSAs cease to have utility; they are not to be construed to have the intent of constraining COM JHQ in the conduct of an operational estimate and the subsequent development and selection of a course of action.

\(^{34}\) Capability requirements are stated using Bi-SC agreed capability codes to facilitate force generation by nations and harmonisation with NATO defence planning, as outlined in Bi-SC Agreed Capability Codes and Capability Statements, dated 14 October 2011 (SHAPE/CPPCAMFCR/JM/281143 and 5000 TSC FRX 0030/TT-7673/Ser:NU0053).

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g. **Appreciate the Use of Complementary Non-Military Actions.** In many cases desired strategic effects cannot be created by military action alone or could be created more effectively by political, economic and civil actions, possibly in conjunction with military means. The Commander must be satisfied that proposed complementary non-military efforts would:

1. Be sufficient to create required effects in conjunction with prescribed military activity.
2. Allow required coordination with military efforts at appropriate levels of command.

h. **Appreciate Force Capability Requirements.** With the input of liaison/planning elements from the designated component commands, the JOPG should appreciate the adequacy of the primary military capabilities\(^{34}\) described in the option to conduct the MSAs and create the desired effect, taking into account the possible opposition. In addition, the JOPG should appreciate (not in order of priority):

1. The capability of the NRF to meet urgent requirements.
2. The readiness and availability of other Graduated Readiness Forces (GRF).
3. The need to incorporate partner capabilities, or opportunities for their incorporation.
4. Impact on force generation for the option and other operations over time.
i. **Appreciate the Main Support Requirements.** The JOPG with input from designated subordinate and component commands must appreciate the main implications of the logistics, engineering and medical support requirements for each option to verify feasibility in terms of:

(1) Strategic lift requirements and costs for NATO\(^{35}\).

(2) Theatre logistics requirements for establishing and operating staging bases, Airports of Debarkation (APODs)/Seaports of Debarkation (SPODs), storage and distribution of all classes of supply (including fuel and ammunition), establishing and maintaining lines of communications (LOC), and developing infrastructure.

(3) Logistic support potentially required to support relevant international actors in extreme situations.

(4) MILENG support and infrastructure requirements.

(5) Medical support.

(6) Budget estimates, including costs associated with deployable communication and information systems (DCIS) deployment and sustainment (e.g. satellite costs) and service provision. Due to the lack of detail of requirements in an MRO (as compared to that provided in a CONOPS), the financial estimate at this point will likely be only a rough order magnitude covering, if possible, both military budget (MB) and NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) aspects.

j. **Appreciate Provisional Theatre of Operations (TOO) and Joint Operations Area (JOA).** With input from designated component commands, the JOPG should provide advice on whether the provisional JOA and TOO, as determined by SACEUR, will be sufficient to achieve the MSOs.

(1) Assigned TOO provides space for the conduct or support of the military option.

(2) Assigned JOA provides space for the conduct of operations.

k. **Appreciate Preliminary Command and Control (C2) Arrangements.** The JOPG with input from designated subordinate and component commands must ensure that the principal command arrangements for each option meet potential operational requirements:

(1) C2 structure is adequate for the operational level, including JHQ and necessary component, regional, and/or functional commands.

(a) Appropriate use of NATO Command Structure (e.g. Headquarters Allied Joint Force Command (HQ JFC), Headquarters Allied Air Command (AIRCOM), or Headquarters Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM)) and/or NATO Force Structure (i.e. a NFS Joint Headquarters (JHQ)) and other

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\(^{35}\) Strategic movement is a collective responsibility where NATO and Nations have specific and shared responsibilities (MC 336-2, Mar 02).
structures available to NATO. The selected JHQ must be, or be augmented to be, sufficiently joint for the possible scope of military operations for the MRO. The JOPG should also consider the need for and the implications/ramifications of deploying the joint headquarters (e.g. early considerations of possible manpower reinforcement and the mechanism best suited to manage this reinforcement (either a Crisis Establishment (CE) or a reinforced Peacetime Establishment (PE)).

(b) If the ‘JHQ’ identified in the MRO to command the operation is not the current designated JHQ, then operational advice should include considerations for how operational planning should be conducted if that MRO is selected (e.g. currently the JHQ working with SHAPE is a HQ JFC but the JHQ for the MRO would be AIRCOM; if this MRO is selected, does AIRCOM conduct Phase 3 supported by the HQ JFC or does the HQ JFC JOPG continue with Phase 3 in support of COM HQ AIRCOM?)

(2) C2 structure is feasible in terms of deployment and sustainment of DCIS.

l. Appreciate Rules of Engagement (ROE) Requirements. The JOPG, with input from designated subordinate and component commands, has to identify specific ROE requirements from the operational aspect and provide advice for each MRO on the use of force, including lethal and non-lethal measures.

m. Appreciate Legal Requirements. The JOPG must review the legal requirements identified for each option and provide operational advice on the requirement for:

(1) Ensuring an appropriate legal basis for the option.

(2) Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA), MOUs, technical agreements/arrangements, etc. These cover such areas as country clearance for transit, over flight, staging, basing and support with HNs and transit countries as required.

(3) Necessary additional agreements for mission support with host and third nations (e.g. handover of suspected criminals, handling and prosecution of suspected pirates, etc).

n. Appreciate Strategic Communication Requirements. The JHQ must ensure that the principal requirements for strategic communication have been identified and adequately cover:

(1) Potential audiences and any need for prioritisation.

(2) Effects to be created.

(3) Requirements for policy guidance on methods to enable and promote relationships with all appropriate actors (civil, military, governmental and non-governmental) in the information environment.

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36 Standard Manpower Procedure (SMAP) 15 - NATO Manpower Reinforcement Policy (change 19 to MC 0216/4-AAP–16 (D)).
(4) Required authorities for addressing the prioritized potential audiences (including level (by whom), timing (when), and any constraints / restraints).

(5) Specialized forces and staff requirements to plan, develop and execute operations in the information environment.

o. **Appreciate Requirements for Interaction with Relevant National and International Actors.** The JOPG should appreciate the requirements and arrangements for effective interaction with relevant national and international actors, including:

(1) Arrangements for in-theatre coordination with cooperating civilian organisations.

(2) Liaison requirements with local, international, governmental and non-governmental entities.

(3) Support from the NATO HQ CMPS Section and the CEPOS, including the EADRCC.

p. **Appreciate Preconditions for Success.** JOPG should provide operational guidance on those strategic conditions that must be established or fostered by the political level in order to achieve operational success.

q. **Consider Pre-Deployment of Enabling Forces.** The JOPG should assess the need for enabling capabilities may be required to pre-deploy, such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), special operations, civil-military cooperation, or, if an NCS HQ JFC will deploy, the Forward Coordination Element (FCE).

r. **Appreciate CRMs Requirements.** CRMs requirements for different MROs will most likely be similar; nevertheless, the JOPG must provide advice for declaration of pre-authorised CRMs and recommendations for further devolution of CRM authorities to SACEUR by the NAC.

s. **Appreciate Possible Partner and Non-NATO Nations Participation.** A final decision on Partner and non-NATO Nations’ participation will rest with the NAC; nevertheless, SACEUR will, at this early stage of the planning process, provide a view on possible partner and non-NATO nations’ participation. The JHQ can contribute with operational views on this issue.

4-20. **Evaluation of MROs.**

a. **Appreciate Strategic Evaluation of MROs.** Following the review of each MRO, the JOPG will then review the strategic evaluation of the MROs, as articulated in the draft MRO document, including advantages, disadvantages, impact on ongoing operations and strategic risks. Strategic risk can be understood as the probability of failure in achieving a MSO within an acceptable cost. Therefore, the JOPG should review the evaluation of strategic risks by carefully examining the degree to which MSOs, concepts and resources may be in or out of balance. The JOPG should conclude this appreciation by considering the strategic level’s recommended MRO and rationale.
b. **Operational Evaluation of MROs.** Based on their analysis of each MRO and appreciation of the strategic evaluation of the MROs, the JOPG conducts an evaluation of the MROs from an operational perspective, including developing an appreciation of possible operational risks (i.e. risk to mission and risk to force). Operational risks are based on probability of an operational failure and the consequences. The JOPG should review the main strategic factors related to time, space, forces/actors and information within the theatre to identify risky situations and their possible consequences on the accomplishment of an operational military mission.

4-21. Develop Conclusions.

a. The JOPG draws together its conclusions from its analysis and comparison of the different MROs as to their adequacy, merits and potential for operational success, highlighting in the process any operational concerns or advice. When developing their conclusions, they should focus on the guidance and direction provided by the Commander, including the key operational questions identified above in paragraph 4.18.b. They should also consider lessons learned from previous operations that should be reflected in the Commander’s operational advice. Some of these conclusions may highlight critical operational requirements or key issues.

b. **Identify Critical Operational Requirements.** The JOPG may have identified specific operational requirements that are critical for operational success, including in particular, but not limited to:

1. Preconditions for success.
3. Critical in-theatre support and infrastructure.
4. Essential C2 arrangements (including if the JHQ needs to deploy), including CIS enablers and Cyber Defence (CD).
5. Pre-deployment of enabling forces\(^\text{37}\).  
6. Deterrence operations.
7. ROE considerations.
8. StratCom and Information strategy.
9. Relevant national and international actors with which interaction will be required and the degree of such interaction.
10. Additional CRMs, in particular to prepare and/or deploy an OLRT, as well as other enabling elements.

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\(^{37}\) Enabling forces – those forces required at the beginning of an expeditionary operation to establish conditions required for the early and rapid entry of the main force into the theatre of operations and deployment within the JOA. (Proposed definition).
Operational advice on these requirements can be captured in the Operational Advice annexes. If however, they are considered critical to the viability of one or all MROs then they can also be highlighted to SACEUR in the Operational Advice main body.

c. **Determine Key Issues for SACEUR.** Throughout the process, the JOPG will have been collaborating with the RDG and raising significant issues as they arise. However, in addition the JOPG should assist the Commander in identifying those specific issues that should be raised directly with SACEUR.

4-22. Provide Operational Advice.

a. **Brief Commander on Staff MRO Analysis and Conclusions.** The JOPG presents to the Commander a summary of its analysis, conclusions and proposed operational advice with respect to the operational viability of the MROs. This can be done through a formal brief or informally, using the draft Operational Advice document, by select members of the JOPG; the approach will depend on the Commander’s preference and will also have to balance the need for timely provision of operational advice to SACEUR so that it can be considered in the finalization of the MROs prior to their submission to the NAC. The JOPG should present a succinct summary of their main conclusions, concerns and advice for each MRO, leading to a staff recommendation. This presentation should include feedback to the Commander on any area on which analysis was specifically requested. The JOPG should also highlight critical operational requirements or other considerations, key issues or operational concerns. The Commander, who will have by this time developed a personal appreciation of the draft MROs, provides direction and guidance for the refinement of operational advice to ensure it highlights the areas that are of concern.

b. **Submit Operational Advice.** The JOPG finalises the Operational Advice and staffs it for the Commander’s approval and submission to SACEUR. The JOPG then collaborates with the RDG as they review the operational advice and refine the MROs for submission to SACEUR and, following approval, the NAC.
PHASE 3 - OPERATIONAL ESTIMATE
Section 1 - General

4-23. Introduction.

a. Purpose. The purpose of Phase 3 - Operational Estimate\(^{38,39}\) is:

(1) To understand the problem, the operational environment and the mission.

(2) To develop courses of action\(^{40}\) (COAs), from which one will be selected.

b. Overview.

(1) Guided by the Commander, the operational estimate is a mechanism
designed to draw together the vast amount of information necessary for the
thorough analysis of a set of circumstances. This enables the development of
feasible COAs leading to the Commander’s selection of one to achieve the
operational mission. It combines objective, rational analysis with the
Commander’s intuition (a combination of experience and intellect, creativity and
innovation).

(2) Phase 3 begins with receipt of SACEUR’s Strategic Planning Directive
(SP), following release of a NAC Initiating Directive (NID) and any Military
Committee (MC) guidance, to initiate planning for a military response to a crisis.

(3) Phase 3 is separated into two distinct parts: Phase 3a - Mission Analysis
and Phase 3b - Courses of Action Development.

(4) Mission Analysis. Mission analysis consists of an in-depth analysis of the
crisis situation to determine the operational problem that must be solved and the
operational conditions that must be established. It identifies the key operational
factors that will influence the achievement of those conditions, and any limitations
on the Commander’s freedom of action for the development of an overall
operational design. The main outcome of Phase 3a is the Commander’s initial
operational design, with the Commander’s planning guidance, and the Operational
Planning Guidance (OPG) to formally trigger the Mission Analysis at the
component level.

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\(^{38}\) An ‘Estimate’ is a command-led military problem solving process which is applied to ill-structured problems in uncertain and dynamic
environments against shifting, competing or ill defined goals, often in high stake, time-pressured situations. It combines objective, rational
analysis with the power of intuition (a combination of experience and intelligence) and its output is a decision about a COA. It is, essentially, a
practical, flexible tool formatted to make sense out of confusion and to enable the development of a coherent plan for action. At the operational
level, we use the term ‘operational estimate’, not to be confused with the term ‘staff estimates’, which describes any functional area analysis in
support of the operational estimate.

\(^{39}\) During execution (Phase 5), results of operations assessment or a sudden change in the operational situation may require a commander to
either re-visit the original operational estimate or commence a new one; if a new operational estimate is required, a commander will have to
decide if a deliberate operational estimate, as described here, or a tailored operational estimate is appropriate. If time is a factor, the
commander can either provide guidance to the JHQ staff on what to concentrate on in their rapid conduct of an operational estimate, or can
decide to personally conduct one with selected key staff. The situation will dictate the approach, guided by the commander’s experience and
judgement.

\(^{40}\) Course of action (COA) - In the estimate process, an option that will accomplish or contribute to the accomplishment of a mission or task, and
from which a detailed plan is developed. (AAP-6).
(5) Courses of Action Development. After appreciating the Commander’s planning guidance, the JOPG brainstorms possible COAs to achieve the mission. In consultation with the Commander, several are chosen and further developed, analysed and compared against each other and the opposing COAs. Phase 3 concludes with the Commander’s decision on a COA and a refined final operational design, as a basis for the development of a CONOPS in Phase 4. An Operational Planning Directive (OPD) is released to formally trigger COA development at the component level.

c. Prerequisites. Issue of SACEUR’s SPD.

d. Main Activities. The main activities of Phase 3 are depicted in Figure 4.4.

e. Desired Outcome of the Phase. The desired outcomes of Phase 3 are:

(1) Phase 3a - Mission Analysis

(a) Operational warning order has been released to components and supporting commands (if necessary).

(b) The operational mission, including objectives, is understood, and any recommendations for change are successfully staffed to SACEUR.

(c) The Commander releases an initial operational design and Commander’s Planning Guidance (CPG) to guide development of COAs.

(d) The Commander releases an OPG to provide guidance to subordinate and supporting commands to assist their planning.

(2) Phase 3b - Courses of Action Development.

(a) The Commander has selected a viable COA as the basis for the development of an operational CONOPS for efficient and effective mission accomplishment, derived from an accurate analysis, within the time available, of the operational conditions to be established.

(b) The Commander’s vision and intent for the conduct of the operation, to guide further planning by staff and subordinate commanders, has been clearly communicated. An OPD is released to the component level.

(c) Subordinate commanders contributed to the conduct of the operational estimate and are well positioned to conduct component planning activities in support.
Figure 4.4 - Operational Estimate Main Activities

Phase 3A - Mission Analysis
- Initiate Mission Analysis
- Framing of Operational Level Problem
- Analyse Mission
- Develop Draft Initial Operational Design
- Estimate Initial Force Capability and C2 Requirements
- Plan and Conduct Mission Analysis Briefing
- Issue Operational Planning Guidance
- Develop and Submit Requests to SHAPE
- Conduct Theatre Recce and Coordination

Phase 3B - COA Development
- Prepare for COA Development
- Develop Own COAs
- Analyse COAs
- Compare COAs
- Plan and Conduct Course of Action Decision Briefing
- Refine Selected COA
- Issue Operational Planning Directive

Operational Level
- COM JHQ
- Operational Planning Order (as req)
- Commander’s Direction and Guidance
- Staff Functional Estimates
- Advice from Subordinates
- Advice from cooperating IO/GO/NGOs
- Component OPG

Components
- COM Comp HQs
- CCOMC RDG Collaborative Planning

Strategic Level
- SACEUR
- SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment
- Strategic Planning Directive
- Other strategic analysis, assessments

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
f. **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.** The Operational Estimate (Phase 3) is guided and energised by the Commander. The JOPG is responsible for the conduct of the operational estimate activities described in the following process as required to meet the Commander’s needs and to coordinate other JHQ staff activities that support the conduct of the operational estimate. The JOPG is supported by other JHQ branches as required, including intelligence/knowledge, coordination and synchronization, and operations assessment staff. Operational analysts should support the analysis of COAs using operational analysis techniques to model and analyse possibilities.

   (1) **Role of the Commander.** The Commander is the central figure for the conduct of the operational estimate. The Commander will provide direction and guidance to the JOPG on the manner in which the operational estimate is to be conducted (e.g. if any time constraints necessitate any abbreviation to the process, and how/when the Commander will participate in the process). The Commander will discuss and resolve issues with SACEUR, such as those related to the assigned provisional mission, including objectives, and the potential ways and means to accomplish them, and collaborate with subordinate commanders during the conduct of the operational estimate.

g. **External Coordination.**

   (1) **SHAPE.**

      (a) CCOMC. The CCOMC will continue to monitor the crisis situation and provide information and intelligence to the RDG.

      (b) RDG. The RDG will have transitioned into Phase 4 of the strategic OPP to begin the development of the strategic CONOPS in parallel to the conduct of the operational estimate. The JOPG will continue to collaborate with the RDG, facilitated by the JOPG liaison at SHAPE.

   (2) **Subordinate Commands.** The COPD process relies on planning being collaborative, concurrent and convergent: collaborative, using tools such as Tools for Operations Planning Functional Areas Services (TOPFAS), Logistic Functional Area Services (LOGFAS), Document Handling System (DHS) and video teleconferences (VTCs) for transparency and timely input; concurrent, in that the CCs need to input environmental advice in real time to foster the viability and suitability of operational planning, whilst conducting their own planning slightly behind the JHQ; and convergent, in that the CC’s plans should seamlessly nest within the resulting operational plan. Liaison and planning elements from subordinate commands are integrated with the JOPG to facilitate collaborative planning.

   (3) **NIFC.** Depending on the situation, the NIFC may deploy an intelligence support team to the designated JHQ to provide direct intelligence support and facilitate intelligence reach back to the NIFC.

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41 The JOPG should be, or be augmented to be, sufficiently ‘joint’ for the planning of the COM JHQ mission.

42 MC 534 Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC) Concept, dated 06 Mar 06.
(4) **NATO HQ CMPS Section.** The NATO HQ CMPS Section may be requested, through SHAPE, to deploy a liaison element to the supported JHQ. It can also draw on additional experts from its COMPASS database available in a wide range of civil/commercial/technical area identified in paragraph 4-5 g. (3).

(5) **Designated Relevant National and International Actors.** Given SACEUR authorisation for direct liaison and coordination with relevant national and international actors (including relevant IOs, GOs and NGOs), the JHQ will arrange for their participation in operational level planning as required. The JOPG must ensure that the required memoranda between NATO and the relevant national and international actors are in place for the release of NATO classified information.
Section 2 - Process

Phase 3A - Mission Analysis

4-24. **Initiate Mission Analysis.**

a. Mission analysis assists the Commander to determine *what* must be done for mission success, by analysing the crisis situation in depth, determining precisely the operational problem that must be solved and appreciating the specific operational conditions that must be established.

b. **Determine Planning Requirements and Milestones.** Upon receipt of the SPD, the JOPG will review SACEUR’s direction and guidance. This initial review focuses on determining planning requirements and milestones required to manage planning efforts and identifying key issues for consideration by the Commander. In particular, the JOPG must evaluate the time available for planning, based on the earliest possible deployment. In addition, the JOPG must confirm:

   (1) Authorisation to prepare and deploy an OLRT.
(2) Requirements to support the FTDM process and the status of related CONPLANS.

(3) Authorisation for direct liaison and coordination with relevant national and international actors.

(4) The Commander’s visit to the theatre, if required/authorized.

(5) Requirements for the pre-deployment of enabling and initial entry forces.

(6) Any issues for immediate clarification

c. **Commander’s Guidance for Mission Analysis.** At this stage the Commander provides guidance to the JOPG to include at a minimum:

(1) Recommendations for abbreviation of the operational level OPP due to time constraints.

(2) Framing the problem.

(3) Key issues and areas of specific attention.

(4) Coordination and liaison requirements.

(5) Time critical requirements.

(6) Deployment of the OLRT/enabling forces.

(7) Command group activities that could impact planning.

(8) Planning milestones, including specifically when the Commander will be available for a Mission Analysis Briefing (MAB) and COA Decision Briefing.

d. **Establish Liaison/Co-ordination.** The JOPG should make arrangements to:

(1) Receive liaison or liaison and planning elements, as appropriate, from the RDG, subordinate commands, etc.

(2) Establish direct liaison and coordination with relevant national and international actors as authorised by SACEUR.

e. **Issue Warning Orders to Subordinates.** A Warning Order should have been sent to subordinates in Phase 2. Following review of the SPD, the Commander may need to approve the release of another warning order to additional subordinate/supporting commands. The warning order\(^43\) should provide the essential information regarding the nature of the mission and the earliest possible deployment of forces.

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\(^{43}\) For Warning Order format see Appendix 2 Annex D or STANAG 2014, Formats for Orders and the Designations of Timings, Locations and Boundaries, 17 Oct 00, Annex A.
f. **Preparation and Deployment of the OLRT.**

(1) If the OLRT has not been prepared and/or deployed in Phase 2, the Commander may direct the preparation and/or deployment of the OLRT to assist with liaison, coordination and information gathering to help build the operational picture of the environment. The exact timing of OLRT deployment will depend on the situation but almost certainly it will be one of the first requests that the Commander will make to SACEUR at the start of the planning process.

(2) In the preparation of the OLRT, the JOPG should consider the need for:

(a) A suitably senior officer to lead the team.

(b) A clear OLRT mission with specified tasks to address but not restricted to: Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI); Force Protection (FP); legal issues with the host nation (HN); contracting for host nation support (HNS); and development of contact information for HN authorities, IOs, GOs, NGOs.

(c) Tailoring the composition of the OLRT.

(d) Clearly defined authorities for the conduct of engagements with HN and other stakeholders, and any approved influence activities.

(e) A single JHQ authority for direction and tasking of the OLRT, as well as to establish and maintain effective communications for the exchange of information.

(f) Guidance on the JOPG relationship to and/or interaction with a SAT/Civil Military Assessment Liaison Team (CMALT), if deployed.

(3) Following the deployment of the OLRT, the JOPG needs to provide them, as required, with prioritised coordination and collection requirements for the confirmation of critical aspects of the mission analysis and key assumptions.

4-25. **Framing the Operational Level Problem.**

a. It is important to ‘frame’ the problem in the unique context of the operational level; this allows the Commander and the JOPG to develop a shared understanding of the operational environment in terms of the crisis background, the underlying causes, and the specific dynamics. It assists the Commander to visualize the extent of the problem and begin to appreciate how to alter the environment to achieve the operational mission.

b. **Strategic Context Review.** The Commander and the JOPG need to update their appreciation of the strategic context through a review of the SPD.

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44 For guidance on the deployment of an OLRT see SHPPP/2100/8/04 – 100507, Subject: SACEUR’s Guidance for the Operational Liaison & Reconnaissance Team (OLRT), 26 Apr 04.
(1) **Review the Current Strategic Situation.** The Commander and the staff should have collaborated with SACEUR and SHAPE (through the RDG) in the development of the SSA and MROs. The JOPG should review the SPD to check for changes to the strategic appreciation of:

(a) The nature, scale and scope of the problem and its causes.

(b) The key strategic (PMESII) factors contributing to the crisis.

(c) The principal actors and their role in the crisis.

(d) International legal aspects, including international law and treaty obligations.

(e) International engagement in the crisis.

(f) International media and public opinion related to the problem and the potential involvement of NATO.

(g) Potential risks and threats to NATO’s security interests.

(2) **Review Strategic Level Problem.** SACEUR’s SPD and the NID, with MC guidance, establish the boundaries of the strategic problem to be solved and conditions that must be established to achieve an acceptable NATO end state. The JOPG must appreciate these directives, including:

(a) The NATO End State and associated conditions.

(b) Political Guidance and Limitations.

(c) The NATO strategic military and non-military roles, including SACEUR’s Mission, MSOs, and the strategic results expected from the employment of military force.

(d) SACEUR’s Intent.

(e) Military Strategic Effects, and/or changes required in the behaviour and/or capabilities of specific systems of different actors.

(3) **Collect and Review Historical Analysis and Lessons Learned.** NATO is in possession of studies and analysis reports from past operations and activities which may provide useful lessons applicable to the current strategic context and how to deal with it. J7 will lead the review of historical analysis and lessons learned and input salient points into the JOPG activity.

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45 Currently MC133/4 (NATO’s Operations Planning) outlines the use of a NATO end state and strategic military and non-military objectives – there is no ‘military’ end state articulated by the NAC per se; thus the establishment of operational conditions derived from SACEUR’s and COM JHQ’s mission will contribute to the achievement of the NATO end state.

46 The Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) has both analysis reports and the NATO Lessons Learned Database (NLLDB) which users can search for relevant information. Other bodies in NATO, such as Allied Command Transformation (ACT) Capability Development or the Joint Warfare Centre, produce reports that may have relevance.
c. **Understand the Operational Environment and the Main Actors.** Having developed an initial understanding of the operational environment and actors, intelligence/knowledge staff share this with the JOPG normally through a CPOE brief. This brief should provide an appreciation for the possible operational impact of the environment main characteristics and those opposing, friendly and neutral actor systems that may have to be influenced to establish the conditions required to contribute to the achievement of the MSOs. This appreciation will assist the JOPG later with analysis of key factors and centre of gravity (COG) analysis. The CPOE brief will also facilitate the identification by the Commander or the JOPG of any additional CPOE products that are needed to support mission analysis.

(1) **Impact of Operational Environment Main Characteristics.** The examples in Figure 4.6 below may be useful to stimulate JOPG insights into the operational impact of the environment main characteristics.

(2) **Appreciation of Adversaries, Friends and Neutrals.** To assist in appreciating the key opposing friendly and neutral actor systems of relevance to the operational level that may need to be influenced to establish the conditions required for the achievement of the military objectives, the CPOE brief should address the following:

(a) **Goals and objectives of each actor.** The political goals and likely desired end-state for each actor, especially any likely strategic objectives to be achieved by the use of military force/violence.

(b) **Primary and supporting instruments of power.** The systems that contribute to the main instruments of power that each actor seeks to leverage to influence other actors and systems.

(c) **System interaction, interdependencies, influences and vulnerabilities.** The strengths and weaknesses of the main actors and systems in terms of their capacity to influence other actors and systems and their ability to be influenced based on their vulnerabilities and interdependencies, including possible critical system relationships, nodes and linkages.

(d) **Military and other capabilities.** The strengths and weaknesses of each actor to achieve its objectives, in particular its capabilities and capacity to use force in time and space.

(e) **Appreciate possible actions.** The fullest possible range of potential actions or COAs of each actor (e.g. Opposing COAs), with consideration to the most likely and most dangerous, including any likely response to a possible NATO military response. Actor’s COAs should consider the following four stages:

1/ **Prior to any public announcement of NATO intervention.**

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47 In a force-on-force scenario, the opposing force can be evaluated using: Order of Battle and Current Disposition; Goals and Objectives; Capabilities, Strengths and Weaknesses; Center of Gravity and Decisive Conditions; High-Value Targets; Likely Intentions; Potential COAs.
2/ After a public announcement of NATO intervention until the initial entry of NATO forces.

3/ After the initial entry of NATO forces until the full build-up of forces.

4/ After the full build-up of forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Operational Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theatre geometry</td>
<td>Possible access, staging, entry, operating areas, bases and distances, lines of communications, sustainment, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographical characteristics</td>
<td>Observation, obstacles, movement/mobility, key terrain, littorals, choke points, international sea lanes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meteorological and Oceanographic (METOC) characteristics</td>
<td>Air operations, ground operations, maritime operations, risks to personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population demographics</td>
<td>Human development, population movement, displaced populations/refugees, dependence on humanitarian aid, populations at risk, unemployment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political situation</td>
<td>Credibility, popularity, effectiveness of governments to provide for the basic needs of the populace, opposition, stability, status of forces agreements, rule of law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military and security situation</td>
<td>External/internal threats, surrogates and proxy forces, illegally armed groups, child soldiers, extremism/terrorism, operational areas, military dispositions, police and military activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic situation</td>
<td>Availability of money, food, energy, raw materials, industry, services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural situation</td>
<td>Social cohesion/conflicts, dominant groups, extremism, gender relations, contribution to protection of vulnerable groups due to sexual and gender based violence and CAAC issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and medical situation</td>
<td>Risk of famine, diseases, epidemics, environmental hazards, available medical support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure situation</td>
<td>Possible points of entry, theatre infrastructure (e.g. adequacy of transportation and communication nodes and networks), utilities, POL storage and distribution, host nations support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information and media situation</td>
<td>Control/bias/manipulation of media, public access to information, use of propaganda, robustness of communications.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.6 - Examples of Impact of the Operational Environment Main Characteristics

4-26. **Analyse the Mission.**

a. **Purpose.** The purpose of mission analysis is to establish precisely the operational results to be achieved (i.e. conditions to be established) and to identify critical operational requirements, limitations on freedom of action and inherent risks. The JOPG will analyse the relevant facts related to the strategic context and the operational environment, review the framing of the problem, make deductions about mission
implications and draw conclusions related to the mission requirements that must be addressed in planning and/or further analysis. The mission analysis should answer the following questions:

(1) What conditions must be established to achieve operational objectives?
(2) What effects are required to establish these conditions?
(3) What are the operational actions necessary to create these effects?
(4) What are the operational implications of time, space, forces/actors, and information?
(5) What capabilities, support and preconditions for success are required?
(6) What limitations have been or are likely to be imposed on the use of military force?
(7) What are the (plausible) assumptions that have to be made in place of unknown facts to allow planning to proceed?
(8) What are the outline requirements for cooperation with civilian organisations?
(9) What operational risks (i.e. risks to mission and risks to force) can be identified at this stage?

b. **Review Strategic Guidance for Commander JHQ (COM JHQ).** The JOPG has already reviewed the SPD to appreciate the context of the strategic problem. The JOPG now reviews the SPD to get a thorough understanding of SACEUR’s planning guidance as it pertains to COM JHQ. The JOPG should review the SPD to appreciate inter alia, SACEUR’s intent, the provisional COM JHQ Mission and its operational objectives, those conditions to be established by COM JHQ, any limitations imposed by either the political level or SACEUR, guidance on ROE, the use of force and targeting, authorities for interaction with external actors, possible partner involvement, and the provisional TOO and JOA. This appreciation may require conversations between: the Commander, the Director of Plans and the Head of the JOPG; the Commander and SACEUR; and/or the JOPG and the RDG.

c. **Review COM JHQ Guidance.** The JOPG reviews the Commander’s guidance (e.g. the Commander’s guidance for Mission Analysis and any subsequent guidance, perhaps received following the framing of the operational problem), including any initial limitations imposed by the Commander, to assist their focus for the Mission Analysis.

d. **Identify and Analyse Factors.** The JOPG possesses a broad understanding of factors with operational impact as identified in the previous analysis of the operational environment and main actors and presented in the recent CPOE brief. The JOPG should examine\textsuperscript{48} specific aspects, facts or conditions of the operational environment and the

\textsuperscript{48} This analysis can be structured in PMESII framework.
capabilities, goals and relationships between actors to determine their impact on operational success. It will consider the effects of the operational environment on the main actors as well as on NATO forces as they interact in time, space and the information sphere. The deductions\textsuperscript{49} and conclusions\textsuperscript{50} gained from this analysis are critical to setting the boundaries and the “realm of the possible” within which solutions must be developed. Results can be presented in a table as per Figure 4.8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Deduction</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A significant factual statement of information known to be true that has operational implication.</td>
<td>The implications, issues or considerations, derived from fact(s) that have operational significance.</td>
<td>The outcome or result reached that requires action in planning or further analysis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>What is the current state of affairs or trends?</em></td>
<td><em>So what is the significance of the factor?</em></td>
<td><em>So, what can or should be done?</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.7 - Factor/Deduction/Conclusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Deduction</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factor #1</td>
<td>Deduction (s) #1</td>
<td>Conclusion (s) #1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor #2</td>
<td>Deduction (s) #2</td>
<td>Conclusion (s) #2</td>
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<tr>
<td>etc</td>
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Figure 4.8 - Factor/Deduction/Conclusion Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Deduction</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Example 1</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Existing SPODs have limited throughput capacity</em></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identified ports are not adequate for rapid deployment of large heavy forces</td>
<td>Pre-deployment of enabling forces to maximize/expand SPOD capacity is required (action, forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SPOD usage requires detailed de-confliction with HN/IOs/NGOs (operational action, liaison)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Need ready alternatives (risk, branch, CCIR)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.9 - Factor/Deduction/Conclusion – Example #1

\textsuperscript{49} Deductions should be concise, relevant and expressed as building blocks of information. They should lead logically to a set of conclusions. It may be necessary to revise some deductions as later aspects of the analysis may affect some deductions developed earlier in the process.

\textsuperscript{50} Conclusions must be relevant and useful in determining military requirements and specific operational conditions that must be established with respect to forces/actors, time and space.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Deduction</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Example 2**  
- Government X is assessed as on the verge of collapse | Collapse:  
- Could further destabilize region  
- Would exacerbate the humanitarian crises  
- Will result in a loss of HNS to NATO  
- May require a mission to ‘nation build’ | Early deployment of NATO is desirable (operational action, sequencing, risk, CCIR, assumption)  
- Immediate political support for Government X is required (CNMA, precondition for success)  
- Branch Plan required for collapse of humanitarian assistance mission (decision point/CCIR/Risk)  
- Adversely impacts Logistics/Legal aspects (Logistics/LEGAD planning considerations)  
- Could exceed mandate (Pol-Mil direction required) |

Figure 4.10 - Factor/Deduction/Conclusion – Example #2

e. **Determine Key Factors.** To assist completion of the mission analysis and the development of an operational framework, the Head of the JOPG, with an appreciation of COM JHQ’s mission including the operational objectives, next needs to focus the JOPG to identify and analyse those ‘key’ factors that will have a direct bearing on what may have to be accomplished in the area of operations and under what conditions. These “key factors” will be presented during the MAB.

f. **Centres of Gravity Analysis.** COG\(^5\)\(^1\) analysis is conducted on each of the main actors, including ourselves, and can assist the determination of the operational conditions to be established or maintained and the operational effects to be created. Operational COGs are typically a dominant capability which allows the actor to actually achieve operational objectives.\(^5\)\(^2\) COG analysis draws upon the systems analysis of the main actors and related systems to identify the COG and determine its critical capabilities (what gives the COG its strength), critical requirements (what it needs to be effective) and critical vulnerabilities (how can it be influenced). Figure 4.11 can be used to support COG analysis. Of critical importance is that the analysis identifies what can be exploited in the opponent and what must be protected in friendly and neutral actors. These key insights should contribute to the development of the main ideas for the campaign or operation and should be captured in the conclusions.

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\(^5\)\(^1\) Centre of gravity - Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. (AAP-06).

\(^5\)\(^2\) During an operation, an actor’s COG may change if their objectives or available sources of power change.

### Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix

**Actor:**

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Deduced Aim and Desired Outcome</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is the actor’s main goal and what conditions does the actor seek to establish by their actions?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Centre of Gravity</strong></th>
<th><strong>Critical Capabilities</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>…is a principal source of strength of power for achieving one’s aim.</td>
<td>…is the primary ability (or abilities) that gives the COG its strength.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the primary element of power upon which an actor depends to achieve operational objectives?</td>
<td>What are the primary means that enables the COG to gain and maintain dominant influence over an opponent or situation, such as to threaten or coerce an opponent, or to control a population, wealth distribution, or a political system?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To be targeted in an opponent and protected in a friend.  
A noun; an entity; a complex system; a thing.  

To be influenced/denied to an opponent and exploited in a friend.  
The key word is the verb - the ability to….

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Critical Vulnerabilities</strong></th>
<th><strong>Critical Requirements</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>…exists when a critical requirement is deficient, degraded or missing and exposes a critical capability to damage or loss.</td>
<td>…are specific conditions, components or resources that are essential to sustaining those capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationship and influences through which the COG may be influenced or neutralised?</td>
<td>What are those key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities, relationship and influences required to generate and sustain the COG’s critical capabilities, such as specific assets, physical resources, and relationships with other actors?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To be exploited in an opponent and protected in a friend.  
A noun with modifiers.  

To be denied to an opponent and provided to a friend.  
Nouns, things.

### Conclusion

Which weaknesses, gaps or deficiencies in the key system elements and essential conditions, characteristics, capabilities and influences could be exploited in an opponent and protected in a friend to change the capabilities, relationship and behaviour that would lead to improved conditions in the engagement space?

---

Figure 4.11 - Centre of Gravity Analysis Matrix
g. **Appreciate Limitations on Operational Freedom of Action.** The JOPG will now identify any limitations on the Commander’s freedom of action to accomplish the mission. Limitations include constraints\(^{53}\) and restraints\(^{54}\). They may be imposed by law, the mandate, or by NATO political or military authorities. However, they may also be determined by operational factors that will dictate the time, place and forces to be used. These need to be identified as they may impact other requirements and pose risks to mission accomplishment.

h. **Determine Assumptions.** Throughout the conduct of the operational estimate, gaps may be revealed in knowledge and information. In these cases, the JOPG may find it necessary to make certain assumptions\(^{55}\) in order to continue planning. Assumptions are often the reason a plan can fail and they must be avoided unless absolutely necessary. The Head of the JOPG must control assumptions and ensure that they are regularly reviewed. Any changes in assumptions have to be evaluated as to their impact on the planning conducted to that point. In addition:

1. Assumptions are used in place of something that is unknown and, to be valid, they must be logical, realistic and necessary.

2. Assumptions should not be made which dismiss adversary capabilities or assumed intentions, alter challenging aspects of the situation or presume our own success.

3. Assumptions are treated as facts and therefore need to be analysed.

4. Once adopted, an assumption will apply throughout planning until verified as fact or discarded. To assist in their verification, assumptions will generate information, knowledge or intelligence requirements.

5. Each assumption needs to have a risk evaluation.

6. Each assumption must be evaluated to determine if the requirement for the development of a branch or sequel exists.

i. **Determine Critical Operational Requirements.** Throughout the conduct of the mission analysis, the JOPG must be continually attuned to the need to identify critical operational requirements including:

1. **Information, Knowledge and Intelligence Requirements.** The mission analysis will highlight gaps in information, knowledge and intelligence, including that which is critical for subsequent command decisions. The JOPG will identify these as a basis for developing requests through the CCIRM process and to refine the CCIRs\(^{56}\). Once approved by the Commander, CCIRs are provided to SHAPE,

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\(^{53}\) Constraint - A requirement placed on a commander that dictates an action.

\(^{54}\) Restraint - A requirement placed on a commander that prohibits an action.

\(^{55}\) Assumption - In planning, a supposition made about the current situation and/or the future course of events to complete an estimate of the situation and decide on the course of action. (AAP-06).

\(^{56}\) CCIRs comprise information required for the commander to make timely decisions as required for mission accomplishment. They identify potential changes in the situation and eventualities that would mandate an operational decision or strategic guidance. The JOPG must consider CCIRs from two aspects: 1) any CCIRs essential to the commander’s decision-making and development of the plan, such as related to a plan’s
subordinate and supporting commands. The two key elements of CCIRs are PIRs and Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR).

(2) **Critical Operational Support and Resources Requirements.** These must capture military requirements, sustainment and strategic support required to accomplish the mission and must be reflected in the request to SHAPE (see paragraph 4-32).

(3) **Preconditions for Success.** The JOPG must identify any essential conditions that are beyond the influence of the JHQ that must be established to allow operational success. These may include establishing transit authorities, legal agreements and HNS. These may also address the changes needed in the non-military domains to facilitate the achievement of the operational commander’s objectives.

(4) **Rules of Engagement/Use of Force.** Additional requirements for the development of ROE should be identified during mission analysis and the development of COAs and discussed with the RDG or raised through the Commander to SACEUR as appropriate.

(5) **Requirements for Interaction with Relevant International and National Actors.** The JOPG will need to consider with which international and national actors there is a need to interact for the following reasons:

(a) Complementary non-military activity in support of military action.

(b) Complementary military actions in support of non-military activity.

(c) Mutual support.

(d) De-confliction of critical activities.

---

57 Information concerning areas that are either critical to the success of the mission or represent a critical threat are expressed as CCIRs. CCIRs cover all aspects of the commander’s concern including FFIR and Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) and PIRs. (AJP2A RD2).

58 PIRs encompass those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his tasking of planning and decision-making and normally encompass identification and monitoring of areas that represent opportunities and threats to the mission plan. They are a standing set of requirements that drive the collection and production effort, and provide the focus of the overall intelligence mission. They should be limited in number and should provide comprehensive and coherent groupings of key issues. They may be enduring or limited to a particular phase or situation. (AJP2A SD2).

59 FFIRs details information that the Commander needs to know about his own forces, which might affect the commander’s ability to accomplish the mission. (AJP2A SD2).

60 Legal agreements such as on the status of forces, HNS, and/or any additional agreement -including with third nations - aimed at specific mission support.
(6) **Strategic Communication/Information Strategy Requirements.** The JOPG must identify specific audiences and key leaders as well as the basic themes that may be required to achieve operational and military strategic objectives and mitigate risks.

(7) **CRMs.** The mission analysis will highlight operational requirements that may call for the implementation of CRMs by SACEUR and nations to ensure that necessary preparations are being made and that capabilities will be ready and available.

**j. Operational Risks.** During the mission analysis, the JOPG should identify any risks to the achievement of operational objectives or risks to the force that result from the operational environment or the capabilities and actions of the main actors in the JOA. Risks have two aspects – first, the chances that something will go right or wrong and, second, the resulting level of impact on the operation. At the operational level, risks typically relate to time, space, forces/actors and information factors within the theatre. The operational level risk evaluation matrix, Figure 4.12, provides a possible way of capturing and evaluating risks. Once risks have been identified, the JOPG must consider ways to mitigate each risk (e.g. for a risk related to WMD, mitigation may be increased FP or deployment of CBRN Defence units), which may highlight additional tasks, capability requirements and limitations resulting from consideration of the following questions:

1. How can we reduce our exposure?
2. How can we reduce the probability of occurrence?
3. How can we limit the scale and severity of the consequences?

At this stage the detailed development of risk and mitigation will be challenging; however, risk will be addressed again during COA development.

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61 When identifying audiences the JOPG should ensure that entire population can be reached through those selected. The use of ‘specific audiences’ also includes target audiences for InfoOps and PsyOps.

62 Normally, each risk is evaluated independently with its own table; another mechanism may be required to summarize risks for presentation to the Commander during the COA Decision Briefing.
Operational Level Risk Evaluation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Consequence for</th>
<th>Severity</th>
<th>Probability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actions of the opponent(s).</td>
<td>Overall mission.</td>
<td>Extremely high - could result in failure to accomplish mission.</td>
<td>High. Moderate. Low.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions of friendly forces.</td>
<td>Line of operation.</td>
<td>High - could result in failure to achieve one or more objectives, or decisive conditions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational environmental factors.</td>
<td>Decisive conditions.</td>
<td>Moderate - could result in failure to meet criteria for success or create operational effect, or exceed time, space, forces/actors limits.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desired operational effect.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low - minimal impact on mission accomplishment.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Risk Mitigation

- Can we neutralise the source, and if so how?
- Can we reduce our vulnerability to the source of the risk and if so how?
- Can we limit the consequence and/or severity of the occurrence and if so how?
- Can we reduce the probability of occurrence and if so how?

Conclusion

- Unacceptable - risk mitigation cannot reduce risk to an acceptable level.
- Conditionally acceptable - risk can be reduced to an acceptable level by taking actions to:
  - Modify force disposition/posture/composition.
  - Adjust current operations.
  - Prepare branch plan or sequel.
- Acceptable - no risk mitigation actions required.

Figure 4.12 - Operational Level Risk Evaluation Template

k. **Determining the Conditions to be Established.** The mission analysis assists the Commander and the JOPG to develop a clear understanding of the operational conditions that must be established and sustained, as well as which actors and systems must change. The evaluation of the main actors/systems and analysis of their COGs provide additional insight into what changes in the behaviour and capabilities of specific actors/systems may be required.

1. **Review the Strategic Conditions to be Established.** When framing the operational level problem, the JOPG reviewed the strategic conditions that must be established to achieve an acceptable NATO end-state, through the application of military and non-military means. As a precursor to determining operational conditions to be established, the JOPG reviews the strategic conditions to be established as described by the NATO end state, strategic military and non-military roles and objectives (and any promulgated criteria for success), SACEUR’s intent and MSEs. The operational conditions to be established will
Contribute to the establishment of the strategic conditions, achievement of strategic objectives and the ultimate achievement of the desired NATO end state.

(2) **Analyse Provisional COM JHQ Mission, including Operational Objectives.** The purpose of this analysis is to consolidate what is known about the assigned mission, and then to determine the actor systems to be influenced. As a part of the Mission Command approach, the mission and its operational objectives are assigned by a higher commander. SACEUR will have provided a provisional COM JHQ mission, including operational objectives, in the SPD, which ultimately provides the focus for the employment of military force to influence strategic and operational COGs and achieve changes required in the operational behaviour or capabilities of specific actor systems. The JOPG analyses the provisional mission and its operational objectives to draw out the implied conditions to be established and/or sustained. The JOPG can develop criteria for success for each operational objective, especially if their wording is vague, to assist determining the conditions to be established. These criteria for success may also assist in determining if wording of the operational objectives can be improved for clarity.

(3) **Determine the Actor Systems to be Influenced.** With consideration to the COM JHQ mission and its operational objectives, the JOPG reviews their appreciation of the main actors (adversaries, friends and neutrals), including their goals, relationships, strengths and weaknesses to better appreciate what physical or behavioural changes in their systems/system elements are required. These additional conditions to be established support those required to achieve operational objectives and their appreciation is critical to the determination of operational effects required to establish overall operational conditions. It should also assist identification of requirements for contributions by non-military means and for possible military contribution to required non-military effects.

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63 A mission is a clear, concise statement detailing who will conduct the operation, what is to be achieved, when it will take place, where it will occur, and why it is being conducted. It includes, by its nature, the authority and freedom of action required to achieve the assigned objectives while clearly articulating the role of the subordinate command in contributing to the higher command's mission accomplishment as envisioned in the higher commander's intent. For every command there is only one mission.

64 At this point, the COM JHQ mission and its operational objectives are still provisional: COM JHQ may approach SACEUR to seek their amendment if deemed required following mission analysis. As such, the JHQ must continually consider the assigned mission and operational objectives during their analysis through the mission analysis and develop, if warranted, recommendations for change.

65 Criteria for success provide tests for determining when the objective has been achieved. They can be useful to the operations assessment process and decisions related to transition and termination of operations. At the strategic level, criteria for success may be used to describe conditions that must exist for the NATO end state or a military strategic objective to be achieved including any conditions that cannot exist. Their use at the operational level is not mandated; depending on the clarity of the wording of operational objectives, DCs and effects, they may not be needed in the operational design. They may however be a useful mechanism at this point to assist the JOPG to determine the conditions to be established and to evaluate if the wording of the provisional operational objectives needs amendment.
4-27. The Operational Design.

a. **General.** An operational design, produced through the application of operational art, is an expression of the Commander’s vision for the transformation of the unacceptable operational situation at the start of the campaign or operation into a series of acceptable operational conditions at its end. This transformation is done through establishing decisive conditions (DCs) along different lines of operation (LoOs), leading to the achievement of operational objectives, while contributing to the achievement of strategic objectives and NATO end state.

b. In general, an operational design is fundamental to:

1. Communicating the Commander’s initial intent for the campaign or operation.
2. Providing the common basis for the development of COAs.
3. Developing the provisional missions for the components.
4. Synchronising and coordinating the campaign or operation over time, in cooperation with relevant national and international actors.
5. Assessing progress or delay of the campaign or operation.
6. Adapting and adjusting the OPLAN to deal with foreseen and unforeseen events.
7. Developing initial ideas for transition and termination of the campaign or operation.

c. The process of developing an operational design consists of two distinct parts. The first is the operational framework, developed as a staff product, which is normally presented as a schematic as shown in Figure 4.13, supported by text as required for detail. It provides a conceptual overview of the entire campaign or operation. The second part is the Commander’s initial intent. Once the Commander takes ownership of the operational framework and applies Commander’s initial intent then it becomes the initial operational design, normally following the MAB.

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66 Operational art - The employment of forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. (AAP-06). For more information on ‘operational art’ see AJP-01(D) ‘Allied Joint Doctrine’ and AJP-5 ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning’.

67 Doctrine identifies two similar operational design concepts; the DC and the decisive point. An operational design would normally use either the DC or the decisive point construct, but not both. Decisive points may be of more use when designing the operational design for a more traditional force-on-force operation. As the COPD espouses an operational design approach using conditions, it will only describe the use of DCs.

68 Commander’s Initial Intent. In simple terms this will be the Commander’s vision for the conduct of the campaign or operation. The staff provide the operational framework and the Commander builds a personal vision around the operational actions and effects expressing them in terms of priority (main effort), phase, time and space, outlining the nature, sequence and purpose of the main operational activities leading logically to the achievement of the operational objectives. The initial intent should also identify risks accepted or not accepted and conclude by relating the Commander’s initial intent to the military strategic objectives. The point in the process where the Commander develops an Initial Intent for the campaign or operation will vary from individual commander to individual commander; clearly the earlier this is done the easier it is for the staff to check and update their work if necessary. The initial intent should come no later than immediately following the MAB.
Figure 4.13 - Basic Concepts of Operational Framework
d. **Operational Framework Development.**

(1) The operational framework development begins with the JOPG drawing together the results of the factor analysis, systems analysis, COG analysis, the analysis of the mission with the objectives, and the determination of the conditions to be established. At this early stage the operational framework is simply based on the staff analysis of the problem, providing the critical link between the operational problem to be solved and the required operational outcomes; however, the Commander may, even at this point, provide guidance to the JOPG for their operational framework development.

(2) The JOPG, in consultation with the staff responsible for operations assessment, will prepare the operational framework, using operational design concepts such as objectives, DCs, effects, etc, as further introduced in this section. As many operational framework elements (e.g. effects and/or actions) can communicate strategically or influence perceptions, the JOPG should review StratCom guidance prior to beginning work to ensure those chosen support the overall intent. The Commander is normally consulted by the JOPG during the operational framework development to ensure that it matches the Commander’s own developing vision.

(3) The development of the operational framework, and its elements, is iterative, especially in the early stages. With the consideration of each type of new operational element (as outlined below), the JOPG will often have to reconsider the elements developed previously to validate if any additional ones are warranted or if the wording of those already developed needs to be modified. While, the list below provides a logical way to sequence to developing an operational framework, the actual order or approach used by the JOPG could vary with the situation, guidance from the Commander and the experience of its members.

e. **Determine Decisive Conditions.** For each campaign or operation to be successful, it is necessary to determine the sequence in which specific conditions must be established to focus the effort required to achieve one or more operational objectives. When specific sustainable conditions are determined to be critical to gaining or retaining freedom of action or to the achievement of the objective, they may be designated as decisive conditions (DCs); these may be sustainable and self-regulating conditions and system states that must exist as well as any conditions or system states that cannot exist in order for the objective to be met. The conclusions drawn from COG analysis should highlight changes in the critical capabilities and influences of specific actors that would be decisive to our success on a given LoO. Identifying DCs is critical to the overall design in terms of:

(1) Establishing the nature and sequence of joint operations along each LoO.

(2) Prioritising the effects to be created.

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69 As described in AJP-01(D) – NATO Joint Doctrine and AJP-5 – Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning.

70 A decisive condition is defined as ‘a combination of circumstances, effects, or a specific key event, critical factor, or function that when achieved allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an opponent or contribute materially to achieving an operational objective.’ (AJP-01(D)).
(3) Determining the force/capability requirements for each LoO over time.

(4) Synchronising and coordinating operations on different LoOs.

(5) The ability to appreciate the progress or delay of the campaign or operation, eventually leading to decisions related to transition and termination of operations.

f. **Determine Operational Effects.** The changes in systems/systems elements to establish the operational conditions necessary to establish DCs and achieve the operational objectives, using primarily military means, are expressed by the JOPG as operational effects.\(^71\) It is important when writing effects to ensure that their description is written in a manner that can be measured. One way to evaluate effect wording is to begin to evaluate what measures of effectiveness\(^72\) (MOEs) could be monitored over time to confirm that the effect has been created. MOEs will be further developed during the planning process and execution.

g. **Determine Operational Actions.** The JOPG will identify operational actions required to create the operational effects and establish the DCs identified above. For the creation of effects, the use of both lethal and non-lethal means should be considered, as appropriate. Operational actions will establish the operational requirement for the allocation of military capabilities and the prioritisation of training, exercises, and evaluations; therefore, they can be expressed as joint or single service actions as appropriate.

h. **Determine Complementary Non-Military Actions.** The analysis of systems/system elements that must change will also have identified those that may not be able to be influenced by military means. The need to use other, non-military means to create desired effects must be captured during mission analysis and will need to be addressed with cooperating organisations or SHAPE during planning. Those changes that require activities beyond the JOA should be identified as pre-conditions for success. Consideration needs to be given to development of appropriate guidance for civil-military interaction, and to identifying those relevant international and national actors with whom interaction is required.

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\(^71\) Effect - A change in the state of a system (or system element) that results from one or more actions, or other causes. (Proposed definition).

\(^72\) Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) - A metric used to measure a current system state. MOE are used during the conduct of operations to help answer the question “Are we on track to achieve the intended new system state within the planned timescale?” Monitoring an MOE over time determines whether or not desired results are being achieved.

\(^73\) Operational actions will be further developed as part of COA development, where different ways to meet the Commander’s intent in the initial operational design are investigated.
i. **Determine Lines of Operation.** LoOs\(^{74}\) link effects and DCs to an operational objective, with normally one LoO per objective. The determination of LoOs will shape the development of the plan as well as the conduct of operations, by arranging operations in time, space and purpose. It is therefore critical that alternatives are developed and presented to the Commander focusing on:

(1) The purpose of each LoO.

(2) Critical vulnerabilities to be exploited or protected.

(3) DCs required to retain freedom of action and progress towards the achievement of operational objectives.

(4) Required interaction with non-NATO entities.

j. **Sequencing and Phasing.** The next major step in the design of an operation or campaign is to sequence and phase the DCs, effects and actions. The primary aim in sequencing and phasing an operation or campaign is to maintain its continuity and tempo and to avoid unnecessary operational pauses. Sequencing and phasing of LoOs can be used to designate and shift the Commander’s main effort\(^ {75}\) during the course of the campaign or operation. The intellectual exercise of arranging actions, effects and DCs can lead to the development of alternative operational frameworks, identification of decision points\(^ {76}\) (and any related CCIRs\(^ {77}\)), and/or begin to identify the requirements for potential branches and sequels. It can also assist the JOPG to determine if additional operational effects are required to establish necessary operational conditions not previously appreciated. While considered at this point, sequencing and phasing will be reviewed in more detail as part of COA development and analysis.

(1) **Sequencing.** Sequencing is the arrangement, simultaneously or sequentially, of actions designed to create effects to establish DCs within a campaign or operation in an order that is most likely to produce the desired operational outcomes. Although simultaneous action on multiple LoOs may be ideal, lack of resources usually forces a commander to sequence actions; alternatively, a commander may choose to sequence actions in order to reduce risks to an acceptable level. This process assists in thinking through the entire operation or campaign logically in terms of available forces, resources and time, and helps to determine different operational phases.

(2) **Phases.** Phases represent distinct stages in the progress of the overall operation leading to the establishment of specific DCs required for subsequent stages and ultimately the successful accomplishment of the overall objective. Phases are sequential but may overlap. In addition, the actions required to create certain effects in a certain phase, may well start prior to the phase in question. In

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\(^{74}\) Line of operation (LoO). In a campaign or operation, a logical line(s) linking effects and decisive conditions in time to an objective. (Proposed definition).

\(^{75}\) The main effort is ‘[a] concentration of forces or means in a particular area and at a particular time to enable a commander to bring about a decision’. (AAP-06).

\(^{76}\) Decision point - A point in space and time, identified during the planning process, where it is anticipated that the commander must make a decision concerning a specific course of action. (AAP-06).

\(^{77}\) For each decision point, there would be associated CCIR(s) to trigger those decisions and PIRs to inform the CCIRs.
some cases the beginning of a phase may be contingent on the successful completion of a preceding phase. This should be clearly recognised in the operational framework. The arrangement of supported/supporting relationships may be a valuable instrument in phasing the operations. The Commander may designate a main effort in each phase and assign the primary responsibility for execution of the military tasks to a subordinate commander.

k. **Determine Branches and Sequels.** The JOPG may be able to identify possible decision points leading to the requirement for branches and sequels, at this early stage, and amend their operational framework.

1. **Branches.** Branches are options within a particular phase of an operation, which are planned and executed in response to anticipated opportunity or reversal within that phase, to provide the Commander with the flexibility to retain the initiative and ultimately achieve the original objective. Branches address the question of “what if”?

2. **Sequels.** Sequels are options for subsequent operations within a campaign or the following phase(s) of an operation. They are planned on the basis of the likely outcome of the current operation or phase, in order to provide the Commander with the flexibility to retain the initiative and/or enhance operational tempo and ultimately achieve the objective. Sequels address the question of “what’s next?”

l. **Develop Provisional Missions for Subordinate Commanders.** Once the operational framework is developed, the JOPG will develop provisional missions, including component objectives, for the subordinate commanders. In addition, specific limitations for a subordinate commander may be identified at this time (e.g. constraint of having to support a specific non-NATO actor with some activity (e.g. UN staff)). These missions will be further refined, in collaboration with subordinate commands, during the COA and CONOPS development.

4-28. **Estimate Initial Force/Capability and C2 Requirements.**

a. **Estimate Initial Force/Capability Requirements.** The JOPG should conduct a high level troops-to-actions\(^78\) analysis to identify the major force/capabilities required for the operation. The process is simply to update the estimate of required operational capabilities based on the mission analysis, and the development of the operational framework, and to compare it with the force capability requirements provided in the SPD. This will allow identification of any significant differences that may reflect an imbalance between required objectives and the means likely to be available. Significant issues may constitute operational risks and should be brought to the attention of the Commander.

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\(^78\) Traditionally ‘troop-to-actions’ analysis was termed ‘troops-to-tasks’ analysis. It is still referred this way in AJP5 ‘Joint Doctrine for Operational Level Planning’. The use of ‘tasks’ at the strategic and operational level is less common in current planning policy, process and conduct. At the operational level, force requirements when using a ‘conditions’ approach are developed by analysing operational actions and related effects. For the component level, who routinely assist the operational level with this analysis, the use of the term ‘troops-to-task’ may still be used as part of their planning process.
b. **Estimate C2 Requirements.** The JOPG operations, CIS and CD staff should work together with the component/subordinate command liaison to establish the basic C2 requirements based on the mission analysis and operational factors.

1. C2 requirements are driven by several factors determined during the mission analysis and the development of the operational framework, including:

   (a) The geographic dispersion of forces in the theatre and the JOA.

   (b) The different LoOs and the nature and purpose of military actions in concert with relevant national and international actors.

   (c) The size and functional composition of the deployed force.

   (d) Critical liaison and coordination requirements.

   (e) Span of control.

   (f) CIS points of presence and information exchange requirements (IER).

   (g) The possibilities for C2 reach back.

   (h) CD requirements.

2. **Analyse TOO and JOA.** The TOO\(^79\) and JOA\(^80\) designated by SACEUR are analysed. Conclusions from this analysis will help the JOPG to determine operational requirements, such as entry points, LOC, operations area, force and logistic requirements, etc. It will also assist the JOPG to determine if the provisional TOO and JOA as proposed in the SPD meet the Commander’s needs.

3. **Determine Required C2 Functions and Locations.** The next step is to appreciate what actions will be accomplished, where and by what kind of forces. This should include evaluating how C2 could be phased if the operational command will deploy (i.e. through the use of FCE, Initial Command Element (ICE) and deployed Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQ)).

4. **Determine Geographical and Functional Areas of Responsibility.** Based on these considerations, the Commander can begin to appreciate the requirements to organise the command structure based on geographical and functional areas of responsibility.

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\(^79\) Theatre of operations (TOO) - An operational area, defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, for the conduct or support of specific military operations in one or more joint operations areas. Theatres of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations in depth and over extended periods of time. (Proposed definition).

\(^80\) Joint operations area (JOA) - A temporary area defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency- or mission- specific and are normally associated with combined joint task force operations. (AAP-06).
Determine Critical Liaison and Coordination Requirements. The location of international and governmental authorities in the area may require a permanent high level C2 presence which will influence C2 requirements.

Span of Control. Following military principles, the Commander will want to balance the advantages and disadvantages between a relatively flat organisation and a multilevel hierarchy.

CIS Points of Presence and IERs. Depending on the theatre location and communication infrastructures, the Commander may have to rely on deployable CIS that will have a limited number of points of presence, which in turn will limit the number of deployed HQs locations. Depending on the nature of the operation, different Functional Area Services may require to be supported.

Consider Cyber Defence Requirements. Depending on the operational context, the JOPG should consider the possible scope of CD activities.

4-29. Review Critical Operational Requirements.

a. At this point the JOPG should review and validate the critical operational requirements identified during the conduct of Mission Analysis (see paragraph 4.26 i.), and determine if others are warranted, such as in the following areas:

(1) CRMs. Following the estimation of the initial force/capability and C2 requirements, the JOPG should identify if the implementation of additional CRMs by SACEUR and nations is warranted to ensure necessary preparations are being made so required capabilities will be ready and available.

4-30. Plan and Conduct the Mission Analysis Briefing.

a. The JOPG must validate the results of the mission analysis and the development of the operational framework, including the risk evaluation, within the HQ and, ultimately, with the Commander, which is normally done through a Mission Analysis Briefing (MAB). The MAB provides the Commander an opportunity to validate the JOPG’s analysis and synthesise it with an initial personal visualization of the campaign or operation, finalize the initial operational design, provide direction and guidance on issues that have surfaced, and provide guidance for subsequent planning. It is also a forum where the entire staff and subordinate command liaison officers can be present to ensure a unified vision in preparation for the development of operational COAs.

b. MAB Preparation. An outline format for a MAB is presented in Appendix 3 to Annex D. The Head of JOPG will have to carefully orchestrate the development and conduct of the MAB to ensure that only the information that is important for the Commander is presented; this will vary with each commander and the manner and depth of their personal involvement in the mission analysis to this point81.

81 Prior to this point, most commanders will have been interacting with the staff influencing the development of the operational framework. Commanders should be provided the pre-reading materiel (hard copies of slides) well in advance if decisions are required at the briefing.
c. **MAB Conduct.**

(1) **General.** The purpose of the mission analysis briefing is to:

(a) Validate the mission analysis, including confirming the mission and its operational objectives, and the operational framework.

(b) Seek from the Commander:

1/ Initial intent.

2/ Guidance for the development of COAs and orientation of subordinate HQs.

At the Commander’s discretion, the component or other supporting commanders could participate in the MAB, through video teleconference (VTC) if necessary. A member of the JOPG will be assigned to capture the guidance, direction and decisions that result during the conduct of the MAB.

(2) **Validate the Mission Analysis and Operational Framework.** The essential aspects of the mission analysis and the operational framework are presented and, as required, discussed with the Commander, who will, as necessary, provide direction and guidance for modification. The Commander must eventually take ownership of:

(a) The assigned mission including operational objectives, and any recommendations for change from those provided by SACEUR in the SPD.

(b) The operational framework, including:

1/ LoOs, and the sequence of required DCs in different phases of the operation.

2/ DCs and operational effects.

3/ Operational actions.

(c) Provisional missions to subordinate commanders.

(d) The opposing COAs, in broad terms, to be developed as a basis for planning.
Commander’s Initial Intent and Planning Guidance.

(a) The Commander’s Initial Intent. The Commander should now be in a position to issue an Initial Intent for the conduct of the campaign or operation. This intent will be fused with the operational framework to become the initial operational design, which will be issued with the OPG. If the staff have not seen the Initial Intent until now then they will have to go back and review their work in light of it.

(b) Commander’s Planning Guidance. The CPG must provide sufficient guidance to the JOPG to allow them to develop COAs within the time available. The level of detail of guidance will typically depend on the nature of the mission, the operational circumstances, the time available, and the experience of the JOPG. On this basis the Commander may:

1/ Specify opposing actions to be considered and opposing COAs to be developed.

2/ Establish criteria for COA development and selection.

3/ Describe in broad terms the COAs to be developed.

4/ Direct the JOPG to focus its efforts on developing a single COA due to the urgency and nature of the situation.


a. With appropriate staff preparation, the Commander will issue an OPG to formally capture the output from the mission analysis briefing, including the initial operational design (operational framework fused with the initial intent); the OPG may also incorporate the CPG. The OPG will provide the necessary direction to formally initiate planning at the component level and, where it includes the CPG\(^2\), COA development by the JHQ staff. An OPG template is provided at Annex D Appendix 4. It can be tailored as required to meet the Commander’s requirements; if maximum use of collaborative tools is used through the development of the operational estimate (e.g. TOPFAS and VTC), and the components have been involved including at the MAB, an abbreviated OPG may be warranted to capture only the Commander’s direction and guidance, including provisional missions for component commanders (CCs). The JOPG should anticipate the Commander’s requirement and can be drafting an OPG in parallel to the conduct of the mission analysis; this would facilitate its rapid release post-MAB following any required changes.

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\(^2\) The CPG may be included in the Operational Planning Guidance (OPG) or provided separately.
4-32. Develop and Submit Requests to SHAPE.

a. The JOPG should develop requests, requirements and issues that require action at the strategic level. These typically include:

(1) Requests to SACEUR for change in the Commander’s mission, including operational objectives.

(2) Requests for change in the provisional TOO or JOA.

(3) Requests for the implementation of additional CRMs.

(4) ROE requirements (if not identified in SPD).

(5) Recommendations for additions/changes to StratCom and authorities for conduct of influence operations (towards specific audiences).

(6) Information, knowledge or intelligence requests.

(7) Preconditions for success. It is critically important that the Commander clearly states those conditions that must be established by the strategic or political levels (in the PMESII domains) to allow for operational success. Early identification to SHAPE allows them to work on solutions, in collaboration with NATO HQ, during CONOPS development.

4-33. Plan and Conduct the Commander’s Theatre Reconnaissance.

a. Ideally, the Commander should visit the theatre with the CCs and key staff to conduct high level coordination and gain first hand insights into the operational environment. This assists confirming the mission analysis and provides better knowledge and understanding of the operational environment for COA development. The JOPG will be required to contribute to the preparation of the Commander.
4-34. **Prepare for Courses of Action Development.**

a. The purpose of the final portion of the Operational Estimate is to determine how best to carry out operations that will accomplish the mission effectively and efficiently. Guided by the Commander, the JOPG will develop a set of COAs, all of which will accomplish the mission effectively in accordance with the Commander’s intent, including that expressed through his operational design and his CPG. Selected COAs will be developed, analysed and compared to develop a coordinated staff recommendation. The results of COA development will be presented, typically in a COA Decision Briefing, where the Commander will select a COA and confirm the final operational design, as the base concept for development into a formal CONOPS document. In advance of their development of own COAs, the JOPG will conduct the following preparation:

1. **CPG Review.** The JOPG should review and discuss the CPG. Particular attention should be paid to ensuring a common understanding of the Commander’s intent, the initial operational design and operational actions, as well as any guidance with respect to opposing COAs, the development and selection of own COAs and the acceptance of risk.
(2) **Review the Results from Theatre Reconnaissance and Coordination.** It is critical that the JOPG update the results of the mission analysis based on any new information, knowledge or intelligence received, including updated information gained from the OLRT and possible visits by the Commander to the theatre.

(3) **Gather Required Additional Planning Information.** The JOPG should gather any additional planning information required to develop and analyse COAs, including: order of battle (ORBAT), and port, airfield, road and rail data.

(4) **Refine Opposing COAs.** The JOPG should ensure that, based on the CPG, the intelligence/knowledge staff are refining selected opposing COAs. This would normally include combined COAs for multiple opponents based on the likelihood that they will cooperate or act for a common purpose. This activity is part of the CPOE.

(5) **Arrange for Wargaming of the COAs.** As part of the evaluation process, the JOPG should ideally war game each own COA with the Commander against selected opposing COAs (e.g. most likely and most dangerous). The conduct of a wargame requires advance consideration and preparation; it may be appropriate for an officer to be dedicated to the preparation and execution of this task. The JOPG should consider the following in planning for the wargame:

(a) Time available.

(b) Availability of the Commander.

(c) Critical events to be wargamed.

(d) Required involvement of subordinates, supporting commands and cooperating relevant national and international actors.

(e) Type of wargame – staff estimate, map exercise, operational analysis etc.

(f) Assignment of a Wargame Coordinator to conduct wargame preparations.

(6) **Review and Update Estimates.** The Commander and staff should update any personal or functional estimates focusing on the factors most likely to affect COA development. Estimates should identify the governing factors for each functional area based on the mission analysis and the effects of the operational area, resulting in a clear understanding of those mission requirements that can, in principle, only be accomplished one way and those for which clear choices are possible.
4-35. Develop Own COAs.

a. Analyse Opposing COAs and Factors Influencing COA Development.

(1) Appreciate Opposing COAs. Before developing own COAs, the JOPG must appreciate the COAs open to opposing forces. The intelligence/knowledge staff will present their estimate of the opposing COAs for each opponent and combined COAs for multiple opponents as appropriate.

(a) Analysis of the different stages of enemy COAs provides the JOPG with a more dynamic understanding of the opponents’ capabilities that may be available to pre-empt or counter our actions, as well as the inherent risks posed by their actions. The development of own COAs must be able to cater for possible opposing actions and identify how it may be possible to influence opponents’ decision-making through coordinated communication and information activities (coordinated by the StratCom Advisor), as well as military and non-military actions under different conditions, in the following four stages:

1/ Prior to any public announcement of NATO intervention.

2/ After a public announcement of NATO intervention until the initial entry of NATO forces.

3/ After the initial entry of NATO forces until the full build-up of forces.

4/ After the full build-up of forces and commencement of operations.

Communications and information activities in the above stages may be beyond the purview of the Commander and may need to be raised to the strategic level for inclusion in StratCom planning.

(b) Analysis should also provide insight into the opposing forces including the following:

1/ Decision points.

2/ Critical Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities.

3/ Critical C2 nodes and decision makers.

4/ High-value targets\(^{83}\).

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\(^{83}\) As described in AD 80-70, a high-value target (HVT), ‘can be considered as a target the adversary commander requires for the successful completion of the mission. The loss of HVTs would be expected to seriously degrade important adversary functions throughout the commander’s area of interest.’ (AD 80-70).
(c) The JOPG should consolidate its appreciation of opposing COAs using the factor – deduction – conclusion method to capture those key requirements for further analysis and planning (see Figures 4.7 – 4.10).

(2) Appreciate/Confirm the Actions of Others in the Theatre. Prior to developing own COAs, the JOPG must also update their common understanding of the actions of cooperating relevant national and international actors, as well as considering the actions of any non-cooperating actors in the theatre to avoid adversely impacting their actions or own COAs, and to enhance interaction with them. Ideally liaisons from cooperating relevant national and international actors should be available to support the JOPG and confirm their activities, especially where cooperation and mutual support may be required. The result of this should be a common understanding of the planning requirements to be accommodated in COA development.

(3) Analyse Other Factors Influencing COA Development. COA development is about determining how to accomplish the mission according to the initial operational design to meet the Commander’s intent. The JOPG will already have significant understanding of the operational factors that will impact how operations can be conducted, in particular conclusions from its analysis of time – space – forces/actors – information. They should review these now, with the aim of drawing out those key conclusions that will influence how COAs are developed, focusing on:

(a) What are the common points applicable to all COAs (e.g. requirements and constraints)? There will be certain constraints that will limit the possibilities for certain operational actions and other activities. For example it could be that entry into the theatre will be constrained by the use of specific ports or the requirement to establish a forward operating base for operations in a specific area, etc. These common elements for all COAs should be established prior to COA development to save time and avoid unnecessary work; they should be captured in a list for reference during COA development and can be challenged at any point.

(b) What are the main operational activities? Operations typically have a number of predominant operational challenges or characteristics which are pivotal to the overall conduct of operations - a critical event, phase or geographic area. Identifying these as the main focus for developing alternatives will be useful in focusing the efforts in COA development.

(c) Where are there principal alternatives? The JOPG should begin COA development with a clear idea as to where there are major choices in how operations are developed.

b. Own COAs. Guided by the initial operational design, the appreciation of opposing COGs and the CPG, the process of developing COAs is designed to encourage creative thinking and the application of operational art to open up the range of possibilities that could be considered. Every attempt should be made at this stage to consider as many COAs as possible. This provides more flexibility in how forces might be employed to accomplish the mission and will quickly highlight similarities and fundamental differences
that can be further developed. Typically, the JOPG will form teams to brainstorm possible COAs and to develop a range of tentative COAs. JOPG teams develop tentative COAs in the form of a main idea, illustrated by a sketch and a brief outline of the sequence of main actions by different forces, to outline how they will create the operational effects and establish the required DCs in the operational design\textsuperscript{84}.

(1) COAs should answer the following questions:

(a) When does the action begin and/or when must it be completed or the required conditions be established (e.g. sequencing, phasing)?

1/ The sequence of the operational actions, operational effects and DCs.

(b) Who will conduct the operation?

1/ The main forces/capabilities required to carry out the operational actions and create the desired operational effects.

2/ The required CNMAs.

(c) What military operations are being considered?

(d) Where will they be performed?

(e) Why is the operation being conducted?

1/ To achieve operational objectives to support desired strategic outcomes.

2/ At what system/system elements are actions directed?

3/ What message must be communicated to the main actors?

(f) How will the operation be conducted?

(2) Supported by points common to all COAs (as explained above), a COA should include:

(a) Assumptions.

(b) Limitations (constraints and restraints) and freedoms.

(c) Concept of Operations, including:

1/ Intent, scheme of manoeuvre and main effort.

\textsuperscript{84} The operational design of each COA may vary slightly from the initial operational design, due to the use of different approaches to establishing the decisive conditions (e.g. sequencing, phasing and different approaches (using possibly different forces and operational actions)).
2/ Description of sequencing and phasing, and decision points.

3/ Operational reserve.

4/ Strategic communication themes.

5/ Required non-military actions.

(d) Operational Design (updated as required to reflect the COA).

(e) Operational graphic/map sketch.

(f) Task organisation.

(g) Command and control arrangements.

(h) Risk assessment.

(i) Provisional missions for subordinate commanders.

(3) Tentative COAs will be tested for viability and selected for review with the Commander. Reduced to a manageable number (based on time and resources), remaining COAs will be further developed and evaluated through analysis and wargaming, as a basis for recommending a COA.

c. **Conduct Troops-to-Actions Analysis.** Troops-to-actions analysis seeks to determine the military capabilities and capacities required to implement a COA by focusing on operational actions, operational effects and other activities during each phase of the operation, under conditions expected within the operational environment. It adds essential detail to the task organisation required to estimate deployment feasibility and to conduct the wargame. Eventually it forms the basis for statement of requirements during operational CONOPS development. Inputs are required from subordinate commands who will better appreciate what is required as well as what is available. However, the process must be led and coordinated by operational planners to optimise the operational force employment and preclude duplication of effort. A typical sequence of analysis is:

(1) Determine the optimum employment of operational capabilities for each operational action and desired operational effects for each phase.

(2) Establish the most effective/efficient mix of component capabilities.

(3) Determine the most effective/efficient theatre level support capabilities to support the operational force and the supplemental support capabilities required by component.

(4) Determine the most effective/efficient C2/CIS capability requirements.

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85 Viability - Follow the principles outlined in Para 4-36 b. below.

86 Traditionally 'troop-to-actions' analysis was termed 'troops-to-tasks' analysis. It is still referred this way in AJP5 ‘Joint Doctrine for Operational Level Planning’.
(5) Update the task organisation.

(6) Prepare a draft operational Troops-to-Actions List\(^7\) focusing on the required capabilities, priorities by phase and the general geographical area in the JOA.

(7) Appreciate, in coordination with cooperating relevant national and international actors, potential requirements for support of relevant national and international actors in accordance with the CPG.

d. **Appreciate Force Availability.** Availability of forces is dealt with by the Force Generation Branch (FOG) at SHAPE. The JOPG should liaise with RDG FOG representative to check the task organisation for each COA to appreciate whether the required force/capabilities are likely to be available and ready given the warning time for the operation.

e. **Prepare a Transportation Feasibility Estimate.** Movement experts in the JOPG should develop an estimate of the feasible deployment of the main forces, based on their assumed readiness, to forecast their potential arrival in the TOO and the JOA. The deployment can be modelled using tools provided by operations and logistics functional services. The estimated arrival of forces should be used as a basis for their employment in the wargame. Deployment issues should be addressed through the RDG to the Allied Movements Coordination Centre (AMCC) at SHAPE. Developing a thorough transportation feasibility estimate is resource and time consuming. A rough order magnitude appreciation of the feasibility of the transportation of each COA may be necessary prior to approaching the Commander for final guidance on the COAs under development; however, a full transportation feasibility estimate may only be available for COA analysis and wargaming.

f. **Commander’s Guidance for the Refinement of COAs.**

   (1) **Update the Commander on COAs.** Before further developing a set of COAs, it is important that the JOPG review the proposed COAs with the Commander. This provides an opportunity for the Commander to influence further COA development by ruling out or adding any COAs and focusing effort.

   (2) **Draft Commander’s COA Selection Criteria.** If not already provided by the Commander, the JOPG should develop draft COA selection criteria for the Commander’s consideration. These criteria should reflect what the Commander considers to be most important for mission accomplishment based on strategic direction (e.g. LoOs, DCs, known risks, etc) and, as such, will change from one operation to another.

g. **Consolidate and Synthesise Related COAs.** At this point, the best aspects from similar COAs should be merged into a limited number of COAs for consideration and further development by the JOPG in the time available.

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\(^7\) Such as a Joint Troops-to-Actions List.
h. **Further Develop COAs for Analysis and Wargaming.** Once COAs are accepted by the Commander, the JOPG further refines them by adding the level of detail required for further analysis and wargaming. Key requirements are to refine:

1. Outline CONOPS describing:
   - The logical sequence and main purpose of operations to be achieved in clearly defined phases\(^88\).
   - When, where and in what sequence operations will be carried out to create desired operational effects and establish DCs.
   - The main and supporting efforts.
   - Operational effects to support DCs and operational actions to support creation of those effects.
   - Operational reserve.
   - Strategic communication themes.
   - Required non-military actions.

2. Provisional missions, including objectives, for subordinate commands. These must be developed in conjunction with subordinate commanders; their development is a collaborative process but led by the JOPG and the Commander, and should reflect the spirit of ‘Mission Command’ to allow components the freedom of action to determine the ‘how’ at the component level.

3. Task organisation - force/capability requirements two levels down (e.g. one level below components/subordinate commands) based on an initial “troops-to-actions” analysis of operational actions, as well as any significant changes in the task organisation between phases.

4. Operational graphic - illustrates the spatial aspects of the COA by phase, using map sketches or overlays and standard NATO military symbols.

5. Operational timeline - depicts the sequencing of operational actions, effects and DCs for each phase of the operation, including other key events and opposing actions.

6. Decision Points. Decision points are events in time or space on which the Commander is expected to have to make a decision. They can be linked to assumptions, CCIRs, branches or sequels. They can also be related to a transition between phases of an operation. Identified during planning and included in the synchronisation matrix and operational design they become a key

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\(^{88}\) Phase - A clearly defined stage of an operation or campaign during which the main forces and capabilities employed set conditions required to achieve a common purpose. (Proposed definition).
focus for the Commander during execution normally requiring the creation of a decision matrix based on Commander agreed criteria.

4-36. Analyse COAs.

a. COA analysis provides an opportunity for the JOPG to examine each COA from different functional perspectives to identify inherent advantages and disadvantages as well as to determine key aspects to be evaluated in wargaming such as: decision points, DCs, high pay-off targets\(^\text{89}\), risks, and branches and sequels.

b. **Analyse and Test COAs for Viability.** The JOPG tests each COA to determine if it is or can be adjusted to be viable. A COA that cannot pass that test should be rejected. This test has six criteria:

1. **Suitability.** Does the COA accomplish the mission and comply with the CPG?

2. **Acceptability.** Are the likely achievements from the COA worth the expected costs in terms of forces deployed, resources expended, potential casualties, collateral effects, media and public reaction, and levels of risk?

3. **Feasibility.** Is the COA possible given the time, space and resources likely to be available and the operational environment? This should include consideration of the likelihood of other actors fulfilling the complementary non-military actions and the results of any force sensing or any understanding developed by SHAPE for the provision of forces/resources.

4. **Exclusivity.** Is the COA sufficiently varied from other COAs to clearly differentiate its comparative advantages and disadvantages?

5. **Completeness.** Is the COA complete? Does the COA answer the when, who, what, where, why and how questions?

6. **Compliance with NATO Doctrine.** Does the COA implement Allied Joint Doctrine to the extent possible?

c. **COA Risk Evaluation.** As they develop COAs, the JOPG should be constantly looking for risks and, if necessary, finding ways to mitigate them. The COA risk evaluation provides the Commander with an appreciation of the risks for each COA against specific aspects of the COA (e.g. mission (including operational objectives), DCs, desired operational effects, etc.), as well as how those risks could be mitigated, including requirements for branches and sequels. Building on the mission analysis risk analysis, the JOPG will evaluate additional risks that have been identified. The operational level risk evaluation matrix, Figure 4.12, provides a possible way of capturing and evaluating risks.

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\(^{89}\) High-payoff target - A target of significance and value to an adversary, the destruction, damage or neutralization of which may lead to disproportionate advantage to friendly forces. (AAP-06).
d. **Wargame COAs.** Wargaming is necessary to evaluate the potential of the COA to accomplish the mission against opposition foreseen in the different opposing COAs\(^{90}\) and to identify and correct deficiencies. However, the real value of wargaming is in allowing the Commander and staff to synchronize actions and visualise the conduct of operation, while gaining insight into implications of opposing capabilities/actions and conditions in the operational environment. This should help: anticipate possible events and develop the mental agility to deal with them; identify potential risks and opportunities that may require branches and sequels to counter or exploit such situations; and identify decision points where the Commander may need to take action.

(1) **Wargame Options.** There are three basic wargame options:

(a) Wargame operations by phases - play out critical actions by phase against the desired outcomes of each phase.

(b) Wargame operations to establish DCs - play out critical actions for establishing DCs.

(c) Wargame operations in segments of the operational environment - play out critical actions in specific operating areas.

(2) **Preparing the Wargames.** This involves:

(a) Determining the desired outcomes.

(b) Deciding on the method and scope.

(c) Determining participants including subordinate commands, friendly, neutral and opposing players (e.g. intelligence/knowledge staff who developed opposing COAs).

(d) Organising referees, expert arbitrators and recorders.

(e) Preparing the operational situation.

(f) Acquiring the tools for manual or computer assisted simulation and analysis.

(g) Preparing a suitable venue.

(h) Establishing rules.

(i) Reviewing the Commander’s COA Selection Criteria. Prior to the wargame the JOPG reviews with the Commander COA selection criteria, including any relative weighting of one criterion to another. Any proposed changes must be approved by the Commander.

\(^{90}\) As a minimum, each own-force COA is normally wargamed against the “most likely” and “most dangerous” opposing COAs.
Conducting Wargames. The conduct of the wargame is determined largely by the desired outcomes, selected method and the scope. Typically, wargames will include:

(a) Setting Conditions. An introduction to set the strategic and operational conditions affecting the operation, including political considerations, threat conditions, environmental conditions, civil conditions, information and media conditions, etc.

(b) Game Turns. A series of “game turns” considering the action - reaction - counter-action of opponents, starting with the opponent deemed to have the initiative.

(c) Analysis. An appreciation of probable results and outcomes typically follows each game turn and is used to set conditions for the succeeding game turns.

Recording Results. Observations and conclusions drawn from the wargame should be recorded in line with the purpose. Typically, these include:

(a) Advantages and disadvantages.

(b) Refinements to the COA and correction of deficiencies.

(c) Additional force/capability requirements.

(d) Synchronisation requirements.

(e) Significant risks/opportunities encountered against opposing COAs.

(f) Branches and sequels required.

(g) Decision points and supporting CCIRs.

(h) Amendments to the provisional component missions.

(i) Other observations/conclusions.

e. Synchronise COAs. The synchronisation matrix (Figure 4.15) provides a useful tool for recording the conduct of the wargame and significant results that may need to be addressed in the CONOPS. Its use can be a great help in achieving coherence across the different forces and functions and visualising how the different elements can be harmonised to create synergies. The synchronisation matrix for the COA that gets selected is refined\(^9\) during CONOPS and OPLAN development and included in the OPLAN Annex A - Concept of Operations as an appendix.

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\(^9\) Some of the rows of the illustrative synchronisation matrix at Figure 4.15 are more applicable for wargaming than the final synchronisation matrix included in the OPLAN. Therefore, in addition to refining the information presented in the synchronisation matrix, the JOPG may choose to alter the format.
### Table: Illustrative COA Synchronisation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1</th>
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- **Political Events**
- **Opposing Actions**
- **Indications & Warnings**
- **Operational Phase**
- **Decisive Conditions**
- **Desired Operational Effects**
- **Operational Actions**
- **LCC Contribution**
- **MCC Contribution**
- **ACC Contribution**
- **SOF Contribution**
- **Complementary Non-Military Actions**
- **Reserve Priorities**
- **Target Priorities**
- **Info Ops, PsyOps, PAO**
- **Civil-Military Interaction**
- **Service and Support**
- **ROE Requests**
- **Risks**
- **Decision Points**
- **CCIR**
- **Branches or Sequels**

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Evaluation of possible component contributions will assist the JOPG to develop provisional missions, including component objectives, for the CCs; the consideration here of component contributions is not meant to 'limit' CCs in their determination of how to accomplish their mission.

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**Figure 4.15 - Illustrative COA Synchronisation Matrix**
4-37. Compare COAs.

a. COAs are compared in three different contexts: first, by comparing their inherent advantages and disadvantages; second, by comparing their performance/risks against opposing COAs; and third, by comparing them against the Commander’s COAs selection criteria. In addition, a final risk evaluation should highlight any risks to the achievement of the operational objectives. Based on these different comparisons the JOPG should be able to recommend the COA with the highest probability for success within acceptable risks. In spite of the constructs shown below, COA comparison remains a subjective process and should not be turned into a mathematical equation. The most important aspect of this process is to be able to articulate to the Commander why one COA is preferred over another. Examples of how the three methods of comparison can be developed and presented are illustrated below:

(1) **Compare COAs Advantages and Disadvantages.** The JOPG consolidates the advantages and disadvantages found during the initial analysis of COAs as well as those revealed during wargaming. The process of comparing these should seek consistency across the different COAs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COA 1</th>
<th>COA 2</th>
<th>COA 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advantages</td>
<td>Advantages</td>
<td>Advantages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disadvantages</td>
<td>Disadvantages</td>
<td>Disadvantages</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.16 - COA Advantages and Disadvantage Comparison Table

(2) **Compare Friendly and Opposing COAs.** Based on the results of wargaming, the JOPG should rate how well each own COA coped with opposing COAs. They should indicate the expected effectiveness, likely costs and potential risks for each combination.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Own COA 1</th>
<th>Own COA 2</th>
<th>Own COA 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposing COA #1 (e.g. Most Likely)</td>
<td>Effectiveness:</td>
<td>Effectiveness:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Costs:</td>
<td>Costs:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk:</td>
<td>Risk:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposing COA #2 (e.g. Most Dangerous)</td>
<td>Effectiveness:</td>
<td>Effectiveness:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Costs:</td>
<td>Costs:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Risk:</td>
<td>Risk:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.17 - Friendly and Opposing COA Comparison Table
(3) **Compare COAs against Commander’s Selection Criteria.** The development of COAs should have been guided by the Commander’s COA selection criteria. Therefore, all COAs should meet these criteria. However, COAs will differ as to how well they satisfy the different criteria. The JOPG should compare these differences using whatever method the Commander prefers (e.g. narrative, one word descriptors, numerical rating, rank ordering or +/-0/-). 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commander’s Selection Criteria</th>
<th>Own COA 1</th>
<th>Own COA 2</th>
<th>Own COA 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criteria 1</td>
<td>High/Moderate/Low</td>
<td>High/Moderate/Low</td>
<td>High/Moderate/Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria 2</td>
<td>High/Moderate/Low</td>
<td>High/Moderate/Low</td>
<td>High/Moderate/Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.18 - Commander’s COA Selection Criteria Comparison Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commander’s Selection Criteria</th>
<th>Weight</th>
<th>Own COA 1</th>
<th>Own COA 2</th>
<th>Own COA 3</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criteria 1</td>
<td>3 2 6 3 9 2 6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria 2</td>
<td>1 2 2 1 1 3 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria 3</td>
<td>2 1 2 3 6 2 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>10 16 13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4.19 - Commander’s COA Selection Criteria (Weighted) Comparison Table

**4-38. Plan and Conduct COA Decision Briefing.**

a. The JOPG presents its comparison of the COAs to the Commander with a coordinated staff recommendation. This is typically accomplished by means of a COA Decision Briefing to the Commander, possibly with subordinate and supporting commanders; it could also be provided in written form. An example COA Decision Briefing format is outlined at Appendix 5 to Annex D. A member of the JOPG will be assigned to capture the guidance, direction and decisions that result during the conduct of the COA Decision Briefing.

b. Regardless of the approach taken to seek the Commander’s decision, the presentation must provide optimum information upon which to base a decision; detailed enough to identify focal points but summarized for effectiveness and brevity. The Commander should coordinate with subordinate commanders and solicit their input, especially during time-compressed Crisis Response Planning. The Commander may select a COA, with or without modification, or may direct that additional COA(s) be investigated.

c. The essential results of the Commander’s COA decision are:

(1) Clear expression of the Commander’s Intent for the conduct of the campaign or operation.

(2) Clear direction on the COA to be developed, as well as required branches and sequels, as the basis for the development of the operational CONOPS.
(3) Approval of a final operational design.

(4) Approval of any proposed changes to the provisional subordinate commander missions.

(5) Additional guidance and milestones for the development of the CONOPS.

(6) Issues to be raised with SACEUR/SHAPE.

(7) Priority issues requiring liaison, coordination or reconnaissance in the theatre.

(8) Guidance on coordination with relevant national and international actors, for Phase 4 - Operational Plan Development.

4-39. Refine Selected COA.

a. Following the Commander’s decision on a COA, the JOPG will refine the selected COA and the final operational design\(^{93}\) according to the Commander’s direction and guidance. They are submitted to the Commander by the Head of the JOPG for approval and then promulgated to the JOPG to inform the development of the operational CONOPS.


a. With appropriate staff preparation, the Commander will issue an OPD to formally promulgate the output of the COA decision briefing including the refined COA, Commander’s intent, final operational design, and CC missions. The OPD will formally trigger COA development at the component level. An OPD template is provided at Annex D Appendix 6. It can be tailored as required to meet the Commander’s requirements; if maximum use of collaborative tools is used throughout COA development (e.g. TOPFAS and VTC), and the components have been involved including at the COA Decision Briefing, an abbreviated OPD may be warranted. The JOPG should anticipate the Commander’s requirement and can be drafting an OPD in parallel to preparations for the COA decision briefing; this would facilitate its rapid release following approval by the Commander of the refined COA and operational design.

\(^{93}\) Referred to as the operational design from Phase 4 forward.
Phase 4A - Operational CONOPS Development

Section 1 - General

4-41. Introduction.

a. **Purpose.** Phase 4 – Operational Plan Development is split into two distinct parts: Phase 4a - the development of an operational concept of operations (CONOPS); and Phase 4b - the development of an operational operation plan (OPLAN). The purpose of Phase 4a - Operational CONOPS Development is to detail COM JHQ’s concept for the conduct of a NATO-led military campaign or operation, in concert with other non-military and non-NATO efforts, to achieve the NATO military operational objectives and establish conditions required to assist in the achievement of the strategic objectives and the desired NATO end state.

b. **Overview.**

1. CONOPS development begins following the revision of the Commander’s selected COA, operational design and provisional component missions, including objectives, which concludes the operational estimate.

2. The operational CONOPS, developed in collaboration with the strategic and component levels, is the formal expression of the Commander’s intent for the conduct of the campaign or operation, including the deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces; submitted with it are a number of ‘illustrative’ statements of requirements that outline the necessary operational requirements needed to realize the Commander’s vision.

3. The operational CONOPS has essentially the same format as an OPLAN; the main effort in this phase is the staff work necessary to:

   a. Develop the details of the CONOPS sections that describe operational direction, execution, service support, and command and signal.

   b. Develop essential annexes.

   c. Develop ‘illustrative’ operational statements of requirements, including CJSOR, Theatre Capabilities Statements of Requirements (TCSOR), Manpower SOR (in the form of a request for PE reinforcement or a CE) and Rules of Engagement request (ROEREQ).

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94 The term ‘illustrative’ is used here to indicate that these SORs are still in development. The illustrative operational SORs inform the illustrative SORs that are normally provided with the strategic CONOPS to give the NAC an understanding of what will be required to realize the strategic concept; the strategic and operational levels will continue to refine these SORs in collaboration with each other, until the strategic CONOPS is approved by the NAC. They will then be provided by SACEUR to nations with the Activation Warning (ACTWARN) message, following the NAC approval of the Strategic CONOPS and their release of the Force Activation Directive (FAD), to start the formal Force Generation process (at this point the CJSOR will be termed the ‘provisional’ CJSOR).
Phase 4a concludes with the submission of the draft operational CONOPS, and its supporting illustrative statements of requirements; they are essential for the finalization of the strategic CONOPS. The draft operational CONOPS also provides the basis for the commencement of the development of the operational OPLAN.

c. **Prerequisites.**

1. Commander’s selected COA, including a clear expression of the Commander’s Intent for the conduct of the campaign or operation, refined as required by the JOPG according to the Commander’s direction and guidance, including:
   
   a. Commander’s operational design.
   
   b. Provisional component missions, including objectives.

2. Commander’s guidance, including on required branches and sequels, and milestones for the development of the CONOPS.

3. Commander’s guidance on coordination with relevant national and international actors.

d. **Main Activities.** The main activities for Phase 4a are depicted in Figure 4.20.

e. **Desired Outcome of the Phase.** The desired outcomes of Phase 4a are:

1. The draft operational CONOPS is submitted and it meets SACEUR’s strategic intent and supports achievement of the strategic objectives and NATO end state. It is accompanied by ‘illustrative’ statements of requirements (e.g. CJSOR, TCSOR, Manpower SOR, and ROEREQ). Normally, the draft operational CONOPS is submitted in time for it to be considered for the finalization of the strategic CONOPS.

2. The finalization of the draft operational CONOPS has considered the draft component CONOPS, if available.

f. **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.** The JOPG is responsible for Phase 4a, supported by the intelligence/knowledge, coordination and synchronisation, operations assessment and other JHQ staff. In addition to supporting the JOPG, functional JOPG SMEs, supported by their parent organisations as required, will be responsible to create functional CONOPS annexes. The Commander approves the CONOPS prior to its submission as a draft to the strategic level.
Figure 4.20 - Operational CONOPS Development Main Activities
g. **External Coordination.** Liaison and/or liaison and planning elements from SHAPE, subordinate and supporting commands, NIFC, NATO HQ CMPS Section, NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), NCIS Group Headquarters and cooperating relevant national and international actors should remain in place from Phase 3 - Operational Estimate.

(1) **SHAPE.**

   (a) **CCOMC.** The CCOMC will continue to monitor the crisis situation and provide information and intelligence to the RDG.

   (b) **RDG.** Supported by the CCOMC, SHAPE directorates and Special Staff, the RDG will develop the draft strategic CONOPS; the JOPG will develop the operational CONOPS in collaboration with the RDG, to ensure that it remains harmonized with the overall intent of the strategic CONOPS and that the strategic CONOPS adequately supports the operational CONOPS, especially with identification of operational requirements. The JOPG will access other SHAPE entities, initially through the RDG, to assist development of the operational CONOPS:

   1/ **AMCC.** The AMCC can assist the JOPG to appreciate the movement aspects for necessary forces.

   2/ **FOG.** The RDG FOG representative will be the FOG point of contact for the refinement of the CJSOR and force generation aspects.

(2) **Subordinate and Supporting Commands.** The development of the Operational CONOPS should be developed in collaboration with subordinate and supporting commands; subordinate commands will be completing their component estimates early in this phase. Liaison and planning elements from subordinate command will remain integrated with the JOPG and will provide feedback to/from their commander/command as required.

(3) **NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC).** Depending on the situation, NCIRC will provide Cyber situation awareness and/or input on cyber defences and deployable rapid reaction teams.
Section 2 - Process

4-42. Initiate Operational CONOPS Development.

a. **Review Refined Selected COA.** The entire JOPG, either collectively or individually, conducts a review of the revised COA and its operational design, which is the basis for the development to the operational CONOPS. This is especially important for JHQ personnel not involved in depth in the conduct of the operational estimate.

b. **Update Planning Milestones and Work Plan.** The SPD will have provided deadlines for the submission of the draft operational CONOPS and its supporting ‘illustrative’ SORs (e.g. CJSOR, TCSOR, manpower SOR and/or ROEREQ). The JOPG must update its planning milestones and adjust its work plan within the JHQ, and coordinate them with those of the RDG and the component OPGs, to make the best use of available time, including as a minimum:

   (1) The first draft of the operational CONOPS main body, supporting annexes, and supporting documentation (e.g. illustrative CJSOR, TCSOR, manpower SOR and ROEREQ).

   (2) The submission of a draft component CONOPS, and illustrative SORs.

   (3) The staffing of the draft operational CONOPS, and illustrative SORs, to the Commander.

   (4) The submission of the COM JHQ’s draft operational CONOPS and illustrative SORs to SACEUR/SHAPE.

The JOPG should also consider those aspects for which work needs to begin during the development of the operational CONOPS, although not required for the CONOPS itself, to be ready for the future development of OPLAN; this includes ensuring someone is assigned and considering additional annexes/appendices necessary for the OPLAN.

c. **Liaison and Coordination for Collaborative Planning.** It is important during the development of the operational CONOPS for the JOPG to continue with external liaison and collaboration; this facilitates maintenance of mutual situational awareness, improves the overall product, and ensures that the operational CONOPS meets the strategic requirement, while reflecting the Commander’s concept and intent for the campaign or operation. The JOPG should re-evaluate its requirements for liaison and coordination, although the primary organisations that are typically involved in Phase 4a

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95 What is submitted to SACEUR/SHAPE by the operational level before submission of the strategic CONOPS to the MC and the NAC should have been discussed as the SPD was developed, and, if necessary, agreed between SACEUR and COM JHQ. Normally this will be in the form of a ‘draft’ operational CONOPS, but in the past this requirement has been satisfied by the submission of a rough draft operational OPLAN, with the essential elements of a CONOPS completed. Following strategic level review, any issues that might impact the development of the operational OPLAN will be discussed between the RDG and JOPG, or SACEUR and COM JHQ, as appropriate. If the agreement was that the Commander would submit ‘the’ operational CONOPS for approval prior to submission of the strategic CONOPS, it would not be formally approved by SACEUR until approval of the strategic CONOPS by the NAC, after which there may need to be some adjustments to the submitted operational CONOPS prior to its final approval.

96 Collaborative planning tools such as VTC and operational functional services such as TOPFAS should be used to the extent possible. Good communication between the RDG and JOPG is essential to the correct collaborative use of these tools.
are the same as described for Phase 3. The operational CONOPS will be developed in collaboration with SHAPE (through the RDG) and especially the component HQs (component OPGs). Functional experts at the various levels should discuss functional issues, as required, to ensure clarity (e.g. an interpretation of the legal mandate - LEGAD at SHAPE, JHQ and NATO HQ). With SHAPE, the JOPG will increase their interaction, initially through the RDG, with FOG and the AMCC. In addition, the JOPG should confirm that they have the authorities or the mechanisms to engage all of IOs, GOs and NGOs deemed necessary for the development of the operational CONOPS and OPLAN. Liaison may be required with the following:

(1) Designated IOs, GOs and NGOs.

(2) HN governments and governments of transit countries.

4-43. Development of the Operational CONOPS.

a. The operational CONOPS, developed in collaboration with the strategic and component levels, is the formal expression of the Commander’s overall intent for the conduct of the campaign or operation, including the deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces. It includes the required detail to outline the necessary operational requirements to realize this vision. The Commander will provide additional direction and guidance, as necessary to focus the development of the operational CONOPS.

b. The format for the operational CONOPS is essentially the same as the operational OPLAN and provides the basis for its development. An operational CONOPS template is at Appendix 7 to Annex D. The JOPG commences development of the operational CONOPS by transcribing and, where necessary, deepening the details of the refined COA selected by the Commander; the main work for the JOPG is to develop: paragraphs 3 through 6 of the CONOPS, to articulate details of Operational Direction, Execution, Service Support, and Command and Signal; essential annexes\(^{97}\), and ‘illustrative’ SORs (e.g. CJSOR, TCSOR, manpower SOR, and ROEREQ).

c. While the production of the operational CONOPS is normally done over a brief period of time, the JOPG must still maintain awareness of any changes in the situation that may impact the Commander’s chosen COA or intent; if necessary, they will advise the Commander of situation changes, with any recommendations for change. The components will be completing their estimates, and confirming their own missions, prior to commencing development of their component CONOPS. The JOPG must maintain close collaboration with the component OPGs, through the component liaison and planning elements, to ensure that their CONOPS reflects the Commander’s intent and that necessary details are incorporated in the operational CONOPS. Issues, such as any requested changes in the component mission, should be discussed with the Commander.

\(^{97}\) JOPG functional SMEs, supported by their parent organisations as required, will be responsible to create the various functional CONOPS annexes and appendices.
4-44. Develop Coordinating Instructions.

a. Specific requirements, direction and priorities for different operational functions confirmed during wargaming should be established as “coordinating instructions” to synchronise activities across all commands. Required functional details will be developed during OPLAN development in respective annexes. Items of command interest should be stated in the CONOPS, including:

2. Crisis Response Measures.
4. Targeting. Including targeting guidance, joint fires and priorities for defence of High-Value Asset/Area (HVA/A).
5. Force Protection.
7. StratCom and Information Concept.
8. Public Affairs, including media policy, master themes and messages.
10. Inter-agency Coordination.
11. Partner Involvement.
12. Environmental Protection.
14. Lessons Learned.
15. Exit Criteria.
17. Other issues may be included for example, rear operations or CBRN defence, etc.

98 CCIRs listed in a CONOPS or OPLAN should relate to possible key decisions during plan execution, including those related to decision points for branches or sequels, assumptions and identified risks.

99 Force protection is defined as, ‘[a]ll measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force’. (AAP-06).
4-45. Describe the Concept for Service Support.

a. Theatre logistics and military engineering are integral parts of the operational CONOPS and must be described within the context of the overall campaign or operation. Details will be provided in the main body of the CONOPS under Service Support and in Annex R - Logistics, Annex S - Movements, and Annex QQ - Medical. Annex R, as a minimum, should describe arrangements for:

(1) Staging and entry into the JOA.
(2) Theatre and forward logistic bases.
(3) Petroleum, oils, lubricants (POL) supply and distribution.
(4) Strategic theatre infrastructure support and priorities.
(5) Development of the theatre infrastructure framework.
(6) Logistic command, control and co-ordination relationships.
(7) Reporting procedures.

4-46. Describe Concept for Command and Control and Communications Information Systems.

a. The description of C2 arrangements\(^\text{100}\) should establish the key aspects for establishing command authorities, relationships and liaison required by the task organisation. In the operational CONOPS, the details can be provided in Annex B - Task Organisation and Command Relationships, and as a minimum should establish the following:

(1) The chain of command.
(2) The delegation and transfer of command authorities.
(3) The TOO, JOA and areas of operations (AOOs).
(4) Liaison and Coordination.
(5) Location/co-location of primary HQs based on CIS limitations.
(6) Phasing of C2 if COM JHQ deploys (i.e. FCE, ICE and JTF HQ).
(7) Reporting.

b. The communication and information concept will describe in principle the provision of CIS for the operation to support the C2 concept, and will be described in the Command and Signal section of the main body of the CONOPS.

\(^\text{100}\) While not a purview of the operational CONOPS itself, a HQ JFC may have to conduct parallel work in collaboration with SHAPE to determine what current HQ JFC responsibilities will be re-assigned if the HQ JFC deploys to command the operation as a deployed JTF HQ.
4-47. Development of Operational CONOPS Annexes.

a. The details for most aspects of the campaign or operation will be developed during Phase 4b - Operational OPLAN Development. However, a limited number of annexes are specifically mandated\(^\text{101}\) for inclusion with the strategic CONOPS to the NAC; unless otherwise directed, the following annexes are normally submitted with the operational CONOPS to provide necessary inputs to SACEUR for incorporation into the strategic CONOPS:

1. A - Concept of Operations, including the operational design graphic.
2. B - Task Organisation and Command Relationships, which covers task organisation, command structure, transfer of authority (TOA), and liaison and coordination.
3. C - Forces and Effects.
4. D - Intelligence.
5. E - Rules of Engagement, including proposed profiles and ROE for land, air and maritime operations.
7. P - Electronic Warfare.
10. T - Environmental Support.
11. AA - Legal.
12. GG - Non-NATO Force Procedures.
13. II - Joint Targeting, specifically target sets and, as appropriate, illustrative target categories and, as far as possible, categories of time sensitive targets (TST)\(^\text{102}\).
14. JJ - NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS), including additional requested implementation of specific CRMs.

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\(^{101}\) Annex C presents the possible annexes for inclusion with an operational CONOPS, including those that are mandated. While appendices for each annex are also shown in Annex C, in many cases, with the CONOPS there would not be sufficient detail yet to develop appendices and, therefore, they are not ‘required’ at this point even for mandated annexes. The annexes themselves would cover the necessary topics if appendices are not included.

\(^{102}\) In accordance with MC 0471/1 - NATO Targeting Policy, 15 Jun 07. For items to be included in the Targeting Annexes, refer to ACO Directive 80-70 (Annex G).
c. Throughout the development of the operational CONOPS, the content of the selected annexes will continue to be identified, developed and refined. The JOPG should, as required, re-evaluate the annexes and appendixes selected for development as part of the operational CONOPS or identify annexes/appendices that will be required for submission with the operational OPLAN (Phase 4b) and assign an appropriate SME to begin to scope their content.

4-48. Develop Operational Requirements.

a. One of the most important aspects in the development of operational CONOPS is the determination of the operational requirements to support COM JHQ’s operational concept. Requirements are articulated using four main products: the CJSOR, the TCSOR, a manpower SOR (a request for PE reinforcement or a CE) and a ROEREQ. At the time of the submission of the draft operational CONOPS to the SACEUR these are termed as ‘illustrative’. In addition, to support the timely availability of forces/capabilities, the JOPG will consider the requirement for implementation of addition CRMs, which will be captured in Annex JJ - NATO Crisis Response System.
b. **Develop the CJSOR.** The development of the CJSOR during crisis response planning is perhaps the most critical step in the development of an executable OPLAN. The CJSOR is the document/tool which contains the (generic) forces requirements of a commander for a specific operation. The CJSOR, including preliminary deployment information, must be developed in parallel with the operational CONOPS. It must balance the ends and the means to ensure the viability of the campaign or operation in terms of its suitability to achieve agreed objectives, acceptability of costs and risks, and the feasibility of deployment, employment and sustainment. Critical elements of information required by nations to determine their contributions and prepare them for deployment include:

1. Required force/capability\(^{103}\) and any special capabilities.
2. Echelon that indicates size.
3. Commander's required date for the force to be available for employment.
4. Required destination.
5. Priority of arrival.
6. Command authority to be transferred to the gaining NATO commander.

The first version of the CJSOR, termed an ‘illustrative CJSOR’, is developed at the operational level by the JOPG, in collaboration with the RDG and the component OPG; it is submitted with the draft operational CONOPS to the strategic level, who vet it and provide it as an ‘illustrative’ CJSOR with the strategic CONOPS\(^{104}\) to the NAC.

c. **Develop TCSOR.** The TCSOR identifies capabilities required to support the entire theatre and which could be, in principle, eligible\(^{105}\) for common funding. Based on their troops-to-actions analysis, the JOPG should identify any functional capabilities required to support the entire joint force and/or the theatre that could be eligibility for common funding as well as the required timeframe. Given that funding and acquisition may take time, the JOPG should identify interim solutions. The TCSOR that exists at the time of the operational CONOPS submission is normally submitted with it for illustrative purposes, as an ‘illustrative’ TCSOR.

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\(^{103}\) They should, if possible, describe these requirements in terms of the Bi-SC agreed capability codes, outlined in Bi-SC Agreed Capability Codes and Capability Statements, dated 14 October 2011 (SHAPE/CPPCAMFR/JM/281143 and 5000 TSC FRX 0030/TT-7673/Ser:NU0053).

\(^{104}\) While the strategic CONOPS is being considered by the NAC, the RDG FOG representative leads the CJSOR’s further development, in collaboration with the operational level and, through them, the components. After the strategic CONOPS is approved by the NAC and they release a FAD, SACEUR releases the ‘provisional’ CJSOR, as a precursor to the commencement of the Force Generation process. The provisional CJSOR represents SACEUR’s minimum military requirement for forces to conduct the operation within acceptable risks; it ultimately determines the viability of the operation in terms of its suitability to achieve agreed objectives, acceptability of costs and risks and the feasibility of deployment, employment and sustainment.

\(^{105}\) PO(2013)0056, 06 Feb 13.
d. **Prepare Manpower Requirements.** If available, when the operational CONOPS is submitted an ‘illustrative’ manpower SOR should accompany it (in the form of a request for PE reinforcement or a CE\(^{106}\)) to identify personnel required to fill the force C2 requirements or activated HQs. It is developed by personnel management staff members of the JOPG. If sufficient detail is not available to produce even an ‘illustrative’ manpower SOR, the JOPG personnel management staff will develop some considerations on manpower requirements for submission under the Service Support paragraph of the CONOPS main body.

e. **Develop Illustrative ROEREQ.** An illustrative ROEREQ is normally submitted with the operational CONOPS to help illustrate the ROE that are considered necessary to support the Commander’s vision for the conduct of the campaign or operation; this ‘illustrative’ ROEREQ is developed by the JOPG operations staff supported by the LEGAD, in collaboration with strategic and component functional experts. It is validated by the RDG and further developed, in collaboration with the JOPG, for submission with the strategic CONOPS\(^ {107}\).

f. **Develop Recommendations for Implementation of Additional CRMs.** Based on its appreciation and the time available to generate forces, theatre capabilities and manpower, the JOPG should consider the need to recommend to SACEUR additional specific CRMs that call on nations to review, prepare and activate national assets to meet NATO requirements. In particular, they should review CRMs in the following areas:

- A  Manpower.
- B  Intelligence.
- E  General Operations.
- J  Electronic Warfare.
- K  Meteorology/Oceanography.
- L  CBRN Defence.
- M  Logistics.
- O  Forces Readiness.
- P  Communications and Information Systems.
- S  Public Affairs.

\(^{106}\) SACEUR will determine the need for reinforcements in coordination with the respective commanders and will coordinate the provision of the appropriate personnel from the pool of identified reinforcement personnel from within the NCS and by asking nations for personnel from outside the NCS. Subject to MC endorsement and NAC approval, SACEUR will decide if the conduct of an operation requires reinforcing a PE or a transition to a CE. (SMAP 15 – NATO Manpower Reinforcement Policy - change 19 to MC 0216/4 - AAP–16 (D).

\(^{107}\) While the ROEREQ is not ‘approved’ by the NAC at this point, they may give direction for its refinement prior to its future submission for approval with the strategic OPLAN. Depending on the NAC direction, this may impact other areas of the strategic and operational CONOPS, and necessitate their amendment.
4-49. **Review of Draft Component CONOPS.**

a. Normally, the operational CONOPS will not be submitted prior to receipt of the draft component CONOPS, and ‘illustrative’ statements of requirements. This is to ensure that each component CONOPS is compatible with the operational one and each other. Any issues identified should be resolved by functional SMEs through discussion with their component counterparts as appropriate. The component CONOPS will be approved by the Commander once the operational CONOPS is approved by SACEUR; at this stage, the Commander should indicate approval ‘in principle’ of the draft component CONOPS, for its use as the basis of component plan development, pending finalization once the operational CONOPS is approved.

4-50. **Coordinate and Submit Draft Operational CONOPS.**

a. **Final Coordination with the Component and Supporting HQs.** Ideally, prior to submission of the draft operational CONOPS, the component OPG is afforded the opportunity to comment on the draft and the illustrative CJSOR, TCSOR, CE and ROEREQ that will normally accompany it. The component HQ liaison and planning element should also review the draft operational CONOPS as it develops and raise any potential issues. If a complete review of the draft operational CONOPS by the component and supporting HQs is not possible, either due to time constraints or their need to focus on their own CONOPS development, the JOPG should ensure that any major issues or possible areas for differences of opinion are discussed between the JOPG and the component OPGs. Prior to submitting the draft operational CONOPS, major issues may need to be resolved at the JOPG leadership level or through the Commander, as appropriate.

b. **Final Coordination with SHAPE (RDG).** If time permits, the JOPG should coordinate with the RDG to ensure the draft operational CONOPS is consistent with the strategic CONOPS under development. Major issues may need to be resolved before staffing the draft operational CONOPS for approval, at the JOPG leadership level or through the Commander, as appropriate.

c. **Seek Commander’s Approval.** The Head of the JOPG will oversee the final preparation and staffing of the operational CONOPS, and illustrative SORs, for approval by the Commander.

d. **Submit Draft Operational CONOPS.** Once the draft CONOPS has been approved by the Commander, it will be forwarded to SACEUR (and the RDG), with a copy to the component and supporting Commander’s. This draft operational CONOPS will be used by the JOPG as the basis for the development of the operational OPLAN (Phase 4b).

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108 Following approval of the strategic CONOPS by the NAC and any necessary changes to the draft operational CONOPS, the final operational CONOPS will be staffed to SACEUR for approval (see paragraph 4-54).
4-51. Assist the RDG in Finalizing the Strategic CONOPS.

a. Once the operational CONOPS has been forwarded to SACEUR/SHAPE, the JOPG will provide any assistance necessary to the RDG for the finalization of the strategic CONOPS, including the review of its draft as appropriate; this will ensure that it accurately captures the operational requirements necessary to support the Commander’s intent for the conduct of the operational mission.
Phase 4B - Operational OPLAN Development

Section 1 - General

4-52. Introduction.

a. **Purpose.** The purpose of Phase 4B - Operational OPLAN Development is to:
   develop the arrangements and further specify the required activities to implement the
   operational CONOPS; and to specify the conduct of operations, including the
   deployment, employment and sustainment of forces.

b. **Overview.**

   (1) Operational OPLAN development is an iterative, collaborative process that
   focuses on synchronising and coordinating the deployment, employment,
   protection, support and sustainment of the operational force during different
   phases of the operation within a single operational level plan. Parallel,
   collaborative planning with subordinate and supporting commands, as well as with
   cooperating relevant national and international actors\(^{109}\), ensures that the activities
   of all forces and operational functions are synchronised and coordinated to create
   the effects required to achieve the operational objectives and contribute to the
   achievement of MSOs and the desired end-state. Synchronisation of operational
   OPLAN and component plan development is critical throughout the process.

   (2) Phase 4B concludes with: SACEUR’s approval of the operational OPLAN;
   and the Commander’s promulgation of the operational OPLAN and approval of the
   component plans.

c. **Prerequisites.** The following are required to commence Phase 4B:

   (1) Draft Operational CONOPS\(^{110}\), approved by the Commander, including
   Illustrative SORs (i.e. CJSOR, TCSOR, Manpower SOR, and ROEREQ).

d. **Main Activities.** The main activities for Phase 4B are depicted in Figure 4.21.

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\(^{109}\) The exchange of information with relevant national and international actors will be subject to arrangements for the release of NATO classified information. Such arrangements will be defined well in advance of an operation and authority to NMAs to release information will be determined by the degree of interaction authorized by the NAC.

\(^{110}\) Note that the JOPG must later factor in any issues resulting from SACEUR’s review of the draft operational CONOPS or changes to it following the NAC approval of the strategic CONOPS.
Figure 4.21 - Operational OPLAN Development Main Activities
e. **Desired Outcome of the Phase.** The desired outcome of Phase 4b is the submission and approval of an operational OPLAN\(^{111}\), with supporting legal agreements and ROE, which meets the criteria for timeliness and adequacy given the urgency of the planning requirement as follows:

1. **Timeliness.**
   
   a. Planning products are produced in time to allow subordinates to complete required planning and preparation.
   
   b. Critical operational planning requirements are covered in the OPLAN.
   
   c. Planning and execution are integrated incrementally as required.

2. **Adequacy.**
   
   a. The legal framework, including an international mandate and SOFAs, as well as arrangements with HNs or other nations are established and satisfy mission requirements, such as those to allow transit or to address specific mission critical legal requirements.
   
   b. Force capabilities and resources satisfy minimum military requirements for mission accomplishment with acceptable risk.
   
   c. The flow of forces into the theatre supports the operational Commander’s scheme of manoeuvre.
   
   d. C2 arrangements, including liaison and coordination with external organisations, as well as CIS and ROE, allow effective integration and employment of forces to execute missions and achieve objectives.
   
   e. Provisions for theatre support and sustainment meet operational requirements with acceptable risks.
   
   f. Contingency planning requirements have been identified and prioritised to cover identified risks.

f. **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.** The JOPG is responsible for Phase 4b, supported by the JHQ staff. Operations staff should be engaged as required to: monitor the force activation process; to facilitate OPLAN handover; to begin preparing execution orders; and to integrate planning and execution in response to an urgent crisis. The Commander approves the OPLAN prior to its submission as a draft to the strategic level, and approves component level plans after the approval of the operational level OPLAN.

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\(^{111}\) Although this process is written for the production of an OPLAN, it can be used as a basis for the development of operational level advance planning operations plans, i.e. an operational CONPLAN, Generic CONPLAN, or Standing Defence Plan (SDP).
g. **External Coordination.** Liaison and/or liaison and planning elements from SHAPE, subordinate and supporting commands, NIFC, NATO HQ CMPS Section, NATO Support Agency (NSPA), NATO Communication and Information Agency (NCIA), CIS Group Headquarters and cooperating relevant national and international actors should remain in place from Phase 4a - Operational CONOPS Development. Close coordination will be required throughout this phase with the AMCC to assist in deployment planning with nations as well as with the HN(s) via the OLRT.

(1) SHAPE.

(a) CCOMC. The CCOMC will continue to monitor the crisis situation and provide information and intelligence to the RDG. It will finalise preparations for management of operation execution.

(b) RDG. Supported by the CCOMC, SHAPE directorates and Special Staff, the RDG will develop the strategic OPLAN; the JOPG will develop the operational OPLAN in collaboration with the RDG, to ensure that it remains harmonized with the overall intent of the strategic OPLAN and that the strategic OPLAN adequately supports it. The JOPG will access other SHAPE entities, initially through the RDG, to assist development of the operational OPLAN, specifically the generation of, and planning for, the deployment of forces:

1/ AMCC. The AMCC supports strategic movement planning and coordinates with Nations by merging National Detailed Deployment Plans (DDPs) into a Multi-national Detailed Deployment Plan (MN DDP), which is used to de-conflict any movement issues between Nations.

2/ FOG. The RDG FOG representative will be the FOG point of contact for the refinement of the CJSOR and coordinating force/capability requirements with nations and the JHQ.

(2) **Subordinate and Supporting Commands.** The development of the operational OPLAN should be developed in collaboration with subordinate and supporting commands, and their development of component plans. Liaison and planning elements from subordinate command will remain integrated with the JOPG and will provide feedback to/from their commander/command as required.
Section 2 - Process

4-53. Initiate Operational OPLAN Development.

a. **Review Guidance and Direction.** The JOPG should review any Commander’s guidance for the development of the operational OPLAN, given with the approval for submission of the draft operational CONOPS, or any issues raised in SACEUR’s review of the draft operational CONOPS. After seeking any additional guidance required from the Commander, the JOPG will accomplish the following:

   (1) Review the operational CONOPS and refine the synchronisation matrix.

   (2) Establish the schedule for operational OPLAN development to include:

      (a) Submission of initial drafts.

      (b) Review and coordination of initial drafts.

      (c) Submission of revised drafts.

      (d) Review and coordination with other HQs.

      (e) Submission of coordinated drafts for final staffing and the Commander’s approval.

   (3) Review the status of strategic planning at SHAPE.

   (4) Establish the inputs required from subordinate/supporting commands, as well as cooperating relevant national and international actors.

   (5) Task specific JOPG members to address issues raised by SACEUR.

   (6) Coordinate arrangements for OPLAN handover.

   (7) Issue further direction and guidance.

b. **Review the Status of Strategic Planning.** Operational OPLAN development depends on a number of critical strategic level planning actions. The presence of a SHAPE (RDG) liaison element, if provided, could allow the JOPG to keep abreast of developments and raise issues requiring attention by SHAPE; if one is not provided then the JHQ liaison to the RDG will provide this conduit. Critical areas that directly impact on the ability of the JHQ to develop its operational OPLAN particularly during crisis response planning, include:

   (1) **Force Generation (FG).** Immediately following the NAC’s approval of SACEUR’s Strategic CONOPS and release of a Force Activation Directive (FAD), SACEUR will formally initiate the force generation process to identify national force contributions to fill the ‘provisional’ CJSOR. The JOPG should monitor this process to track the following:
(a) Release of the Activation Warning\textsuperscript{112} (ACTWARN) and the provisional CJSOR\textsuperscript{113}.

(b) Conduct of the Force Generation Conference - presentation of the strategic CONOPS and the filling of the provisional CJSOR.

(c) Release of the draft CJSOR\textsuperscript{114} with national commitments.

(d) Release of the Activation Request (ACTREQ) requesting national confirmation forces commitments in the draft CJSOR.

(e) Receipt of nations’ Force Preparation (FORCEPREP) messages identifying forces to fill commitments.

(f) Release of the Allied Force List (AFL) confirming the force package for the operation.

(2) Preliminary Deployment Planning. Typically SHAPE and national movement planners will meet soon after the force generation conference to review and coordinate strategic movements based on the force flow in the provisional CJSOR. Joint Logistic Support Group (JLSG) and JHQ movement planners must participate in this initial meeting. The main issues include:

(a) Designation of APOD/SPODs in theatre as well as staging areas and responsibilities for their operation.

(b) Designation of air and sea ports of embarkation (APOEs/SPOEs) and responsibilities for their operation.

(c) Allocation and coordination of strategic air and sealift.

(d) CRDs.

(3) Legal Arrangements with the Host Nation(s). SHAPE will coordinate with the NATO HQ LEGAD to negotiate SOFAs as a basis for developing HNS agreements/understandings. These are essential for planning with the HN(s).

\textsuperscript{112} In lieu of an ACTWARN, the Deputy SACEUR (DSACEUR) may send nations a formal ‘calling’ letter to initiate force generation.

\textsuperscript{113} An ‘illustrative’ CJSOR would have been provided to the NAC with the strategic CONOPS to provide nations an indication of the type and scale of forces and capabilities required to realize the strategic CONOPS. This ‘illustrative’ CJSOR would be further developed in collaboration between the strategic and operational level until the strategic CONOPS is approved by the NAC and they release the FAD. SACEUR then releases the ACTWARN to nations for formally commence the force generation process and provides them with the further refined CJSOR – termed a ‘provisional’ CJSOR. To ensure an effective and accurate force generation process it is important that the provisional CJSOR contains enough detail of the requirements for nations to prepare their force offers.

\textsuperscript{114} The ‘draft’ CJSOR reflects national force offers towards the operational commander’s requirement and is a product of the Force Generation Conference. It is issued with the ACTREQ (or acceptance letter, especially for sustained operations) to advise nations that their offers (as captured in the draft CJSOR) have been accepted and requests nations to prepare their forces. The ‘draft’ CJSOR provides the first indication of fills and shortfalls and will, as such, provide the basis for the list of forces available for the operational commander. The CJSOR continues to be updated throughout Phase 4 b and is included in the strategic OPLAN.
Strategic Communications. StratCom direction and guidance is developed at NATO HQ with input from SHAPE. It provides critical information required for all JHQ planning, including audiences, master themes and topics.\(^\text{115}\)

ROE. An illustrative ROEREQ should have accompanied the operational CONOPS when it was submitted to outline the ROE required for the use of force to accomplish the mission. SACEUR’s CONOPS when submitted to the NAC would also have included an ‘illustrative’ ROEREQ based on the JHQ requirements and justification. The JOPG should review the ‘illustrative’ ROEREQ submitted with the strategic CONOPS and analyse any differences from the one submitted by JHQ. In addition, once the strategic CONOPS is approved, the JOPG should review any NAC direction and guidance on ROE, specifically with respect to the ‘illustrative’ ROEREQ, for any implications that may impact the development of the operational OPLAN.

c. Review the Status of Planning by Subordinate and Supporting Commands. Operational OPLAN development by the JHQ must provide for the integration of the force as well as the coordination and synchronisation of actions by subordinate and supporting commands. It is therefore important for the JOPG to remain fully informed as to the status of planning by subordinate and supporting commands through regular updates by their liaison/planning elements related to:

1. The status of component planning (e.g. COA, CONOPS, or component plan development as applicable).
2. Coordination of supporting/supported requirements.
3. Issues and concerns.

d. Review the Planning with Relevant National and International Actors. JHQ planning may require further detailed coordination with a number of different cooperating relevant national and international actors. It is important to review the planning requirements, the current status of planning and the arrangements that will be made to facilitate coordination, including who is the lead within the JOPG. In particular, planning requirements should be addressed for the HN(s) as well as cooperating international and regional organisations in the theatre.

e. Coordinate Plan Handover. During OPLAN development, the JOPG should be reinforced by operations staff and the JOC who will be responsible for execution. Arrangements should be made to ensure continuity\(^\text{116}\) between planning and execution across all functional areas. This must balance the requirements for those who developed the OPLAN to oversee its execution with the need to continue planning during the conduct of operations.

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\(^{115}\) This guidance may also result in the generation of a SECGEN authorised StratCom Framework for the operation or mission. This Framework may be developed in parallel with the planning process, will be fully aligned with planning analysis and products, and completed in collaboration with ACO StratCom staffs.

\(^{116}\) Continuity between planning and execution across all functional areas is normally enabled by the “plan owner” post in the JOPG transitioning to J3 for execution as well as the specialists transitioning from planning to execution. This must be addressed in detail in JHQ JOPG Standing Operating Procedures.
4-54. SACEUR Approval of Operational CONOPS.

a. Some time after the commencement of operational OPLAN development, the strategic CONOPS will be approved by the NAC; SACEUR would then be able to approve the operational CONOPS. The JOPG will refine the draft operational CONOPS as required and staff it to the Commander for approval and submission to SACEUR for approval. The changes that were required to seek its approval will have to be factored into the developing operational OPLAN. In addition, the JOPG should review the approved strategic CONOPS for any other salient points that may impact the operational OPLAN. The JOPG liaison to the RDG will be able to assist this process by apprising the JOPG of issues during the approval process of the strategic CONOPS that would impact the operational CONOPS and OPLAN.

4-55. Plan for the Employment of Operational Forces.

a. Review the Planning Requirements for the Employment of Operational Forces. The operational CONOPS provided a description of how the operation will be conducted, supported by an illustrative CJSOR that outlined the force requirements. Planning development must now refine the employment of operational forces with subordinate/supporting commands within the constraints of the expected or actual force package for the operation, adding the required level of detail regarding C2 of joint forces and appreciating the impact of any critical force shortfalls.

b. Confirm the Task Organisation. Given the expected or actual force package based on the provisional (and then draft) CJSOR and eventually the AFL, the JOPG should review and confirm the task organisation with subordinate/supporting commands to identify any critical shortfalls that would prevent them from accomplishing assigned missions. This review should look at each phase of the operation to understand more precisely the impact. The Task Organisation is depicted schematically and described in OPLAN Annex B - Task Organisation and Command Relationships.

c. Synchronise Forces and Functions for Each Operational Phase. Based on their review of the task organisation, the JOPG should confirm and, as required, revise the synchronisation of activities to create the desired operational effects and establish the DCs required in each phase of the operation. Working together with subordinate/supporting commands, the JOPG may be able to reallocate or reschedule activities to compensate for force shortfalls. On this basis, the JOPG should update the relevant paragraphs of the OPLAN main body and develop respective OPLAN Annexes. The refined synchronisation matrix is included in the OPLAN Annex A - Concept of Operations. Specific areas to be develop for each phase of the operation include:

(1) Implementation of the Operational Scheme of Manoeuvre. The JOPG should confirm the flow of forces into the theatre, including the conduct of initial entry operations and the operational deployment within the JOA. In addition to confirming the timing and sequence of arrivals, this detailed review should confirm

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117 In a time compressed Crisis Response Planning situation, where collaborative planning between the strategic and operational levels is effectively conducted, SACEUR and COM JHQ may agree to leave the operational CONOPS as a draft so as to not divert the RDG and JOPG from OPLAN development. In this case, the RDG would apprise the JOPG of any changes or additions that will need to be considered in the operational OPLAN development.
movement priorities and points of entry required to produce the Allied Disposition List (ADL). The ADL is included in OPLAN Annex C - Forces and Effects.

(2) **Develop Supported and Supporting Relationships.** The JOPG should review supported and supporting relationships with subordinate/supporting commands to confirm precisely the support required by the supported commander designated for each phase and/or LoO. Missions to supporting commanders should be specified in the OPLAN main body (paragraph 4 a). Supporting/supported relationships are detailed in OPLAN Annex B - Task Organisation and Command Relationship, with the nature of support articulated in the respective component annexes as well as subordinate/supporting plans.

(3) **Plan for Joint Targeting and the Employment of Joint Fires.** A major coordinated effort by specific members of the JOPG will be required to synchronise joint targeting\(^{118}\) and the use of lethal and non-lethal means to create the desired operational effects and establish the DCs for each operational phase. Details are provided in OPLAN Annex II - Joint Targeting. This activity should seek to achieve coherence and synergy in the use of all means available in accordance with the Commander’s intent including coordination of:

(a) Intelligence support to targeting (OPLAN Annex D - Intelligence).
(b) Maritime strike operations (OPLAN Annex F - Maritime Operations).
(c) Air Operations (OPLAN Annex H - Air Operations).
(d) Special operations (OPLAN Annex K - Special Operations).
(e) Electronic warfare (OPLAN Annex P - Electronic Warfare).
(f) Civil-military co-operation (OPLAN Annex W - Civil-Military Co-operation).
(g) Military engineering contribution to the joint fires and targeting process (OPLAN Annex EE - Military Engineering).
(h) Information operations (OPLAN Annex UU - Information Operations).
(i) Psychological operations (OPLAN Annex VV - Psychological Operations).

(4) **Refine ROE.** The JOPG must ensure that the ROE being developed for the operation meets mission requirements, including likely contingencies, and provide further requests with justification as required. ROE profiles and ROE for land, air and maritime forces are provided in OPLAN Annex E - Rules of Engagement and developed into a ROEREQ that will accompany the operational OPLAN for approval.

\(^{118}\) For items to be included in the Targeting Annexes refer to ACO Directive 80-70 (Annex G). Targeting processes should include mechanisms for identifying natural and cultural resources, and mitigating the adverse effects of joint operations upon them.
d. **Plan for the Build up and Use of Reserves.** Plan development must provide for reserves as required to cover contingencies based on the force package. Further consideration may have to be given as to where reserves are positioned, under whose authority they are placed, and any conditions for their employment. Details are provided in OPLAN Annex A - Concept of Operations and Annex C - Forces and Effects.

e. **Develop StratCom and Information Strategy.** Working in close cooperation with SHAPE, the JOPG must harmonise InfoOps, PsyOps and PA to achieve coherence within their focus areas regarding specific audiences, themes and messages. Planning must be coordinated closely and in collaboration with the development of joint targeting and the employment of all capabilities and forces (i.e. targeting including joint fires, fielded forces, electronic warfare (EW), etc). Details are provided in OPLAN Annexes SS - StratCom (if required), TT - Public Affairs, UU - Information Operations and VV - Psychological Operations.

f. **Plan for Cooperation with Relevant National and International Actors.** Given the main areas of cooperation established in the CONOPS, the JOPG must now develop the practical arrangements required to cooperate on the ground within the theatre and the JOA. These should be described in OPLAN Annex B - Task Organisation and Command Relationships and OPLAN Annex W - Civil-Military Co-operation. As a minimum they should specify the following:

1. The delegation of authority for coordination of specific activities.
2. Mechanisms and arrangements for coordination and information sharing in accordance with relevant security policy for release of information.

4-56. **Plan for Command and Control.**

a. **Review C2 Requirements Planning.** The CONOPS described the C2 arrangements\(^{119}\) required to conduct the operation. Based on the force package and further planning by subordinate/supporting commands, the JOPG must now further develop specific aspects of the C2 arrangements, including those to consider the multinational nature of the forces from all contributing nations and the necessary arrangements for coordination with non-NATO entities. Details are to be included in OPLAN Annex B - Task Organisation and Command Relationships.

b. **Further Specify Authorities and Responsibilities.** Unity of command and freedom of action require that authority is clearly delegated for critical functions and/or geographical areas. The result must be that a single designated authority is established with responsibility for each joint function and geographical area of responsibility within the JOA and the theatre.

\(^{119}\) HQ JFCs would have been working in parallel during operational CONOPS development to determine what JFC activities would be reassigned if the HQ JFC deploys as a JTF HQ; this would have to be finalised during operational OPLAN development.
c. **Refine and Coordinate Areas of Operations.** Subordinate/supporting commanders must confirm that their respective AOOs\(^{120}\) are sufficient to accomplish their assigned missions and protect their force.

d. **Confirm C2 Locations and Communications Connectivity.** The JOPG must coordinate and confirm the locations and phasing (e.g. FCE, ICE, and deployed JTF HQ) of the different HQs and C2 facilities, especially those deploying to the theatre. This should consider initial locations, collocation and any subsequent changes within the constraints of deployable CIS. The location of the deployed Joint Task Force (JTF) HQ is critical to determining the location of other HQs that typically will collocate with it. Any changes need to be reflected in the ADL.

e. **Plan for Transfer of Authority (TOA).** The JOPG should confirm the level of authority required for the employment of each force in the force package against each nation’s FORCEPREP message and further establish precisely when, where and under what conditions TOA should occur. This information should be included in the Activation Order (ACTORD) and provide the basis for nations’ Order of Battle Transfer of Authority (ORBATTOA) messages.

f. **Plan for the Exchange of Liaison Elements.** Every operation confirms the importance of the exchange of liaison officers/elements to facilitate collaboration and coordination. While the use of enhanced network capabilities may improve real time collaboration, liaisons still play an important role. Therefore, the JOPG must clearly establish the requirements for the exchange of liaison elements including effective dates and ensure that manpower requirements are filled.

g. **Plan for Knowledge Development and Management.** The JHQ must put into place the mechanisms to collect, fuse, analyse, validate and share critical information and, where appropriate, knowledge with other commands and non-NATO actors throughout the life of the operation. Details are provided in appropriate annexes, such as OPLAN Annex NN - Knowledge Development, Annex CC - Command Information Management, Annex W - Civil-Military Cooperation, and Annex D - Intelligence.

h. **Lessons Learned.** The Commander must build into the OPLAN arrangements for a Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned process that includes the sharing of such Lessons with NATO and non-NATO entities, as appropriate. Details should be described in OPLAN Annex LL - Lessons Learned.

i. **Plan for Operations Assessment.** Operations assessment assists the Commander during execution to gain an appreciation of the conduct of own actions according to the plan and the overall progress of the campaign or operation, which assists making evidence-based adjustments to the plan being executed. Therefore during OPLAN development, the JOPG should plan for the conduct of operations assessment, and articulate details in Annex OO - Operations Assessment. This may require regular data collection and reporting across the theatre, including from and to

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\(^{120}\) Area of operations - An area defined by the joint force commander within a joint operations area for the conduct of specific military activities. (AAP-06).
military and non-military sources and may have resource implications. Requirements will be different for each operation but should consider the need to look back at trends to evaluate operational effectiveness, as well as the need to look forward to anticipate eventualities that pose risks and/or present opportunities that may require branch and/or sequel plans. Planning for the preparation and conduct of operations assessment should establish requirements, responsibilities and procedures that must be established to appreciate:

(1) Success in and risks to achieving operational and military strategic objectives.
(2) Success in and risks to establishing DCs on LoOs.
(3) Effectiveness of actions in creating desired operational effects.

j. **Plan for CIS and CD.** The operational CONOPS included a description of the CIS concept based on known C2 requirements and CIS constraints. The JOPG will refine the CIS concept based on: the actual CIS capabilities available, including bandwidth and CIS and CD capabilities in the force package; and the further definition of C2 requirements across different functional areas.

4-57. **Plan Force Preparation and Sustainment.**

a. **Review Planning Requirements for Force Preparation and Sustainment.** The purpose of force preparation and sustainment is to ensure the forces required to mount and conduct operations are fully capable of meeting mission requirements. It includes the following main areas:

(1) Mission training and certification of HQs, personnel and forces.
(2) Logistic and military engineering support to the force in theatre.
(3) Financial support.
(4) Rotation of HQs, personnel and forces.
(5) Identification of lessons learned and ensuring that these are applied appropriately.

b. **Plan for Mission Training and Certification of HQs, Personnel and Forces.** The JOPG should establish mission training and certification requirements for HQs, personnel and forces deploying to the theatre with the details included in OPLAN Annex BB - Training and Mission Rehearsals. These should be based on operational actions and conditions in the operational environment, including FP requirements, as well as cultural aspects. Requirements and arrangements to be implemented should be established for:

(1) Augmentation training.
(2) Pre-deployment training support.
(3) Certification of forces.

(4) In-theatre training support.

c. Plan Logistical Support to the Force in Theatre. The logistic concept that was developed during CONOPS development described how joint multinational logistic support to the force would be accomplished in theatre. During OPLAN development detailed planning and coordination is required with troop contributing nations (TCNs) and HN(s) as well as subordinate/supporting commands to ensure that supplies and services can be delivered to the force to meet operational requirements for each phase. Logistical conferences will be required to confirm logistic arrangements, especially with the HN(s) to ensure that they meet operational needs and allow a sufficient build-up of logistic resources, including stockpiles for POL and critical munitions. Any shortfalls in HN support may require the activation and deployment of additional logistic units. The following areas have significant operational impact and must be closely coordinated with other planning and with the details provided in OPLAN Annex R - Logistics:

(1) Logistical Standards. Logistical standards must reflect the expected operational tempo and demands for each phase. Experts from subordinate/supporting commands must assist in refining operational requirements for fuel and munitions.

(2) Host Nation Support. The level and scope of HN support must be confirmed based on close contacts with the HN(s) including access to specific facilities, infrastructure and logistic operating units, especially ground transportation. Provisions must be made for TCN(s) to coordinate with HN(s) within guidelines developed by the JOPG and established by the Commander.

(3) National Responsibilities. Logistic execution by framework, lead or role specialised nations must be confirmed for critical logistic activities such as POL distribution.

(4) Multinational Solutions. Multinational Solutions supporting the mission like a JLSG, Contractors or multinational enablers have to be specified; their tasks and responsibilities and those of nations need to be clearly delineated.

d. Plan for Theatre Medical Support. Theatre medical support must meet the requirements of TCNs in different operating areas. Details are provided in Annex QQ.

e. Plan for Theatre MILENG Support. Military engineering support to critical theatre infrastructure requirements is to be identified and prioritised against operational requirements (e.g. infrastructure requirements to support RSOI (PODs, marshalling and staging areas, LOC, etc) and in support of sustaining the force (theatre logistic base, convoy support centres, main supply routes, etc)).

f. Plan for Financial Support. It is critical that NATO common funding is made available as early as possible to meet those requirements eligible for common funding. The JOPG should identify and prioritise operational requirements for financial support for each phase of the operation. Particular attention should be given to detailing funding requirements to support enabling and initial entry operations, such as establishing
communications, operating ports and facilities, contracting local services such as interpreters and security. Details are provided in OPLAN Annex FF - Financial Support.

g. Plan for the Rotation of HQs, Personnel and Forces. The JOPG should anticipate the requirement to sustain the operation through to its termination. They should develop requirements and initial plans to replace HQs and forces, including personnel augmentation in deployed HQs, with consideration to the likely tempo of operations and the possibility to adjust force levels over time.


a. Review the Requirements for Planning the Deployment of Forces. The strategic deployment of forces into a TOO and their onward movement into and within the JOA constitutes the initial operational manoeuvre (influenced by the operational level through the ADL/AFL) and must be planned as an operation requiring the expertise of operations, movements and logistic planners. Planning should cover the entire sequence of activities required for mounting, embarkation, debarkation, reception, staging, onward movement and integration. Details are provided in OPLAN Annex S - Movements. It requires close coordination with the AMCC, TCN(s), the HN(s), port operating organisation, the JLSG HQ and gaining commands. Legal arrangements must be in place or assumed regarding the status of forces and understandings/agreements with the HN(s) as well as arrangements for transit and over-flight.

b. Design and Develop the Theatre Movements Architecture. The design, development, implementation and control of movements architecture within the theatre is a JHQ and JLSG responsibility. The logistic element of an OLRT plays a critical role in reconnaissance of movement infrastructure and coordination with the HN, as well as with relevant international actors operating in the area, for the use of facilities and LOC. The JOPG, in close coordination with the OLRT must confirm with the HN, as early as possible, the availability and capabilities of the following infrastructure:

   (1) APOD/SPODs and other key transportation nodes such as railheads.
   (2) Staging areas and facilities required for operational entry into the JOA.
   (3) Reception areas and facilities.
   (4) LOC to and within areas of operation.

c. Finalise the Force Flow. Based on detailed planning for the employment, sustainment, support and C2 of the force based on the AFL force package, the JOPG must make any final revisions to the force flow in the ADL. Specific deployment requirements must be established for each force in the force package identified in the AFL, according to the final force flow, including the following:

   (1) Strategic lines of communication and entry points into the theatre.
   (2) Final destination in the JOA.
   (3) CRD for the full operational capability of the force.
(4) Priority\textsuperscript{121} for sequence of movement.

(5) Command authority to be transferred.

d. **Establish Command Authority and Responsibilities for Deployment operations.** The JOPG must establish specific requirements and responsibilities for the conduct of specific aspects of deployment operations. Depending on the ability of the HN(s) to provide adequate support for these operations, the JHQ may have to establish the required capabilities or contract for them. Critical aspects to be developed include:

   (1) Mounting operations to prepare assigned HQs and forces for deployment.

   (2) Security of entry points, staging/reception areas and LOC within the theatre.

   (3) Operation of air and sea port facilities and reception areas.

   (4) Operation of staging areas.

   (5) Control of onward movements into and within the JOA.

e. **Coordinate Detailed Deployment Plans with Nations.** The ADL serves as COM JHQ’s principal means for establishing the required flow of forces into the theatre. It provides the operational basis for the AMCC to coordinate with nations on behalf of SACEUR for the strategic deployment of HQs and forces to their required destination, including the coordination of strategic LOC, modes of transportation and strategic lift. On this basis each TCN develops a DDP for its forces for coordination and de-confliction by the AMCC into a MN DDP to best achieve the required flow of forces into the theatre. Based on the MN DDP and the scheduled arrival of forces, the JOPG can further plan for the RSOI and sustainment operations in close coordination with the theatre logistics commander (e.g. COM JLSG HQ). Deployment planning is typically conducted with nations at the strategic level, but is heavily reliant on operational requirements provided by the JOPG representatives during a series of Movement Planning Conferences, as follows:

   (1) **Initial Movement Planning Conference (IMovPC).** The IMovPC is hosted by the AMCC as soon as possible after ACTWARN and will provide the first step of the deployment planning cycle. A JOPG representative will attend to ensure that the movement plan reflects the Commander’s intent. IMovPC will:

      (a) Confirm the overall concept of operations.

      (b) Confirm HN resources to include APODs, SPODs and railheads.

      (c) Establish or confirm possible requirement for sharing logistic and infrastructure resources with relevant international actors operating in the JOA.

\textsuperscript{121} Priority is set to allow de-confliction at PODs.
(d) Review and confirm the required force flow based on the ADL.

(e) Establish the movement control organisation network and point of contact register.

(2) Main Movement Planning Conference (MMovPC). The purpose of the MMovPC is to coordinate the details of the actual deployment of forces based on national deployment planning. The main activities of the MMovPC are:

(a) Review the DDPs.

(b) Start the initial de-confliction process, including de-confliction with cooperating relevant international actors operating in the JOA, as required.

(c) Start the strategic air and sea assessment and identify national shortfalls.

(d) Confirm HN support agreements and MOUs as well as resources and throughput capabilities.

(3) Final Movement Planning Conference (FMovPC). The aim of the FMovPC is to provide a fully co-ordinated and de-conflicted MN DDP agreed to by all HQs, TCNs and the HNs. The MN DDP will form the basis of all further movement planning in support of the plan.

4-59. Plan Force Protection.

a. Review Requirements for Force Protection Planning. FP consists of the following diverse notional capabilities: Security, Military Engineering Support to FP, Air Defence, Force Health Protection, Consequence Management and CBRN Defence. FP planning should develop requirements and measures to be taken to protect the HQs, personnel and forces from identified risks and threats. Details are provided in OPLAN Annex J - Force Protection. Specific measures should be developed to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations for each phase of the operation. FP planning requires close coordination with the HN(s), TCNs and supporting/subordinate commands. It should consider possible HN force protection capabilities and their possible contributions. Particular attention should be given to protection of forces in transit, choke points, air and sea ports as well as reception and staging areas where concentration of personnel and equipment may be vulnerable to attack. FP planning should consider the following four areas: Protective Security; Active Defence; Passive Defence; and Recuperation.

b. Protective Security. The JOPG should establish requirements for protective security for operational activities, facilities and operations as well as direction to subordinate/supporting commands for specific protective security measures to be taken based on the evaluated risks and threats in the following domains: physical security, personnel security, information security, operational security and industrial security. Coordination with HN(s) and military engineers is essential to establish practical arrangements for interaction with local and national law enforcement, Information and Intelligence Sharing (I&IS), environmental health & safety, fire protection, medical,
road/traffic, recreational safety, etc, as arranged in SOFAs and memoranda/agreements of understanding.

c. **Active Defence.** Based on their appreciation of the threat of attack, the JOPG should determine the required defensive measures to deter, prevent, neutralise, or reduce the effectiveness of potential attacks, including defence against surface, subsurface, air, rocket and missile attack. The JOPG must coordinate with subordinate commands and HN(s) for the provision of active defence measures including:

1. Counter-air operations.
2. Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD).
3. Port and harbour defences.
4. Defence of key areas for staging, lodgement, rear area activities and other vital areas.
5. CBRN defence.
6. Counter terrorism.

d. **Passive Defence.** FP planning should also develop passive defence measures necessary to minimise the likelihood of conventional and CBRN attacks on HQs, forces and personnel and limit the potential operational, component, psychological and political consequences. Passive defence includes the preparation of HQs, personnel, forces and facilities to limit their exposure and to deal with such attacks to ensure their survival and ability to continue operations with minimal loss of effectiveness. All deployed HQs, personnel and forces operating in a potential CBRN environment must be prepared to sustain operations under CBRN conditions. Required training in passive defence measures should be specified.

e. **Recuperation.** Based on their appreciation of threats and the potential consequences of possible attacks, the JOPG should develop recuperation measures to enable HQs, forces and facilities to recover from the effects of an attack, restore essential services and allow operations to continue with the minimum of disruption. In particular, operations in a CBRN environment require the capability for recuperation from a CBRN attack, or from the effects of Release Other Than Attack (ROTA) and Toxic Industrial Material (TIM). The centralisation of recuperation capabilities requires clearly designated organisational responsibilities and command authority to ensure timely and effective recuperation action. Recuperation planning should include requirements for:

1. Damage control.
2. Post-attack reconnaissance and assessment.
3. Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance and Disposal (EOR/EOD).
(4) Fire fighting.

(5) Rescue operations, including search and rescue/combat search and rescue (SAR/CSAR).

(6) Mass casualty handling.

(7) Decontamination.

4-60. Coordinate Operational OPLAN for Approval and Handover.

a. **Complete Operational and Component Coordination.** Final coordination of an OPLAN at the operational level requires that responsibilities, authorities, resources, arrangements and actions are in place for the essential operational and functional activities called for in the OPLAN. This typically requires a deliberate review by the JOPG with representatives from supporting/subordinate commands as well HN(s) and TCNs as required, and, if relevant and feasible\(^{122}\), representatives from relevant international actors operating in the JOA. Ideally, this would have been preceded by a JOPG review of the draft component plans. The Commander is briefed on the outcome. In addition, the Commander may direct an OPLAN review/rehearsal which may be conducted as a theatre map exercise, sometimes referred to as a “Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drill” to step through the critical aspects of the operation to ensure synchronisation. In any case the final coordination should examine each phase of the operation in terms of:

(1) Deployment.

(2) Employment of operational forces to create desired operational effects and establish DCs, and the related MOEs and, if appropriate, criteria for success.

(3) Contingencies.

(4) C2 responsibilities, authorities and relationships.

(5) Sustainment and support.

(6) FP measures.

(7) De-confliction with non-NATO entities operating in the JOA.

(8) Operational risks especially resulting from shortfalls in required capabilities.

(9) Strategic requirements.

b. **Conduct Final Operational Risk Evaluation.** Based on the outcomes from operational coordination of the OPLAN, the JOPG should conduct a final evaluation of operational risks, including in particular any risks resulting from shortfalls in critical capabilities. This risk evaluation needs to consider risks to the mission and risks to the

\(^{122}\) In accordance with agreed security requirements and arrangements.
force. The evaluation is presented to the Commander with recommendations regarding any risks considered to be unacceptable at this point.

c. **Complete Strategic Coordination.** The Commander should arrange to back brief SACEUR on the final OPLAN focusing on: the main operational aspects as described above; specific strategic requirements for confirmation and/or coordination by SHAPE; and any significant or unacceptable operational risks. To facilitate this strategic coordination, the Commander would normally authorize the release of a draft operational OPLAN to SHAPE to assist in their finalization of the strategic OPLAN, especially in time critical crisis response situations, unless the final operational OPLAN will be completed in time to serve this purpose. The JOPG would also assist, as necessary, the RDG as they finalize the strategic OPLAN for submission to ensure it supports and correctly interprets the operational requirements.

d. **Forward OPLAN for Approval.** Following strategic coordination, the Commander will direct any further changes required in the OPLAN. Once these are coordinated and incorporated in the OPLAN, the JOPG forwards the completed OPLAN, including the main body and all required annexes, to the Commander for approval and submission to SACEUR. Following approval of the strategic OPLAN by the NAC, there may be a need for minor amendments of the submitted operational OPLAN, coordinated by the RDG and JOPG, prior to gaining SACEUR’s approval.

e. **Handover of the Plan.** During OPLAN development, the JOPG should have been reinforced by operations staff and the JOC, who will assume responsibility for execution. Once the OPLAN is approved, the OPLAN should be handed over for execution in anticipation of a NAC Execution Directive (NED) and SACEUR’s ACTORD.
PHASE 5 - EXECUTION

4-61. Introduction.

a. **Purpose.** The purpose of Phase 5 - Execution is to manage the execution of the approved operational OPLAN.

b. **Overview.** Phase 5 includes all operational level activities to ‘execute’ the operational OPLAN, including operations assessment and, if required, the conduct of an OPLAN review.

c. **Prerequisites.** The commencement of Phase 5 requires: the decision by the NAC to execute the operation, with their promulgation of a NAC Execution Directive (NED), SACEUR’s approval of the operational OPLAN and the issue of the ACTORD to activate the necessary forces.

d. **Main Activities.** The main activities of Phase 5\(^{123}\) are:

   (1) Coordinating the actions necessary to initiate an operation.

   (2) Implementing the operational OPLAN. The coordination and synchronization of the campaign or operation, including adjustment, liaison and coordination, and identifying and managing operational risks and issues.

   (3) Operations Assessment. Reviewing the operational-level progress of the campaign or operation.

   (4) Assessing the relevance of current plans with stakeholders, and, when required, conducting a plan review (using the Phase 2-4 processes as appropriate).

e. **Desired outcome of this phase.** The desired outcomes of Phase 5 are:

   (1) Smooth commencement of the campaign or operation, with the Component HQs supported by JHQ as required.

   (2) Operational direction and guidance for the execution of the operation, to include Fragmentation Orders (FRAGOs) and Joint Coordination Orders (JCOs).

   (3) Provision of accurate and timely operational military input, including operational level operations assessment products, to inform SACEUR and assist decision-making.

   (4) Revised/new operational OPLAN, as directed by SACEUR.

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\(^{123}\) Subject to policy guidance. To be developed further. See also AJP3(B) - Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations.
(5) The establishment of the conditions in the engagement space, and the achievement of the operational military objectives, by military-led NATO forces, including successful military support of any NATO non-military activities, to contribute to the achievement of MSOs and the NATO end state.

f. **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.** Overall, the Commander is responsible for the execution of the operational OPLAN. The main staff focal point for the coordination and synchronization of the campaign or operation is the operations staff, who are supported by the JHQ staff (e.g. intelligence/knowledge, plans, operations assessment, support, etc). The JOC monitors major events or incidents as well as establishing and maintaining the Joint Common Operational Picture of the area when possible, facilitating ISR and EW cross-cue, enabling joint tactical C2, and conducting real-time coordination of joint action between components.

g. **External Coordination.** Phase 5 activities at the operational level are facilitated by liaison and coordination with a variety of, authorized and appropriate, external entities. Liaison elements from subordinate and supporting commands, and cooperating relevant national and international actors should remain in place from Phase 4 - Operational Plan Development.

(1) **SHAPE.** The CCOMC will be the main staff interface with the JHQ during execution. It is the focus of SHAPE cross-functional effort in support of mission execution and is responsible for the conduct of strategic operations assessment including Periodic Mission Reviews (PMRs). If required, a RDG will be established to conduct activities described in Phases 2-4 of the strategic OPP, including strategic OPLAN revisions.

### 4-62. Considerations for Execution.

a. **Implementation.** Phase 5 is the execution of the developed and approved operational OPLAN, which occurs in a dynamic, ever-changing environment. In order to enable the implementation of the OPLAN, the JOPG will normally provide one of its key planners (plan owner) to help the transition of ownership of the plan to the operations staff. Thus as well as having had membership in the JOPG during the development of key execution documents (including: synchronisation matrix and the tool developed by the JOPG to support the understanding of the interrelationships and ownership of objectives, effects, DCs and other elements of the operational design (sometimes called the operational design support matrix)), the synchronization and execution staff begins the operation with direct planning support and a clear understanding of the vision of the operational OPLAN. Even at the beginning of execution, planners and the JOPG will also need to consider the impact of emerging information on the OPLAN and any adaptations or changes that have to be made.

b. **Civil-Military Interaction.** Execution requires the C2 of military forces and interaction with other non-military means to conduct integrated, coordinated or synchronised actions that create desired effects. To accomplish this, the operational OPLAN has to not only sit within the strategic OPLAN but also within the comprehensive political approach adopted by the Alliance and any other contributors. It is often the case that military planning is conducted before, or more rapidly than, civilian preparation;
though it is recognised that the military’s structure and procedures enable this rapid reaction it is equally important to recognise that harmonisation between military and civil actors is also essential. The strategic level will have defined the parameters and levels of liaison and interdependent planning for its subordinates and it is within these guidelines that the operational level must interact with civilian and multinational agencies and structures.

c. **Battle Rhythm.** As operations commence, the battle rhythm of briefings and meetings should be established as quickly as possible to support the Commander’s decision-making and fuse staff effort; it is an essential mechanism for maximizing concurrent activity and aiding synchronization. Three essential forums for the Commander are:

(1) **Situational Awareness Briefing (SAB).** The SAB is a daily update brief to the Commander on the last and next 24 hours in detail, and the next 48 hours in outline. It is given by the outgoing watch and should be attended by all available staff. The Commander usually concludes the brief with any necessary direction and guidance.

(2) **Assessment Board (AB).** The AB is the second principal meeting for the Commander. The aim is to seek the Commander’s endorsement of the provided assessment and recommend staff actions and plan adjustments. Decisions on follow-on actions will be taken by the Commander during the Joint Coordination Board.

(3) **Joint Coordination Board (JCB).** The JCB is the Commander’s principal meeting. Its aim is to assist the macro aspects of joint activity and effects synchronization, specifically to issue Commander’s priority guidance across the components, and to resolve potential areas of conflict. Recommendations from the AB will be presented during the JCB and the Commander will take decisions on follow-on actions and/or adjustments to the plan. The JCB comprises as a minimum COM JHQ, COS, functional commanders (FC)/CCs (in person, by VTC, or represented by their senior liaison officers (LOs)), POLAD, LEGAD, chief JOC, StratCom Advisor and other individuals as required.

d. **Operations Assessment.**

(1) Key to execution of any operation will be the ability to measure progress and to adapt quickly at the relevant level to changes in the engagement space. Operations assessment involves monitoring and evaluating the outcome of all actions taken across the whole engagement space and all associated effects (details are in Chapter 5). Progress of actions, creation of effects, establishment of DCs and achievement of operational objectives, and their contribution to the achievement of strategic objectives and the NATO end state, are all evaluated via a continuous cycle. This cycle measures current status and trends, and provides feedback to the planning and decision-making process.

(2) The operations assessment process applies to all levels. The operational level will focus on its effects and their part in creating the desired strategic effects.
The components will generally concentrate on the tasks/actions necessary to accomplish their mission, which will contribute to the creation of operational and strategic effects. Responsibility for determining and monitoring effects resides at the military strategic and operational levels.

(3) The focus of operations assessment at the operational level is split between two aspects:

(a) The first, more broad in nature, is a planned, periodic review of campaign or operation progress, normally, when prescribed in the operational OPLAN. It seeks to answer the question: “Are we accomplishing the operational military mission?” This type of operations assessment leads to staff recommendations to the Commander for the development of direction and guidance to amplify/modify the OPLAN, through a plan review. While the plan review (using the process described for Phases 3 and 4 as applicable) is ongoing, and, within the limits of the operational OPLAN, or, with SACEUR’s approval, within the limits of the strategic OPLAN, the Commander may implement modifications through FRAGOs or a JCO. This type of operations assessment will support the strategic level operations assessment process, including PMRs.

(b) The second, more focused, supports the ongoing synchronization and execution of the campaign or operation. It is a short to mid-term review of effects leading to DCs along particular LoOs, and the evaluation of any special events or situations that may arise outside of the operational OPLAN. It validates current operations and feeds the Commander’s decision cycle with recommendations for modifications/changes through FRAGOs or the need to initiate a new JCO.

(4) Data, on which operations assessments depend, may come from non-NATO means, further highlighting the requirement for interaction and cooperation where possible amongst all instruments and relevant actors. Operations assessment and knowledge development are closely related through system analysis which provides the backdrop for operations assessment to understand how to measure effects and actions.

e. Adjustment. Throughout the execution of the operation, commanders and their staff will conduct periodic operations assessments aimed at measuring the effectiveness of their actions in creating the desired effects, establishing DCs and achieving the operational objectives. Based on these operations assessments, the plan will be adjusted accordingly. During execution there are a number of tools available to the operational level to amend and adjust the plan:

(1) FRAGO. Though normally the main tool of the components, this is also available at the operational level to provide specific direction to subordinates on

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124 Ultimately, COM JHQ will report that the achievement of operational objectives and strategic military objectives is approaching. After concluding that the strategic military objectives have been achieved, with consideration to the overall conditions of the NATO end-state to which military efforts contribute, SACEUR will recommend to the NAC that planning for transition and termination of the NATO military operation should commence.
an issue already in the OPLAN or agreed at the strategic level. It permits a rapid
reaction through a minor adjustment or development of the operational OPLAN.

(2) JCO. This is normally the main tool of the operational level during
execution to provide detailed direction and guidance to subordinates on activities,
such as transitioning between phases of an operation, that normally cover a
number of related or unrelated issues. The process of staffing and issuing a
JCO\footnote{For more detail on the use and content of a JCO see AD 80-70 – Campaign Synchronization and Joint Targeting in ACO (27 Apr 10).} is a deliberate process and normally requires a number of days. The
planning staff should be fully involved in the JCO development. Again the JCO
focuses on adjusting/expanding/adapting something already in the plan but could
include a modification or correction that is within existing guidance of the strategic
level.

(3) Plan Revision. A plan revision can be initiated by the outcome of a PMR
but a single major event could equally provide the catalyst. Normally the NAC/
NATO HQ would provide guidance to the strategic level leading to the need to
change the strategic OPLAN. This in turn initiates a parallel plan review at the
operational level. Though the operational level commander will decide if the
revision published by the strategic level requires a revision of the operational level
plan this will normally be the case. While necessity may lead to a short period of
revision, this process can take \textbf{up to} a number of months and involves all levels of
the operation.

(4) Branches and Sequels. Developed by the planning staff but normally within
the JOPG process, branches and sequels are designed as contingencies (pre-
planned options) that deal with the inability to establish a decisive condition or
take advantage of a positive rapid development in the operation. Typically they
are developed immediately after the OPLAN and sit “on the shelf” ready for use
and regularly reviewed.

4-63. Execution and the Operational Estimate.

a. During execution, a sudden change in the operational situation or results from
operations assessment activities may require a commander to either re-visit the original
operational estimate or commence a new one; if a new operational estimate is required,
a commander will have to decide if a deliberate operational estimate, as described in
Phase 3, or a tailored operational estimate is appropriate. If time is a factor, the
Commander can either provide guidance to the JHQ staff on what to concentrate on in
their rapid conduct of an operational estimate, or can decide to personally conduct one
with selected key staff. The situation will dictate the approach, guided by the
Commander’s experience and judgement.
b. A sudden change in the operational situation, such as a surprise offensive by an opposing force, can lead the Commander to conduct a rapid operational estimate; the outline below may assist in focusing such an operational estimate:

(1) Mission Analysis

(a) Analyse Mission.

1/ Intent of higher HQ?
2/ Objectives to be accomplished?
3/ Imposed limitations?
4/ What has changed?
5/ What has to be analysed and decided?

(b) Analysis of the Operational Environment.

1/ Geographical factors.
2/ Demographic factors (the population).
3/ International Organisations.
4/ Information factors.

(c) Appreciation of Opponent(s):

1/ Identified forces, force disposition, force deployments.
2/ Deduced opponent intent, objectives.
3/ Analysis of opponent's relative combat power.
4/ Analysis of opponent COAs related to forces, time and space.
5/ Analysis of impact on own operations.

(d) Analyse own Situation:

1/ Own forces disposition, committed, uncommitted, availability of reserves?
2/ Relative combat power of own forces?
3/ Suitability of own forces for evolving operational requirements (new mission)?
(2) Courses of Action Development.

(a) Develop and Analyse potential own COAs (related to own forces, to time and to space).

(b) Comparison of COAs.

1/ Comparison Own and Opponent COAs. Comparison of relative combat power of own and opponent forces related to:

   a/ Time (when?).

   b/ Space (where?).

   c/ Consequences for own COAs.

2/ Compare Own COAs Advantages and Disadvantages. Advantages/Disadvantages of own COAs related to mission accomplishment. With an existing operation consider impact on the existing mission and its objectives and the resultant requirements for consultation with “higher”.

(c) Decision on COA Selection.

4-64. Operations Assessment and the Operational Estimate.

a. The operational level operations assessment process looks at effects and actions that have occurred over time (in the past) and assesses progress against an existing operational design. The use of the operational estimate during execution differs from operations assessment in that:

   (1) It is a planning and not an operations assessment activity.

   (2) It is a tool used to look ahead to consider options for action in the future.

   (3) Its use is normally event driven; the use of the operational estimate in an ongoing operation is normally triggered by one or more CCIRs and is, therefore, based on indicators and warnings. However, it is possible for the operations assessment process to identify such significant weakness or failure in an ongoing operation that it leads to a staff recommendation to the Commander that an operational estimate needs to be conducted.

   (4) It can be used as a rapid planning process that can be used to develop contingencies.

b. As a planning tool, the structure of the estimate can also be used for the development of Branches and Sequels but, whereas these are related to minor adjustments to the operational design or as follow-on activities, the operational estimate’s primary role is to address situations where there are likely to be potential changes to the Mission, including its objectives.
Figure 4.22 - Operations Assessment and the Operational Estimate in Execution
PHASE 6 - TRANSITION

4-65. Introduction.

a. **Purpose.** The purpose of Phase 6 - Transition is to coordinate the transition and termination of a NATO military operation, including the transition of NATO military responsibilities to proper authority and the withdrawal of forces under NATO military command and their return to national command (reverse TOA).

b. **Overview.** Throughout the execution phase of an operation, periodic operations assessments will be conducted to evaluate the progress made towards the desired objectives and the NATO end state; eventually after concluding that achievement of strategic military objectives is approaching and, with consideration to the overall conditions of the NATO end-state to which military efforts contribute, SACEUR will recommend to the NAC that planning for transition and termination of the NATO military operation should commence. This phase covers all the activities for the transition and termination of a NATO military operation to facilitate the handover of responsibility to proper authority (e.g. the UN, other international organisations (e.g. EU) or indigenous actor) in the crisis area and the withdrawal of forces under NATO military command, in a controlled manner so as to avoid this action being a destabilising influence in the region. Depending on the situation, transition and termination may be able to be managed within the construct of the existing strategic and operational OPLANs; alternatively, appropriate operations planning activities may be needed, leading to NAC approval for a specific transition strategic CONOPS or OPLAN. As the exact moment for transition may be difficult to define, Phase 5 and 6 are likely to overlap.

c. **Prerequisites.** The commencement of Phase 6 requires: a NAC decision sheet to begin preparation for transition and withdrawal of NATO forces under military command, with SACEUR direction and guidance; or SACEUR direction and guidance to commence considering the issues associated with a future transition and withdrawal.

d. **Main Activities.** The main activities of the disengagement planning process are:

1. The provision of operational input to assist SACEUR decision-making for the transition and termination.

2. Activities to appreciate the need for and conduct transition planning to minimise the risks and negative effects on a stabilized crisis that could result from the disengagement of NATO forces. This may include activities described in Phases 2-4 depending on how the NAC wishes to proceed (e.g. the NAC may wish to start the process with a Strategic Assessment).

3. Coordination and/or collaboration between JHQ, SHAPE, NATO HQ, and relevant actors.

4. The provision of COM JHQ guidance and direction and support to component commanders to facilitate the transition and termination of NATO military operations, including minimizing risks and negative effects on a stabilized crisis that could result from the disengagement of NATO forces.
(5) Operational level coordination with relevant non-NATO actors within the engagement space.

e. **Desired outcome of this phase.** The desired outcomes of Phase 6 is:

(1) Operational input provided to assist SACEUR decision-making for the transition and termination of NATO’s role in the crisis, including the associated military operation(s).

(2) Either:

   (a) Operational direction and guidance provided to CCs, to assist in managing the transition and termination of the NATO military operation within the current operational OPLAN and component plans.

   or

   (b) Operational transition OPLAN developed. Development of appropriate products for SACEUR, as requested, leading to approval of a revised or new operational OPLAN (e.g. operational advice on MROs, transition CONOPS and/or transition OPLAN). Following SACEUR approval of the operational OPLAN, COM JHQ approval of the component transition plans.

(3) The transition and termination of NATO’s military operation has been completed, in a controlled manner so as to avoid being a destabilising influence in the region.

f. **Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities.** The main JHQ staff focal point for transition and termination activities will depend on the manner in which transition is being considered. If Phase 2-4 activities are required, the JOPG will lead or coordinate the required JHQ staff effort, with the focus shifting back to the operations staff on approval of the operational transition OPLAN. If management of the transition will be done within the construct of the current operational OPLAN, the operations staff will be the main staff focal point for the coordination and synchronization of the campaign or operation termination supported by the JHQ staff.

g. **External Coordination.** Phase 6 activities at the operational level are facilitated by liaison and coordination with a variety of external entities, authorized and appropriate for the ongoing NATO military operation. These may include but are not limited to the following:

(1) **SHAPE.** The JHQ will collaborate with the CCCOMC, who will lead initial transition thinking at SHAPE., and as required send an appropriate liaison, including to any RDG assembled to conduct strategic level operations planning activity. As the operation terminates, the JHQ will liaise with the CCOMC who will manage all the strategic post operation termination activities, such as end of mission reports, archiving operation information, completing post operation analysis (e.g. lessons learned process), etc.
(2) **Other Relevant Actors.** By this point in an operation, relationships between strategic and operational levels and relevant actors would have been established; however, there may be additional actors, not yet involved in the crisis resolution, who will be relevant for the transition and termination of NATO’s military operation. JHQ staff (operations staff or JOPG as appropriate) will have to ensure they have the requisite authorities/mechanisms to engage all actors, guided by SACEUR guidance, relevant to transition and termination activities.

4-66. **Considerations for Transition and Termination.**

a. Modern conflicts are complex in nature involving interdependent actors with both convergent and divergent interests and objectives. The deployment of NATO forces introduces them into an already complex system and, over time, creates interdependencies with other actors, and systems (e.g. economic, civil, and political) present in the engagement space.

b. Throughout the execution phase of an operation, commanders and their staff will conduct periodic operations assessments aimed at measuring the effectiveness of their actions in creating the desired effects, establishing desired conditions and achieving objectives, to contribute to the achievement of the desired NATO end state.

c. Eventually SACEUR will consider that the strategic military objectives have been achieved; having established the conditions required by forces under NATO military command, consideration can now be given to the withdrawal of those forces. The desired NATO end state may require both military and non-military activities to establish all the conditions necessary to achieve it; thus following the achievement of the MSOs, the continued presence of forces under military command may be required to support non-military efforts. Eventually, through operations assessment, indications will begin to highlight that military forces could be withdrawn, the timing for which will be approved by the NAC. As the exact moment for transition may be difficult to define, Phase 5 and 6 are likely to overlap.

d. Planning for the disengagement of NATO forces must be initiated well in advance and may eventually involve a large number of non-NATO actors in order to minimize the negative effects that the departure of NATO troops may have on the overall stability of the theatre. Planning for transition may involve activities to facilitate the coordination and management of the transition and withdrawal within the construct of the current strategic and/or operational OPLANs\(^1\); it also may require conduct of some or all of the activities described in Phases 2-4, culminating in a series of approved transition specific OPLAN/plans. Each case will be different. The approach to transition and termination will be guided by appropriate NAC guidance and direction, including the issue of decision sheets (such as a NID to direct the production of a transition CONOPS and/or OPLAN). As guided by the Commander, the JHQ will collaborate with SHAPE bodies (e.g. CCOMC COG or RDG) in the preparation of input on transition and termination of NATO military operations. Appropriate liaison elements should be exchanged to facilitate the

\(^1\) If this approach is chosen for transition and termination, the Commander will control the necessary activities as described in Phase 5, including through the issue of JCOs or FRAGOs.
effort at each level. The following may help guide the conduct of Phase 2-4 activities if they are required for transition planning:

(1) **Phase 2 – Operational Appreciation of the Strategic Environment.**

Already engaged in the theatre in question, COM JHQ and the JHQ will collaborate with the SACEUR/SHAPE if there is a requirement to produce a strategic assessment (e.g. SSA) and/or options (e.g. MROs) for the NAC as they begin considering transition and termination.

(a) **Strategic Assessment.** Operations Assessments, including PMRs, lead to the determination that transition and termination of the NATO military operations is warranted. Depending on the timing and focus of the last strategic operations product (e.g. PMR) prior to the decision to begin transition and termination planning, there may be no need for a separate strategic assessment to support transition and termination planning. Ideally, with the PMR advising that a transition is warranted, the status of relevant actors and the impact of such a transition, including on the gender perspective, should have been assessed. If not this updated systems understanding of the operational environment should be established as a basis for further work, even if not formally tasked.

(b) **Options.** Once operations assessments indicate the conditions required of military forces have been established and that these are sustainable without the current level of NATO forces in theatre, SACEUR may recommend to the NAC that options for NATO disengagement (total or partial) be developed. In such cases, options could be presented at the same time as the operations assessment itself. Options may or may not necessitate revised/new strategic or operational planning products; transition and withdrawal within the construct of the current strategic and/or operational OPLAN may be achievable with appropriate strategic guidance and direction. Alternatively, the option chosen by the NAC may see the issue of a NID to direct the production of a transition strategic CONOPS and/or OPLAN. The options tabled should clearly state the level of interaction with non-NATO actors required during strategic and operational planning.

(2) **Phase 3 - Operational Estimate.** The use of the Operational Estimate process, as described in Phase 3 or modified by the Commander, would support development of the operational CONOPS, but it could also be used to develop operational advice to support SACEUR’s development of options on how to best carry out the transition and termination of the campaign or operation. If used for the latter purpose, that operational estimate will have to be revisited once the NAC issues a NID prior to developing the operational CONOPS; the review of the

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127 Not conducting this appreciation can be mitigated by the strategic level, for the consideration of options, if the requisite authorities for interaction have been received.

128 Once this decision is made, the CCOMC would be the focus point at the strategic level to facilitate the operational level transition and termination of the operation within the construct of the current OPLANs.
An operational CONOPS would articulate how to disengage NATO forces from the mission most effectively and efficiently. It would be developed with consideration to the different interdependencies that were created over the duration of the mission between the deployed NATO forces and possible ways to mitigate the negative effects caused by the withdrawal of forces.

(a) Mitigation measures will in most cases involve international or national actors developing transition plans with NATO forces adjusting their handover of responsibilities to these actors in a way that allows them, as much as possible, to minimize the negative impacts during this critical phase of the operation. It should be noted that the overriding factor in the decision to repatriate troops should be the need to maintain stability in the theatre and to give sufficient time for a proper handover to take place. In cases where the handover will take place over a long period of time, it may be necessary to re-tool or re-role elements of the NATO forces in theatre.

(b) The operational transition CONOPS will require coordination with the strategic level to articulate to the NAC required comprehensive activities (including supporting NATO non-military efforts) required to establish the preconditions for success.

(4) Phase 4b - Operational OPLAN Development. OPLAN development will further amplify the operational effects required, the supporting preconditions for success, and the general flow of forces out of theatre. The NAC would issue a NED to execute the approved strategic transition OPLAN; SACEUR would then approve the operational OPLAN.

(5) Execution and Operations Assessment. Throughout the transition phase, it will be necessary to monitor execution closely and to appreciate the developing impacts of the departure of NATO forces. An operations assessment process, similar to the process used throughout the execution phase of the operation will be used, with particular emphasis on measuring negative effects. These operations assessments will allow changes, within the construct of the approved OPLAN, or identify the need for changes to the OPLAN where necessary.

e. Process Controls. Transition planning is designed to identify and mitigate, to the maximum extent possible, the negative risks and effects resulting from the disengagement of NATO troops. It also allows commanders to coordinate, in detail, the transfer of authority to non-NATO actors, by allowing the Commander and the JHQ staff enough freedom to develop ideas and concepts while ensuring necessary political and military control over the entire process.

f. In enabling a coordinated and deliberate transition, a detailed systemic analysis of the engagement space is necessary. This systemic analysis should place a particular
emphasis on the interdependencies that have resulted due to the presence of NATO forces in-theatre. It will be essential that all relevant non-NATO actors be identified early and that proper liaison and coordination be implemented to allow these actors to be able to inform and contribute where appropriate to the strategic and operational planning for the withdrawal of NATO forces under military command.

g. The authority to de-activate and redeploy forces, as well as to execute OPLANs, is retained by the NAC and delegated incrementally to SACEUR.

h. **Political Controls.** The NAC maintains political control of transition and termination by:

   (1) Issuing direction and guidance to guide the transition and planning for it, including NAC decision sheets like a NID.

   (2) Delegating or retaining coordinating authority for planning.

   (3) Approving a strategic transition CONOPS, including approving strategic effects and endorsing the preconditions for success.

   (4) Authorising force de-activation.

   (5) Approving a strategic transition OPLAN.

   (6) Authorising force redeployment.

   (7) Authorising execution.

i. **Military Controls.** NATO military commanders maintain control of the OPP by:

   (1) Issuing transition direction and guidance, such as planning directives.

   (2) Delegating or retaining coordinating authority for planning.

   (3) Approving subordinate CONOPS.

   (4) Approving subordinate plans (e.g. OPLANs).

   (5) Issuing deactivation messages and execution orders (when authorised).

j. **Collaborative / Parallel Planning.** The development of strategic and operational transition CONOPS/OPLANs, if necessary for transition and termination, requires collaboration and continuous coordination at the Political/Military (NAC/MC and Nations) and at strategic, operational, and component levels with relevant non-NATO actors.

k. **Coordination with Participating Nations.** Coordination with participating nations should take place as soon as authorised. This should include the early exchange of information with HNs to facilitate comprehensive planning by the HN as well as with troop-contributing nations. Once authorized by the NAC, SACEUR will negotiate with NATO and non-NATO Nations in order to ensure a coordinated and deliberate disengagement of forces.
I. **Coordination with the Civil Environment.** Early liaison and coordination between Allied HQs and civil authorities and agencies is essential to the success of the NATO disengagement. This includes establishing, during the initiation of planning, effective means for coordination and liaison, initially at the strategic level, with national governments, IOs and NGOs. Planning by the JHQ must provide for effective cooperation with these same civil organisations within the joint operations area.

m. **StratCom Framework.** A well planned and executed StratCom Framework will be critical to the successful disengagement of NATO forces from a crisis area. It will address aims with specific respect to: local/regional audiences to re-assure them about the stability of the situation; the international community to underline NATO’s accomplishments; potential de-stabilizing actors to demonstrate NATO’s resolve; and the populations of NATO member and non-NATO partner nations to inform them about the success of the mission.

n. **Operation Termination.** Once the manner of transition and termination is decided, and transition plans are created, approved and execution initiated as appropriate, the operations staff will conduct their normal functions as per execution, supported by the other JHQ staff as required.
Allied Command Operations
Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive
Interim V2.0
(Chapter 5 – Operations Assessment)

04 October 2013
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CHAPTER 5
OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT

5-1. Introduction.

a. NATO operations take place in dynamic environments in which the political, economic, social, military, infrastructure and information domains are constantly changing. Commanders need to have the feedback process of operations assessment to inform on progress being made in creating desired effects, establishing decisive conditions (DCs) and towards achieving objectives, which in turn allows for adjustments to be made to the plan, and inform the decision-making process for the military and political leadership. Operations assessment also provides an important input in the knowledge development (KD) process, which builds up and maintains a holistic understanding of the situation and operating environment.

b. Operations assessment can only provide indications of trends in a system’s behaviour. Thus, success in operations still heavily relies on a commander’s intuition, experience and judgement.

5-2. Definitions of Terms.

a. In this chapter, the following terms are used:

(1) Operations assessment: The activity that enables the measurement of progress and results of operations in a military context, and the subsequent development of conclusions and recommendations in support of decision-making.

(2) Measure of effectiveness (MOE): A metric used to measure a current system state.

(3) Measure of performance (MOP): A metric used to determine the accomplishment of actions.

(4) Risk Assessment: The continuous monitoring of strategic and operational risks at the corresponding level of command.

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1 This chapter describes a metric-based method for Operations Assessment as described in the 19 Jan 13 version of the NATO Operations Assessment Handbook (NOAH). Other approaches to Operations Assessment are under analysis by NATO to complement this metric-based approach. See the latest NOAH for more detail and the most up-to-date information on NATO Operations Assessment.

2 Important Note: In late 2010, the decision was made to change the formal name of this activity from Assessment to Operations Assessment in order to avoid confusion with other existing uses of “assessment” in NATO.

3 A decisive condition is defined as “a combination of circumstances, effects, or a specific key event, critical factor, or function that when achieved allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an opponent or contribute materially to achieving an operational objective.” (AJP-01(D)).
5-3. **Overview of Operations Assessment in Military Operations.**

a. The purpose of operations assessment is to support the decision-making process in three areas:

   (1) Operations assessment evaluates the progress of plan execution (actions / tasks).

   (2) Operations assessment evaluates the effectiveness of those executed actions by measuring the achievement of results (creation of desired effects, establishment of DCs, and achievement of desired objectives and the end-state).

   (3) Operations assessment draws conclusions about past situations, in some cases makes forward looking estimates about future trends, and makes recommendations; e.g. to move on to the next phase of a plan or make adjustments to the plan based on these conclusions.

b. Operations assessment can be applied to specific operations, events or topics either within or outside the military plan. Operations assessment may consider a range of timescales from short-term changes to long-term changes over years. There are many ways in which the responsibility for the level and timescale of operations assessment can be divided, depending on the particular context, the level of command and the needs of the Commander.

c. At any level and any timescale, in general, there are two types of operations assessment that will be undertaken typically during an operation: 'historic' and 'predictive'. ‘Historic’ operations assessment during an operation provides the Commander with an evaluation of completion of actions, and progress toward the creation of the desired effects, establishment of DCs, and achievement of objective(s) and ultimately the end-state. This type of operations assessment utilises historical data to identify trends up to and including the current state. ‘Predictive’ operations assessment builds on the historic operations assessment and helps extrapolate current trends to the future, thus identifying potential opportunities and risks for the Commander. In addition to past events, predictive operations assessment is based on known future events/plans/intentions/actions and assumptions to develop a forecast of the future situation.

d. Operations assessment supports and continuously interacts with KD, Planning and Execution.

   (1) **Knowledge Development.** KD is critical during planning of operations, but has a strong link to execution and operations assessment. A systems understanding is critical to the initial development of the operations assessment process and throughout the operations assessment cycle the KD process should feed, as well as benefit from, operations assessment activities. The products generated from the operations assessment process will add to the understanding of the operational environment and this information will be fed back into the knowledge base. KD and operations assessment processes will be interdependent by the virtue of their common linkages to the knowledge base.
(2) **Planning.** Operations assessment has a critical linkage to planning: those staff involved in planning and operations assessment must work collaboratively to determine that the tasks, actions, effects and objectives defined in the plan are measurable, and a component of the plan must consider the resources and actions necessary to perform operations assessment. The primary purpose of operations assessment is to support decision-making by providing the necessary recommendations to adapt a plan based on the results from execution.

(3) **Execution.** Execution refers to overall processes and techniques of leading and managing an operation. This involves the preparation of orders and fragmentation orders (FRAGOs), command and control of military actions, and de-confliction or collaboration with non-military actors. Although the leadership and management of operations may vary greatly depending on the situation, scale and personnel, a common component is the necessity for ongoing feedback on the progress of tasks and actions, creation of desired effects and the achievement of objectives. Operations plans are not presumed to be foolproof; during their execution, they will require continuous operations assessment-informed adjustments. Continuous assessment is an essential element of plan execution.

5-4. **The Operations Assessment Process.**

a. The operations assessment process involves four major steps which are described in detail in the NATO Operations Assessment Handbook (NOAH):

   (1) Designing the operations assessment and support to planning.

   (2) Developing the data collection plan.

   (3) Data collection and treatment.

   (4) Analysis, interpretation and recommendations.

b. This chapter of the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) focuses on the first two stages: designing the operations assessment, and developing the data collection plan. See the NOAH for details.

c. Operations Assessment Staff. This generic term applies to staff within a headquarters (HQ) who work specifically on operations assessment (i.e. at the operational level, in Operations Assessment Branches) and any other staff who contribute to the operations assessment process as and when required.

5-5. **Operations Assessment at the Strategic Level.**

a. At the strategic level, the term “operations assessment” refers to the development and conduct of the measurement of strategic progress and results of the post-North Atlantic Council (NAC) execution directive activities.

b. In the complex, multi-dimensional and asymmetric military operations of today and of the future, “success” is becoming increasingly hard to define. In previous years, the
battle-damage assessment paradigm focused on military targets: numbers of enemy killed, bridges destroyed, or quantifiable measures about the status of enemy military forces. Experience demonstrates that many extra factors must now be considered, as winning militarily may not necessarily lead to success in every domain.

c. At both the political and military strategic levels, the engagement space must be examined from a comprehensive perspective, across all PMESII domains, to ensure that all influences, actors and interdependencies have been considered. Activity in the military domain affects – and is affected by – the activity and situation in the non-military domain. Operations assessment at the strategic level must therefore consider progress in the non-military domains in addition to military progress and results. A successful military operation does not necessarily mean that the NATO end-state will be successfully achieved, as there may be many factors outside the military domain that are required for success. Although NATO does not have all the instruments of power to deal fully with all PMESII domains, a comprehensive strategic-level operations assessment can identify those areas which need to be raised at the NAC.

d. At the strategic level of command, operations assessment is therefore a function that involves varying combinations of: regular measurement of strategic effects and progress towards the achievement of objectives in a military context; regular measurement of strategic progress and results in non-military domains; measurement of strategic progress, with consideration of results of activities of non-military organisations as they contribute to NATO objectives; an overall evaluation of progress towards the NATO end-state; and the subsequent development of conclusions and recommendations that support Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) strategic decision-making, and inform the NAC.

5-6. Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities at the Strategic Level.

a. At the Strategic level, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre (CCOMC) has the lead responsibility to ensure appropriate strategic operations assessment for SACEUR, in coordination with other SHAPE staff. Where necessary, SHAPE may seek outside expertise for certain aspects of the operations assessment function. At the strategic level, operations assessment staff have the following specific responsibilities:

(1) Considering the operational level operations assessments received from the Joint (Operational) Headquarters (JHQ) and other areas of NATO, to produce the strategic level operations assessments on ongoing military operations for SACEUR

(2) Producing for SACEUR the strategic level operations assessments on all other domains

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\(^4\) For explanation of PMESII see COPD Chapter 1.

\(^5\) See Chapter 1.

\(^6\) For each operation, duties and responsibilities may be shared and exchanged between levels, which will be defined in the operations assessment OPLAN annex.
(3) Producing the operations assessments required\(^7\) for the NATO HQ level.

b. As operations assessment at the strategic level considers political, economic and social issues, the practice of operations assessment may be enhanced by the use of subject matter experts (SMEs) to better define and analyse the non-military aspects of a system. Operations assessment staff should seek experts from all relevant domains from: NATO organisations, including: J2, J9\(^8\) and KD\(^9\) entities, the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre\(^10\) (NIFC) or Civil-Military Planning and Support (CMPS) Section; or non-NATO organisations, including: academia, think-tanks, international organisations, or private contractors.

c. Operations assessments at the strategic level should use openly available data sources from international organisations such as the United Nations, World Bank, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, European Union, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, International Monetary Fund and the International Committee of the Red Cross. All these organisations have well-developed Monitoring and Evaluation\(^{11}\) capabilities, and have detailed reports and subject matter expertise on many conflict areas. See the NOAH for more information on non-military monitoring and evaluation techniques.

5-7. Characteristics of Operations Assessment at the Strategic Level.

a. **Process Overview.** In NATO, planning is initiated as a top-down process that begins with the NAC issuing a decision sheet tasking the NATO Military Authorities to provide an assessment of the crisis situation. In response to the NAC decision sheet and the associated tasking, SHAPE will produce a SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment, informing the NAC decision process and eventually serving as a baseline assessment for operations planning (Phase 2 of the strategic OPP as described in Chapter 3 of the COPD).

b. Once the decision has been made to initiate strategic planning, planners will begin developing the strategic Operation Plan (OPLAN) (Phase 4a/4b of the strategic OPP). SHAPE Operations Assessment experts will develop the design of the operations assessment which includes metrics to measure progress and effectiveness.

c. **Strategic Operations Assessment Design.** The strategic OPLAN considers strategic military effects and objectives that contribute to achieving the NATO end-state, in combination with non-military effects and objectives. The design of the strategic operations assessment describes the means by which progress will be measured towards the creation of military strategic effects and achievement of military strategic objectives (MSOs), and their contribution towards setting the conditions necessary to

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\(^7\) The normal strategic operations assessment product required by the NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP) is the Periodic Mission Review (PMR).

\(^8\) At SHAPE, J9 Civil Military Interaction Branch has the leading staff role for strategic engagement and outreach with civil organisations.

\(^9\) Such as the Civil Military Analysis Branch at SHAPE.

\(^10\) The NIFC is tasked through SHAPE J2.

\(^11\) *Monitoring and Evaluation* is the equivalent term to “Operations Assessment” that is generally used by international organisations.
achieve the NATO end state, as well as progress in the various non-military PMESII domains in the engagement space. This design should commence during the initial phases of planning. It contributes to the process of defining system state changes and actions by ensuring that these can indeed be observed and measured. Furthermore, the process of determining metrics increases understanding of the corresponding effects and objectives.

d. **Comprehensive Nature of the Engagement Space.** Success cannot be defined in military terms alone. A comprehensive operations assessment of the strategic engagement space and the progress towards the NATO end-state must consider all the aspects of the PMESII domains within the region and the engagement space. Although NATO does not have the instruments of power to act directly in many of these domains, operations assessment at the strategic level must consider:

   1. Progress and effectiveness of NATO military operations.
   2. Development of political processes, governance, and civil institutions.
   4. Economic development.
   5. General well-being of local populations.

e. **Intended Audiences and Use.** Strategic level operations assessments may be produced for a variety of different purposes and audiences:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Audience</th>
<th>Focus of Operations Assessment</th>
<th>Intended Use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE</td>
<td>Strategic overview of ongoing military operations Amalgamation of operational level operations assessments</td>
<td>High level decision-making and necessary adjustments (within the scope of the current strategic OPLAN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAPE, NAC, Military Committee, Host Nations</td>
<td>Comprehensive operations assessment in all PMESII domains</td>
<td>Briefing the NAC Informing NATO political decision-making and strategic communications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational HQs</td>
<td>Strategic implications of progress and effectiveness of operational level missions</td>
<td>Decision-making on necessary plan adjustments for the operational level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.1 - Operations Assessment - Intended Audience and Use
f. **Development of Metrics and Data Collection Plans.** Metrics are the means by which progress and effectiveness can be measured and are divided into MOP and MOE; however, at the strategic level, typically only MOEs will be used. Metrics are normally developed during the initial phases of planning in parallel with development of objectives and effects, but may be refined as necessary during the course of an operation, depending on the specific outcomes and situation. In a similar method to the determination of planning elements (effects / objectives), metrics should be based on systems analysis of key nodes and leverage points. The relevance and importance of individual metrics will vary with the phase of the operation and should both respond to, and inform SACEUR’s priorities and the NAC decision-making.

g. The strategic operations assessment design will incorporate the use of three sets of metrics:

1. A set that measures the creation or achievement of the elements in the strategic plan, which contribute to the achievement of the NATO end state: strategic effects and objectives.

2. When required, a set received from the operational level, that measures creation of effects, establishment of DCs, and achievement of objectives and performance of actions in the operational OPLAN, some of which are directly linked to strategic elements.

3. An independent set that may not be directly tied to elements in the strategic plan, but considers the broader PMESII aspects of the engagement space. The progress towards MSOs, for example, will not always be revealed by an amalgamation of MOEs from the operational level. These independent MOE may capture standard data produced by international organisations such as the United Nations.

h. **Timescales.** In general, operations assessment at the strategic level will consider longer timescales than operational and component levels. Currently, NATO produces a Periodic Mission Review (PMR), which is the formal operations assessment of strategic progress and results normally required by the NATO Crisis Management Process (NCMP). Depending on the specific context and situation, the timescales may change, or different strategic operations assessment products will be required.

5-8. **Summary – Operations Assessment at the Strategic Level.**

a. Operations assessment at the strategic level is much more than a simple aggregation of lower level operations assessments, and success at the strategic level cannot be reached only by the achievement of MSOs. The strategic engagement space is a complex, interdependent system of systems including: regional and international powers and political institutions, regional, national and international economies, social and cultural influences, international organisations and non-governmental organisations, humanitarian aid organisations, reconstruction and development agencies, and military forces, both NATO and national.
b. NATO’s instruments of power are military and political; however, SACEUR requires an understanding of how NATO military operations interact with non-military domains, how the activities of non-military organisations contribute to or hinder progress towards achieving MSOs and contributing to achievement of the NATO end state, and how the state of various critical social and economic indicators change.

c. Operations assessment at the strategic level focuses on the overall progress of NATO military operations and the general state of critical PMESII domains, but considers relevant non-NATO actors. If cooperative planning is conducted with specific non-NATO organisations, cooperative operations assessment should occur.

d. In some cases, it may be necessary for strategic level operations assessment to take an expanded view and consider two separate missions as a whole when interdependencies exist between the two operations. As an example, the humanitarian assistance mission in Pakistan and the ongoing ISAF mission in 2005, where the former operation, if properly synchronized and coordinated with the NATO mission in Afghanistan, could have had positive strategic impact on the latter.

5-9. Operations Assessment at the Operational and Component Level

a. The primary focus at the operational and component levels of command is the execution of the military operation and the creation of effects, the establishment of DCs and the achievement of the operational objectives defined in the plan. The operation is planned by the Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG) and assessed by the Assessment Working Group (AWG).

b. Plans will need continual adjustment, based on the circumstances of the operation, to be effective. The primary purpose of operations assessment at the operational and component levels is to increase the effectiveness of the execution of military operations. By continually monitoring and analysing the implementation of actions, creation of effects and establishment of DCs and achievement of objectives, the intention of operations assessment is to assist the commander in making evidence-based adjustments to the plan being executed. Operations assessment aims to provide confirmation of the plan design, by demonstrating that the planned actions are indeed creating the desired results, and to improve understanding of the workings of the engagement space. Operations assessment also plays an important role in providing situational awareness relative to the plan.

c. At the operational level, the process is based on the overall analysis of metrics measuring progress of planned actions (MOP), the creation of desired effects, the establishment of planned DCs and the achievement of planned objectives (MOE). The focus of operations assessment at the operational level is split between two aspects:

(1) The first, more broad in nature, seeks to answer the question: “Are we accomplishing the operational military mission?” This involves the continuous monitoring and evaluation of all effects, DCs and objectives specified in the operational OPLAN. Furthermore, the evaluation of desired and undesired effects across all the PMESII domains will be considered, where they impact significantly on the campaign or operation, or where they are explicitly stated in the OPLAN.
This type of operations assessment leads to staff recommendations to the Commander for the development of direction and guidance to amplify/modify the campaign or operation.

(2) The second, more focused, supports the ongoing synchronization and execution of the campaign or operation. It is a short to mid-term review of effects leading to DCs along particular lines of operation, and the evaluation of any special events or situations that may arise outside of the operational OPLAN. It validates current operations and feeds the Commander’s decision cycle with recommendations for modifications/changes through FRAGOs or a new joint coordination order.

d. At the component level, the focus is on measuring the achievement of planned actions, tasks or activities using MOP. In some special cases, the component level may measure the establishment of DCs and creation of operational effects using MOE.

5-10. Organisation, Roles and Responsibilities at the Operational Level

a. At the operational level, the Commander owns the operational level operations assessment. The operations assessment staff takes responsibility for development of the operations assessment annex in the OPLAN (Annex OO), and the conduct of operations assessments during execution. At the operational level, operations assessment staff have the following specific responsibilities:

(1) Acting as the focal point for operations assessment development in their respective HQ, including the contribution to doctrine development.

(2) Working with the JOPG during development and revision of the OPLAN.

(3) Considering the component level operations assessments received from their subordinate commands and other areas of NATO.

(4) Producing the operational level operations assessments on ongoing military operations considering the component level operations assessments.

(5) Contributing to strategic operations assessments, as required.

(6) Monitoring the operational level risks.

b. Operations Assessment Staff at Component Level. At the component level, the Commander owns the component level operations assessment. The operations assessment staff takes responsibility for development of the operations assessment annex in the OPLAN, if required, and the conduct of operations assessments during execution. At the component level, operations assessment staff have the following specific responsibilities:

(1) Acting as the focal point for operations assessment development in their respective HQ, including the contribution to doctrine development.
(2) Working with the JOPG during development and revision of the OPLAN.

(3) Considering the operations assessments received from their subordinate commands and other areas of NATO.

(4) Producing the component level operations assessments on ongoing military operations considering the operations assessments of their subordinate commands.

(5) Contributing to operational level operations assessments as required.


a. It is essential that operations assessment personnel are involved from the beginning of the decision cycle\textsuperscript{12} of plan, execute, monitor, and assess to ensure that the plan is measurable.

b. Operations assessment staff are an integral part of the JOPG and support the planning in the different syndicates. The syndicate developing the operational framework must contain operations assessment expertise. The operational framework consists of operational objectives nested within the MSOs, related operational effects and DCs. The operational design\textsuperscript{13} is the key reference for the plan and operations assessment process, and thus forms the basis for the development of the operations assessment annex.

c. In order to achieve an overall coherent operations assessment plan, the operations assessment development must be conducted as a top down approach throughout all levels of command. Consequently, the operations assessment products at strategic level, especially the strategic objectives and effects, and the strategic operations assessment design must be taken into consideration at the operational level.

d. Both the planning process and the development of operations assessment products are interdependent. They both must be derived from the operational design. It should be a key goal of the operations assessment staff to develop the operations assessment annex in parallel whilst the JOPG finalises the rest of the OPLAN.

e. When the main body of the operational OPLAN is drafted, the operations assessment annex must be developed using the expertise of all JOPG areas. The development of MOEs can be given to the relevant SME or subordinate command to ensure maximum validity and coherence. The interdisciplinary development of the operations assessment annex will ensure that the plan is measurable in execution and discrepancies between the plan and reality can be discovered and recommendations for plan adjustment identified.

\textsuperscript{12} See AJP-01(D) paragraph 0524.

\textsuperscript{13} The Operational Design is the fusion of the operational framework and the Commander’s initial intent. See Chapter 4 paragraph 4-27 c.
f. During execution, periodic meetings of the AWG ensure that the plan is on the correct track or identify potential plan adjustments for submission to the Commander. The AWG must have an interdisciplinary make-up in order to maintain coherence.

g. Beyond the AWG, interactions with J2/KD provide key data and analysis for the operations assessment staff. In turn, the operations assessment staff provides feedback to systems analysis and KD to help ensure a common perspective.

h. The AWG will provide the appropriate data for the Assessment Board briefing to the Commander. The Assessment Board is the formal forum to seek Commander’s endorsement of the operations assessment provided. The Assessment Board should culminate in a recommendation to the Commander. The resulting Commander’s decision and direction, normally during the Joint Coordination Board, may initiate staff actions and plan adjustments (e.g. FRAGO, Joint Coordination Order, development of branches and sequels, plan review) and adjustments of the operations assessment annex if required.

5-12. Summary – Operations Assessment at the Operational and Component Levels.

a. It is essential to recognize that operations assessments at all levels are not isolated, but need to be considered in a holistic way in order to understand the whole theatre of operations and beyond. Care must be taken to ensure that operations assessment is not done simply to satisfy itself. Operations assessment is done to monitor and validate the plan during execution and can be a significant part of the decision-making process. Without operations assessment, decision makers will find it more difficult to get the appropriate feedback (plan-execute-monitor-assess).

b. The operational level is the pivotal point in the overall coherent NATO operations assessment process, as it acts as the interface between the strategic/political requirements and component operations.

c. A common understanding of operations assessment requirements and procedures throughout all levels of command is to be achieved and continuously maintained via appropriate operations assessment, information exchange, meetings and exercises. Operations assessment is a HQ responsibility.

5-13. Interrelations between Levels of Command.

a. **NATO Headquarters and SHAPE: TBD.**

b. **SHAPE and Operational Headquarters.** The strategic level initiates the overall operations assessment process as a top-down approach and gives guidance to the operational level regarding structure of the plan and reporting procedures. The operational level, as the pivotal point in the overall coherent NATO operations assessment process, requires that guidance from the strategic level in order to ensure consistency. Clear reporting guidance from the Strategic Command supports the operational commander’s reporting requirements. In order to maximise collaborative work, strategic and operational levels must ensure that their planning and operations assessment staff are fully integrated.
c. **JHQ and Component Commands:** During planning, liaison or planning, experts of the component commands support the JOPG and ensure the synchronisation of planning efforts between the levels of command. The operational design and the operations assessment annex will be the leading references for component level planning and operations assessment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Military Considerations</th>
<th>Non-Military Considerations</th>
<th>Audience / Users</th>
<th>Geography</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>- Creation of the effects and objectives in strategic OPLAN, which contribute to achievement of NATO end state</td>
<td>- Achievement in political, economic, civil, social domains in theatre, as they relate to the achievement of NATO’s aims.</td>
<td>SACEUR / SHAPE</td>
<td>International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Progress of overall mission and status strategic military assets</td>
<td>- Achievements of key non-military national government, international, and non-governmental organisations, in theatre, as they relate to the achievement of NATO’s aims.</td>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>Regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Capture of overall operations assessments from operational levels</td>
<td>- Tracking of international organisation’s monitoring and evaluation in region (e.g. United Nations reports, World Bank, IMF, OSCE)</td>
<td>NATO Nations’ Defence Ministries</td>
<td>Joint Operation Area (JOA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Engagement of internationally recognised subject-matter experts on region</td>
<td>- Monitoring of key international conditions and situations that may impact upon strategic military mission (e.g. international trade embargos, world oil prices, international public opinion)</td>
<td>Operational Level Commander</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>- Creation of the effects, establishment of decisive conditions, and achievement of objectives in operational OPLAN</td>
<td>- Measurement of key conditions and situations in non-military domains that impact on the operational military mission</td>
<td>Host Nation Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Capture of operations assessments from subordinate level</td>
<td>- Achievements of non-military organisations whose goals are specified in the military plan (either through collaborative planning or through estimation)</td>
<td>IO/NGO HQs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Coordination of overall data collection effort</td>
<td></td>
<td>International Media</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Hiring of external contractors required to support data collection / polling etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Regional</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component</td>
<td>- Establishment of decisive conditions as appropriate</td>
<td></td>
<td>JOA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Achievement of tasks / component objectives / mission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Data collection for the component / operational level operations assessments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.2 - Operations Assessment - Focus and Responsibilities
5-14. Operations Assessment Design and Support to Planning

a. The strategic operations assessment design and the operational OPLAN operations assessment annex describe the means by which one assesses the plan and/or the chosen aspects of the engagement space. Development of the operations assessment design/annex (as applicable) must take place during initial planning. As with the rest of the plan, the operations assessment design/annex will need continuous revision throughout the course of an operation.

b. The first stage of operations assessment is supporting the development of plans to ensure that the plan is measurable. Within the planning process, there is an explicit link between formulating desired future system state changes (end state, objectives, effects and conditions) and selecting metrics to measure actual systems states at a particular point in time. Appropriate metrics may be qualitative or quantitative, subjective or objective, as long as it is possible to define them in sufficient detail that operations assessments are produced consistently over time. There are two types of measurement in operations assessment: measurement of results (change in system state), which uses MOE, and measurement of activity (action accomplishment), which uses MOP.

c. **Measurement of Results:** While the planning staff is responsible for writing the desired objectives, DCs and effects, they must work in conjunction with the operations assessment staff, who will draft the associated MOEs. The process of drafting MOEs ensures that: a) where possible, progress toward those system states can actually be measured; and b) the meaning of the system state is unambiguous. This interactive process may require modification of currently drafted system states; extreme cases may require drafting completely new effects, DCs or objectives.

d. Monitoring an MOE over time determines whether or not results are being achieved, as defined in the plan. If there are elements within the plan developed to support other involved non-NATO entities, these items must be considered as well. In addition monitoring an MOE determines the likelihood of important strategic and operational risks occurring.

e. **Measurement of Activity:** This type of operations assessment measures activity of importance in the engagement space, whether of NATO forces or other actors, using MOP.


a. A Measure of Effectiveness is defined as a ‘metric used to measure a current system state’. The MOE will help answer the question “Are we on track to achieve the intended new system state within the planned timescale?” This may require multiple MOE per intended system state to fully capture the changes. MOE must be repeatedly measured over time to determine changes in system states, and it is the trends that result from these repeated measurements that allow the determination of progress (or lack of) in an operation.

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14 Note with the NATO mission command philosophy, while there is normally room for some discussion, objectives are given from the higher level to the lower level with the assignment of the ‘mission’.
b. A MOE must:
   (1) Describe one system element or relationship of interest.
   (2) Be observable, such that it is measurable consistently over time.
   (3) Describe how the element is expected to change.
   (4) Be as specific as possible (ensure you are measuring only and exactly what you want).
   (5) Be sensitive to change in a period of time meaningful to the operation.
   (6) Be culturally and locally relevant.
   (7) Have an associated acceptable condition.

c. Additionally, a MOE should:
   (1) Be reducible to a quantity (as a number, percentage, etc.).
   (2) Be objective.
   (3) Be defined in sufficient detail that measurements are produced consistently over time.
   (4) Be cost-effective and not burdensome to the data collectors.
   (5) Have an associated rate of change.

d. The setting of explicit targets for each metric to judge the achievement of results is done through the use of four mechanisms:
   (1) Acceptable Condition (AC): A target level for the metric at which a desirable situation has been achieved.
   (2) Rate of Change (RoC): A rate of change is the amount of change in a metric over a specific time during an operation.
   (3) Threshold of Success (ToS): A tipping point at which a positive level of achievement becomes unstoppable and most likely irreversible.
   (4) Threshold of Failure (ToF): A tipping point at which an unrecoverable situation is reached.

e. Conditions, Rates and Thresholds may change throughout the phases of the operation, and must be meaningful in the context of the operation, accounting for appropriate regional or international standards. However, the Commander must approve any change of values.
5-16. Developing MOE.

a. Examples of MOE may be found in the NOAH. Some considerations for the operations assessment staff during MOE development include:

(1) While supporting planners in drafting end state, objectives, DCs or effects, ensure that they can be measured and that their description is written in a manner that can be measured.

(2) Participate in the operations planning group at their level to ensure changes in the system state that are defined in the plan are accompanied by appropriate, workable MOE.

(3) Consider data sources for proposed MOE – even if the element can be measured, failure to collect the required data will make it impossible to assess if it has been created (i.e. an effect), established (i.e. a DC) or achieved (i.e. an objective), as applicable. Whenever feasible, plan to use multiple independent data sources to guarantee availability of data and to improve the reliability of the operations assessment.

(4) Selection of MOE will require significant input from KD or related systems analysis functions. This input provides deeper insight to ensure that the chosen MOE is actually related to the system element in question.

(5) The relevance and importance of individual MOEs will vary with the phase of the operation and should both respond to, and inform Commander’s priorities and decision-making.

(6) To avoid the trap of assuming causality\(^\text{15}\), different MOE are required for each level in the operational design hierarchy (e.g. effects, objectives, etc), which need to be measured independently.

b. Effects that are undesired may be identified during the planning process. Undesired effects are those that disrupt or jeopardise the achievement of objectives; these can include possible negative or detrimental consequences of own-force actions identified in the plan. If plan modifications cannot avoid these undesired effects, they should be incorporated in the plan by defining the opposite of the undesired consequence and re-writing them as desired effects and developing appropriate MOE.

(1) For example: consider an undesired effect identified as “Due to the perceived hostile presence of own force, local militia activity increases.” This may be included in the plan as “Local militia activity remains low” or “Own force not perceived as hostile.”

(2) There may be undesired effects that may not be easily transformed into desired effects, or where doing so may disrupt the construct of the plan. In this case, MOE must still be scripted for the undesired effects. This ensures data

\(^{15}\) See Para 5-19 – Causality; A Cautionary Note.
collection requirements are identified and the system is monitored for undesired changes.

c. The operations assessment staff may also be called upon to monitor important strategic and operational risks. These are undesired events or situations that may arise independent of the actions of own forces – i.e. the presence or activities of own forces do not affect whether or not these eventualities arise. MOE that monitor for the emergence of strategic and operational risks may be formulated in the same manner as MOE for other changes in system state and included in the data collection matrix.

5-17. Measures of Performance.

a. Once the hierarchy of end state, objectives, DCs and effects have been approved by the Commander, the planning staff begins development of the actions necessary to achieve those system states and must remain involved in crafting the required MOP. However, the key consideration here is ensuring that the MOPs are directly tied to the action – not to the other elements of the plan.

b. The MOP allows the measurement of activity, intending to answer “Are the actions being executed as planned?” If, during execution, progress towards the creation of desired effects is not made as expected, one possibility is that actions are not being carried out as planned.

c. A MOP is defined as a “metric used to determine the accomplishment of actions” – usually referring to own force actions. Each level (e.g. operational and subordinate levels) will normally develop MOP for the actions they will execute. Each MOP must:

1. Align to one or more (own-force) actions.
2. Describe the element that must be observed to measure the progress or status of the action.
3. Be observable, such that it is measurable consistently over time.
4. Describe how the action is expected to be executed.
5. Be as specific as possible (ensure you are measuring only and exactly what you want).
6. Be sensitive to change in a period of time meaningful to the operation.
7. Have a known deterministic relationship to the action.
8. Have an associated AC.
d. Additionally, an MOP should:
   (1) Be reducible to a quantity (as a number, percentage, etc.).
   (2) Be objective.
   (3) Be defined in sufficient detail that measurements are produced consistently over time.
   (4) Be cost-effective and not burdensome to the data collector.
   (5) Have an associated RoC.

e. It is important to note the key difference between MOE and MOP: The MOP measures the status of own-force actions, but does not measure the changes that result from those actions. Results of actions, or changes to the system, are measured by monitoring MOE. In essence, you have direct control over items measured by the MOP, but no direct control over items measured by an MOE. An alternative point of view is that MOP are used to measure the amount of effort being input into a situation, while MOE are used to measure the outcome or impact by looking for the changes that result.

f. As with MOE, the ToS and failure that indicate the level of achievement of the related action must be included. In general, it is appropriate to shift thresholds or to have planned for different thresholds as phases of the operation change; however, the Commander must approve any change of threshold values.

g. Again, as with MOE, RoCs can be used to demonstrate the level and RoC of activity that is envisioned within the plan to be undertaken by own forces. Examples of MOP may be found in the NOAH.

5-18. Developing Data Collection Plan.

a. Once the MOE have been established, the operations assessment staff (with input from the planning staff) is responsible for indicating the methods of data collection and the sources of data in order to monitor the status of each MOE. The majority of MOP data will probably be organic – it will be generated, captured, and reported by units within the command structure, while some might be reported by external non-military organisations.

b. This process would likely be coordinated by the operations assessment staff using a data collection matrix that should indicate for each MOE or MOP:
   (1) The type of data (including units of measurement).
   (2) The source of data.
   (3) The method of collection.
   (4) The party responsible for its collection.
(5) The format in which it should be recorded.

(6) The required frequency of recording (including start and end times).

(7) The frequency of reporting.

(8) Any other necessary information.

c. The creation of the data collection matrix will clarify the ‘measurability’ of the selected MOE and MOP – forcing further revision of the metrics should it be identified that some are either un-measurable, or that the effort required to capture the data outweighs the benefit of measuring.

d. When drafting the plan and creating orders, the planning staff will include the data collection requirements specified by the operations assessment staff. In the case where the resources required to collect the data are significant, the planning staff must create separate actions and MOP that reflect this task. Also, care should be taken regarding the resource allocation cost/benefit required for data collection. Once the Assessment Plan is written, and prior to commencement of the operation, all levels of command must start data collection and analysis.

e. In general, collection of data for MOP should commence when the action(s) start, and stop after the Action is assessed as complete.

f. Collection of data for MOE will be more situation dependant. In some circumstances reporting of progress towards effects not yet scheduled may yield erroneous results. In other circumstances it may be appropriate to collect data for MOE in order to establish a baseline, which once started should be a continuous process to monitor changes in the system prior to execution. The compilation of data will establish the baseline, which is the capture of current system state(s) just prior to any attempt by own forces to modify the system. This will by definition include evaluation of effects prior to execution of any own actions.

5-19. Causality; A Cautionary Note.

a. Operations assessment is about measuring execution of implemented military actions and the effectiveness – or results – of those actions. By carefully designing metrics to allow activity (MOP) and results (MOE) to be measured, and then collecting data, operations assessment staff will compare the completion of actions with the level of achievement of results.

b. It may be tempting or seem appropriate to assume that when all associated actions are complete, the effect must be created; or when all effects are created, the objective is achieved; or when all objectives are achieved, the end-state must therefore also be achieved. Completion of all assigned actions may not lead to creation of the desired effect for many reasons: unknown or unaccounted for actors in the theatre; an unknown linkage with a different system causing an adverse (unwanted) impact; or perhaps not all required actions were identified in the original plan.
c. In general, avoid the temptation to assume causality.\textsuperscript{16} Rather than trying to identify and demonstrate how changes in the environment can be “attributed” to particular actions (implying causal relations), it may be more constructive to talk about how activities might or might not have contributed to the creation of effects or the achievement of objectives.

d. The use of words like “correlation” and “contribution” are much more in line with the realities of what can be accomplished by planning and operations assessment staffs. Current thinking in academia on statistical theory and assessment of complex programs is of the view that causality is extremely challenging to infer, in all but the simplest of cases\textsuperscript{17}.

\textsuperscript{16} Adapted from “Assessing Progress in Military Operations: Recommendations for Improvement”, produced by United States Joint Forces Command for Multinational Experiment 6. (Version 0.5, 24 Jul 09).

Allied Command Operations
Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive
Interim V2.0
(Chapter 6 – Formats and Administration)

04 October 2013
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CHAPTER 6
FORMATS

6-1. Introduction.

a. A standard format for planning documents will ensure that all important aspects connected with the conduct of military operations are considered in a familiar uniform pattern and that adequate background material is provided for expeditious decisions to be taken. Planning documents should adhere to the instructions contained in ACO Directives AD 35-4, Preparation of Documents, and AD 70-1, Allied Command Operations (ACO) Security Directive. Unless directed otherwise by HQ NATO, Operation Plans (OPLANs) are to adhere to the formatting guidelines of this directive.

6-2. Physical Elements.

a. Planning documents (e.g. Concept of Operations (CONOPS)/OPLAN) should consist of the following elements:

(1) Document Cover.
(2) Letter of Promulgation.
(3) Table of Contents / List of Effective Pages.
(4) Record of Changes.
(5) Main Body.
(6) Annexes, to include Appendices, Tabs and Enclosures, as applicable.

6-3. Document Cover.

a. Covers must conform to the following colour scheme that is used to identify the security classification of the material covered:

(1) **Red**: COSMIC TOP SECRET (CTS) material.
(2) **Blue**: NATO SECRET (NS) material.
(3) **Green**: NATO CONFIDENTIAL (NC) material.
(4) **Yellow**: NATO RESTRICTED (NR) material.
(5) **White**: NATO UNCLASSIFIED (NU) material.

b. The formats for the document covers are provided in Annex E.
6-4. **Letter of Promulgation.**

a. Planning documents will be forwarded with a "Letter of Promulgation" (see Annex F for format), which should include the following as applicable:

   1. Key references (e.g. NAC Initiating Directive, higher level related OPLAN, CONOPS, Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD)).
   2. Purpose of document.
   3. Conditions under which the document is effective (e.g. "effective for planning purposes", "for exercises", on concurrence of the approving commander or appropriate authorities).
   4. Date of approval (and reference) of the approving authority.
   5. Document’s effective date ("upon receipt" is not to be used).
   6. Further planning and implementation instructions.
   7. Peacetime practice instructions (if required).
   8. Request for comments from Nations and NATO commanders.
   9. Request for approval by the approving authority.
   10. Plan Synopsis Paragraphs (if required):
       a. Extract of situation.
       b. Commander’s mission.
       c. Extract of commander’s concept of operation.

b. "Major Changes" to documents must be issued with a letter of promulgation. Editorial changes and other non substantive amendments are issued under cover of a military letter.

c. The letter of promulgation is the first page(s) after the document cover.

d. Each page of the letter of promulgation will be numbered "i", "ii", "iii", etc. The total number of pages of the attached document must be specified (see format) and includes all pages less the document cover and card stock separators inserted to facilitate the use of the plan.

e. In situations of urgency, planning documents and substantive amendments thereto may be promulgated by message action. This procedure will follow the procedure prescribed above as closely as circumstances permit.
6-5. **Table of Contents / List of Effective Pages.**

a. A list of effective pages is mandatory for documents classified NATO SECRET and above. However, the list of effective pages may be combined with the table of contents, provided it includes the effective page count (start and end page numbers).

6-6. **Record of Changes.**

a. A sample format for record of changes is at Annex G. Superseded letters of promulgation and letters promulgating minor changes constitute the historical record of the document development and review, and are to be recorded at the bottom of the record of changes.

6-7. **Operations Planning Documents.**

a. **Concept of Operations / Operation Plan Main Body.**

(1) The format of the CONOPS/OPLAN main body listed in COPD annexes B (strategic level) and D (operational level) follows the same structure and should be honoured where possible. Additional paragraphs and sub-paragraphs, as well as changes to sub-paragraphs are permitted to meet the needs of the particular situation.

(2) A CONOPS/OPLAN main body will be accompanied with appropriate annexes/appendices as mandated or appropriate, as described in COPD Annex C.

   (a) A list of annexes will be placed at the end of the main body.

   (b) Annex / appendix numbering will follow the list of annexes / appendices provided in Annex C.

   (c) Where possible annexes and appendices should conform to the basic six-paragraph OPLAN format as outlined in Annex B (strategic level) and Annex D (operational level). Where the basic six-paragraph format is inappropriate, different paragraphs may be used to meet the needs to the particular situation.

   (d) Under certain circumstances annexes may be published separately; however, the main document should indicate how the annex is published.

b. **Advance Plans.** The CONOPS/OPLAN formats described above can also be used as the basis for the production of advance plans (e.g. Standing Defence Plan (SDP), contingency plan (CONPLAN), generic CONPLAN).

c. **Other Operations Planning Documents.** The formats for other operations planning documents, such as Warning Orders, SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment, Military Response Options, Planning Directives, etc, can be found in Annex B (strategic level) or Annex D (operational level).
6-8. **Functional Planning Guides.**
   a. The format of Functional Planning Guides is discussed in Annex H.

6-9. **Consultation, Approval, Promulgation and Activation Procedures.**
   a. Consultation, approval, promulgation and activation procedures are described in Annex I.

6-10. **Review, Revision and Cancelation Procedures.**
   a. Procedures for periodic review, revision, and cancelation of plans and operations planning documents are described in Annex J.

6-11. **Plans Identifications and Nicknames.**
   a. Details in Annex K.
WRITING OBJECTIVES, EFFECTS AND DECISIVE CONDITIONS

1. Introduction.

   a. Operations planning involves the production of plans at various levels in a collaborative manner and often under extreme time pressure. Commanders at each level work with their staffs to develop a plan to explain the 'way' they will reach the 'ends' assigned by the level above, and what resources they require. The planning processes used at each level are facilitated by a common language to help express a commander's vision and intent to their staff and the levels above and below. To further facilitate this communication, this annex presents a standard approach for writing objectives, decisive conditions (DCs) and effects. While the use of alternate methods is possible, it is important that the meaning of what is written is clear between the commander and his entire staff, and that this meaning is apparent to or can be explained to others.

2. Objectives.

   a. In operations planning, an objective is defined as, 'an objective is defined as, “a clearly defined and attainable goal to be achieved.”' Focused at the level for which they are written, each objective:

      (1) Is a brief statement that clearly defines a single, attainable goal or 'end' to be achieved, without prescribing the way or means.

      (2) Contributes to the achievement of the NATO end state.

      (3) Is written as something to be achieved (ideally in the present tense).

   b. In NATO, with mission command, military objectives are normally included in the mission statement of the responsible command (i.e. strategic-military level or operational level) given by the level above (i.e. North Atlantic Council (NAC) for the strategic-military level (Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR))).

   c. The responsible command normally has input into their objectives before they are promulgated by the level above (e.g. SACEUR provides possible military strategic objectives (MSOs) with each military response option, and is normally represented, at least informally, in the drafting of a NAC Initiating Directive). Operational objectives when issued in the Strategic Planning Directive are considered provisional; following mission analysis an operational commander can propose changes to SACEUR for consideration and approval.

   d. MSOs should be focused at the strategic level and thus will generally be broader and fewer in number than operational objectives. Operational objectives are written to describe operational-level ends in support of strategic ends; with an eye on the NATO end state and political-military guidance, operational objectives are derived from the MSOs and Military Strategic Effects.

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1 Strategic objectives promulgated in a NID, as per the MC133/4 illustrative NID format, are categorised as either military objectives (for which SACEUR is responsible) and non-military objectives.
e. An example:

(1) NATO End State. A secure and stable environment in Country Y.

(2) Military Strategic Objectives.
   
   (a) Secure environment in Southern Areas of Country Y.
   
   (b) Improved Humanitarian Situation.
   
   (c) Improved Regional Stability.

(3) Military Strategic Effects.
   
   (a) Territorial Integrity in Southern Country Y is preserved.
   
   (b) Freedom of Movement through land lines of communication (LOC) is ensured in southern Country Y.
   
   (c) Country Y Armed Forces are capable to provide internal security.
   
   (d) The flow of humanitarian aid to IDP and refugee camps is not impeded by armed groups.
   
   (e) Potential for intervention by Country X is reduced.
   
   (f) Illegal arms entering Country Y is reduced.

(4) Operational Objectives.

   (a) A secure environment in Southern Country Y, including preservation of territorial integrity and freedom of movement along main land lines of communication.

   (b) Unimpeded flow of Humanitarian Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons and Refugee camps.

   (c) Country Y Armed Forces capable to provide internal security.

   (d) Country X deterred from intervening in Country Y.

   (e) Reduction of Illegal arms entering Country Y via main border crossing points.

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2 For an explanation on how to write effects see paragraph 4 below.
3. **Decisive Conditions.**

   a. In operations planning when we refer to a ‘condition’ generally we are referring to a physical or behavioural state of a system\(^3\) or system element. We think of conditions as being acceptable or non-acceptable. We also think of them in terms of time – a current condition and the same system or system element at some future state.

   b. At the operational level, one of the concepts (as described in AJP-5\(^4\)) used in operational design is the DC. A DC is defined as, ‘[a] combination of circumstances, effects, or a specific key event, critical factor, or function that when achieved allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an opponent or contribute materially to achieving an operational objective.’

   c. The current definition of a DC is broad; thus, what we choose to describe as being ‘achieved’ will vary as could the manner we choose to describe it. One way to approach writing DCs is to think of them as the desired condition(s) (or state) of a system or system element that we wish to exist at some point in the future, which we believe will be ‘decisive’ to the achievement of one or more of the operational objectives. In planning, we would express these desired ‘decisive’ conditions using the present tense - as we would wish to see them at that future time - to show that they are something to be established or achieved.

   d. Examples.

      (1) Air Superiority in the Joint Operations Area (JOA).

      (2) Sea control in the Olive Strait and the Purple Sea.

      (3) Secure Land LOC.

      (4) Operational Airports of Debarkation (APODs)/Seaports of Debarkation (SPODs).

4. **Effects.**

   a. An effect is defined as, ‘[a] change in the state of a system (or system element), that results from one or more actions, or other causes.’ Derived from objectives, effects bridge the gap between objectives and actions by describing what changes in a system are required.

   b. An effect statement must:

      (1) Support achievement of the NATO end-state and higher level objectives (in other words, each level should avoid the creation of effects that would be counter to higher level goals).

      (2) Support achievement of one or more objectives for the level for which they

---

\(^3\) System - A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements forming a unified whole.

\(^4\) AJP-5 ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational-Level Planning’.
are written.

(3) Express one idea in simple language, without adverbs.

(4) Identify who or what must be affected or changed (e.g. what system elements and/or relationships in the system need to change) and the desired resultant state. It must be clear how the system state described by the effect differs from the system state that precedes it.

(5) Not suggest ways, solutions or means, or infer causality. The effect does not describe who will act to make the desired change, the means to be used or if those means will be lethal or non-lethal.

(6) Be measurable and achievable. Changes in behaviour or system attributes must be able to be observed. Effects should also avoid being overly simplistic, idealistic or optimistic.

Effect statements also may include position and importance in time and space, including when creation of the effect must start and the required duration.

c. The effects expressed in a plan are ‘desired effects’\(^5\). During the planning process, specifically during war-gaming, undesired effects\(^6\) may be identified. These may be either deliberate effects caused by opposing forces, or possible negative or detrimental consequences of own force actions. If plan modifications cannot avoid these undesired effects, they should be incorporated into the plan by defining the opposite of the undesired consequence, thus re-writing them as desired effects.

d. Writing effects. Effect statements can be written in two ways:

(1) Using the present tense to describe the new state of a system or system element as we wish to see it after it has been changed. Examples:

(a) Main roads secure.

(b) Only authorised flight activity occurs within JOA.

(c) Country X security forces capable of independent operations.

(2) Using the passive voice, with the verb ‘to be’ and the part participle of a verb. Examples:

(a) Main roads are secured.

(b) Unauthorised flight activity is prevented.

(c) Movements of Humanitarian Assistance convoys are unhindered.

(d) Essential Country Y Government services are restored.

\(^5\) Desired effects are those that have a positive impact on the achievement of the objectives.

\(^6\) Undesired effects are those that disrupt or jeopardize the achievement of objectives.
(e) Country Z attacks on main supply routes in Country XX are reduced.

(f) Incursion by Country YY aircraft is denied.

(g) Shipments of prohibited arms and material into Country ZZ by sea are interdicted.

In most cases, the same ‘effect’ can be expressed with both approaches explained above (such as examples (a) and (b) in each case). At the operational level, where the DC is used, the second approach is recommended so as not to cause confusion between effects and DCs. In addition, ideally the same approach should be consistently applied throughout a given document.
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STRATEGIC PLANNING TEMPLATES

1. This Annex provides standard templates\(^1\) in Appendices 1 through 5 that provide common standards and formats for the preparation of the following documents\(^2\):
   
   a. Appendix 1 - Strategic Warning Order.
   b. Appendix 2 - SACEUR's Strategic Assessment.
   c. Appendix 3 - Military Response Options.
   d. Appendix 4 - Strategic Planning Directive.
   e. Appendix 5 - Strategic CONOPS/OPLAN main body\(^3\).

   (1) The annexes that may be included with the strategic CONOPS/OPLAN are presented in Annex C to the COPD.

2. While these templates should be used as depicted, their layout and content can be adjusted if required.

---

\(^1\) While these templates carry a NATO Unclassified classification, the documents for a particular crisis will be classified as appropriate.

\(^2\) Refer to ACO Directive 35-4 ‘Preparation of Documents’ and SHAPE Grammar Mama for further details on formatting.

\(^3\) The format of the strategic CONOPS/OPLAN main body was determined with reference to the illustrative template provided in MC133/4 Annex B.
Appendix 1 to Annex B – Strategic Warning Order

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS
EUROPE

GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES
EN EUROPE

B-7010 SHAPE, BELGIUM

Our ref: insert file ref # - insert tasker #
Tel: +32-(0)65-44-7111 (Operator)
Tel: +32-(0)65-44 + ext
NCN: 254 + ext
Fax: +32-(0)65-44-3545 (Registry)

Date: Month Year

TO:

SUBJECT: WARNING ORDER FOR …

REFERENCES:

1. Background. The situation on/in … is deteriorating and calls for … The UN Security Council assesses that … As a consequence, the UN Secretary General (UNSG) has requested NATO to consider …, acting under …of the UN Charter. In light of the NAC assessment at Reference XX … the IMS issued guidance at Reference YY … requesting SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment (SSA).

2. Operational/Joint Headquarters. I intend to designate JHQ … as the operational/joint planning HQ for this potential crisis. COM JHQ …… is to:

   a. Provide operational advice on potential military response options to be developed at SHAPE, including…

      (1) Recommendations on measures focussing on a deterrence and prevention posture, in particular in the field of military presence, surveillance and intelligence gathering.

      (2) Recommendations on the necessity and feasibility to conduct other operations, taking into account the availability of NATO and non-NATO forces, and the preparatory planning activities necessary for their conduct.

B-1-1

NATO UNCLASSIFIED
Identification and advice of those non-NATO entities with which NATO-led forces will need to interact.

b. Provide an updated assessment daily. This should include advice on readiness for forces, including OLRT.

c. Provide a liaison officer to SHAPE CCOMC (RDG) by E+1.

d. Be prepared to coordinate with EADRCC.

3. Supporting Commands. The following commands are to support COM JHQ as described:

a. ...

b. ...

4. Crisis Response Measures. CRM … are herewith declared.

5. SACEUR Strategic Assessment. The SSA is due to the MC by ...

---

4 At this early stage roles and responsibilities for supporting commands to support JHQ planning may not yet be fully developed, and may need their guidance on the support required. Further detail can be provided later in the Strategic Planning Directive. Supporting relationships could come from one of the HQ JFCs, any of the Single Service Commands, NATO Communications and Information Systems Group (NCISG), or other structures and capabilities as described in the Conceptual Framework for Alliance Operations (CFAO), such as NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ).
Appendix 2 to Annex B – SACEUR’S Strategic Assessment

REFERENCES:

1. Strategic Situation.
   a. Background. In Reference A, SHAPE was requested to provide a strategic assessment of the situation …
   b. Strategic Appreciation of the Crisis. This section should provide a brief synopsis of the crisis, including: its nature, scale and scope, main aspects, causes and symptoms (e.g. humanitarian issues, international law, and instability).

   (1) Potential Threats and Risks. The major threats and risks to international interests and the potential consequences of not taking action or taking action, i.e. ethnic violence, regional instability, or interruption to LOC/energy. Potential for collateral damage to civilians, infrastructure and cultural sites.

   (2) Urgency. The most urgent aspects of the crisis are:

      (a) Immediate risk. Risk to DPRE/military intervention/interruption to energy supplies…. 

      (b) Increased risk…. 

   c. Key Factors. The key PMESII (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information) and other significant factors influencing the crisis and the interaction of the main actors (i.e. METOC and geospatial):

      (1) Factor…. 

---

5 The format for a SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment (SSA) may be adjusted for the situation. The overall intent is that it be a succinct document providing relevant military advice for the particular crisis/issue. The SSA would be forwarded as an enclosure to a short cover letter highlighting the major points from a SACEUR point of view.

6 See Chapter 3 paragraph 3-10 c and Figure 3.4 (Factor-Deduction-Conclusion Table). Key factors are those that define the problem and which must ultimately be addresses when resolving it. While PMESII is a way to deduce key factors, its use here is not to imply that key factors for a given crisis exist in each of the PMESII domains.
(2) ....

d. **Principal Actors.** The principal actors (including state and non-state actors) shaping events in the region are: ... The assessed strategic centre of gravity is.... The information for this paragraph should be derived from analysis described in Chapter 3 paragraph 3-11. It should be succinct, providing only a synopsis of the most important aspects of the principal actors. Additional detail, if required to be included in the SSA, can be placed in an Annex to the SSA.

(1) Actor 1. Role, strategic goals and objectives, primary power, key relationships, dependencies, vulnerabilities, centre of gravity, etc.

(2) Actor 2.

(3) Actor 3.

(4)

2. **Appreciation of International Interests and Engagement in the Crisis.**

a. **International Legal Aspects.** What, when and summary.

(1) International Agreements.

(2) United Nations Mandates.


(4) United Nations and other international conventions.

b. **International Interests and Objectives.** This paragraph should set out a summary of the most likely common aim and objectives of the international community. It can also set out the interests and/or objectives of principal international organizations (if overly detailed, but considered necessary for inclusion with the SSA, this can be in an Annex to the SSA). UN Security Council resolutions clearly set out the intentions of the Security Council and mandates to achieve ... Safe access, halt violations of international law, end, protect, etc.

(1) UN.

(2) Other international organisations ...

c. **International Commitments.** Based on current commitments, international contributions to resolve the crisis likely will be: political/diplomatic, humanitarian, military (NATO), neighbouring nations. This can also describe possible areas for interaction and/or cooperation between NATO and other non-NATO entities that may be operating in the crisis area.

d. **Information Environment.** Overall succinct appreciation of the information environment within the theatre and in the international community related to the theatre
(if overly detailed, but considered necessary for inclusion with the SSA, this can be a synopsis with the details in an Annex to the SSA), including:

(1) Audiences. Cover potential target audiences in broad terms, using additional sub-paragraphs as needed for clarity, such as those listed:

(a) Alliance Audiences.

(b) International Community Audiences.

(c) Local Audiences.

(2) StratCom Considerations. Any details that may inform the subsequent development of StratCom requirements for NATO.

e. Media and Public Affairs Environment. A succinct summary of the important aspects of the media and public affairs environment (if overly detailed, but considered necessary for inclusion with the SSA, this can be a synopsis with the details in an Annex to the SSA). Critical media-related Infrastructure in the Area of interest, general attitudes and trends in the media, and local audience accessibility are:

(1) International Media.

(2) Regional and local Media in potential JOA.

(3) NATO nations internal media (contentious issues only).

3. Potential NATO Interests.

a. NATO Political Context. The declaration of the NATO heads of state and government ....

(1) ....

b. Political Limitations. Includes those limitations (restraints\(^7\) or constraints\(^8\)) placed on SACEUR by the NAC.

c. Assumptions\(^9\). The UN will provide the mandate, terrorist groups will, involvement by sympathetic nations cannot be ruled out, etc....

d. Desired NATO End State. A region that is ...., with the following specific conditions:

(1) ....

---

\(^7\) Restraint - a requirement placed on a commander that prohibits an action.

\(^8\) Constraint - a requirement placed on a commander that dictates an action.

\(^9\) Assumption - In planning, a supposition made about the current situation and/or the future course of events to complete an estimate of the situation and decide on the course of action. (AAP-06).
e. **NATO Strategic Objectives**\(^{10}\). Achieving the desired NATO end state would be supported by the following strategic objectives:

(1) ....

f. **Desired Strategic Effects.** In order for NATO to achieve these objectives, its actions, in concert with those of other cooperating organisations, must create the following effects.

4. **Military Considerations.** A succinct synopsis of military considerations to provide sufficient SACEUR advice to inform the NAC on the applicability of the use of the NATO military instrument to assist with the situation resolution, if they so decide. If the NAC decides that the Alliance should become involved in the crisis, the SSA and its military considerations should assist the NAC in providing the necessary direction (through a NAC Decision Sheet requesting options) for SACEUR to develop MROs. The military considerations for each situation will vary and may include some of the following:

a. **Applicability of the Military Instrument.** A succinct synopsis of the general applicability of the military instrument to assist in the resolution of the crisis, including implication from the use of force and an appreciation if other actors are available to assist within the security environment.

b. **Use of NATO Military Instrument.** The considerations on the application of the NATO military instrument of power to assist in resolution of the situation, including: necessity, suitability, availability and existing constraints (i.e. lack of suitable legal framework); this can include an appreciation on the possible use of the NRF, on the need for FTDM, the possible impact on other NATO operations, etc.

c. **Non-NATO Interaction Requirement.** To further develop an understanding of the crisis and, when requested, develop military options for possible NATO involvement, SHAPE and the ‘designated JHQ’ will require to interact with the following list of non-NATO actors (if needed this could be articulated in a table as an Annex to the SSA):

(1) Non-NATO actor #1.

(2) Non-NATO action #2.

---

\(^{10}\) MC133/4 – NATO Operations Planning outlines military, non-military and supporting objectives at the NATO strategic level, where supporting objectives may be military or non-military in nature but must be achieved within means and capabilities. At this stage however, any strategic objectives articulated may be more general in nature.
Appendix 3 to Annex B – Military Response Options

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS
EUROPE

GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES
EN EUROPE

B-7010 SHAPE, BELGIUM

Our ref: insert file ref # - insert tasker #
Date: Month Year

TO:

SUBJECT: MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS FOR ...

REFERENCES:

1. **Introduction.** Based on the references, this document provides possible military response options to address the given crisis. This paragraph should provide a brief explanation of the crisis (especially if there have been changes since the release of the NAC decision sheet requesting options) and the task received from the NAC.

2. **General.** This paragraph can be used to provide context for the MROs to be presented. If common to all MROs, it can provide a summary of such things as: desired NATO end state, NATO mission, NATO role, and NATO strategic objectives (if articulated as generic strategic objectives (i.e. not military and non-military specific)).

3. **Military Response Options.** Brief introduction of each option, which will be expanded in the Annex.

---

The format of the Military Response Options (MROs) cover letter is illustrative. It can be altered as required to suit the situation. In general, it should be a succinct description of the MROs, with enough detail on the main areas of interest/difference to lead the reader to the conclusion and recommendations.
4. **Military Response Option Comparison.** This paragraph should discuss the major aspects of comparison between the MROs, which led to the recommendation in the letter (derived from the analysis of Evaluation of Military Response Options Annex).

5. **Any Other Considerations.** This paragraph summarizes any other considerations relevant to the MROs presented or other issues of importance at this stage of planning, such as to introduce the Strategic Communication Strategy requirements (attached as an annex) or to highlight the need for further non-NATO interaction authorities.

6. **Recommendation.** SACEUR recommends Option X, based on …
   a. The military option that provides the best balance between probability for success, cost-effectiveness and acceptable risks.
   b. Most effective option in achieving NATO potential strategic objectives and desired end state against cost/risk etc. Likely costs compared with expected strategic benefits.
   c. Inherent advantages and disadvantages in creating the desired effects and achieving the strategic objectives in conjunction with other instruments.

7. **Points of Contact.**

   INSERT AUTHORITY LINE HERE, IF APPROPRIATE

---

**SIGNATURE BLOCK**

**ANNEXES:**
A. Potential Military Response Options\(^{12}\).
B. Evaluation of Military Response Options.
C. Strategic Communications Approach (if required).
D. Non-NATO Interaction Requirements (if required).

**DISTRIBUTION:**

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\(^{12}\) While the example shows all three options in one table for ease of comparison, a separate appendix for each option may also be used.
### Potential Military Response Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MRO 1 – NAME MRO 1</th>
<th>MRO 2 – NAME MRO 2</th>
<th>MRO 3 – NAME MRO 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>a. NATO End State</strong>&lt;sup&gt;13&lt;/sup&gt;:</td>
<td>a. NATO End State:</td>
<td>a. NATO End State:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. SACEUR’s Mission: SACEUR, in close cooperation with the cooperating organisations, conducts type of military operations in specified areas to create specific military strategic objectives to achieve NATO end state. Improve/maintain.</td>
<td>b. SACEUR’s Mission: Contain, improve</td>
<td>b. SACEUR’s Mission: Enforce…..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) … .</td>
<td>(1) … .</td>
<td>(1) … .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Complies with, cooperates with, resumes, stops, disarms, improves, increases, is deterred from….</td>
<td>(1) ….</td>
<td>(1) ….</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) … .</td>
<td>(2) ….</td>
<td>(2) ….</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Military Strategic Actions.</td>
<td>e. Military Strategic Actions.</td>
<td>e. Military Strategic Actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Conduct, provide, protect, be prepared to, establish, disarm, assist….</td>
<td>(1) ….</td>
<td>(1) ….</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>13</sup> This row can be deleted if the desired NATO end state is the same for all MROs. In addition, if provided and needed for clarity when considering MROs, the NATO mission statement (as suggested by the MC133/4 illustrative NID format (Annex D)) and/or non-military or ‘supporting’ objectives can be included in this table as needed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MRO 1 – NAME MRO 1</th>
<th>MRO 2 – NAME MRO 2</th>
<th>MRO 3 – NAME MRO 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Political (Diplomatic) incentives to influence...</td>
<td>(1) Political (Diplomatic) ....</td>
<td>(1) Political (Diplomatic) ....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Economic ....</td>
<td>(2) Economic ....</td>
<td>(2) Economic ....</td>
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<td>(3) Civil ....</td>
<td>(3) Civil ....</td>
<td>(3) Civil ....</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>g. Force Capability Requirements.</strong></td>
<td><strong>g. Force Capability Requirements.</strong></td>
<td><strong>g. Force Capability Requirements.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Maritime, ground forces, PSYOPS, CIMIC Logs etc...</td>
<td>(1) ....</td>
<td>(1) ....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) ....</td>
<td>(2) ....</td>
<td>(2) ....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Budget Requirements. <strong>Budget will be order of magnitude in a range of estimated costs.</strong></td>
<td>(3) Budget Requirements. <strong>Budget will be order of magnitude in a range of estimated costs.</strong></td>
<td>(3) Budget Requirements. <strong>Budget will be order of magnitude in a range of estimated costs.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Medical.</td>
<td>(4) Medical.</td>
<td>(4) Medical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) MILENG.</td>
<td>(5) MILENG.</td>
<td>(5) MILENG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>h. Resource Implications.</strong></td>
<td><strong>h. Resource Implications.</strong></td>
<td><strong>h. Resource Implications.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Strategic Lift.</td>
<td>(1) Strategic Lift.</td>
<td>(1) Strategic Lift.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Sustainment.</td>
<td>(2) Sustainment.</td>
<td>(2) Sustainment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Budget Requirements. <strong>Budget will be order of magnitude in a range of estimated costs.</strong></td>
<td>(3) Budget Requirements. <strong>Budget will be order of magnitude in a range of estimated costs.</strong></td>
<td>(3) Budget Requirements. <strong>Budget will be order of magnitude in a range of estimated costs.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Medical.</td>
<td>(4) Medical.</td>
<td>(4) Medical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) MILENG.</td>
<td>(5) MILENG.</td>
<td>(5) MILENG.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>i. Provisional Theatre and JOA.</strong></td>
<td><strong>i. Provisional Theatre and JOA.</strong></td>
<td><strong>i. Provisional Theatre and JOA.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) JOA.</td>
<td>(2) JOA.</td>
<td>(2) JOA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>j. Preliminary Command and Control Arrangements.</strong></td>
<td><strong>j. Preliminary Command and Control Arrangements.</strong></td>
<td><strong>j. Preliminary Command and Control Arrangements.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Designated JFC, CC’s etc....</td>
<td>(1) ....</td>
<td>(1) ....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) C2 Manpower reinforcement considerations.</td>
<td>(2) ....</td>
<td>(2) ....</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRO 1 – NAME MRO 1</td>
<td>MRO 2 – NAME MRO 2</td>
<td>MRO 3 – NAME MRO 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. ROE Requirements.</td>
<td>k. ROE Requirements.</td>
<td>k. ROE Requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. Legal requirements.</td>
<td>l. Legal requirements.</td>
<td>l. Legal requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. StratCom Requirements.</td>
<td>m. StratCom Requirements.</td>
<td>m. StratCom Requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) StratCom Activities, target audiences, potential effects, and requirements for policy guidance.</td>
<td>(1) StratCom Activities, target audiences, potential effects, and requirements for policy guidance.</td>
<td>(1) StratCom Activities, target audiences, potential effects, and requirements for policy guidance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) UN, Governments, local national ‘Unions’ e.g. AU….</td>
<td>(1) ….</td>
<td>(1) ….</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o. Preconditions for Success.</td>
<td>o. Preconditions for Success.</td>
<td>o. Preconditions for Success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal, alliance commitment, transfer of command authority, ROE etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p. Pre-deployment of enabling Forces including OLRT.</td>
<td>p. Pre-deployment of enabling Forces including OLRT.</td>
<td>p. Pre-deployment of enabling Forces including OLRT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>q. CRM requirements.</td>
<td>q. CRM requirements.</td>
<td>q. CRM requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>r. Partner and Non NATO Nation Participation.</td>
<td>r. Partner and Non NATO Nation Participation.</td>
<td>r. Partner and Non NATO Nation Participation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Evaluation of Military Response Options.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MRO 1 – NAME MRO 1</th>
<th>MRO 2 – NAME MRO 2</th>
<th>MRO 3 – NAME MRO 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Minimum forces, non escalatory, meets immediate security requirement….</td>
<td>(1) ….</td>
<td>(1) ….</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) ….</td>
<td>(2) ….</td>
<td>(2) ….</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>b. Disadvantages.</strong></td>
<td>b. Disadvantages.</td>
<td>b. Disadvantages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Flexibility to cope with deterioration situation, credibility. Long term solution….</td>
<td>(1) ….</td>
<td>(1) ….</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) ….</td>
<td>(2) ….</td>
<td>(2) ….</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Demand on limited assets, e.g. strategic lift….</td>
<td>(1) ….</td>
<td>(1) ….</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) ….</td>
<td>(2) ….</td>
<td>(2) ….</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Aggression not curtailed, failure of UN/IC to meet … resulting in….</td>
<td>(1) ….</td>
<td>(1) ….</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Particularly at the political level, collateral damage etc.</td>
<td>(2) ….</td>
<td>(2) ….</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4 to Annex B – Strategic Planning Directive

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES EN EUROPE
B-7010 SHAPE, BELGIUM

Our ref:  insert file ref # - insert tasker #
Tel: +32-(0)65-44-7111 (Operator)
Tel: +32-(0)65-44 + ext
NCN: 254 + ext
Fax: +32-(0)65-44-3545 (Registry)

Date:  Month Year

TO:

SUBJECT: STRATEGIC PLANNING DIRECTIVE FOR...\(^{14}\)

REFERENCES:

1. Situation.

   a. **Strategic Environment.** The main aspects of the crisis are drawn from the NAC ID and SSA to re-emphasise to COM JHQ in a broad overview the key issues, especially any emerging issues. NATO will contribute to international efforts with cooperating nations in the region. Highlight key actors but refer to detail as submitted to the NAC is SSA. Information environment. Legal basis and requirements.

   b. **NATO End State and Strategic Objectives\(^{15}\).**

      (1) NATO End state. *(Given in NID)*

---

\(^{14}\) The format of the SPD generally follows the format of the CONOPS main body. The format is flexible and may be altered as required to suit the situation. The intent of the SPD is to give timely guidance and direction to COM JHQ, to guide the operational estimate and development of the operational level CONOPS, which is instrumental in the finalization of the strategic level CONOPS. The RDG should endeavor to get the guidance and direction as accurate as possible without unnecessarily delaying its delivery to the operational level. Collaborative planning, including the use of TOPFAS, can mitigate the need for overly detailed direction and guidance at this point.

\(^{15}\) Criteria for Success. If necessary, criteria for success may be developed and articulated for the NATO end state and/or the military strategic objectives to aid clarity of how the military has interpreted the political intent. Conditions that must exist for the NATO end state or an objective to be achieved including any conditions that cannot exist.
(2) NATO Strategic Objectives\textsuperscript{16}. (Normally given in NID)

(a) Military Strategic Objectives. If NAC guidance provides only generic strategic objectives, Military Strategic Objectives will be developed by the RDG.

(b) Non-Military Strategic Objectives.

c. NATO Centre of Gravity.

d. Political Guidance and Limitations.

(1) Political Constraints.

(2) Political Restraints.

e. Political Assumptions.

f. Participation of Non-NATO Contributing Nations.

2. Mission\textsuperscript{17}. When authorised by the NAC, SACEUR, in close cooperation with \ldots[UN/other Govs/IOs] will direct the deployment of a [NATO-led] [multi-national force] to [country/region] and conduct\ldotsoperations in the JOA, considering relevant UN resolution [international law], to establish a secure environment for\ldots to enforce [UN sanctions etc], deter, safeguard, counter, etc.

3. Strategic Planning Direction.

a. SACEUR’s Intent. (Refined from selected option – Core of the SPD). A broad statement of SACEUR’s initial intent covering the vision and aim for the operation sufficient for COM JHQ to begin an operational orientation.

(1) Strategic Main Effort. This item may only be useful for inclusion if there are two operational commanders for two operations with a strategic level campaign.

(2) Additional Limitations.

(a) SACEUR Constraints.

(b) SACEUR Restraints.

(3) Cooperation with Non-Military and Non-NATO Efforts.

\textsuperscript{16} MC133/4 – NATO Operations Planning outlines military, non-military and supporting objectives at the NATO strategic level, where supporting objectives may be military or non-military in nature but must be achieved within means and capabilities. If the NAC does not promulgate specific ‘military strategic objectives’ in the NID, then they should be developed and added to the SPD under paragraph 3.

\textsuperscript{17} The MC133/4 illustrative NID format includes a ‘mission’ statement described as a ‘precise statement of NATO’s overall mission to achieve its end state’. In the spirit of mission command, the NAC should give SACEUR a mission; draft SACEUR mission statements will have been submitted with the MROs. If the NAC does not include a ‘SACEUR’ mission statement, the ‘NATO’ mission should be placed in the Situation paragraph and a SACEUR mission statement developed here under ‘Mission’, which will be later refined as necessary by the NAC and approved with the approval of the strategic CONOPS.
(4) Risk Evaluation and Mitigation. The strategic risks currently identified for this operation and possible mitigation. In addition, any guidance on how to mitigate risk at the operational level.

b. Strategic Planning Assumptions.

c. Strategic Centre of Gravity.

d. MSO Criteria for Success. If necessary, criteria for success may be developed and articulated for the military strategic objectives to aid clarity of how the military has interpreted the political intent.

e. Military Strategic Effects.

f. Preconditions for Success. This should include currently identified preconditions for success and request further operational requirements (i.e. for example broad legal arrangements, coordinated Strategic Communications strategy, transfer of command authority, timely provision of forces, ROE, and Intelligence). This may also include the changes needed in the non-military domains to support military efforts and to address the current crisis in a sustainable manner.

g. Strategic Phasing and Sequencing. If needed, provide a description of the strategic phases of the operation or the intended sequencing of strategic military effects. This will facilitate coordination and harmonisation of military and non-military actions with cooperating authorities and organisations, as well as Alliance political control.

h. Theatre of Operations and Joint Operations Area. The provisional Theatre of Operations and Joint Operations area. Requests for consideration for change should be discussed as early as possible between SACEUR and COM JHQ.

4. Execution.

a. Missions and Objectives for Subordinate Commanders. Draft mission and objectives for the operational commander (normally these have been already socialized with the JHQ through the JOPG). It should be emphasized here that these are ‘draft’ at this stage, and COM JHQ can discuss possible amendments with SACEUR following a mission analysis. This paragraph also lists any supporting commands and a general description of their responsibilities.

b. Force and Theatre Capability Requirements. Normally taken from the refined ‘selected’ MRO; these are provisional force capability requirements that should be used as a basis for planning. Major changes in operational requirements to support developed courses of action should be discussed with SHAPE.

c. Coordination of Requirements. Sufficient guidance in some or all of the following areas to aid/focus operational level orientation and planning. In some areas SHAPE will request operational level requirements to assist development of the strategic CONOPS.
(1) SACEUR’s Commanders Critical Information Requirements. Possible changes in strategic conditions that may necessitate decisions at the military strategic level. SACEUR’s CCIR should guide subordinate commands in developing their own Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs), Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) and Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI) (i.e. Enemy forces changes in readiness, emerging information on key leaders and disposition…).

(2) Crisis Response Measures. Update on CRMs that SACEUR may have declared or on the status of previous requests to the NAC for devolution of authority to declare certain CRMs (i.e. especially those related to the OLRT). If numerous create an annex to the SPD. Must include implementation reporting requirements, degree of implementation and associated risks …). Request for operational requirements for implementing additional crisis response measures including justification.

(3) Rules of Engagement and the Use of Force. (SHAPE provides guidance and requests COM JHQ requirements). Guidance on the use of military force including lethal and non-lethal measures. Legitimacy, non-escalatory…

(4) Targeting. (SHAPE provides guidance and request COM JHQ requirements). COM JHQ is to, in accordance with AD 80-70, develop target sets and, as appropriate, illustrative target categories, including, as far as possible, TSTs that would need to be targeted to counter threats and exploit opportunities to achieve NAC agreed military strategic objectives. Proposed target sets and illustrative target categories for engagement using non-lethal and lethal means should be forwarded to SHAPE for submission to the NAC for approval and amplifying guidance or caveats. COM JHQ will develop and maintain target lists, to include TST, based on approved target sets and SACEUR’s targeting guidance.

(5) Force Protection. Guidance and direction for force protection, focusing on strategic threats and risks that require actions by NATO and nations during deployment and entry into the theatre of operations. The protection of the Force is a crucial consideration with implications that extend well beyond the military mission and into issues such as public support, political cohesion and other areas that may be exploited by the adversaries.

(6) Military Police. Guidance and direction for Military Police Operations, focusing on security, detention and stability policing functions, and strategic threats and risks that require actions by NATO and nations during deployment and entry into the theatre of operations.

(7) Strategic Communications. (SHAPE provides guidance and requests JFC recommendations). General statement introducing the Strategic Communications concept and addresses how ACO will implement NATO’s Strategic Communications objectives and guidance. Makes reference to the full Initial Strategic Communications concept at Annex to the SPD….
(8) Public Affairs. Public Affairs (PA) plan is to be developed in accordance with NID, StratCom objectives and guidance, and pertinent NATO policy setting out the PA mission and specific PA objectives of NATO's engagement in the region.

(9) Civil-Military Cooperation. Guidance and any specific direction to subordinate commands on civil-military interaction. Assist local authorities and international civil presence to ensure freedom of movement and secure environment.

(10) Inter-agency Coordination. Guidance on how inter-agency coordination will be managed.

(11) Partner Involvement. Guidance on Partner participation in accordance with the NID and SACEUR's initial guidance. (i.e. Partner participation should be authorised for sustainment of operations as well as to provide special capabilities for intelligence, logistics). Guidance on Partner participation should cover the preparation, certification and integration of partner forces, including arrangements for information sharing.

(12) Environmental Protection. Initial guidance on environmental protection requirements, measures and considerations, consistent with operational imperatives.

(13) Operations Assessment. Direction or guidance on, or the development of, operations assessment criteria, methodologies and reporting requirements.

(14) Lessons Learned. Specific guidance and requirements should be established to ensure that operational and strategic lessons are captured and best practices developed to promote operational effectiveness and strategic success.

(15) Exit Criteria. (If possible SHAPE provides guidance). If no exit criteria are provided in the NID by the NAC for the termination of military operations, the RDG will develop some initial exit criteria, for the OPG to factor into their operational estimate and which will be further developed for NAC consideration with the submission of the strategic CONOPS.

(16) Critical Timings. (SHAPE provides guidance). Conferences, CONOPs to be submitted by, FG conference, OLRT deployment, NLT deployment date...

5. Service Support. A brief description of the initial service support concepts with sufficient guidance for COM JHQ to commence an orientation, to include possible discussion on the following:

- Strategic lines of communications.
- Access to the theatre and entry points, including air and sea ports of debarkation (APODs and SPODs).
- Intermediate staging bases, if required.
- Main logistic bases and forward logistic bases.
Possibilities for host nation support.

In addition, operational requirements for each of the following should be requested.

a. Logistic Support Concept.
b. Logistic Standards and Requirements.
c. Movement Concept.
d. Host Nation Support Concept.
e. Supply and Maintenance Concept.
f. Contractor Support Concept.
g. MILENG Support Concept.
h. Medical Support Concept.
i. Finance.
j. Manpower.

6. Command and Signal. Sufficient initial guidance on Command and Signals to permit COM JHQ to conduct an operational estimate and develop an initial operational concept. COM JHQ is to be requested to submit operational C2 requirements to SACEUR.

a. Command and Control.
   (1) Command Structure. The military chain of command runs from SACEUR… (SHAPE provides guidance and request operational requirements)...
   (2) Command Authority.
      (a) Transfer of Authority.
      (b) Delegation of Command Authority.
   (3) Liaison and Coordination. (SHAPE provides guidance and request operational requirements).
   (4) Conduct of Combined Operations.

b. Communications and Information Concept. A brief description of the initial CIS concept with sufficient guidance for COM JHQ to commence an orientation, to include possible discussion on the following:
   (1) NATO Communications and Information Systems links.
The Main Networks and information exchange gateways (IEGs), DCIS for each point of presence (PoP), required AIS, back up communications, alternative networks, etc.

NATO Satellite Coverage.

Connectivity with external organisations.

OPSEC Direction/ Security Conditions. (Alfa…Gamma…etc).

Host Nation’s CIS Infrastructure Utility. (Leased Lines, GSM, ADSL, DSM etc).

Etc.

SIGNATURE BLOCK

ANNEXES:

DISTRIBUTION:
Appendix 5 to Annex B – Strategic CONOPS/OPLAN Main Body

insert file ref # - insert tasker #  Day Month Year

SACEUR CONOPS/OPLAN XXX00 REV X CHANGE X
‘FORMAL PLAN/OPERATION NAME’

REFERENCES:

Note - The framework below supports the development of strategic level CONOPS and operations plans (CONPLAN/SDP/OPLAN).

1. **Situation.** This introductory paragraph describes: the political/military situation leading to the requirement for the applicable planning product. It draw on SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment, Strategic Political-Military Plan (SPMP) (if one exists), the NID and the SPD to highlight: the key factors (in a broad overview), specifically addressing any emerging issues; details of NATO’s contribution to international efforts and role with cooperating actors in the crisis area; and the legal basis for involvement.

   a. **Political Environment.**

   b. **Strategic Environment.** The main aspects of the crisis. Sub-paragraphs succinctly summarise those main actors necessary to allow a full appreciation of the crisis.

      (1) **Opposing Actors.** This could include criminal organizations and terrorists groups.

      (2) **Friendly and Cooperating Actors.** This should include the UN and as appropriate Governments including those providing host nation support, International and Non-Governmental Organisations (IO/NGOs).

      (3) **Neutral Actors.**

   c. **Information Environment.**

   d. **NATO End State and Strategic Objectives.**

      (1) **NATO End State.** (Given in NID)

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16 A CONOPS or OPLAN main body will be covered by a document cover as described in Annex E. The CONOPS/OPLAN will be submitted with a cover letter. Once approved by the NAC, it will be promulgated by SACEUR with a promulgation letter as described in Annex F.

17 Adapted from the strategic level CONOPS/CONPLAN/SDP/OPLAN template found in MC133/4 Annex B Appendix 1.

19 REV and CHANGE are only used in the title when applicable as per Annex K.

20 Criteria for Success. If necessary, criteria for success may be developed and articulated for the NATO end state and/or the military strategic objectives to aid clarity of how the military has interpreted the political intent.
(2) NATO Strategic Objectives. (Normally given in NID)

e. NATO Centre of Gravity.

f. Political Guidance and Limitations.
   (1) Political Constraints.
   (2) Political Restraints.

g. Political Assumptions.

h. Legal Basis. The legal and legitimate basis for NATO's involvement.

i. Participation of Non-NATO Contributing Nations.

2. Mission

   Clear, concise definition of the nature of the operation, identification of the military commander responsible for the conduct of the operation, the location of the operation and, if appropriate, the likely timeframe for the operation.

3. Strategic Direction.

   a. SACEUR's Intent. This paragraph should be a broad statement of SACEUR's intent covering the vision and aim for the operation. This broad statement should consider, but not be limited to, the following areas, which can if necessary be articulated as separate specific sub-paragraphs:
      (1) Strategic Main Effort. This item may only be useful for inclusion if there are two operational commanders for two operations with a strategic level campaign.
      (2) Additional Limitations.
         (a) SACEUR Constraints.
         (b) SACEUR Restraints.
      (3) Cooperation with Non-Military and Non-NATO Efforts.
      (4) Risk Evaluation and Mitigation.

   b. Strategic Planning Assumptions.

   c. Strategic Centre of Gravity.

   d. Military Strategic Objectives.

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22 The MC133/4 illustrative NID format includes a ‘mission’ statement described as a ‘precise statement of NATO’s overall mission to achieve its end state’. In the spirit of mission command, the NAC should give SACEUR a mission; draft SACEUR mission statements will have been submitted with the MROs. If the NAC does not include a ‘SACEUR’ mission statement, the ‘NATO’ mission should be placed in the Situation paragraph and a SACEUR mission statement developed here under ‘Mission’, which will be refined as necessary by the NAC and approved with the approval of the strategic CONOPS.
(1) Criteria for Success. If necessary, criteria for success may be developed and articulated for the military strategic objectives to aid clarity of how the military has interpreted the political intent.

e. Military Strategic Effects.

f. Preconditions for Success. This should include for example broad legal arrangements, coordinated Strategic Communications strategy, transfer of command authority transferred, timely provision of forces, ROE, and Intelligence; in addition, it may include non-military supporting or complementary activities, not considered sufficiently addressed as non-military objectives or guidance in the NID.

g. Strategic Phasing and Sequencing. If needed, provide a description of the strategic phases of the operation or the intended sequencing of strategic military effects. This will facilitate coordination and harmonisation of military and non-military actions with cooperating authorities and organisations, as well as Alliance political control.


4. Execution.

a. Missions and Objectives for Subordinate Commanders.

b. Force and Theatre Capability Requirements. A summary of the scale and type of force capability requirements necessary for the successful prosecution of the operation. This should include key capabilities and enablers.

c. Coordination of Requirements. General overview supported by detailed Annexes where appropriate.

(1) SACEUR’s Commanders Critical Information Requirements. Possible changes in strategic conditions that may necessitate decisions at the military strategic level. SACEUR’s CCIR should guide subordinate commands in developing their own Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs), Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) and Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI).

(2) Crisis Response Measures. Requirements for implementing additional crisis response measures including justification.


(4) Targeting. Targeting guidance on, and direction to further determine, target sets and, as appropriate, target categories, and categories of time-sensitive targets (TSTs).

(5) Force Protection. Guidance and direction for force protection, focusing on strategic threats and risks that require actions by NATO and nations during deployment and entry into the theatre of operations.
(6) Military Police. Guidance and direction for Military Police Operations, focusing on security, detention and stability policing functions, and strategic threats and risks that require actions by NATO and nations during deployment and entry into the theatre of operations.

(7) Strategic Communications. A summary of the concept for implementation of the StratCom objectives and guidance detailed in the NID, this paragraph outlines specific direction provided to subordinate commands and describes how StratCom contributes to creation of the desired strategic effects with reference to Annexes TT, UU and VV (PA, Info Ops and PSYOPS respectively). This is meant to be a concise overview, not a reproduction of the entire StratCom concept, which is outlined in detail in Annex SS and developed in parallel with the SECGEN’s Framework. The direction and guidance contained in the concept will also have been taken into account in the individual PSYOPS, Info Ops and PA annexes.

(8) Public Affairs. Public Affairs (PA) plan is to be developed in accordance with NID, the StratCom concept and pertinent NATO policy setting out the PA mission and specific PA objectives of NATO’s engagement in the region.

(9) Civil-Military Co-operation. Guidance and any specific direction to subordinate commands on civil-military interaction.

(10) Inter-agency Coordination. Guidance on how inter-agency coordination will be managed.

(11) Partner Involvement. Guidance on Partner participation in accordance with the NID and SACEUR’s initial guidance. This should cover the preparation, certification and integration of partner forces, including arrangements for information sharing.

(12) Environmental Protection. Initial guidance on environmental protection requirements, measures, considerations, consistent with operational imperatives.

(13) Operations Assessment. Direction or guidance on, or the development of, operations assessment criteria, methodologies and reporting requirements.

(14) Lessons Learned. Specific guidance and requirements should be established to ensure that operational and strategic lessons are captured and best practices developed to promote operational effectiveness and strategic success.

(15) Exit Criteria. ‘Exit criteria’ are those conditions that must be established prior to the conclusion of the NATO military activity called for in the operation described by the strategic plan, and the transition of residual authorities to a proper authority. These will have been further developed from the issue of the SPD. They are developed and used as a basis for planning the transition and exit from the theatre while ensuring that favourable conditions can be sustained as military forces are withdrawn from the theatre.
(16) Critical Timings. Direction or guidance on critical timings, such as:

(a) JHQ operational CONOPS with provisional CJSOR due …
(b) Force generation conference on ….
(c) JHQ operational OPLAN due to SACEUR…
(d) Forces ready to deploy, etc.…
(e) …

5. Service Support. A brief description of the support requirements necessary for mission accomplishment to include, where appropriate the theatre logistics architecture.

- Strategic lines of communications.
- Access to the theatre and entry points, including air and sea ports of debarkation (APODs and SPODs).
- Intermediate staging bases, if required.
- Main logistic bases and forward logistic bases.
- Possibilities for host nation support.

   a. Logistic Support Concept.
   b. Logistic Standards and Requirements.
   c. Movement Concept.
   d. Host Nation Support Concept.
   e. Supply and Maintenance Concept.
   f. Contractor Support Concept.
   g. MILENG Support Concept.
   h. Medical Support Concept.
   i. Finance.
   j. Manpower.


   a. Command and Control.

      (1) Command Structure. The military chain of command runs from SACEUR…
      (2) Command Authority.

         (a) Transfer of Authority.
(b) Delegation of Command Authority.

(3) Liaison and Coordination.

(4) Conduct of Combined Operations.

b. Communications and Information Concept.

(1) NATO Communications and Information Systems will be extended to link...

(2) The Main Networks and IEGs, DCIS for each PoP, required AIS, back up communications, alternative networks, etc.

(3) NATO Satellite Coverage.

(4) Connectivity with external organisations.

(5) OPSEC Direction/ Security Conditions. (Alfa…Gamma…etc).

(6) NATO CIS Support Agency (NCIA) will …

(7) IEGs will provide to (PiPs forces, Host Nation …coalition unit’s ships, etc).

(8) Host Nation’s CIS Infrastructure Utility. (Leased Lines, GSM, ADSL, DSM etc).
STRATEGIC/OPERATIONAL CONOPS/OPLAN ANNEXES

1. The table below presents the possible annexes for strategic and operational CONOPS and OPLANS. The shaded ‘annexes’ are mandated for inclusion with a strategic CONOPS/OPLAN for NAC approval; however, while the appendices give an indication of what a particular annex should cover, they themselves are not mandated per se. An operational CONOPS/OPLAN shall contain, as a minimum, the annexes mandated for a strategic CONOPS/OPLAN. Additional strategic CONOPS/OPLAN annexes that are developed beyond those mandated for inclusion should also be submitted to the NAC, as per mandated annexes.

2. As necessary, Commanders may use non-assigned annex letters to present an additional annex felt necessary for a particular CONOPS/OPLAN, or may add appendixes to an already designated annex. In addition, if a listed appendix is not required, and therefore not developed, the remaining appendixes used may be renumbered, while preserving the same order as the lists in the table below. In these cases, the subordinate headquarters should discuss this necessity with the higher headquarters, to ensure consistency of approach in the development and presentation of nested operations planning documents.

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<sup>1</sup> MC133/4 Annex B.

<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that some of the appendices as written are appropriate for the Operational level operations plans only, i.e. Appendix A-2 Operational Design Graphic.

<sup>3</sup> The NATO CONOPS is a formal document, with the same format as the OPLAN; as such, the majority of the detail of the ‘concept of operations’ is already contained in the main body of both the CONOPS and the OPLAN. If the Commander produces a concept of operations synopsis, from which the CONOPS is based, it could be captured in this Annex. Alternatively, some of the detail of the ‘concept’ could be placed here instead of the main body to keep the main body succinct, for example a detailed description of the phases. Finally, it could be used only to introduce the attached appendixes.
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\(^4\) The CJSOR is submitted as an Annex to the strategic OPLAN; an ‘illustrative’ CJSOR is submitted ‘with’ the strategic CONOPS, but not as an Annex for ‘approval’.
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<td>R-3: Maintenance, Repair and Recovery</td>
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<td>R-4: Supply</td>
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<td>R-5: Service Support</td>
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<td>R-6: Real Estate Management</td>
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<td>R-8: Mission Essential Equipment</td>
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<td>R-9: Logistic Reporting and Visibility</td>
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<td>R-10: Redeployment and Recovery</td>
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<td>S</td>
<td>Movements</td>
<td>S-1: M&amp;T C2 Structure</td>
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<td>S-2: Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>S-3: Designated APOD Data</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>S-4: Designated SPOD Data</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>S-5: Road, Waterway and Rail Network</td>
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<td>S-6: Movement Visibility and Reporting</td>
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<td>Environmental Support</td>
<td>T-1: Geospatial</td>
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<td>T-2: Meteorological and Oceanography</td>
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<td>U</td>
<td>Operations in a CBRN Environment</td>
<td>U-1: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Defence</td>
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<td>U-2: Bases and Facilities</td>
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<td>ANNEX</td>
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<td>APPENDIX</td>
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<td>V</td>
<td>Search, Rescue and Recovery</td>
<td>V-1: Search and Rescue</td>
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<td>V-2: Combat Search and Rescue</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>V-3: Evasion and Escape</td>
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<td>W-1: Civil Assessment</td>
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<td>W-4: CIMIC Sites of Significance</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>Conflict Termination and De-escalation</td>
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<td>(Transition Strategy)</td>
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<td>AA-1: Guidance on Law and Order</td>
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<td>Training and Mission Rehearsals</td>
<td>BB-1: Augmentation Training</td>
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<td>BB-2: Pre-deployment Training</td>
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<td>BB-3: In-Theatre Training</td>
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<td>Command Information Management</td>
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<td>CC-2: Records</td>
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<td>CC-3: Information Exchange Requirements (IER)</td>
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<td>CC-4: Historian Support</td>
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<td>CC-5: Visual Information and Combat Documentation</td>
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<td>Space Operations</td>
<td>DD-1: Space Surveillance and Reconnaissance</td>
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<td>EE-1: Military Engineer Task Organisation</td>
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<td>EE-2: Military Engineering Support to Infrastructure</td>
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<td>EE-3: Military Engineering Support to Environmental Protection</td>
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<td>EE-4: Mobility and Counter-Mobility</td>
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<td>EE-5: Military Engineering Support to Explosive Ordnance Disposal</td>
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<td>EE-6: Military Engineer Capabilities Analysis</td>
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<td>Financial Support</td>
<td>FF-1: Funding Support</td>
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<td>GG</td>
<td>Non-NATO Force Procedures</td>
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<td>Rear Area Operations</td>
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<td>Joint Targeting</td>
<td>II-1: Detailed Joint Fires Concept</td>
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<td>II-2: Targeting Guidance</td>
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<td>II-3: Joint Targeting Process</td>
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<td>II-4: Fire Support Coordination Measures</td>
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<td>NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS)</td>
<td>NATO Crisis Response Measures (CRM)</td>
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<td>Guidance on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings</td>
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<td>NN</td>
<td>Knowledge Development</td>
<td>NN-1: KD Responsibility and Interest</td>
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<td>NN-2: System analysis</td>
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<td>NN-3: Information acquisition, Co-ordination of KD Requirements Management.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NN-4: Knowledge Support, Architecture</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NN-5: Support to KD</td>
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<td>OO</td>
<td>Operations Assessment</td>
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<td>PP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
<td>PP-1: Mobility Support</td>
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<td>PP-2: Security Function</td>
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<td>PP-5: Stability Function</td>
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<td>QQ</td>
<td>Medical</td>
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<td>RR</td>
<td>Gender Perspective&lt;sup&gt;5&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>RR-1: Sexual and Gender Based Violence</td>
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<td>RR-2: Monitoring and Reporting</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RR-3: NATO Standards of Behaviour</td>
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</table>

<sup>5</sup> See Bi-SC Directive 40-1 (Rev 1) – Integrating UNSCR 1325 and Gender Perspective into the NATO Command Structure, especially for development of Appendix RR-3.
<table>
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<tr>
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<th>APPENDIX</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td>Strategic Communications⁶</td>
<td>SS-1: Introduction, Aim, Objectives&lt;br&gt;SS-2: Themes – match to suggested audiences&lt;br&gt;SS-3: Co-ordination with information disciplines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TT</td>
<td>Public Affairs</td>
<td>X-1: Background and public environment analysis&lt;br&gt;X-2: PA organization&lt;br&gt;X-3: PA approach, goals and associated objectives by phase, audience identification, master messages&lt;br&gt;X-4: Guidelines for release of information, media registration and ground rules, imagery support and casualty reporting&lt;br&gt;X-5: Appendices to include: news releases, media advisories and other products as appropriate (fact sheets, backgrounders,) talking points, Qs and As, templates (news releases, media advisories, Response to Query)&lt;br&gt;X-6: Organization of the NATO Media Information Centre (NMIC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UU</td>
<td>Information Operations</td>
<td>UU-1: Information Operations Objectives, Themes and Messages&lt;br&gt;UU-2: Information Operations Synchronisation Matrix</td>
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<tr>
<td>WW</td>
<td>SPARE</td>
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<td>XX</td>
<td>Record of Change</td>
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<td>YY</td>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>YY-1: Definitions and Abbreviations&lt;br&gt;YY-2: Bibliography and References</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZZ</td>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

⁶ Although Annex SS is not mandated for inclusion with a strategic CONOPS/OPLAN by MC133/4 it shall be included; the use of Annex SS in an operational CONOPS and OPLAN is not mandated.
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OPERATIONAL PLANNING TEMPLATES

1. This Annex provides standard templates\(^1\) in Appendices 1 through 6 that provide common standards and formats for the preparation of the following documents and briefings:
   
   a. Appendix 1 - Operational Advice on Military Response Options.
   b. Appendix 2 - Operational Warning Order.
   c. Appendix 3 - Mission Analysis Briefing-Outline format.
   d. Appendix 4 - Operational Planning Guidance.
   e. Appendix 5 - COA Decision Briefing-Outline format.
   f. Appendix 6 - Operational Planning Directive.
   g. Appendix 7 - Operational CONOPS/OPLAN Main Body.

2. While these templates should be used as depicted, their layout and content can be adjusted if required.

---

\(^1\) While these templates carry a NATO Unclassified classification, the documents for a particular crisis will be classified as appropriate.
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Appendix 1 to Annex D – Operational Advice on Military Response Options

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

HEADQUARTERS’ LETTERHEAD

TO:

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL ADVICE ON SACEUR’S MILITARY RESPONSE OPTIONS (MRO) FOR…


1. Introduction. Based on Reference A, this document provides operational advice and recommendations to SACEUR on the draft Military Response Options, with details on each MRO provided in the attached annexes.

2. Summary of MRO Review. These paragraphs contain a succinct summary of the main conclusions and operational concerns/advice from the analysis and comparison of the different MROs, as to their adequacy, merits and potential for operational success. They can include comments on any element of the MRO (i.e. desired End State, Military Strategic Objectives, etc) that is necessary for inclusion in the cover letter – otherwise the detail in the attached table will stand for itself. Some specific areas that should be covered are the use of complementary non-military actions and operational risk.

   a. MRO #1.
   b. MRO #2.
   c. MRO #3.

3. Critical Operational Requirements. Each MRO annex provides the venue for expressing operational requirements for that MRO. This paragraph is to capture those operational requirements, either common to all MROs or to ensure the viability of one MRO, that need to be highlighted to SACEUR; as such, each list will be tailored to identify the Commander’s specific concerns for the set of MROs under consideration. Items shown below are for example only.

   a. Preconditions for Success.
   c. Rules of Engagement Considerations.
d. Interaction Requirements with Relevant Actors.

e. Crisis Response Measures.

4. Any Other Considerations/Concerns. This paragraph can include any other considerations, key issues or operational concerns that need to be highlighted to SACEUR.

5. Recommendation. This paragraph identifies the MRO recommended by COM JHQ with a succinct explanation of the reasons for its selection.

SIGNATURE BLOCK

ANNEXES:

A. Operational Analysis of MRO #1 - Matrix.
B. Operational Analysis of MRO #2 - Matrix.
C. Operational Analysis of MRO #3 - Matrix.
D. Operational Evaluation of MROs.

DISTRIBUTION:

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]
### Operational Analysis of draft MRO # (Name Option #) Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MRO # – NAME MRO</th>
<th>Operational Analysis</th>
<th>Operational Advice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. NATO End State:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. SACEUR’s Mission: SACEUR, in close cooperation with the cooperating organisations, conducts type of military operations in specified areas to create specific strategic military objectives to achieve NATO end state. Improve/maintain.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Military Strategic Objectives.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) ...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Military Strategic Effects.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Complies with, cooperates with, resumes, stops, disarms, improves, increases, is deterred from...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) ...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Military Strategic Actions.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Conduct, provide, protect, be prepared to, establish, disarm, assist...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

2 Matrix shown is illustrative; the matrix used to evaluate a set of MROs should use the format in which the MROs are presented.

3 Content of this column comes from the draft MRO provided by SACEUR/SHAPE.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MRO # – NAME MRO #</th>
<th>Operational Analysis</th>
<th>Operational Advice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
  (1) Political (Diplomatic) incentives to influence.  
  (2) Economic.  
  (3) Civil. | | |
| g. Force Capability Requirements.  
  (1) Maritime, ground forces, PSYOPS, CIMIC Logs etc. | | |
| h. Resource Implications.  
  (1) Strategic Lift.  
  (2) Sustainment.  
  (3) Budget Requirements. Budget will be order of magnitude in a range of estimated costs.  
  (4) Medical.  
  (5) MILENG. | | |
| i. Provisional Theatre and JOA.  
  (1) Theatre of Operations.  
  (2) JOA. | | |
| j. Preliminary Command and Control Arrangements.  
  (1) Designated JFC, CC’s etc.  
  (2) C2 Manpower reinforcement considerations. | | |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MRO # – NAME MRO #³</th>
<th>Operational Analysis</th>
<th>Operational Advice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>k. ROE Requirements.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>l. Legal requirements.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. StratCom Requirements.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) StratCom Activities, target audiences, potential effects, and requirements for policy guidance.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>n. Non-NATO Interaction Requirements.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) UN, Governments, local national ‘Unions’ e.g. AU….</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o. Preconditions for Success.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal, alliance commitment, transfer of command authority, ROE etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p. Pre-deployment of enabling Forces including OLRT.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>q. CRM requirements.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>r. Partner and Non NATO Nation Participation.</td>
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</table>
**Operational Evaluation of MRO # - NAME MRO #**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Evaluation</th>
<th>Operational Evaluation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Minimum forces, non escalatory, meets immediate security requirement....</td>
<td>(1) ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) ....</td>
<td>(2) ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>b. Disadvantages.</strong></td>
<td>b. Disadvantages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Flexibility to cope with deterioration situation, credibility. Long term solution....</td>
<td>(1) ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) ....</td>
<td>(2) ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Demand on limited assets, e.g. strategic lift....</td>
<td>(1) ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) ....</td>
<td>(2) ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>d. Strategic Risks.</strong></td>
<td>d. Operational Risks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Aggression not curtailed, failure of UN/IC to meet ... resulting in....</td>
<td>(1) ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Particularly at the political level, collateral damage etc.</td>
<td>(2) ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) ...</td>
<td>(2) ...</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2 to Annex D – Operational Warning Order

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

HEADQUARTERS' LETTERHEAD

TO:

SUBJECT: WARNING ORDER FOR ...

REFERENCES: A.

1. **Background.** The situation on/in ... is deteriorating and calls for ...UN Security Council assesses that ... As a consequence, UN Secretary General (UNSG) has requested NATO to consider ..., acting under ... of the UN Charter. In light of the NAC assessment at Ref XX, ... a request was made for a SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment.

2. **Designation of Headquarters.** I intend to designate the following HQs for this crisis:
   a. xxx.
   b. xxx.

3. **Crisis Response Measures.** CRMs ... have been declared by SACEUR.

4. **HQ Updates.** HQs are to provide updates daily. This should include advice on readiness, etc.

5. The JHQ CONOPs is due by xxxxx.

SIGNATURE BLOCK

ANNEXES:

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[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

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4 Illustrative, Commander driven requirement.
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Appendix 3 to Annex D – Mission Analysis Briefing-Outline Format

1. Introduction.
   a. Aim of Brief.
   b. Outline.

2. Review of Situation.
   a. Current Strategic Situation.
   b. Adversaries, Friends and Neutrals.
      (1) Goals and objectives of each key actor.
      (2) Primarily and supporting instruments of power.
      (3) System interaction, interdependencies, influences and vulnerabilities.
      (4) Military and other capabilities.
      (5) Possible Actions.
   c. Political Direction and Guidance.
      (1) NATO End State
      (2) Strategic Non-Military Objectives
      (3) Political Limitations
      (4) Additional Direction and Guidance.

   (1) Strategic Military Mission.
   (2) Intent.
   (3) Military Strategic Objectives.

---

5 The format of the MAB should be tailored to ensure that only the information that is important for the Commander is presented; this will vary with each commander and with the manner and depth of personal involvement in the mission analysis to this point.

6 In a force-on-force scenario, the opposing force can be evaluated using: Order of Battle and Current Disposition; Goals and Objectives; Capabilities, Strengths and Weaknesses; Center of Gravity and Decisive Conditions; High-Value Targets; Likely Intentions; Potential COAs.

7 For adversaries, present opposing COAs.
(4) Military Strategic Effects.
(5) Preconditions for Success.
(6) Assumptions.
(7) Limitations.
(8) Provisional Operational Mission (including objectives).
(9) Additional Direction and Guidance.

4. **Mission Analysis.**
   a. **Key Factors and Conclusions.**
   b. **Operational Limitations.**
      (1) Constraints.
      (2) Restraints.
   c. **Operational Assumptions.**
   d. **Operational Risks.**

5. **Operational Design.**
   a. **Operational Mission (including Operational Objectives).**
   b. **Operational COGs.**
   c. **Initial Commander’s Intent.**
   d. **Operational Framework.**
      (1) Possible Lines of Operations.
      (2) Decisive Conditions.
      (3) Operational Effects.
      (4) Operational Actions.

---

8 Brief any recommendations for change from the mission and provisional operational objectives promulgated in the SPD. Include criteria for success if used.

9 The JOPG would highlight here any proposed changes in the operational mission (including objectives) from that provided in the SPD.

10 If the Commander provided the JOPG with ‘initial intent’ following a review of the draft Operational Framework, then reflect it here in the MAB; if not, then omit this item.
e. Complementary Non-Military Actions.

f. Assessment of Possible Branches and Sequels.

g. Provisional Component Missions (including Objectives)\(^{11}\).


b. Estimate of Forces/Capability Required.

7. Command and Control.

a. Preliminary C2 Arrangements.


8. Operational Level CCIR.


a. Critical Operational Support and Resources Requirements.

b. Pre-conditions for Success.


d. Requirements for Interaction with Other Actors.
   
   (1) Requirements.
   
   (2) Guidance for Civil-Military Cooperation.

e. STRATCOM/Information Strategy Requirements.
   
   (1) Political Guidance.
   
   (2) Core Message.
   
   (3) Themes.
   
   (4) Themes to avoid.
   
   (5) Audiences.

\(^{11}\) If there are any specific component limitations, they would also be identified here (i.e. constraint of having to support a specific non-NATO actor).
f. **CRM.**
   1. Declared CRMs.
   2. Additional CRM requirements.

g. **Other Critical Operational Requirements.** *(i.e. targeting).*

10. **Critical Timings.**
   a. **Operational Timings.**
   b. **Planning Milestones.**

11. **Requests to be Submitted to SACEUR/SHAPE.**

12. **Proposed Commander’s Planning Guidance**
    a. **Planning Guidance to Staff.** To include guidance on the following sorts of issues:
       1. Opposing COAs to develop.
       2. Criteria for COA development and selection.
       3. Broad terms on COAs to develop.
    b. **Direction to Subordinate Commanders.**

13. **Conclusion.**

14. **Approvals.** Seek approval as necessary of elements of the MAB to include:
    a. **Operational Framework.**
    b. **Provisional Missions for Subordinate Commanders.**
    c. **Preconditions for Success.**
    d. **Proposed Planning Guidance.**
    e. **ROE requirements.**
    f. **Additional CRMs.**
    g. **Submissions to SACEUR/SHAPE.**

---

12 If Commander has already provided the JOPG with ‘initial intent’, the JOPG can present here some proposed CPG; if not, then this section is omitted.
15. Seek from Commander.
   a. Commander’s Initial Intent.
      (1) Commander’s Planning Guidance.
      (2) Guidance to Planning Staff.
   b. Direction to Subordinate Commanders.
   c. Additional COM Guidance.
Appendix 4 to Annex D – Operational Planning Guidance.

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

TO: See Distribution

SUBJECT: COM XXXXX OPERATIONAL PLANNING GUIDANCE

REFERENCES: A.

1. Review of Situation.
   a. Current Situation.
   b. Political Direction and Guidance.
      (1) NATO End State.
      (2) Strategic Non-Military Objectives.
      (3) Political Limitations.
      (4) Additional Direction and Guidance.

2. SACEUR's Direction and Guidance.
      (1) Mission.
      (2) Intent

---

13 The OPG intent is to formally capture the output from the MAB, including the initial operational design (with Commander’s initial intent) and, if desired, the CPG. The format can be tailored as needed to succinctly communicate the information necessary for component level planning, which will depend on the involvement of the component and supporting commands in the conduct of the mission analysis and MAB. The JOPG should anticipate the Commander’s requirement and can be drafting an OPG in parallel to the conduct of the mission analysis to facilitate its rapid release post-MAB following any required changes.
b. Military Strategic Objectives\textsuperscript{14}.
   (1) MSO1.

c. Military Strategic Effects.
   (1) MSE1.

d. Pre-conditions for success.

e. Assumptions.

f. Limitations.

g. Additional Direction and Guidance.

3. \textbf{Operational Mission}\textsuperscript{15}.

4. \textbf{Mission Analysis}.

a. Main Actors\textsuperscript{16}.
   (1) Adversaries.
   (2) Friends.
   (3) Neutrals.

b. Key Factors and Conclusions.

c. Operational Limitations.
   (1) Constraints.
   (2) Restraints.

d. Operational Assumptions.
   (1) …

\textsuperscript{14} Including criteria for success if promulgated.
\textsuperscript{15} As provided in the SPD, or as agreed with SACEUR following Mission Analysis.
\textsuperscript{16} A succinct summary of the key actors relevant to the mission analysis. As appropriate, provide a general summary of potential goals/objectives, strengths/weaknesses, and possible courses of action.
e. Operational Risks.
   (1) Risk 1:
      (a) Probability:
      (b) Impact:
      (c) Consequence:
      (d) Mitigation:
   (2) Risk 2:

5. **Operational Design.** See Annex A.
   a. Commander’s Initial Intent.
   b. Line of Operations.
   c. Operational COGs.
   d. Decision Points.
   (1) Branches and Sequels.

6. **Initial Force/Capability Estimate.**
   a. Land Forces.
   b. Maritime Forces.
   c. Air Forces.
   d. Special Operations Forces.
   e. JLSG.
   f. Other Forces.

7. **Command and Control.**
   a. Preliminary C2 Arrangements. Refer to Annex XX.
   b. Theatre of Operations and Joint Area of Operations. Refer to Annex XY.

8. **Operational Level CCIR.**
9. **Critical Operational Requirements.**

   a. Critical Operational Support and Resources Requirements.
   
   b. Pre-conditions for Success.
   
   
   d. Requirements for Interaction with Other Actors.
      
      (1) Requirements.
      
      (2) Guidance for Civil-Military Cooperation.
   
   e. STRATCOM/Information Strategy Requirements.
      
      (1) Political Guidance.
      
      (2) Core Message.
      
      (3) Themes.
      
      (4) Themes to avoid.
      
      (5) Audiences.
   
   f. CRM.
      
      (1) Declared CRMs.
      
      (2) Additional CRM requirements.
   
   g. Other Sub-Paragraphs as required (targeting, etc).

10. **Planning Guidance.**

    a. Direction to Planning Staff.
      
      (1) The planning staffs are to focus on the following provisional Courses of Action:
      
      (a) COA 1.
      
      (b) COA 2.
      
      (c) ...
(2) Common to all COAs:
(3) Additional points to be considered.

b. Direction to Subordinate Commands.

c. Provisional Missions for Subordinate Commanders.
   (1) CC Mission\textsuperscript{17}.
   (2) CC Mission.

11. Coordination.
   a. Critical Timing for Operation. Refer to Annex B.
   b. Planning Milestones.

SIGNATURE BLOCK

ANNEXES:
A. Operational Design.
B. Operational Timeline.
C. Proposed C2.
D. TOO and JOA.

DISTRIBUTION:

\textsuperscript{17} Mission statements include provisional component objectives. If it is necessary to impose specific limitations on a component commander (i.e. a constraint to support a specific non-NATO actor) they should be listed here with the provisional mission.
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Appendix 5 to Annex D – COA Decision Briefing-Outline Format

1. **Introduction.**
   a. **Aim of Brief.**
   b. **Outline.**
   c. **General Introductory Comments.**

2. **Political and SACEUR Direction and Guidance Highlights.**

3. **Commander’s OPG Highlights.**
   a. **Higher Direction.**
      (1) NATO End-state.
      (2) Strategic Non-Military Objectives.
      (3) SACEUR’s Mission and Intent.
         (a) Strategic Military Objectives and Effects.
         (b) Preconditions for success.
         (c) Key Assumptions.
      (4) Key Imposed Limitations.
   b. **Own Operational Design**\(^{18}\).
      (1) Mission.
      (2) Initial Intent.
      (3) Operational COGs.
      (4) Initial Operational Design.
         (a) Operational Objectives\(^{19}\).
         (b) Lines of Operation.

---

\(^{18}\) The JOPG would present the approved initial operational design, normally using the graphic itself, and cover any of the essential elements listed as necessary to set the stage for the presentation of COAs.

\(^{19}\) Include criteria for success if used.
(c) Decisive Conditions.
(d) Operational Effects.
(e) Operational Actions.

(5) Other Key Elements, such as:
(a) Key Assumptions.
(b) Key Limitations.
(c) Provisional Mission for Component Commander’s.

4. **Situation Analysis**\(^{20}\).

5. **Opposing COAs.**
   a. **General Description.**
   b. **Potential Operational Timeline.**
   c. **Analysis (Advantages and Disadvantages).**
   d. **Assessment of Opposing COAs.**

6. **Own Forces COAs.**
   a. **Common Points Applicable to all COAs.**
   b. **Specifics for each COA.**
      (1) **Aim.**
      (2) **General CONOPS.** *(Including Sequencing/Phasing Description, map sketches).*
      (3) **CONOPS by Phase.** Including, for each phase:
         (a) Start and end conditions, and purpose of the phase.
         (b) Sub-sequencing as necessary.
         (c) Operational effects.
         (d) Operational actions.

---

\(^{20}\) Highlight key changes in the situation with operational impact; key factors and deductions that have direct effect on potential COAs (Opposing, Own).
(e) Essential capabilities required for the phase, if appropriate.

(f) Possible decision points, and related required CCIR.

(4) Task Organisation.

(5) Operational Timeline.

(6) Logistic Support Concept (if not common to all COAs).

(7) Military Engineering Concept.

(8) Command and Control Arrangements including Areas of Operations (if not a common to all COAs).

(9) Major differences to other COAs.

7. Analysis and Comparison of COAs.

a. War Game Results.

b. Comparison of COAs.

   (1) Advantages and Disadvantages.

   (2) Friendly COAs to Opposing COAs.

   (3) Against Commander’s Selection Criteria.

   (4) COA Risk Assessment.

c. Recommended COA.

d. Branch Plan Requirements for Recommended COA\(^2\).

8. Unresolved Critical Issues.


10. Way Ahead.

---

\(^2\) Branch plan requirements should be related to identified decision points.
11. **Commander’s Decision and Guidance.**

   a. **Decision**\(^\text{22}\) on COA, including:

      (1) Decision on final operational design.

      (2) Direction for COA or operational design revision.

      (3) Refined Component Provisional Missions.

   b. **Confirmation of Commander’s Intent.**

   c. **Planning Guidance for CONOPS Development.**
Appendix 6 to Annex D – Operational Planning Directive.

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

HEADQUARTERS’ LETTERHEAD

TO: See Distribution

SUBJECT: COM XXXXX OPERATIONAL PLANNING DIRECTIVE

REFERENCES: A. COM XXXXX Operational Planning Guidance, dated XXX.
B.

1. Review of Situation. With reference to OPG, a succinct précis of the situation to provide context to the Operational Planning Directive (OPD), including as required:
   a. Update on Current Situation (if required).
   b. Update on Higher Direction (if required).

2. Opposing COAs. An assessment of opposing COAs as required.

3. Operational Mission.

   a. Overall description/Aim.
   b. Commander Intent.
   c. Scheme of Manoeuvre (By Phase).
      (1) Main Effort.
      (2) Supporting Effort(s).
   d. Assumptions.

23 The OPD intent is to formally capture the output from the COA decision briefing, including the refined COA, Commander’s intent, final operational design, and CC missions. The format can be tailored as needed to succinctly communicate the information necessary to support component level COA development, which will depend on the involvement of the component and supporting commands in the conduct of the operational COA development and the COA decision briefing.
e. Limitations and Freedoms.

f. Operational Design. See Annex A. The operational design depicted at Annex A can be supported by text in the main body of the OPD as required, such as:

  (1) Operational COGs.
  (2) Decisive conditions.
  (3) Effects.
  (4) Decision Points.
  (5) Branches and Sequels.
  (6) Critical timings.

5. **Operational Risks.**

6. **Task Organisation.** See Annex B.

7. **Command and Control.**
   a. Preliminary C2 Arrangements. Refer to Annex C.
   b. Theatre of Operations and Joint Area of Operations. Refer to Annex D.

8. **Operational Level CCIR.**

9. **Critical Operational Requirements.**
   a. Critical Operational Support and Resources Requirements.
   b. Pre-conditions for Success.
   d. Requirements for Interaction with Other Actors.
      (1) Requirements.
      (2) Guidance for Civil-Military Cooperation.
   e. STRATCOM/Information Strategy Requirements.
      (1) Political Guidance.
      (2) Core Message.
      (3) Themes.
(4) Themes to avoid.
(5) Audiences.

f. CRM.
   (1) Declared CRMs.
   (2) Additional CRM requirements.

g. Other Sub-Paragraphs as required (targeting, etc)

10. **Planning Guidance.**
   a. Direction to Planning Staff.
   b. Direction to Subordinate Commands.
   c. Provisional Missions for Subordinate Commanders.
      (1) CC Mission\(^{24}\).
      (2) CC Mission.

11. **Coordination.**
   a. Critical Timing for Operation. Refer to Annex E.
   b. Planning Milestones.

SIGNATURE BLOCK

ANNEXES:
A. Operational Design.
B. Task Organisation.
C. Proposed C2.
D. TOO and JOA.
E. Operational Timeline.

DISTRIBUTION:

\(^{24}\) Mission statements include provisional component objectives. If it is necessary to impose specific limitations on a component commander (i.e. a constraint to support a specific non-NATO actor) they should be listed here with the provisional mission.
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Appendix 7 to Annex D – Operational CONOPS/OPLAN Main Body

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

insert file ref # - insert tasker #  Day Month Year

COM JHQ CONOPS/OPLAN XXX10 REV X CHANGE X

‘FORMAL PLAN/OPERATION NAME’

REFERENCES:  A.

1. **Situation.**
   
   a. **Political Environment.**
   
   b. **Strategic Environment.**
      
      (1) Opposing Actors.
      
      (2) Friendly and Cooperating Actors.
      
      (3) Neutral Actors that influence JFC mission.
   
   c. **Information Environment.**
   
   d. **NATO End State and Strategic Objectives.**
      
      (1) NATO End State.
      
      (2) NATO Strategic Objectives\(^2^7\).
         
         (a) Non-Military Strategic Objectives.
         
         (b) Military Strategic Objectives.
   
   e. **Strategic Centres of Gravity.**
      
      (1) NATO Strategic Centre of Gravity.
      
      (2) Friendly Actors’ Strategic Centre of Gravity.

---

\(^{25}\) A CONOPS or OPLAN main body will be covered by a document cover as described in Annex E. The CONOPS/OPLAN will be submitted with a cover letter. Once approved by SACEUR, it will be promulgated by the originator with a promulgation letter as described in Annex F.

\(^{26}\) REV and CHANGE are only used in the title when applicable as per Annex K.

\(^{27}\) MC133/4 – NATO Operations Planning outlines military (i.e. Military Strategic Objectives), non-military and supporting objectives at the political-military level.
(3) Opposing Actors’ Strategic Centres of Gravity.

f. Military Strategic Effects.

g. Strategic Planning Assumptions and Limitations. (Political and Military Strategic).

h. Legal Aspects.

i. Intelligence and Threat Assessment.

2. Operational Mission. On order, COM JHQ will conduct operations in XXX to operational objective 1, operational objective 2, etc, in order to...

3. Operational Direction.

a. Commander’s Intent.

b. Main Effort.

c. Operational Centres of Gravity.

(1) Own COG.

(2) Opposing actors’ COG.

d. Concept of Operations.

e. Operational Design.

(1) Operational Objective (OO) 1 - XXX.

(a) Criteria for Success.

(b) Line of Operations (LoO) 1 - XXX.

1/ Decisive Condition (DC) 1 - XXX.

a/ Operational Effect (OE) 1 - XXX.

b/ Operational Action (OA) 1 - XXX.

2/ DC 2 - XXX.

(c) LoO 2 – XXX.

(2) OO2 - XXX.

f. Forces and Resources.

g. Cooperation with Others Actors.
h. **Preconditions for Success.**

i. **Risk Management.**

(1) Xxxx.

4. **Execution.**

a. **Subordinate Command Missions and Objectives**\(^{28}\).

(1) LCC Mission. COM LCC will... in order to...

(2) MCC Mission. COM MCC will... in order to...

(3) Xxxx.

b. **Coordinating Instructions.**

(1) Operational Level CCIR.

(2) Crisis Response Measures.

(3) Rules of Engagement and the Use of Force.

(4) Targeting.

(5) Force Protection.

(6) Military Police.

(7) StratCom and Information Strategy.

(8) Public Affairs.

(9) Civil-Military Cooperation.

(10) Inter-agency Coordination.

(11) Partner Involvement.

(12) Environmental Protection.

(13) Operations Assessment.

(14) Lessons Learned

(15) Exit Criteria.

(16) Critical Timings.

---

\(^{28}\) If it is necessary to impose specific limitations on a component commander (i.e. a constraint to support a specific non-NATO actor) they should be listed here with the component mission.
5. Service Support.
   a. Logistic Support Concept.
   b. Logistic Standards and Requirements.
   c. Movement Concept.
   d. Host Nation Support Concept.
   e. Supply and Maintenance Concept.
   f. Contractor Support Concept.
   g. Military Engineering Concept.
   h. Medical Support Concept.
   i. Finance.
   j. Manpower.

   a. Command and Control.
      (1) Command Structure.
      (2) Command Authority.
         (a) Transfer of Forces.
         (b) Delegation of Command Authority.
   b. TOO and JOA.
   c. Liaison and Coordination.
   d. Communications and Information Concept.
   e. Reporting.

}[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]
FORMAT FOR DOCUMENT COVERS

1. Figure E-1 below depicts the layout and content of an operations plan cover, including:
   a. Cosmic Top Secret (CTS) control number\(^1\) for CTS documents.
   b. Originator’s abbreviated title.
   c. Plan number as per Annex K.

An example of a SACEUR OPLAN document cover follows as Figure E-2.

---

**[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]**

**[FULL TITLE OF ORIGINATORS HEADQUARTERS]**

**[LOCATION]**

(FILE NUMBER)(a) [DATE]

SHIELD

__(b)__ [PLAN TYPE] __(c)__

“[NICKNAME]”

**[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]**

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\(^1\) See ACO Manual 70-1-003, ACO COSMIC and ATOMAL Registry Standard Operating Procedures.
FORMAT FOR LETTER OF PROMULGATION

NOTE: The following formatted example applies to all NATO command levels for Letters of Promulgation. The letter must clearly state the status of the attached document (e.g. “Draft”, or “Final Plan” as appropriate).

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
GRAND QUARTIER GÉNÉRAL DES PUISSANCES ALLIÉES EN EUROPE
B-7010 SHAPE, BELGIUM

Our ref: Insert file reference
Date: Insert date

TO: See Distribution or enter a Single Action Addressee

SUBJECT: SUBJECT OF LETTER

REFERENCES:
A. Insert details of reference.
B.

1. Promulgation. This letter promulgates SACEUR’s Strategic plan XXXX for xxyy. As per reference A, this plan has been approved by the North Atlantic Council. This Strategic plan is effective as of dd mm yy.
   a. Planning: (specific planning instructions as applicable).
   b. Implementation: On separate order, subjects to transfer of operational command or control of forces required from national authorities to SACEUR.
   c. Supporting Plan: (if applicable).

2. Plan Synopsis.
   a. Extract of Situation – derived from the Plan.
b. Mission – verbatim as in the Plan.

c. Extract of SACEUR Strategic Concept – derived from the Plan.

FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE:

SIGNATURE BLOCK

DISTRIBUTION:

See Annex ZZ of attached Plan

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]
FORMAT FOR RECORD OF CHANGES

[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]

RECORD OF CHANGES

1. After a change has been incorporated it is to be recorded below and the pages that have been replaced are to be destroyed in accordance with security orders.

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2. Superseded letters promulgating changes to be recorded below.

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[SECURITY CLASSIFICATION]
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FORMAT FOR FUNCTIONAL PLANNING GUIDES

1. Functional Planning Guides\(^1\) (FPGs) are one mechanism\(^2\) to provide function-specific planning guidance to assist planners from those functional areas in their contributions to the operations planning process as part of a headquarters cross-functional planning body (i.e. Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG)). These functional areas can include warfare areas (e.g. Joint Air Operations) or specific areas of expertise (e.g. Civil-Military Co-operation, Logistics, etc). FPGs can be written to support the planning process at any level (e.g. strategic, operational and/or component).

2. The format of FPGs can vary as required to support the detail required by planners from the functional area for which it is written. Normally, they should be divided into three main areas: an introduction, a main body (to support functional contribution to the planning process) and instructions for preparations of relevant operations plans annexes and appendices.

   a. Introduction. The introduction should clearly describe the purpose of the FPG; furthermore, it should assist planners in integrating functional knowledge into the operations planning process and help them identify the main inputs and products.

   b. Main Body. The main body of FPGs should follow the format of the main activities, as outlined in the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) (i.e. Chapter 4 for the operational level). It is recognised that it will not always be possible for functional experts to participate in all steps of the planning process; therefore, the guides must identify where in the six phases of the planning process their contribution is needed. In addition, there should be sufficient detail for developing functional estimates and concepts and to prepare the functional expert to be an active member of the applicable planning body (i.e. JOPG). As required, the FPG can also introduce the functional planner to their responsibilities in the use of Tools for Operations Planning Functional Area Service (TOPFAS).

   c. Annexes and Appendices. Instructions for the preparation of relevant functional operations plan annexes and appendices (as outlined in Annex C) should include an outline of the appropriate annex/appendix. It should also include key reference material concerning NATO policy and doctrine to focus a new planner’s contribution to the planning process.

---

\(^1\) As described in MC133/4, NATO’s Operations Planning (07 Jan 11) paragraph 37 b.

\(^2\) While a FPG can be a mechanism to standardise functional area support to the OPP across levels (e.g. strategic and operational) or headquarters of the same level (i.e. HQ JFCs, single service commands, NATO Force Structure Joint Headquarters), other mechanisms can also be used such as internal Standard Operating Procedures and Standard Operating Instructions.
CONSULTATION, APPROVAL, PROMULGATION AND ACTIVATION PROCEDURES

1. Introduction.

   a. The consultation procedures for advance and crisis response planning are essentially the same. However, crisis response planning may require expedited consultation due to the amount of time available based on the ongoing crisis situation.

   b. Commands and Nations participating in an operation, or with co-ordinating interests, must be consulted at an early stage during the initiation of a strategic plan and at further appropriate stages in its progression to approval.

   c. All plans, be they for contingency or for actual operations, will be developed using a collaborative process involving all levels of planning. For each strategic level plan, the Supreme Commander Allied Powers Europe (SACEUR) will decide on the need to develop a supporting operational level version. Approval of a strategic level plan provides SACEUR with the necessary authority to approve the operational version of that plan.

2. Consultation Process.

   a. Contingency Plan (CONPLAN). CONPLANs will be developed in accordance with the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) (Chapters 3 & 4). Ideally, for any iteration of a strategic or operational CONPLAN, 60 days should be allowed between issue and expected responses. Normally, the following versions of a CONPLAN are produced:

      (1) Initial Draft. An initial draft of a CONPLAN will be forwarded to relevant NATO commanders for comment.

      (2) Draft. Taking into account the comments on the initial draft, a draft CONPLAN will be forwarded to the relevant NATO Commanders, involved Nations and, for strategic CONPLANs, the International Military Staff (IMS), for comment. Pending the nature of the comments, it might be necessary to forward an additional draft(s), which then will be identified as second, third, draft, etc.

      (3) Coordinated Draft. Comments on the draft(s) will be incorporated, as appropriate, and the coordinated draft CONPLAN will be submitted to the initiating authority for approval. Once approved, the final CONPLAN is promulgated.

   b. Operation Plan (OPLAN). In general terms, the consultation process for an OPLAN should be identical to that for CONPLANs. However, there is a clear recognition that OPLAN development is usually time constrained and, therefore, the process may need to be compressed.
c. **Standing Defence Plan (SDP).** Consultation as required.

d. **Primary Planning Tools.**

   (1) The COPD. The COPD consultation process will be based on that for CONPLANs.

   (2) Functional Planning Guides (FPGs). Once a FPG has been produced, either as an initial draft, or as a draft revision, the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) will distribute the document for review (including SHAPE J5), comment and approval in accordance with the procedures as detailed for CONPLANs. Following approval, FPGs should be forwarded to SHAPE J5 who will coordinate MC ‘notation’ as required by MC133/4.

3. **Approval Procedures.** The approval authority is detailed in MC 133. Strategic operations plans are approved as follows.

   a. All strategic level CONPLANs will require Military Committee (MC) approval while strategic OPLANs and SDPs will require North Atlantic Council (NAC) approval. All subordinate operations plans, including supporting plans (SUPPLANs), require approval of the initiating authority, which is the next superior NATO commander.

   b. The initiating authority must approve the concept of operations (CONOPS) (strategic or operational), as a preerequisite for the full development of a CONPLAN / SDP / OPLAN. Approval, however, is not a pre-requisite for plan development. The planning does not need to stop while awaiting CONOPS approval.

4. **Promulgation Procedure.** Once approved by the initiating authority, operations plans are promulgated by the originator using a Letter of Promulgation. Details and a format are included at Annex F. Approved FPGs shall also be accompanied with a Letter of Promulgation.

5. **Activation Procedure.** The force activation procedures are detailed in MC133/4.

6. **Exercise Operations Plans.** For NATO exercises, operations plans should be developed in accordance with the COPD. Depending on exercise specifications and objectives, the consultation and approval processes described herein for the relevant type of plan may be abbreviated.

---

1 MC133/4, NATO’s Operations Planning, 07 Jan 11.
REVIEW, REVISION AND CANCELLATION PROCEDURES

1. Periodic review, revision and possible cancellation of operations plans must occur. This is done to evaluate and confirm their continued suitability, feasibility and viability. Each commander will:

   a. Maintain a current status of the command’s operations plans (including related plans at the next immediate subordinate level) and forward that status whenever it changes to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) J5, who will maintain an Allied Command Operations (ACO)-wide master plans list.

   b. Develop procedures to facilitate the conduct of plan reviews.

   c. Determine follow-up action to be taken as a result of such reviews, including changes to the command’s own plan or recommendations for changes to the superior commander’s plan.

2. Review. Review must occur when:

   a. There is a significant alteration to the situation.

   b. Any related plan is superseded or when a "Major Change" to it is issued.

   c. For the purposes of operations plans, a “Major Change” is:

      (1) Whenever there is a significant change that alters the basic concept or affects the force proposals/commitments to the plan.

      (2) The review will dictate the degree of revision required or cancellation of plans as appropriate.

   In addition, after initial approval or the last comprehensive review, a periodic review of operations plans should occur on an interval chosen by the original initiating authority. ¹

3. Revision.

   a. Purely editorial changes and other non-substantive amendments may be issued by the originator when appropriate and without approval or justification. The amended operations plan will be marked as a ‘change’ as described in Annex K.

¹ For guidance on review of CONPLANS, see MCM-0179-2005, Military Committee Guidance on Article 5 Contingency Plans, 14 Oct 05.
b. Major changes will require approval in accordance with the procedures detailed for newly developed plans. The amended operations plan will be marked as a ‘revision’ as described in Annex K.

c. If there is a question as to whether a change is to be considered a major or a minor change it should be discussed with the original approving authority or the next superior NATO commander.

4. Cancellation. Cancellation of an operations plan requires the authority of the original approving authority. The promulgation letter of new draft plans is to list those plans that the new document supersedes. Should a command decide that a plan should be cancelled, the following guidelines will apply:

a. Draft Letter of Intent. Notice of intention to cancel a plan should be given to all agencies involved in the original consultation process. The Letter of Intent should include the rationale for plan cancellation and allow at least 60 days for response.

b. Statement of Cancellation. If no major objections to the plan’s cancellation are raised, a letter directing cancellation of the plan should be issued to all agencies on the plan’s distribution list. The letter should provide the effective date of cancellation.

c. Registration. For the registration procedures for valid plans, the distribution list for both letters must include SHAPE J5.

d. Supporting Plans (SUPPLANs) and Operational Orders (OPORDs). Cancellation of a plan is automatic authority to cancel its SUPPLANs and OPORDs.

e. Archive Copy. The originating command for a plan that is cancelled shall retain at least one copy of the plan as an archive copy. That copy should be clearly marked as “Cancelled” effective date of cancellation by date-time group (DTG) of Cancellation Letter. Retain as an archive copy.

5. Other Operations Planning Documents. The review, revision and cancellation of other operations planning documents should follow the procedure outlined in this Annex (i.e. Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive, functional planning guides, etc).
PLANS IDENTIFICATION AND NICKNAMES

1. **General.** For identification, management and security reasons, a NATO identification system of plans is established.

   a. All or some of the following elements will identify each plan:

      (1) A plan number.

      (2) A letter suffix to the plan number for supporting plans (SUPPLANs).

      (3) A revision and/or a change number.

      (4) The plan originator, category and date.

      (5) A Nickname. SHAPE J5 is the focal point for registering all Nicknames.

      (6) A descriptive title.

2. **Plan Number.** Each Commander’s plan will be assigned an unclassified plan number comprising 5 digits. SHAPE J5 will allocate the plan number. The plan numbering system (PNS) is described in Appendix 1 to Annex K.

3. **Revision/Change Number.** A plan number may be followed by a revision and/or a change number, to indicate a major or minor change to the original plan respectively, as follows:

   a. **Revision.** XXXXX Rev X.

   b. **Change.** XXXXX Change X. A change number follows a revision number (i.e. XXXXX Rev 1 Change 2).

4. **Plan Originator, Category and Date.**

   a. The plan originator is identified:

      (1) For Allied Command Operations (ACO) plans by the originator’s abbreviated title.

      (2) For national plans by the issuing commander’s short title, proceeded by the letters identifying the nation (e.g. UKCICC).

   b. The plan or document category is identified by the originator as a contingency plan (CONPLAN), standing defence plan (SDP), operation plan (OPLAN), SUPPLAN or National Plan, as appropriate. The date of a plan is the one appearing on the front cover of the most recent edition

   c. Operations Plans developed during exercises or those developed to support the

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1 Existing approved operations plans will adopt the new PNS on the next ‘Revision’ of the related strategic plan.
training scenario should be named as “OPLANs” with page markings to clearly indicate they are ‘exercise’ OPLANs in accordance with ACO Security Directive 70-1.

5. **Nicknames.** The purpose of the Nickname is to provide an unclassified and easy reference to an operations plan. The usage and allocation of Nicknames are described below.

a. **Usage.**

   (1) A Nickname shall consist of two short separate words.

      (a) Hyphenated words are not to be used.

      (b) The abbreviation NATO is not to be included in a Nickname.

      (c) The second word is not to be the same as the first word.

   (2) Nicknames should have a robust connotation; undignified or frivolous usage should be avoided.

   (3) A Nickname is NATO UNCLASSIFIED when used on its own. However, the subject or material to which it relates may be classified. Therefore, whenever a Nickname is used in a context that reveals the connection, or discloses classified information, a suitable classification must be imposed.

b. **Allocation.**

   (1) SACEUR will designate the Nickname for new operations, with the same Nickname designation process used throughout subordinate operations plan development. The second word will remain the same throughout each subordinate plan to link all appropriate plans to a specific campaign/operation (e.g. SACEUR OPLAN is designated "Operation JOINT GUARDIAN", COM JHQ OPLAN is designated "Operation DISCREET GUARDIAN", etc).

   (2) NATO commanders may originate and use Nicknames at their discretion. No accounting is required, but the originating commander is responsible for informing all interested authorities. The selected Nickname must not conflict with other short titles, well-known phrases or existing Nicknames. The plan originator will designate a Nickname, while adhering to paragraph 4.b. (1) above.

   (3) There will be no allocation of block letters. This allows for greater flexibility in selecting Nicknames for operations at all levels.

6. **Descriptive Title.** The plan originator will allocate to each plan a short, properly classified title, which is descriptive in nature (e.g., "Employment of 20th IT Division in S Norway"). This title, which constitutes the official one, must appear in the promulgation letters and in the heading of the first page of the plan.

**APPENDIX:**

1. Plan Numbering System (PNS).
Appendix 1 to Annex K – Plan Numbering System (PNS)

1. **General.** Plans are allocated a plan number\(^1\) consisting of 5 digits and, if appropriate, suffix letters. The plan number, which is unclassified, includes:
   a. Plan type/subject characters.
   b. Plan level characters.

2. **Numbering System.** A five-digit number identifies plans:
   a. The first three digits identify the specific type/subject of a plan.
   b. The last two digits identify the level of the plan.
   c. A suffix letter can be added at the end of the plan number to identify SUPPLANs.
   d. Commanders subordinate to Component Commanders (CC) will use the same number as the corresponding CC plan.

3. **Plan Category, Subject Characters.** The first three digits of the plan number will identify the plan category and subject area as listed below. For each new subject (i.e. a new operation), SHAPE J5 will issue a number sequentially. The characters "XX" indicate the plan level digits as described below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPLANS and SDPs</th>
<th>100XX-299XX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONPLANS</td>
<td>300XX-499XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise Plans</td>
<td>500XX-799XX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spares</td>
<td>800XX-999XX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. **Plan Level Characters.** The level\(^2\) of the plan will be indicated as shown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic (SACEUR)</th>
<th>XXX00</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational (COM JHQ)</td>
<td>XXX10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component (COM CC)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land</td>
<td>XXX11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maritime</td>
<td>XXX12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air</td>
<td>XXX13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations</td>
<td>XXX14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spare</td>
<td>XXX15-XXX19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^1\) Existing approved operations plans will adopt the new PNS on the next 'Revision' of the related strategic plan.

\(^2\) Exceptions will be decided by SHAPE J5 (i.e. if an operational level theatre HQ (like ISAF) was required for a new operation reporting through an HQ JFC, then the Operational Level (JFC) OPLAN could be numbered XXX10 (as above), with operational theatre OPLAN numbered XXX20, and if components were required their plans could be numbered XXX21 etc).
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# GLOSSARY OF TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Action(^2)</td>
<td>The process of doing something to achieve an aim.</td>
<td>Collins Oxford English Dictionary, 11ed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor</td>
<td>A person or organization, including state and non-state entities, with the capability to pursue its interests and objectives.</td>
<td>Proposed Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adversary</td>
<td>A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Interest (AOI)</td>
<td>The area of concern to a commander relative to the objectives of current or planned operations, including his areas of influence, operations and/or responsibility, and areas adjacent thereto.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of Operations (AOO)</td>
<td>An area defined by the joint force commander within a joint operations area for the conduct of specific military activities.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment(^3)</td>
<td>A considered process of appraisal to support decision-making.</td>
<td>Proposed Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td>In planning, a supposition made about the current situation and/or the future course of events to complete an estimate of the situation and decide on the course of action.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign</td>
<td>A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre of Gravity (COG)</td>
<td>Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. Proposed definitions will undergo a harmonization process with current/emerging doctrine to ensure unified terminology where appropriate.

2. For the purposes of the COPD, an action can also be thought of as the process of engaging any instrument at an appropriate level in the engagement space in order to create (a) specific effect(s) in support of an objective.

3. See also Operations Assessment. Also the current AAP-06 definition for assessment is ‘The process of estimating the capabilities and performance of organizations, individuals, materiel or systems. Note: In the context of military forces, the hierarchical relationship in logical sequence is: assessment, analysis, evaluation, validation and certification.’
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil-military Cooperation</td>
<td>The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including the national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander’s Required Date (CRD)</td>
<td>The latest date, calculated from G-day(^4), established by the theatre commander, on which forces are required to be complete in their final destination and organized to meet the commander’s operational requirement.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
<td>A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish his given mission.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constraint</td>
<td>A requirement placed on a commander that dictates action.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency Plan</td>
<td>A plan which is developed for possible operations where the planning factors have been identified or can be assumed. This plan is produced in as much detail as possible, including the resources needed and deployment options, as a basis for subsequent planning.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course of Action (COA)</td>
<td>In the estimate process, an option that will accomplish or contribute to the accomplishment of a mission or task, and from which a detailed plan is developed.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Point (DP)</td>
<td>A point in space and time, identified during the planning process, where it is anticipated that the commander must make a decision concerning a specific course of action.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decisive Condition (DC)</td>
<td>A combination of circumstances, effects, or a specific key event, critical factor, or function that when achieved allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an opponent or contribute materially to achieving an operational objective.</td>
<td>AJP-01(D) Proposed Definition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desired Effect</td>
<td>Desired effects are those that have a positive impact on the achievement of the objectives.</td>
<td>Proposed Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect</td>
<td>A change in the state of a system (or system element), that results from one or more actions, or other causes.</td>
<td>Proposed Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enabling Forces</td>
<td>Those forces required at the beginning of an expeditionary operation to establish conditions required for the early and rapid entry of the main force into the theatre of operations and deployment within the JOA.</td>
<td>Proposed Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End State(^5)</td>
<td>The NAC statement of conditions that defines an acceptable concluding situation for NATO’s involvement.</td>
<td>Proposed Definition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^4\) G-Day (AAP-06) - The day on which an order is or is due to be given to deploy a unit. Note: Such an order is normally a national one.

\(^5\) AAP-06 defines ‘end state’ as ‘The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved.’
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engagement Space</td>
<td>That part of the strategic environment relevant to a particular crisis in which the Alliance may decide, or has decided, to engage. Note: the engagement space can be initially viewed through several conceptual models. The most common in NATO are the following six PMESII domains (recognizing this list is not exhaustive): political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information.</td>
<td>Proposed Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Protection</td>
<td>All measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-day</td>
<td>The day on which an order is or is due to be given to deploy a unit. Note: Such an order is normally a national one.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-payoff target</td>
<td>High-payoff target - A target of significance and value to an adversary, the destruction, damage or neutralization of which may lead to disproportionate advantage to friendly forces.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint</td>
<td>Adjective used to describe activities, operations, organisations in which elements of at least two services participate.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Operations Area (JOA)</td>
<td>A temporary area defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency- or mission-specific and are normally associated with combined joint task force operations.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge Base</td>
<td>The knowledge base is a collection of data, information, knowledge, expertise and established contacts that is distributed, inter-linked and standardised.</td>
<td>Proposed Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge Development (KD)</td>
<td>KD is a proactive, collaborative and iterative process carried out at all levels of Allied Command Operations, drawing on NATO and non-NATO entities, to develop and then maintain a holistic understanding of complex environments in support of NATO political and military authorities' decision-making.</td>
<td>Proposed Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge Management (KM)</td>
<td>A multi-disciplined approach to make the best use of information, insights and best practices, to facilitate the achievement of organisational goals. KM, and its intrinsic component Information Management (IM), is the means by which NATO organisations determine what knowledge is required, manage existing knowledge and identify knowledge gaps to be filled.</td>
<td>Proposed Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge Requirement (KR)</td>
<td>A specific need for understanding about a situation, a system, or an element of a system in order to make a decision.</td>
<td>Proposed Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line of Operation(^6) (LoO)</td>
<td>In a campaign or operation, a logical line(s) linking effects and decisive conditions in time to an objective.</td>
<td>Proposed Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Effort</td>
<td>A concentration of forces or means in a particular area and at a particular time to enable a commander to bring about a decision.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure of Effectiveness (MOE)</td>
<td>A metric used to measure a current system state.</td>
<td>NATO Operations Assessment Handbook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measure of Performance (MOP)</td>
<td>A metric used to determine the accomplishment of actions.</td>
<td>NATO Operations Assessment Handbook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>A clearly defined and attainable goal to be achieved.</td>
<td>Proposed Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Order</td>
<td>A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Plan</td>
<td>A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation &quot;plan&quot; is usually used instead of &quot;order&quot; in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Art</td>
<td>The employment of forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Level</td>
<td>The level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^6\) Line of Operation is defined in AAP-06 as, ‘In a campaign or operation, a line linking decisive points in time and space on the path to the centre of gravity’.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational-</td>
<td>Note: The preferred English term to designate the planning of military operations at the operational level is “operational-level planning”. The term “operational planning” is not to be used so as to prevent confusion with “operations planning”.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Pause</td>
<td>A temporary and deliberate cessation of certain activities during the course of an operation to avoid reaching the culminating point and to be able to regenerate the combat power required to proceed with the next stage of the operation.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Assessment</td>
<td>The activity that enables the measurement of progress and results of operations in a military context, and the subsequent development of conclusions and recommendations that support decision-making.</td>
<td>NATO Operations Assessment Handbook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations Planning</td>
<td>The planning of military operations at the strategic, operational or tactical levels. Note: The preferred English term to designate the planning of military operations at all levels is “operations planning”. The term “operational planning” is not to be used so as to prevent confusion with operational-level planning.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase</td>
<td>A clearly defined stage of an operation or campaign during which the main forces and capabilities employed set conditions for a common purpose.</td>
<td>Proposed Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restraint</td>
<td>A requirement placed on a commander that prohibits action.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules of Engagement (ROE)⁷</td>
<td>Directives to military forces (including individuals) that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force, or actions which might be construed as provocative, may be applied.</td>
<td>MC362/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Communications (StratCom)</td>
<td>The coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities - Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs, Military Public Affairs, Information Operations and Psychological Operations - in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO's aims.</td>
<td>PO (2009)0141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Line of Engagement</td>
<td>A logical line that connects military, political, economic and/or civil actions in time and purpose through strategic effects to strategic objective(s) and the end state.</td>
<td>Proposed Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System</td>
<td>A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements forming a unified whole.</td>
<td>Proposed Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theatre of Operations (TOO)</td>
<td>An operational area, defined by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, for the conduct or support of specific military operations in one or more joint operations areas. Theatres of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations in depth and over extended periods of time.</td>
<td>Proposed Definition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁷ Rules of Engagement (ROE) is defined in AAP-06 as ‘Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered’.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transfer of Authority (TOA)</td>
<td>Within NATO, an action by which a member nation or NATO Command gives operational command or control of designated forces to a NATO Command.</td>
<td>AAP-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undesired Effects</td>
<td>Undesired effects are those that disrupt or jeopardize the achievement of objectives.</td>
<td>Proposed Definition</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Key Term</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAP</td>
<td>Allied Administrative Publication</td>
<td>AAP-15¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAW</td>
<td>Anti-Air Warfare</td>
<td>AAP-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>Assessment Board</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Acceptable Condition</td>
<td>NOAH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACO</td>
<td>Allied Command Operations</td>
<td>AAP-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOS</td>
<td>Assistant Chief Of Staff</td>
<td>AAP-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Allied Command Transformation</td>
<td>AAP-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTORD</td>
<td>Activation Order</td>
<td>AAP-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTPRED</td>
<td>Activation Pre-deployment</td>
<td>NCRSM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTREQ</td>
<td>Activation Request</td>
<td>AAP-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTWARN</td>
<td>Activation Warning</td>
<td>AAP-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADAMS</td>
<td>Allied Deployment and Movement System</td>
<td>AAP-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD</td>
<td>ACO Directive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADL</td>
<td>Allied Disposition List</td>
<td>AAP-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL</td>
<td>Allied Forces List</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIFS</td>
<td>Allied Information Flow System</td>
<td>AAP-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIG</td>
<td>Address Indicating Group</td>
<td>AAP-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIMS</td>
<td>AIFS Integrated Message System</td>
<td>AAP-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIRCOM</td>
<td>Headquarters Allied Air Command</td>
<td>MC 0324/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied Joint Publication</td>
<td>AAP-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMCC</td>
<td>Allied Movement Coordination Centre</td>
<td>AAP-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOI</td>
<td>Area Of Interest</td>
<td>AAP-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOO</td>
<td>Area Of Operations</td>
<td>AAP-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>Area Of Responsibility</td>
<td>AAP-15</td>
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<tr>
<td>APIC</td>
<td>Allied Press Information Centre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APOD</td>
<td>Airport of Debarkation</td>
<td>AAP-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APOE</td>
<td>Airport of Embarkation</td>
<td>AAP-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Allied Submarine Command</td>
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¹ AAP-15 – NATO Glossary of Abbreviations Used in NATO Documents and Publications.
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2 Within SHAPE, ‘COM’ is normally used to denote the Command Group. In the COPD, CG has been chosen to represent ‘Command Group’ so as not to cause confusion with the AAP-15 acronym ‘COM’ to denote ‘Commander’.
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