NATO CAPABILITIES & OPERATIONAL READINESS Post-ISAF

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• The Security Environment ahead of us
  – Morphing nature of the Threat
  – The POST-ISAF climate

• Scenarii & case studies for FUTURE OPS
  – Parameters & Military considerations
  – The SCENARIO debate in favour versatile capabilities ?
  – New Terms of the COERCION-equation

• Focus of OPERATIONAL Readiness ?
  – Future Alliance Military structures & Forces
    • Features & challenges
    • Future NCS & NFS HQs
    • Outline Air C2
    • Linkages J-ISR Architecture

• Conclusion & way ahead : the CONNECTED Forces Initiative
Morphing nature of the Threat

Adapted from ACT input
The POST – ISAF Climate

• Political & parliamentary climate deteriorated
  – Economic austerity reflected in Defence budgets

• Military Establishments reconstituting
  – Material fatigue
    • Partial recovery from AFG & PAK theatres
  – Personnel levels & motivation
    • veteran battle stress & disorders

• Strategic re-alignments & unstable political allegiances
  – US pivot to Asia-Pacific
  – Resurgent RUSSIA
  – Partners & partners
    • redefine security debitors vs creditors & concentrate on win-win sit’s
Parameters of our future Defence Posture

- similar to the project-triangle

- the defence-posture-triangle

i.e. to protect against COERCION

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Scenarii & case studies for FUTURE OPS
Parameters & MILITARY considerations

• Classic Planning parameters categorise ...
  – by NATO agreed Mission Types = 15
    • High Intensity : CD – CT – PE – EOP
    • Low Intensity : PK - CM – CP - ESE - SHA – DR
      AT - NEO – SCA - PM – PB
  – by size (for NDPP use)
    • Smaller Joint Ops - Major Joint Ops – MJO+
  – through Generic Planning Situations
    • aggregate MT defining End State – Objectives – Effects
  – into Case Studies
    • in context of GEOGRAPHICAL situations

• REAL (FUTURE) DIVIDING LINES
  – NATO LEADING versus SUPPORTING
  – NATO ‘ad hoc’ MISSIONS & TASKS
    • CRISIS MANAGEMENT <> COMBAT <> POST-CONFLICT STAB & RECON
  – LONG TERM & TERRITORIAL <> BRIEF & KINETIC <> REMOTE & VIRTUAL (sic)
    • JOINT = yes, but ...
    • LAND Heavy – MAR Heavy – AIR Heavy(i.e. NO-boots-on-the-ground) - CYBER – SPACE

High Intensity =
Collective Defence
Counter-Terrorism
Peace Enforcement
Extract OP
Low Intensity =
Peace Keeping
Crisis Management
Conflict Prevention
Enforce Sanct Embargo
Sp Hum Aid
DisRelief Sp
Implicit in NDPP =
Anti-Terror
Non-Combatant
Extraction Ops
Sp Civ Aid
Peace Making
Peace Building

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SCENARIO debate should favour versatile (versus single use) capabilities

COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

MOST DEMANDING SCENARIO

High INTENSITY COMBAT CAPABILITIES

EXCLUSIVE High INT CAPABILITIES
(that cannot be used in CRO)

EXCLUSIVE CRO CAPABILITIES
(that cannot be used for CD)

ROLE of CAPABILITIES OWNED/OPERATED/FUNDED by NATO = ENABLE in the THEATRE

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New Terms of the COERCION-equation

• The semantics of COERCION has changed
  – COLD WAR Deterrence was against a ‘HOSTILE TAKEOVER’
    • Military action sought to ...
      – DEFEAT & TAKE CONTROL of ALL Soviet <> NATO Centres of Gravity
      – THREATEN Territorial Integrity ACROSS time & space
  – Today’s deterrence should guard NATO from DISRUPTION
    • A-SYMMETRIC or HYBRID action will seek to ...
      – DISRUPT – DISORDER – CONFUSE – DISARRAY Centres of Gravity of CHOICE
      – THREAT is limited in time & space
Focus of OPERATIONAL Readiness?

Given that the THREAT is limited in time & space, OPERATIONAL READINESS should deter against & guard from COERCION by **DISRUPTION**! That will inevitably involve **MINIMAL** reaction times, but CAPs limited in scope.

**SOF (Few-boots-on-the-ground)**

**JISR+PGM Capability**

**Trained & certified NRF**

**Enclaves of contention**

**Immediate Response CAPs + Concepts & Plans**

- BMD+CBRN
- Populations
- SP to CT + CIED/MCM
- Societal CoG
- Economy
- Natural resources & finances
- Awareness & Sp

**StratCom**

**Cyberspace Internet**

**NCIRC**

**Media**

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Operational Readiness graduated i.f.o. breath of Coercive FACTOR

- need EARLY WARNING
  - Strategic Analysis capacity
  - Reliable & available SENSORS
- need EARLY CONSENSUS to ACT
  - Build up ifo scope of threat
    - TRAIN & CERTIFY
    - GENERATE & DEPLOY
  - Ability to ‘Quick-connect’
    - POL with MIL
    - NCS with NFS
    - Allies with Partners
    - MIL with CIV effects
- need EARLY use of LL
  - to re-orient mission training
  - to adapt & reconfigure
  - to avoid mission creep
  - to re-focus exercise policy

(*) Conceptual Framework on Alliance (CFAO) refers
Operational Command (OPCOM) SACEUR

National Command until NAC approval of the Operation Plan (OPLAN) – Transfer of Authority as OPCOM SACEUR, SACEUR access for evaluation of exercises and training

Coordination

1 Permanently assigned to NATO. High Readiness Force (M) HQ capable of commanding Maritime Operations at Expanded Task Force (ETF) and Major Joint Operations

2 Permanently assigned to NATO. 7 High Readiness Force (L) HQs (ARRC, NRDC-TU, NRDC-GENL, NRDC-IT, NRDC-SP, MNC NE, NDC-GR)
By default for 1st MJO / SJO, then NFS
Includes NATINAMDS, SNMG, SNMCMG NCIRC, CCOMC and Depl CIS Modules including backbone of Fut Miss Network
Supported for AIR Heavy Ops
Supported for MAR Heavy Ops
Policy & C2 arrangements TBD
• NCS remains the C² backbone of the Alliance
  – FULL spectrum capability (to include Art 5)
  – Readiness of C² arrangements
  – Linkages to NFS and National HQ

• New DEPLOYABILITY model
  – In theatre Joint HQ (for LAND Heavy OPS)
    • directly in Sp of MIL-Strat
  – Network enabled (static) HQ for Air and Mar Heavy OPS

• Ability to Face New Challenges
  – CIV-MIL interaction
    • SHAPE Comprehensive Crisis Ops Mngt Centre

• Part of a wider REFORM
  – Resource Reform
    • Manpower reductions – Cost of ownership concerns
    • Review of Host Nations Support arrangements
  – Agency and NATO HQ reform
    • CIS synergies between static and deployable parts
Future NCS and NFS HQs (*)

- NCS + NFS JFHQ
  - in Long Term Rotation Plan
- Readiness = 30 days
  - given that NRF takes first SJO
- Deployable
  - with advance C2 elm
- Training & certification
  - 6 months prior standby
  - distributed learning & simulation

- Cost-lie-where-they-fall
  - NFS Training & simulation
- Common funding for
  - certifying exercise
  - deployment
  - recovery
  - of NCS + NFS HQs

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New NCS Outline Air C2

Crisis Establishment
JFAC Ramstein

JFACC
Command Group

Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
Strategy
Combat Plans
Combat Operations
Combat Service Support

(Embedded) Air Ops Center

Deployable Air C² Centre
DACCC POGGIO

Deployable AIR OPS Centre

Deployable TAC C²

Deployable Sensors (scalable)

Peace Establishment

Air Com RAMSTEIN

NCS CAOC
UEDEM

Static AIR DEFENCE Centre

Deployable AIR OPS Centre

NCS CAOC
TORREJON

Static AIR DEFENCE Centre

Deployable AIR OPS Centre

JOA

Combat
Strategy
Combat Plans
Combat Support

Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance

Combat Service Support
Linkage J-ISR Architecture

Links to NCS for Time Sensitive Targeting?

High Altitude Geo

Wide Area Coverage GMTI/SAR

AEW & C2

Full Motion Video

TAC RECCE/TAC AIR

Battle Damage Assessment

NFS X-feed with NCS: Service Level Agreement+Fut Miss Network+NEW CONCEPTS

Joint Ops Area

HUMINT

ANALYSIS

GROUND STATION

TARGETING

JFAC

SIGINT
Way ahead: the CONNECTED Forces Initiative

• WHY Connect Forces (before an operation)?
  – so they would be INTEROPERABLE during OPS

• WHO should be Connected?
  – ALL actors in a JOA
    • COMMAND & CONTROL
      – NCS <> NFS <> National HQs <> IOs <> NGOs
    • FRONTLINE Troops + SUPPORT ELEMENTS
      – including THEATRE (STRAT-OPS-TAC) RESERVES
    • CIVIL ACTORS + Private MIL Companies

• HOW should Forces be(come) CONNECTED?
  – TRAINING (within ETEE) + DOCTRINE
  – Special COMPONENTS
    • Bolstering NRF
    • Enhancing SOF
  – TECHNOLOGY (including CIS) + STANDARDS (C3B + CNAD)
CONCLUSIONS

• NATO’s ...
  – ... HEADQUARTERS & AGENCIES are RE-FORMING
  – ... COMMAND Structures are RE-CALIBRATING
  – ... FORCES are RE-CONSTITUTING (post-conflict)
  – ... PARTNERS are RE-DISCOVERING (interoperability needs)

• NATO’s C2 & OPERATIONAL READINESS should ...
  – ... RE-APPRAISE their future operating environment
  – ... RE-VIEW its hardware challenges (processor speed)
  – ... RE-CONFIGURE its software
  – ... RE-CONNECT NATO’s MAIN processors:
    i.e. the COMMAND & the FORCE Structure
Questions?

Other than the ACRONYMS:

AOR=Area of Responsibility
C²=Command & Control
CCOMC=Comprehensive Crisis & Ops Management Centre
CoG=Centrres of Gravity
CNAD=Conference of National Armament Directors
C³B=Consultation,Command & Control Board
DCM=Deployable Communication & Information system Modules
FMN=Future Mission Network
JISR=Joint Intelligence Surveillance & Reconnaissance
JALLC=Joint Analysis & Lessons Learned Centre
NCS= NATO COMMAND STRUCTURE
NFS=NATO FORCE STRUCTURE
NATINAMDS=NATO Air integrated Air & Missile Defence System
NCIRC=NATO Compter Incident Responce Centre
NRF=NATO Response Force
SLA=Service Level Agreements
SNMG = Standing NATO Maritime Group
SNMCMG=Standing NATO Mine Counter Measures Group
SOF=Special Ops Forces
WMD=Weapons of mass Destruction
CFI ETEE Strands of Work

- Transparent Management process
  - adaptable online tools for cost-effective & accessible training
- Enforce standards for validation & certification
- Large scale exercises for low + high intensity conflict
  - maximise CoE – Partner Training & Edu centres
- Greater use of common doctrine – concepts – standards & procedures supporting interoperability
- Simulation to reduce running costs