Long-Term Military Transformation
Broad Strategic Insights Workshop
Syndicate Debriefs

26 September 2013
Syndicate 1

Sverre Diesen
Syndicate 1 Findings
BSI - 1

Future Characteristic Model
Snowball Effect /Approaching Storm

Strategic Situational Awareness

- Breakdown of institutions and fracturing of identities coupled with greater interconnectedness have a global impact creating uncertainty and unpredictability.
- NATO needs to generate a long term recognised comprehensive picture to gain greater strategic situational awareness.
- Strategic situational awareness can be improved by better utilizing the existing interconnectedness between organizations and agencies worldwide.
NATO must improve its ability to deal with the effects of trans-national non-state groups, depending on the scope, scale and attribution of these effects.

This will require a truly grand strategic approach to the challenges to the Westphalian order in conjunction with EU/AU/UN and other political decision-making bodies.

It will take a combination of strategic soft and hard power solutions to deal with multi-layer trans-national groups, identities and problems.
Information growth and dissemination facilitated by computer networks, coupled with a selective approach to seeking information, may contribute to the rise of prejudice, bigotry and fanaticism and hence to security challenges.

NATO needs to recognize the importance of the “Battle of the Narrative” in the future, both internally and externally.

Externally NATO needs to professionalize its information efforts and tailor its message to the target audience with more precision, drawing on cultural awareness and expertise.

The information vacuum resulting from the failure to do so will be filled by other actors and narratives, thereby reducing NATO’s ability to conduct its core tasks.
Syndicate 2

Stephan De Spiegeleire
Syndicate 2 / Process

• Introduction/First round of generic BSI collection (24)
• Discussion of first FCMs
• Discussion of Taxonomies/Handles
• First plenary round of First FCM/first core task
• Break-up in smaller groups for BSI development (35 BSIs – 100 bullets)
• Discussion, review and integration of BSIs (13 /
• Preparation of Debrief
Issues confronted (and dealt with)

• Issues with ‘BSI’ concept
  • *Essence*: two different aspects: characteristics / future tasks
  • *Formulation*: should be more precise
  • *Structure*: similar structure, description, length...

• Example (different ones now)

• Process
FCM Metropolis/Choice // CT Collective Defence

- Blurring of lines between military and law enforcement [ALL]
- NATO may need more law enforcement caps/1st responders,
- CoE for urban law enforcement
- Joint training, more cross-postings
- ‘Protect’ becomes more important + different forms [Prot]
- MD/CBRN/Cyber
FCM Metropolis/Choice // CT
Collective Defence

• More emphasis on resilience [PREV]

• Return to the past (cities as main actors in conflict) [E]

• Who sits on the NAC? [Pol]

• Empowering of people/business

• Change mindset of dependency on Sec forces

• NATO role in designing ‘smart cities’

• New forms of ‘walls’

• Redefine NATO responsibilities
FCM Metropolis/Choice // CT
Collective Defence

• Increased density in all domains (also in air/maritime) [Sust/Prep]

• How to deal with that (C2 challenges)
• More emphasis on non-lethal strike AND more precision

• Critical littoral infrastructure becomes more important [C3]

• More cooperation with and between littoral cities and companies
Metropolis

• Diffuse Power Structure

CoopSec

• Ability to identify Governance/Security Actors Structure
• Civilian authorities on all levels
• Critical infrastructure
• Resource providers [C3/I/P]
• Ensure interoperability
• Adapt to different standards [C3/E/P]
• Cascaded Consultations
GlobGame/PolycBrain CollDef

- Increase of Complexity and Uncertainty and the rise of unconventional threats

- proactive approach
- InfoMgt
- Conflict Prevention
- Integration (DIME)
- Civ – Mil (CA?)
- Out-Of-Area Ops (C3 / I / E)
- Manage rise of other actors
- CRC (E / P)
- New Model of Deterrence
- Tendency from Collective Defense to Collective Security
GlobGame/PolycBrain
CRISIS MGMT

- Increase of Complexity and Uncertainty and the rise of unconventional threats
- Importance of “Flow” security

- Prevention is critical element for core task achievement
- Comm channels between NATO and first responders
- Build a global knowledge network for situational awareness
- Develop advanced predictive analytic capabilities
- We may be deterred too
- CYBER Deterrence critical
- BMD/Theatre missile defense
- Arms control opportunities may present themselves
- Connectedness/cost of conflict
GlobGame/PolycBrain
CRISIS MGMT

• Increase of Complexity and Uncertainty and the rise of unconventional threats
• Importance of “Flow” security

• Integrate military capabilities
• More NATO bilaterals
• Need relationships with like and non-like minded nations
• Understand flows
• Intervention capability
• Deterrence becomes more important
• “Protect” still relevant
• Importance of “Flow” security
GlobGame/PolycBrain
COOP SEC

• Data partnership

• Interagency collaboration on data
• Comprehensive decision making process
• Adaptive (to ever changing environment) leadership
• Out-of-box collaboration: industry, academic, foreign partners
• Security and disclosure policy
• Internal and external rule enforcement
• Better situational awareness by exploiting information ubiquity
• Better Prevent/Prepare for conflict by developing predictive capability
• Mutual Transparency
Metropolis Crisis Management

- Unclear situation picture
  - Conflicting Legitimacies/Loyalties
  - Intent of players
  - Informal Powerstructure
  - Mega-Cities action with global consequences
  - State not in control of the Mega-City
  - Self sustaining economy
  - Reliance on infrastructure

- Conduct various parallel activities
- Develop and plan Non-Military capabilities
- Information Mngt
- Mandate for NATO
Cross-Cutting Take-Aways

- From response to prevention
- Info mngt/big data
- Towards more openness
- From defence to security
- From kinetic/lethal to non-kinetic/non-lethal
- Changing role of LoA (what iy is, how it is formulated,...)
- Comprehensive with mil as catalyst

- From NATO-centric to ‘other’-centric
- Time compression
- Special ops become normal ops
- ‘Old’ terms (deterrence, arms control) may require a fresh look
- Sustaining political support/resourcing (including disinvestment)
- Foresight (also differently?)
Syndicate 3

Ian Bayless
A NATO engagement space is where NATO must, should, and could act, a security environment is more global,
Shift of power to the people: role of social media, culture of people change the role of ISR; social media analysis in a decentralized, instantaneous information based society
Increased importance of agile strategic communication
Increased demand for ISR due to expanded engagement space
Technology enabled, Hybrid adversaries evolve; A range of state and non-state actors in all domains: Access to WMD/E, BMD
Concept of 3 Cs (compete, cooperate, conflict)
Networked adversaries: sophisticated, innovative; speed of innovation; Instantaneous proliferation
NATO stabilize research and technology work
Uncertainty of environment; prevalence of “fog” of conflicts
Policy and legal framework to match advances in technology
Syndicate 3

Future Characteristic Model
Filtering World Views/Shifting Sands

Cooperative Security

Collective Defence

Integrated Security

- Coordination, cooperation, interoperability, integration, Alliance
- NATO as integrator facilitator with defence and security networks
- Functionality of a clearing house to come to an advanced cooperation in place
- More important and need more tools beyond partnership
- Cultural cooperation tools
- NATO influence is positive standards
- Coalition of the willing with partners
- Command and Control to focus and convergence
- Build Relationships with international institutions
- Use education more broadly to integrate partners
- Collect and process information for quick knowledge
- Develop partnerships and information sharing frameworks
Syndicate 3

Future Characteristic Model
Filtering World Views/Shifting Sands

Crisis Management

Collective Defence

Adaptive Shaping

- Crisis management new domains (e.g., cyber, human, [and how to address space domain])
- Comprehensive Approach will be as if not more important with a range of actors
- Develop resilience against chaos
- Ability to have specific and credible measures
- Deter human networks threats
- Affect adversary interests and values
- Resilience and security of allied systems (cyber …)
- Guarantee not be denied access to the global commons (global finance system)
- Outsourcing of capabilities improve cost effectiveness and incurs risk: NATO outsourcing buy-in to use collectively; for example, aircraft, demining, commercial ISR)
- Demand for efficiency
Increasing ambiguity of Article 5 threats
• Broaden deterrence posture: increase our ability to deter polymorphous adversaries (concerning cyber and space, difficulty to track down origin)
• Decreased time for responding to aggressors and security challenges/opportunities
• Collective defence new domains (e.g., cyber, human, [and how to address space domain])
• Innovative and persistent ISR capabilities with rapid analysis, fusion, and dissemination
• Demand for resilience within chaotic environments as a component of deterrence
• Conventional attack cannot be asymmetric threat: Alliance conventional capabilities must remain credible and resilient
Survey Results

Mehmet Kınacı
In your opinion, should NATO continue to focus on territorial defence and remain as a collective defence organization?

A. Yes
B. No

63% Yes
37% No
In your opinion, do threats to NATO originate from NATO territory and NATO’s immediate periphery?

A. Yes
B. No
As threats to NATO are becoming more global, do you agree that NATO has the ability to adapt to become a collective security organization?

A. Strongly Agree
B. Agree
C. Somewhat Agree
D. Neutral
E. Somewhat Disagree
F. Disagree
G. Strongly Disagree
Do you agree that the SFA timeframe, 2030 and beyond, provides a sufficiently long-term perspective to the Political Guidance as part of the NDPP?

A. Strongly Agree
B. Agree
C. Somewhat Agree
D. Neutral
E. Somewhat Disagree
F. Disagree
G. Strongly Disagree
Do you agree that the trends expressed in the SFA are sufficiently reflected in the Future Characteristics Models (shifting sands, approaching storm, snowball effect, global brain etc.)?

A. Strongly Agree
B. Agree
C. Somewhat Agree
D. Neutral
E. Somewhat Disagree
F. Disagree
G. Strongly Disagree
Do you agree with the following definition of the BSI? “A BSI is a fundamental characteristic of the future security environment that may indicate a change at the Political-Military level that informs future NATO missions, tasks, roles, and requirements.”

A. Strongly Agree
B. Agree
C. Somewhat Agree
D. Neutral
E. Somewhat Disagree
F. Disagree
G. Strongly Disagree
Do you agree that current FCMs (shifting sands, approaching storm, snowball effect, global brain etc.) are suitable tools to help develop the Broad Strategic Insights (BSIs)?

A. Strongly Agree
B. Agree
C. Somewhat Agree
D. Neutral
E. Somewhat Disagree
F. Disagree
G. Strongly Disagree
Do you agree that the linkage between the SFA, FCMs and BSIs has been sufficiently developed?

A. Strongly Agree  
B. Agree  
C. Somewhat Agree  
D. Neutral  
E. Somewhat Disagree  
F. Disagree  
G. Strongly Disagree
BSIs and FFAO

Do you agree that the BSIs will answer the first part of the FFAO – what do the future characteristics mean for NATO in executing the three core tasks?

A. Strongly Agree
B. Agree
C. Somewhat Agree
D. Neutral
E. Somewhat Disagree
F. Disagree
G. Strongly Disagree
BSIs and FFAO

Do you agree that the BSIs should be developed by domain?

A. Strongly Agree
B. Agree
C. Somewhat Agree
D. Neutral
E. Somewhat Disagree
F. Disagree
G. Strongly Disagree
BSIs and FFAO

Does a BSI need to affect more than one domain to be considered relevant?

A. Strongly Agree
B. Agree
C. Somewhat Agree
D. Neutral
E. Somewhat Disagree
F. Disagree
G. Strongly Disagree
Do you agree that the core tasks – collective defence, cooperative security, crisis management - will remain in effect for the next two decades – 2030 and beyond?

A. Strongly Agree
B. Agree
C. Somewhat Agree
D. Neutral
E. Somewhat Disagree
F. Disagree
G. Strongly Disagree
Do you agree that other tasks may become more relevant than the core tasks for NATO in the future?

A. Strongly Agree
B. Agree
C. Somewhat Agree
D. Neutral
E. Somewhat Disagree
F. Disagree
G. Strongly Disagree
Closing Remarks

Col Janos Szonyegi
Broad Strategic Insights

- Strategic Situational Awareness
- Proactive NATO
- Battle of the Narrative
- Blurring of lines between military and law enforcement
- ‘Protect’ becomes more important + different forms [Prot]
- More emphasis on resilience [PREV]
- Return to the past (cities as main actors in conflict) [E]
- Who sits on the NAC? [Pol]
Broad Strategic Insights

- Increased density in all domains (also in air/maritime) [Sust/Prep]
- Critical littoral infrastructure becomes more important [C3]
- Dynamic Security Challenges/Opportunities
- `Integrated Security
- Adaptive Shaping
- Adaptive Deterrence
FFAO Development to date

Strategic Foresight Analysis

5xThemes; 15xTrends; 34xDefence & Security Implications

Future Characteristic Models
6xMetaphors

Shifting Sands – Globalized Polycentric Brain
Filtering Worlds – Snowball Effect
Approaching Storm – Global Game

6xBroad Strategic Insights

Dynamic Security Challenges/Opportunities
Integrated Security - Adaptive Shaping
Adaptive Deterrence

O’gau
July 2013

Izmir
Sept 2013

Cross Domain
FFAO Development – Next WS

6xBroad Strategic Insights

Dynamic Security Challenges/Opportunities
Integrated Security - Adaptive Shaping
Adaptive Deterrence

Brussels, Belgium
20-21 November 2013

Domain Specific Investigation
✓ Venue: Brussels, Courtyard Marriot – close to NATO HQ
✓ Time: 20-21 November 2013
Key Messages to take home

✓ Participation is crucial – please attend last event
✓ Please bring domain specific experts
✓ Delegation members from NATO HQ are welcomed
✓ Detailed information will be provided during opening session about
  • FFAO implementation timeline
  • Writing methodology
  • Review plan
Long-Term Military Transformation
Broad Strategic Insights Workshop

26 September 2013