China Report #5
This China BLUF Assessment provides an overview of NATO and China diplomatic exchanges of the month, such as NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s speech in occasion of the NATO Arms Control Conference, where he urged Beijing to join international efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapon and expressed concern on how China's nuclear capability lacks transparency. Is also given an overview of NATO Secretary General virtual meeting with China’s Foreign Minister Wang.
In the military domain, the dedicated section provides comments of China’s announcement to produce a new J-20 fighter jet and other major engines. Moreover, it is analyzed in details a new Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)’report containing an assessment of the qualitative scale of change in the Chinese warfare domain, whose remarks are useful in facilitating SACT’s effort to anticipate and prepare for the ambiguous, complex and rapidly changing future security environment, with regard to China.
Turning on technology, the highlights for this month include the leaders of the Quad announcing their willingness to agree to work toward creating a safe supply chain for semiconductor, with a clear reference to counter China’s position in this domain. Moreover, is given a review of the increasing technological dependence on China related to Beijing’s state investments in submarine cables. An assessment of NATO’s need to understand the Chinese conceptions of intelligentization and the PLA’s efforts to integrate it into its model of future warfare, concludes this section.
The last part of the BLUF, focused on the thematic regional area of concern for NATO, retraces Beijing’s activities within multilateral platforms for September, confirming China’s attempt to engage with neighboring countries to respond to the evolving situation in Afghanistan. Lat but not least, a final and fundamental part of this paper is dedicated at providing an assessment of the recently announced new trilateral security Alliance, the AUKUS, among Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom, and at showing how this agreement might affect China’s role in the Indo-Pacific and the Transatlantic relations.