



# **Long-Term Military Transformation Framework for Future Alliance Operations**

**Broad Strategic Insights Workshop**

## **Final Report**

**25-26 September, 2013  
Izmir, Turkey**

**<http://www.act.nato.int/futures-work>**

**Organized by  
Allied Command Transformation (ACT), Norfolk**

**In partnership with  
NATO Land Command**

## Executive Summary

The third Framework for Future Alliance Operations (FFAO) workshop took place on 25-26 September 2013 in Izmir, Turkey. ACT gathered a broad representation of 73 participants from Alliance and Partner Nations, Centres of Excellence, Component Commands, and defence experts from other governmental and non-governmental organizations including academia and industry to further develop NATO's Futures Work. Following a review of the overall FFAO methodology and the results of the last workshop, the workshop analysed Future Characteristic Models (FCMs) to develop an initial set of Broad Strategic Insights (BSIs) for NATO operating within a Future Security Environment (FSE) described in the Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA) 2013 Report. These will be refined into domain-specific Military Implications (MIs).

## Analysis Report

### I. INTRODUCTION

In a plenary session, the overall FFAO methodology and the results of the last workshop, specifically the FCMs that describe the FSE, were reviewed. Participants used the FCMs to develop BSIs, defined as "a fundamental characteristic of the future security environment that may indicate a change at the Political-Military level that informs future NATO missions, tasks, roles, and requirements", that describe how accomplishing NATO's Core Tasks will differ in 2030. These insights will be used in follow-on work to develop MIs, defined as "domain specific conclusions derived from BSIs that may drive change in how the military prepares for and executes operations to accomplish NATO's core tasks." The three syndicates produced raw findings that established 15 proposed ideas for consideration as potential BSIs. Following the Izmir Workshop, the ACT team consolidated, refined, and detailed the existing BSI proposals to arrive at the following list of six, still draft, BSIs.

### II. DRAFT BROAD STRATEGIC INSIGHTS

1. **Strategic Awareness:** a deliberate focus on strategic level challenges and opportunities to synchronise and align military planning and organisation with political intent. Institutions and states face a rapidly growing range of security challenges including those presented by trans-national and non-state actors. At the same time, individuals may be less connected to the state and traditional institutions. These related trends, coupled with greater interconnectedness, increase uncertainty and unpredictability on a global level. However, they may also prompt opportunities. A comprehensive and long-term understanding of the environment and associated cultures would enable greater strategic awareness to address those challenges.

2. **Strategic Narrative:** the planned engagement of specific audiences with messages that impact NATO's Core Tasks to synchronise and align military planning and organisation with political intent. Currently, the Alliance has a diversified mix of strategic messages that are not necessarily synchronized or arranged to support Core Tasks. Maximizing understanding of NATO's purpose and goals involves incorporating Alliance messages within a plan of engagement. Such planning promotes complementary action to align with political intent by a range of distinct audiences. NATO could develop and implement a Strategic Narrative that clarifies Alliance positions and policies by establishing communication and engagement goals, identifying and understanding relevant audiences, and providing straightforward content. Implementing such an engagement strategy is a key to success in the battle of the narrative.

3. **Focused Protection:** limited NATO protection for specific groups of people, infrastructure, organisations, and capacities—confined in scope, scale, and duration of action. Focused

Protection anticipates a future when NATO could extend early limited protection to those people or things that could, if left unprotected, lead to a decline in Alliance security. Therefore, Focused Protection would advance in different phases and could begin before a crisis event occurs. Such early action requires the development of advanced predictive analysis capabilities and global knowledge networks for situational awareness. The awareness requirement creates a need for developing and maintaining relationships with like and non-likeminded nations to understand and protect the flow of goods and services.

4. **Shared Resilience:** sufficient reserve capacity across the defence and security community to provide a shared ability to withstand strategic shock. Resilience should also include structures and systems, with the capability for rapid recovery, and the constant ability to analyze and process data throughout crises despite potential interruption. The FSE requires increased resilience in acting as interoperable entities by empowering different actors. One foundation of shared resilience is a comprehensive and adaptive decision making process. Another foundation is a certain degree of trust between the involved entities. This trust should enhance mutual transparency and enable a coordinated response to any threat or opportunity.

5. **Coordinated Security:** coordination, cooperation, and interoperability between NATO and a wide network of defence, security, and other relevant actors to strengthen complementary actions. Since NATO may not be the primary actor in a future conflict or crisis, the Alliance could function as an integrator or facilitator of actors within defence and security networks. NATO could provide a clearing house function, beyond Partnerships, for crisis management, where people, organizations and states achieve improved cooperation. Such a security model would require more interconnected relationships with a wider range of actors, thus necessitating tools beyond partnership and cultural cooperation.

6. **Adaptive Shaping:** ability to anticipate and counter a diversified range of potential threats, depending on the scope, scale and attribution. This may require a strategic approach, in conjunction with other intergovernmental decision-making bodies, and a combination of soft and hard power solutions to deal with multi-layer hybrid and dynamic trans-national groups in an expanded engagement space. Adaptive shaping may encompass a broadened deterrence posture, which could increase NATO's ability to deter adaptive adversaries who may be operating in less attributable domains such as cyber or space. The ability to adapt shaping actions to a variety of identified threats is critical in a future characterized by a decreased time to respond to security challenges and opportunities in current and new domains.

### III. CONCLUSION

FFAO workshop #3 successfully produced a range of findings that form the foundation for draft BSIs based upon the foundation of FCMs developed at FFAO workshop #2. These BSIs are the third step in the FFAO effort to provide a coherent long-term perspective that will strengthen the Alliance's ability to determine and allocate requirements. The next FFAO workshop will be held at the Marriott Hotel in Brussels 20-21 November where domain-specific MIs, developed by respective domain SMEs, will be presented and reviewed to ensure their adequacy to inform a future Capabilities Hierarchy Framework (CHF) within the NDPP, expressed in terms of what type of capacity and effects the Alliance could develop to execute the three core tasks.

# The FFAO Development Process



- Strategic Awareness
- Strategic Narrative
- Focused Protection
- Shared Resilience
- Coordinated Security
- Adaptive Shaping